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MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE



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
**GIFT OF
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THE MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BY
WILLIAM L. SNYDER

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME II



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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
XXIII. Salamis	347
XXIV. Himera — Defeat of Hamilcar at Himera, in Sicily, by Theron and Gelon of Syracuse, B. C. 480 . . .	374
XXV. Themistocles	382
XXVI. Platæa	393
XXVII. Wars for Persian Expulsion . . .	425
XXVIII. Sestus — Conquest of the Thracian Chersonese — Xerxes the Ahasu- erus of the Book of Esther — Cruelty of Queen Amestris (Vashti) — Crucifixion of the Per- sian Governor of Sestus . . .	431
XXIX. Cyprus and Byzantium	445
XXX. Confederacy of Delos B. C. 478 . . .	452
XXXI. Aristides	464
XXXII. Athens Under Cimon, Becomes a Maritime Power	476
XXXIII. The Athenian Empire — Athens Subjugates her Allies and Attains Imperial Supremacy — Her He- gemony becomes an Empire and Athens an Imperial City . . .	490
XXXIV. Internecine Wars — The Struggle for a Land Empire in Hellas — Tanagra, Œenophyta and Coronea . . .	501
XXXV. Cimon	518

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXXVI.	The Thirty Years' Peace, Known as the Peace of Pericles — Con- temporaneous Events . . .	535
XXXVII.	Athens at Peace	546
XXXVIII.	The Samian War	550
XXXIX.	The Corcyrian War — Epidamnus — Actium — Sybota . . .	556
XL.	The Peloponnesian War and Its Causes	573
XLI.	Pericles — Ancestry — Education — Early Public Career . . .	588
XLII.	Advance in Learning since the Age of Pericles, A Retrospect — Theory of the Creation — Doc- trine of Immortality Among the Ancients — Continuity as Viewed by Modern Science . .	668
	Index	685

MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE

CHAPTER XXIII

SALAMIS

SALAMIS — Sal-a-mis — [Σαλαμίς]. An island in the Saronic Gulf, about ten miles long, immediately south of Megara, north of Ægina, and west of Attica. It forms the southern boundary of the bay of Eleusis. The shore-line is separated from the Attic coast by a channel which varies in width, on the north and south, from two to eighteen miles. There is a narrow passage in the channel north of the peninsula of Cynosura, and south of the island of St. George which in some places is not more than 3,500 feet wide. The width between the little island of Psyttalea east of Cynosura and west of Attica is less than 4,000 feet.

The prehistoric town of Salamis was on the southern extremity of the island, and was the abode of the Telamonian Ajax. The city which flourished at the time of the battle was built by the Athenians in the Attic demus of Salamis, on a good harbor at the head of a deep bay in the east shore of the island known as the bay of Ambelakia, having for its southern boundary the peninsula of Cynosura. It is claimed, however, that the new Salamis is very ancient and was the abode of Telamon at the time of the Trojan War, and a stone is still pointed out on the bay of Ambelakia upon which it is said Telamon seated himself when his sons departed for Aulis on the expedition to Troy.

The conspicuous features of Salamis were a temple to Ajax and a temple to Artemis (Diana). In the Agora, or market place, was a statue of Solon, with one hand covered by his mantle. Close to the city, also at the head of the bay, was the Village of Ambelakia. In a wider bay, immediately to the north, is the island now known as St. George.

The weight of authority justifies the assumption that the Greek fleet was, at the time of the battle, drawn up in the bay of Ambelakia, off the town of Salamis, which by reason of the width of the bay, was distant about four miles from the coast of Attica. It sailed out of the bay into the channel at dawn, September 20,

B. C. 480, formed in the enemy's front, attacked and overwhelmingly defeated the fleet of Xerxes, and drove them southward through the channel into the open sea, past the peninsula of Cynosura and the island of Psyttalea, which marked the scenes of greatest slaughter. The carnage ceased only when night put an end to the conflict.



HE battle fought in the straits of Salamis, September 20, B. C. 480, was the most notable naval engagement of antiquity. The Greek fleet under Themistocles and Eurybiades defeated the Persian fleet, which fought under the eye of Xerxes, who viewed the battle from his gilded throne, erected on a rocky eminence on the shore of Attica, which overlooks the straits and island of Salamis. The Persians outnumbered the Greeks more than three to one. This engagement concluded the first campaign of the second Persian War B. C. 480.

The credit for the victory of Salamis belongs solely to Themistocles, the Athenian, the greatest admiral and strategist of his age. He compelled Eurybiades, the Spartan commander, to fight in the straits, after the proposition had been voted down twice, in council. Themistocles saw very clearly what his associates were unable or unwilling to see, that if he could get the Persians to fight in the narrow straits, the numerical superiority of the enemy would not avail, and their numbers would retard and embarrass rather than aid them, because they would not have sufficient sea room to manœuvre their many ships to advantage in the channel. The Greeks, on the other hand, with a comparatively small number of ships, would have the advantage because a large part of the Persian fleet would be precluded from taking part. But the clear and forcible argument of Themistocles fell upon deaf ears. The Spartans were dull or stupid or both, and they promptly voted against every plan proposed by the Athenian commander.

The latter saw clearly that if Eurybiades succeeded in holding the council to his determination not to engage, that Athens was lost. The Spartan admiral, being able to control the vote of his associates, intended to sail to the Peloponnese, to protect its ports, and leave Athens to her fate, urging as his excuse, that the numerical strength of the fleet was such that they could not afford to risk a battle in the straits, where the enemy, with their powerful armament, might be able to destroy the Greek navy. The features of the situation which to the dull mind of Eurybiades seemed most unfavorable, were those which to the mind of Themistocles afforded the greatest hope of success.

When the Greek fleet sailed from Artemisium, after the defeat of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, as narrated in a previous chapter (q. v.) and when news was received that Athens had fallen, the intention of Eurybiades was to proceed to the Peloponnesus, without offering any assistance to the inhabitants of Attica. He did not deem such assistance necessary, because Athens was too weak to resist alone the invading army of Xerxes and in anticipation of his approach, the inhabitants had deserted the city, and fled with their families for refuge to Salamis, Ægina, Corinth, Træzen and other places in the Peloponnese. Themistocles, however, prevailed upon the Spartan admiral to tarry in the straits to give some measure of protection to the Athenians who had taken refuge on the island of Salamis. When the news of the fall of Athens reached the fleet, Eurybiades resolved to sail at once to the Peloponnesus, and leave Athens and Salamis to their fate. A council of war was held and the majority voted to sail to the isthmus to defend the Peloponnesus, but the approach of night alone prevented the order from being immediately executed.

Mnesiphilus, an influential Athenian, the same evening sought Themistocles to find out what the navy

intended to do at this critical juncture, and was told that the fleet was ordered to the isthmus. "If they remove the ships from Salamis," said Mnesiphilus, "you will no longer fight for any country, for they will each betake themselves to their cities, and neither will Eurybiades nor any one else be able to detain them, and all Greece will perish. If there is any possible way, have the decree annulled and persuade Eurybiades to alter his determination and remain here."

The situation in which Themistocles was placed was critical and perplexing. A man of ordinary abilities under the circumstances would have failed. If Themistocles had not been possessed of intrepid courage and commanding genius, Eurybiades and his short-sighted, selfish, unpatriotic associates would have deserted their countrymen, retreated to their own shores, and allowed the Persian hosts to remain in peaceful possession of Northern and Central Greece. The inevitable result would have been the subjugation of Hellas, and the extension of the empire of Cyrus to the shores of the Adriatic, perhaps to the gates of Hercules. Themistocles saw that failure at Salamis meant the destruction of his country, the abolition of free government, and the triumph of Persia. He determined to force Eurybiades to fight and to so manœuvre as to compel Xerxes to block both ends of the strait with his great navy, so that the Greek fleet could not possibly escape, but must conquer the enemy or perish where it lay in the waters of the Saronic Gulf.

Xerxes was to be unwillingly forced to aid the plans of Themistocles. The designs of Eurybiades, who contemplated retreat, were defeated through a clever bit of strategy which made Xerxes the instrument to bring about the result. The plan was to force both Greeks and Persians to fight where they were. The task which Themistocles undertook was difficult but it was successfully accomplished.

Posterity is indebted to Herodotus for a report of the discussions which took place in the councils of both Greeks and Persians, immediately before the battle. Xerxes, as soon as his fleet arrived at Phalerum, was desirous to learn the opinion of his commanders and admirals of the several nations which composed his navy as to the advisability of a naval engagement. A council was held for this purpose. Xerxes presided, with the King of Sidon seated at his right, and the King of Tyre at his left. Those assembled did not address their monarch on the floor of the assembly, but Mardonius, the King's brother-in-law, was instructed to ask each his opinion. All advised in favor of an engagement except Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, the city where Herodotus himself was born. Some writers assign this circumstance as a reason why the historian makes her appear to advantage in the council. She reminded Mardonius that she had fought well in the naval engagements at Artemisium off the north coast of Eubœa, so as to emphasize her loyalty and then said that she was justified in giving her real opinion, as to what would be most advantageous for the Persians. "Spare your ships," she said, "do not risk a sea-fight, for the Greeks in seamanship are as much superior to your crews as men are superior to women. Why do you desire to risk a naval engagement? It is not necessary. Have you not possession of Athens for the sake of which you undertook this expedition, and have you not the rest of Greece? No one stands in your way; and those who still hold out against you have fared as they deserved. You will readily accomplish your purpose, if you keep your fleet here, remaining near land, or even advancing to the Peloponnesus. Because the Greeks will not be able to hold out long. You will disperse them, and they will fly to their respective cities. I am informed they have no provisions on Salamis, and if you march your

land forces to the Peloponnesus, it is not probable that those Greeks, who came from thence will remain quiet; nor will they care to fight at sea for the Athenians. But if you risk a sea-fight, and are beaten, it might bring disaster to the land forces. Consider also that good masters usually have bad slaves, and bad masters good slaves. You, who are the best of men, have bad slaves among your allies, the Egyptians, Cyprians, Cilicians and Pamphylians; and these are of no use at all."¹

Thus did the woman, the queen of the native city of Herodotus, the commander of a squadron in the navy of Xerxes, use her endeavors to dissuade her sovereign from risking a battle at sea. Her enemies in the council were pleased at what she said, because they believed that her words would anger the King, and might cost her her life. But Xerxes, we are told, was greatly pleased when her opinion was reported to him. He greatly admired her abilities and the courage she displayed in battle. Her objections, however, were overruled. Xerxes concluded to engage the enemy at sea, and said that his fleet did well at Artemisium, but did not do its best. This he attributed to the fact that he was not personally present to witness the engagement. He said the navy could do much better if he were present. He concluded, therefore, to disregard the sage advice of the woman, the most sensible suggestions he had received, and fight.

The discussions and fierce denunciations which characterized the debates in the council called by Eurybiades aboard his flag-ship, were in marked contrast with these calm and dove-like proceedings in the council assembled by Xerxes. After the departure of Mnesiphilus, who called on the Athenian admiral, as above stated, and urged him, if possible, to secure a reversal

¹ Herod., viii, 68.

of the order, directing the fleet to sail to the isthmus, Themistocles resolved to hinder the departure of the ships and force an engagement at the earliest possible moment. As soon as Mnesiphilus departed, he proceeded to the flag-ship and requested an interview with Eurybiades. The request was granted, and Themistocles tried to show the Spartan that the only hope of success was to stay where they were and fight. He finally prevailed upon Eurybiades to again convoke the commanders in council. When they were assembled, Themistocles made a strong and powerful plea in favor of remaining where they were. He was strongly opposed by his old enemy Adimantus, the Corinthian, who had formerly threatened to abandon the fleet at Artemisium and was bribed by Themistocles to remain and do his duty.

While making his argument, Adimantus interrupted him, saying: "In the games, Themistocles, those who start before the time are beaten with stripes." Then came the ready retort, "but those who are left behind are not crowned." Plutarch says that in the course of the debate Eurybiades became enraged and in his excitement advanced towards Themistocles, lifting his staff as if to strike, when the latter exclaimed: "Strike, but hear me." Eurybiades was amazed at his moderation, and bade him continue. Themistocles, then turning to Eurybiades and the assemblage, said:

"It now rests with you to save Greece. This you can do if you will remain and give battle, and be not persuaded by those who urge you to sail to the Isthmus. Analyze and compare each opinion. If you fight near the Isthmus, you must fight in the open sea, where it is least advantageous to us, whose ships are heavier and fewer in number. Consider also that even if you succeed, your departure for the Isthmus involves the abandonment and loss of Salamis, and Megara, and Ægina, because the Persian land forces will follow close

upon their navy, and thus you will be the means of leading them to the Peloponnesus, and expose all Greece to danger.

"If, however, you follow my advice, you will secure the following advantages: In the first place, it is obvious that by engaging in a narrow space with a few ships against many, if the probable results which experience has shown, are most likely to happen, we shall have a much superior advantage, because to fight in a narrow space is advantageous to us; but in a wide space to them. Again, we shall save Salamis, where are now our wives and children. Consider also that by remaining you will fight just as much for the Peloponnesus as if you fought at the Isthmus. If you are wise, therefore, you will not lead the enemy's land forces to the Peloponnesus. If we succeed with our fleet here, the barbarians will not advance to the Isthmus, but will retreat from Attica in confusion which we shall gain also by saving Megara, and Ægina and Salamis, where it is announced by the oracle, we shall be superior to our enemies.

"Fortune favors those who follow what is reasonable; but the fortunes of those who do not follow what is reasonable, the gods do not favor."

Thus Themistocles pleaded the cause of Greece, his demands were reasonable and just and had his associates possessed the liberal patriotic spirit of the Athenian, the order would have been given to fight at Salamis. The admiral was now to be insulted by his old enemy and rival, Adimantus of Corinth. Of course the latter dwelt on the Isthmus, and naturally desired the fleet as near his own door as possible. But this fact did not excuse him for the insult he addressed to a fellow-officer in whose veins also ran Hellenic blood. Adimantus challenged the right of Themistocles to address the officers of the fleet. He arose and addressing Eurybiades reminded him that Athens had fallen, that

Themistocles had no city to represent and that the admiral had no right to put a question to the council to vote upon, unless it was raised by some one who represented a Grecian city, and then turning to Themistocles bade him be silent, because as his city was lost, he had no right to speak.

Themistocles arose and made his final appeal. In reply to the ungrateful speech of the Corinthian, he reminded him that although Athens had fallen temporarily into the hands of the barbarian, he still represented a city, a powerful city, the strongest in Greece. That city was the Athenian navy, which comprised 200 ships, more than half of the entire Greek fleet, which numbered but 366 vessels. Then turning to Eurybiades, he continued: "If you remain here, you will show by your actions that you are a brave man. If you will not remain, then you will ruin Greece. Because the success or failure of the war depends upon the fleet, and on the fleet alone. Therefore, yield, I entreat, to my advice. But if you refuse, then we Athenians will take our wives and children aboard our ships, and depart to Siris in Italy, which is an ancient possession of ours, and the oracles declare it is fated to be founded by us. Then, when bereft of such allies, when it is too late, you will remember my words."

If the selfish Peloponnesians dreamed that the Athenians would meekly surrender Attica, at their behest, abandon Athens, and lend the Peloponnesians their ships to protect their shores, the dream was dispelled. Eurybiades was now compelled to choose between shame and honor. The assembly was obliged to decide either to support the Athenians, who contributed 200 ships out of a total of 366, to protect Attica and Salamis, or fight alone. They were plainly told that the Athenians would not remain in Greece, to be abandoned to the overwhelming hosts of Xerxes. They would sail away towards the setting sun and, in fair Italy, found an-

other Athens. On the answer of Eurybiades and his associates hung the fate of Greece.

We may be allowed to speculate on the momentous character of the issues impending. What if Themistocles had founded a new Athens on the shores of Italy? Would Rome, whose future fame filled the world, have been a Greek, not a Latin city? Would the language and civilization of the West and the East have been Greek? Would the Punic Wars which involved the fate of Carthage have been fought for the supremacy of Greek instead of Latin civilization? The fate of the ancient world was involved in the question as to whether Persian arms should force the civilization of Greece to establish itself in Italy, because Hellas refused to unite and stand together in the crisis caused by the fall of Athens.

The final appeal of Themistocles had its effect. Eurybiades determined not to sail, but to remain at Salamis. Herodotus says, in his opinion, Eurybiades reached this conclusion, not because he was convinced by the reasons assigned by the Athenians, but because he was afraid that if he went to the Isthmus, the Athenian fleet would desert them and sail to Italy. He knew that the remainder of his squadron of but 166 vessels would be no match for the enemy. The order was given to stay at Salamis, and the council dispersed.

At sunrise on the following morning the shock of an earthquake was felt on both land and sea. The Greeks then offered prayers and supplications to the gods and invoked the aid of Telamon and Ajax, the heroes of Salamis, and a vessel was dispatched to Ægina to fetch Æacus himself and other Æacids.

Meantime, the Greeks at the Isthmus toiled incessantly to put themselves in a posture of defense, to be able to repel an invasion of the Peloponnesus, for the barbarians had begun their march thither. When the

Lacedæmonians learned of the death of Leonidas, at Thermopylæ, the inhabitants of the peninsula flocked to the Isthmus under the command of Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, regent for Pleistarchus, the infant son of Leonidas. They first blocked up the Scironian Way, a road which led from Megara to Corinth, along the eastern shore of the Isthmus. A short distance from Megara it passed along the Scironian rocks, a range of shelving cliffs, overhanging the sea, along the foot of a spur of Mount Gerania. The only other route by which the Isthmus can be traversed runs inland through the defiles of a higher part of the Geranian mountains. The number of land forces at the Isthmus amounted to many tens of thousands, including Lacedæmonians, Eleans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, Hermionians and tribes of the Arcadians. After the Scironian Way was blocked, the Greeks built a wall across the Isthmus, which is about four miles wide at its narrowest part. Where the wall was built it was about five miles across. Every man in the army worked on the wall, which was of stone, brick, timber and bastions, or baskets filled with sand.

News reached the Peloponnesian commanders in the fleet as to what transpired at the Isthmus, and they began to fear for the safety of those in the peninsula, as it was rumored the barbarian land forces were going to invade the Peloponnesus. Notwithstanding, it was agreed at the council the night before to stay at Salamis, the officers began next day to murmur and express their discontent. They wondered at the imprudence of Eurybiades. At first they conversed in low tones, each man with his fellow. Then their mutterings grew louder, and before the day was over, they insisted that another council be held to reconsider what had been done the night before. When the commanders were assembled, Themistocles saw that the Peloponnesians

would carry the vote against him. He then determined to thwart them by contriving to make Xerxes close both ends of the strait, so that Eurybiades could not sail away, even if he wished.

He went secretly out of the council and sought Sicinnus, one of his household slaves, a man of ability and learning, who acted as tutor to his sons. Plutarch says that Sicinnus was a Persian captive, and was strongly attached and devoted to his master. Æschylus, in his drama, "The Persians," says he was a Greek. Mr. Grote, to reconcile these statements, suggests that he may have been an Asiatic Greek. The object of Themistocles was through the agency of Sicinnus, to make Xerxes believe that the Greeks were hopelessly divided among themselves, some being desirous even of aligning themselves with the barbarians, that their camp was in the utmost confusion; that they meditated flight; and all Xerxes had to do was to surround their fleet, enter the channel and seize the entire armament.

It was indeed a desperate expedient to which Themistocles now resorted. He was about to use Xerxes to shut in the Greek fleet, and close every avenue of escape to his countrymen. What if Persia shut his fleet in the strait forever? What if Hellas lost the battle? To the mind of Themistocles it were better the Hellenic navy should lie at the bottom of the Saronic gulf, than suffer humiliation and defeat, and become fugitives and wanderers on the face of the earth.

The remedy was desperate; but it was not more so than the disease. Themistocles carefully confided his plans to Sicinnus, and instructed him what to say. The faithful messenger was then put aboard a merchant ship and escaped into the Persian lines. Sicinnus asked to be taken at once to the commander and delivered this message: "The Athenian commander has sent me to you privately without the knowledge of the other Greeks for he is in the interest of your King, and pre-

fers that you, rather than his own countrymen, should succeed. He bade me tell you that the Greeks are in a state of consternation and confusion, and are deliberating on flight. Now is your opportunity. Do not suffer them to escape. They will not oppose you. They are even now quarrelling among themselves. You may witness a fight already begun between such as favor and such as oppose you."

Having delivered his message he was permitted to depart. Darkness had set in. The barbarians were jubilant. A body of Persians, selected by Xerxes for their beauty, valor and fidelity to their sovereign, many of them of royal blood, was detailed and sent to the small island of Psyttalea, at the southern entrance to the straits and midway between the Piræus and the eastern extremity Cynosura, a promontory of Salamis. These were instructed to save their own men, but to permit none of the enemy to escape. As midnight approached, they advanced their western wing towards Salamis so as to enclose the Greeks. In order to prevent the escape of the enemy northward, through the straits of Megara, a detachment of two hundred ships was ordered to sail north into the bay of Eleusis and the Megaric channel, in order to block any attempt at flight in that direction. Diodorus says that this squadron was composed entirely of Egyptian vessels. At the same time the ships south and east along the shores of Salamis and Attica moved into the mouth of the channel, and filled the whole strait, so that the flight of their enemies was impossible. Eurybiades and the Greek fleet were shut in, and Themistocles had his way. These silent movements of the barbarians by which they surrounded the Hellenic fleet occupied the night, but Eurybiades and his associates were wholly unaware of what was being done, until told by Aristides that they were completely surrounded by the enemy.

Colonel Leake is of opinion, and his views seem to

be amply supported by the evidence we have on the subject, that the Persians made two movements. The first was in the afternoon, when they advanced their fleet from the bay of Phalerum to the Piræus. The second movement was made in the night. When the enemy learned from Sicinnus, after darkness had set in, that the Greeks would offer no resistance, if the Persians boldly entered the channel, and surrounded them. Then the Persian admiral sent the Egyptian squadron, above referred to, into the Gulf of Eleusis in the strait between the coast of Megara and the north shore of Salamis to block the straits on the north, and prevent the escape of the enemy in that quarter, and also sent his ships directly into the channel, thus surrounding the enemy on all sides.

The Persian admiral at Salamis, according to Ctesias, who compiled his history from Persian sources, was Onaphas, father-in-law of Xerxes. But Herodotus says the admiral's name was Ariabignes, the King's brother, born before Darius became king and who contended with Xerxes for the crown.

While the Greeks were disputing in council as to the propriety of sailing to the Isthmus, at dawn, Aristides crossed over from the island of Ægina, and sought out Themistocles with whom he desired to confer. The latter was at the council. A messenger entered and told him privately that a friend desired to talk with him. When Themistocles came out, Aristides stood before him. These distinguished men had fought together at Marathon; they held the centre in that engagement against the Persians and Sacæ, the flower of the barbarian army. Subsequently they had become bitter political rivals, and through the influence and machinations of Themistocles, Aristides was ostracised and banished for ten years. When Athens was again threatened with a second Persian invasion, the patriotism of Themistocles asserted itself, and he procured

the unjust decree of banishment to be vacated, and annulled, and Aristides was recalled. In the face of common danger to their country, the two men forgot their differences. According to Plutarch, Aristides thus addressed his old friend and comrade:

“If we have any discretion, Themistocles, laying aside at this time our vain and childish contentions, let us enter upon a safe and honorable dispute, vying with each other for the preservation of Greece; you in the ruling and commanding, I in the subservient and advising part; even, indeed, as I now understand you to be alone, adhering to the best advice, in counselling without any delay to engage in the straits. And in this, though our own party oppose, the enemy seem to assist you. For the sea behind, and all around us, is covered with their fleet; so that we are under necessity of approving ourselves men of courage. For we must fight, whether we will or no; for we are surrounded on all sides and can no longer escape by flight.”

He then told that he had come from Ægina, and it was with great difficulty that he was able to elude the vigilance of the enemy which now surrounded the Greek fleet. He begged Themistocles to return to the council and break the news to Eurybiades, and tell him that an eye-witness had arrived, who would support the statement.

Themistocles greeted Aristides cordially and said he brought good news. Then he revealed to his old comrade the fact that what Aristides had seen, he had himself brought about, because he found it necessary, as Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians would not, of their own accord, fight in the straits. He then requested Aristides to go into the council and break the news, saying they would not credit it, coming from Themistocles. Aristides entered. The debate was in progress. He delivered his message. Many doubted what he said. At this juncture a Tenian trireme arrived, having de-

serted from the fleet of Xerxes. It was commanded by Panætius, who gave an account of the movements of the enemy, and assured the council that their fleet was completely surrounded.

A battle then and there was no longer a matter of choice, but of necessity. The enemy having surrounded the Greeks and defied them, the latter now became united and vied with one another, as to who could outstrip the other in deeds of valor. One touch of Persian defiance made Hellas one. Every man in the fleet felt proud of his Hellenic blood. His patriotism was kindled. The gauge of battle was thrown down by the sons of Perseus, and the men of Hellas must conquer or die. There was no alternative.

The bit of clever strategy resorted to by Themistocles to compel the enemy to surround the Greeks and make them fight against their will is referred to by Æschylus, who took part in the engagement, in his musical drama, entitled "The Persians." In this production an account of the reverse at Salamis is given by a courier fresh from the scene, who arrives at Susa and in the royal palace, pours into the ears of Atossa, the queen-mother, the mournful details. He thus refers to the strategy of Themistocles:

"The spring of all this misery,
Was some Avenger; or some angry god.
For from the Athenian host a Greek arrived,
And to thy son, King Xerxes, tidings spake;
To wit; that if night's blackness should arrive,
The Greeks would stay not, but upon their decks
Leaping in panic, seek their lives to save
By secret flight, one here, one there afar.
Now Xerxes heard, yet marking not the trick
Of Greek informer, nor ill-will of heaven
To all his captains proclamation make;
When Helios, lighting with his rays the earth
Shall cease, and gloom the Ether's temple hold;
To range the throng of ships in triple lines
To guard all exits and the seaward paths;
Others he bade round Ajax's Isle to wheel;

For if the Grecians should escape their doom
By finding hidden loop holes for their ships,
Beheading was, to all, the stern decree.
And all night long the captains of the fleet,
Kept their crews moving up and down the strait,
So the night waned, and not one Grecian ship
Made effort to elude or slip away."

When morning broke it became apparent that Sicinnus, the messenger sent by Themistocles, had deceived Xerxes, when he told him that the Greeks were in a state of confusion, and would make no resistance, when they saw that flight was impossible. There was no confusion in the Greek alignment. On the contrary the enemy presented a united front, and the Persian monarch began to realize that a terrible struggle was imminent. Xerxes, as he had done at Thermopylæ, had ordered a throne to be erected under Mount Ægaleos, on an eminence which overlooked the straits on which was placed his silver-footed chair, beneath a purple canopy fringed with gold. Here the King seated himself early in the morning to view the conflict. About him were gathered the principal officers of his household. An attendant held the imperial parasol over his head. At his side were the scribes, who were directed to write down the names of those who had distinguished themselves in the action. The spot where Xerxes' throne was erected was doubtless under Mount Ægaleos, not upon its summit. The highest point of that eminence commands a view not only of the Saronic Gulf, but of part of Attica, Megara and Corinth, also. But Colonel Leake argues that Xerxes desired to be near enough to communicate speedily with the ships, to distinguish each vessel, observe the conduct of those on board, and commit the memorials of that conduct to writing. He thinks, therefore, that the place from which Xerxes witnessed the humiliating defeat of his navy was an eminence on the Attic shore nearly opposite the island of Psyttalea.

The Persian right towards the bay of Eleusis and the westward was held by the ships of the Phœnicians and Cyprians; on the left toward the Piræus and the east were the Ionians, Persians and Egyptians; the Cilicians and Pamphylians held the centre. On the left of the Greek line were stationed the Athenians, opposite the Phœnicians and Cyprians on the Persian right. The Lacedæmonians and other Peloponnesians occupied the Greek right, opposite the Ionians, Persians and Egyptians on the Persian left. The Ægeinitans and Eubœans occupied the centre.

As the sun began to mount into the heavens, Themistocles made an eloquent appeal to his countrymen assuring them that if they but remained steadfast they must win the victory. He reminded them that on that day's business depended their future, whether they should emerge from the contest free men, for the only alternative was chains and slavery. History has not preserved a record of the language used in this appeal of Themistocles. What the oracles of Bacis had spoken was now to come to pass for he declared, "When they shall bridge with ships the sacred shore of Artemis (Diana) with the golden sword, and sea-girt Cynosura, having with mad hope destroyed beautiful Athens, then divine Vengeance shall quench strong Presumption, son of Insolence, when thinking to subvert all things. *For brass shall engage with brass, and Ares shall red-dens the sea with blood.* Then the far-thundering son of Saturn and benign victory shall bring a day of freedom to Greece."

After Themistocles had finished his speech, he ordered the men to go on board their ships. The order was obeyed with alacrity. At this juncture the trireme from Ægina which had gone to fetch the Æacidæ arrived. The Greeks then as soon as Eurybiades advanced with the flag-ship sounded the trumpet and gave the command to go forward, were suddenly assailed by

the Persians. One tradition says that at the outset some of the Greeks backed water, when suddenly the apparition of a female figure appeared, and they heard her voice as if from heaven, declare, "Dastards, how long will you back water?" Thereupon the entire line advanced with enthusiasm. This tradition is not referred to in the account given by Æschylus.

Plutarch says that the Persian admiral from his flag-ship, which was a ponderous affair, with a lofty structure on its prow, from which, as from the walls of a castle, the Persian men-at-arms shot their arrows among the enemy, singled out the trireme of Themistocles, seeking to destroy the ship commanded by the most illustrious of the Grecian leaders. While the Phœnician ship directed its darts against the vessel of this illustrious man, an Athenian trireme commanded by Aminias darted from the line and bore down upon the Persian, seeking to strip it of its bank of oars with its sharp prow. In this movement the brazen beaks of the contending vessels became fastened together. Pikes were used as grappling irons, and the crew of the Persian headed by Ariaramenes (the Ariabignes of Herodotus), attempted to board the Greek trireme, but no sooner had he reached the deck of the enemy than he fell pierced by the pikes of the Athenians, and his bleeding corpse was cast into the sea. If we may credit Diodorus, the Athenian Aminias was a brother of Cynægirus, who distinguished himself at Marathon, and the brother also of Æschylus, who also took part in the engagement. The latter notices this assault which his brother made on the Phœnician flag-ship in his poem, "The Persians." The lines are rendered by Professor Blakie as follows:

A Greek ship led on the attack,
And from the prow of a Phœnician, struck
The figure-head.

What Herodotus says about the exploit of Aminias is (viii, 84), that when the other ships backed water, and made for the shore, Aminias of Pallene, an Athenian captain, being carried onwards, darted forth in front of the line, and charged a ship of the enemy. The two vessels became entangled and could not separate, whereupon the rest of the fleet came up to help Aminias, and engaged with the Persians. Thus, the Athenians say the battle commenced; but the Æginetans maintained that the ship which had been to Ægina for the Æacidæ was the first to begin the fight.

The Persians were inferior in seamanship, and unable to withstand the repeated attacks, and skilful manœuvres of the Greeks. Their ships were rammed in many instances by a dexterous movement, whereby the Greek prows were so managed as to strip from the side of an enemy's ship the entire bank of oars, a piece of seamanship practised by the Greeks, but with which the barbarians were not familiar. The conflict raged until more than half the Persian fleet was destroyed or disabled. The ships of Xerxes, as had been predicted by Themistocles, were at a disadvantage in the narrow channel by reason of their numbers and the multitude of disabled ships obstructed those who desired to save themselves by flight.

Herodotus gives no detailed account of the engagement. He observes that the greater part of the ships were run down at Salamis, some being destroyed by the Athenians, others by the Æginetæ. The Greeks fought in good order, in line, but the barbarians were neither properly formed nor did anything with judgment. He mentions this incident with respect to Artemisia, queen of Hellicarnassus, that being pursued by an Athenian ship, she bore down upon a friendly ship manned by Calyndians, with the Calyndian King on board. Whether she had any trouble with this monarch at the Hellespont, Herodotus says, he is unable to say; nor

does he know whether she did it on purpose, or whether the Calyndian ship happened by chance to be in her way. However, she ran it down, sunk it, and gained a double advantage thereby. For the captain of the Attic ship, when he saw her bearing down on a ship of the enemy, concluding Artemisia's ship to be a Grecian, or one that had deserted from the enemy and was assisting the Greeks, turned aside and attacked others.

She escaped, and what is even more incredible, she won the favor of Xerxes, who was watching the engagement. One of his counsellors said to the King, "Do you see Artemisia, how well she fights, and she has sunk one of the enemy's ships." Xerxes said, "Are you sure the exploit was that of Artemisia?" The answer was that they knew the ensign of her ship perfectly well, but supposed she had sunk a ship of the enemy, and no one on board survived to disabuse the mind of Xerxes on that point. The King was much pleased with the woman's courage and it is said he exclaimed, "My men have become women and my women men."

On account of the confusion and panic among the barbarians, occasioned by the severity of the struggle, and the great mortality among them, the entire Persian fleet and Xerxes himself became demoralized and panic-stricken and the ships withdrew as best they could into the open sea.

Since the dawn, the Son of Darius, from the rocky eminence he occupied, had been watching the attempt of his captains to execute his orders to destroy the Greeks and sink their ships. But he was compelled to witness the destruction of more than half his fleet. The damage done to the enemy, however, was comparatively slight. Xerxes, however, instead of giving orders to renew the contest on the following day, really became solicitous, and alarmed for his personal safety. It is true he had taken Athens and reduced it to ashes.

He had on the Attic peninsula a formidable army, numbering more than two millions of fighting men, many of whom, doubtless were near enough the coast to witness the engagement off Salamis, yet Xerxes was afraid. The grandson of the Great Cyrus seemed to be altogether lacking in the qualities that made his distinguished ancestor the greatest conqueror up to that time, that the world had seen. He became seized with the idea that the victorious Greeks would dispatch a squadron to the Hellespont, destroy the bridge of boats he had constructed to bring his army into Europe, cut off his retreat and harass his retreating army in the wilds of Thrace.

He sought the advice of his brother-in-law, Mardonius, who had begged Xerxes to undertake the expedition. Fearing the wrath of his sovereign, and not wishing to incur his displeasure by advising contrary to what he knew Xerxes wished to do, he concurred in the view that it would be wise to retreat and return with the entire armament to Asia. It is clear, however, if we may judge from his subsequent conduct at Plataea, that Mardonius, had he been free to act according to his own will, would never have retreated. He would, in all probability, have renewed the contest at the Isthmus, and united the land and naval forces, in an attempt to invade the Peloponnesus. Had Mardonius been Xerxes, and Xerxes Mardonius, a different page would doubtless have been written concerning the destinies of Hellas.

Xerxes unquestionably was weary and disgusted. He longed for the luxurious ease and comfort of his royal parks, gardens and palaces at Susa and Ecbatana. Orders were given for the fleet to proceed with all despatch to the Hellespont and very soon after the battle of Salamis, the army took up its march north through Attica, Bœotia, Locris, through the bloody pass at Thermopylæ, where Leonidas and his followers

slept in honored graves, to Thessaly and thence north to Macedonia and into Thrace, thence eastward into Asia.

But all the while Mardonius was anxious for permission to stay in Hellas and accomplish the purpose for which the expedition had been undertaken. When the army reached Thessaly Xerxes consented that he might remain there during the winter with a detachment of 300,000 men, and in the spring renew the contest for the conquest of Hellas.

With the remainder of his forces Xerxes finally reached the Hellespont. The bridge of boats during his absence had been destroyed by the severe storms, and he was obliged to transport his troops into Asia by means of his fleet.

The net results of this memorable campaign B. C. 480, which covered a period of a few weeks, was the destruction of a garrison of eleven hundred men under Leonidas at Thermopylæ; an indecisive sea fight off Artemisium, on the northern coast of the island of Eubœa; the burning of Athens; an unsuccessful attempt to sack the temple of Delphi; and the decisive naval engagement in the Saronic Gulf off the island of Salamis.

One incident in connection with the battle of Salamis must be noted. On the island, almost within bow-shot of the contending fleets, amid the clash of resounding arms, a mother, driven from Athens by the invading Persians, gave birth to a son, whose name was destined to live forever in the world of letters. They called him Euripides. While Æschylus, a great poet, was that day doing battle, to preserve and redeem Athens, a poet, destined to become equally famous, first saw the light.

A detailed account of the battle of Salamis is given by Æschylus in his musical drama entitled "The Persians," a quotation from which is given above. He was

a native of Eleusis in Attica, born B. C. 525, and hence was contemporaneous with Pindar and Simonides. He fought at Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis and Platæa. He is one of the great poets of antiquity. "The Persians" is the first page of Greek history ever written. It was produced in Athens B. C. 472, eight years after the battle, when Herodotus was but twelve years of age. The latter began to write his famous history when he was a young man. He read his works at public assemblies, the first recorded recitation of Herodotus having taken place at the festival of the Panathenæa, at Athens B. C. 446.

Æschylus laid the scene of his drama in Asia. On the stage was represented a room in the royal palace of Xerxes at Susa. When the curtain rises a chorus of Persian elders is discovered. They sing of the absent Xerxes, and express hopes for his safe return to his capital, and magnify and extol his powerful armament. Operatic dialogue is then introduced, expressing confidence in the result of the campaign. Suddenly the singers begin to express forebodings as to the intervention of Heaven, and the mysteries of fate. Presently Atossa is seen approaching in a royal chariot, attended by a numerous train. The singers all prostrate themselves before her.

Atossa then discloses her forebodings as to the safety of her son and members of the royal household. In one place she sings of the visions that came to her on her bed. She tells of a dream she had and relates that the night before she saw two women, one in Persian robes, the other in Dorian garb:

Between these twain, for so methought I saw,
Some feud arose, which learning, straight my son
Strove to appease and soothe; he to his car
Yoked them, and placed the collar on their necks.
Proudly the one exulted in this gear,
And kept her mouth submissive to the reins;

Restive the other was; she with her hands
The chariot-harness rends, then without bit,
Whirls it along, snapping the yoke asunder.
Prone falls my son, and close at hand, his sire,
Darius, pitying stands, whom, when he sees,
The robes about his person Xerxes rends.
Such was, I say, the vision of the night.

She then relates what strange portents she saw when she awoke. The chorus then sings and seeks to put a good construction and interpretation on the visions the queen had seen, and a dialogue ensues extolling the traditions of Persian arms, when suddenly a courier out of breath rushes on the stage and the chorus sings:

But soon, if I mistake not, thou the whole truth shalt learn
For here a courier speedeth whose gait proclaimeth him
Persian, and he will bring us clear news of weal or woe.

Æschylus now introduces an account of the Persian defeat at Salamis, which this courier relates to Atossa. He was dispatched to Susa immediately after the battle. He thus begins his doleful narrative before the miserable queen.

O fenced homes of all the Asian earth
O Soil of Persia, haven of vast wealth,
How, by one stroke, our full prosperity
Hath shattered been, and blighted Persia's flower.
Woeful his office first who heralds woe!
Yet all our sorrow must I needs unfold —
Persians, the whole barbaric host is lost.

The messenger then relates the terrible and bloody spectacle he witnessed in the straits of Salamis. He describes it thus:

Darkness advanced, yet not in secret flight
Ionia's host was minded to escape;
But when white-steeded Day, bright to behold,
Held the wide earth, from the Hellenes first,
Like joyous chant, rang out their battle-cry,
And forthwith Echo, from the island rocks,
Sent back responsive an inspiring shout.

On all the Persians, cheated in their hopes,
Fell terror; for by no means as in flight
Their solemn pæan did th' Hellenes sing,
But with stout courage speeding to the fray.
The trumpet's blare fired all their ranks, and straight,
With simultaneous dip of sounding oar,
They at the signal smote the surging brine,
And instant all conspicuous were to sight.
First the right wing, well marshall'd, took the lead;
Then their whole naval force in fair array
Bore down against us. All at once was heard
A mighty shout: "*Sons of Hellenes, on,
Your country free, your children free, your wives,
The temples of your fathers' deities,
Your tombs ancestral; for your all ye fight.*"
And from our side clamour of Persian speech
In answer rose; no time was then for pause,
But instant galley against galley dashed
Her armature of brass. A ship of Hellas
Led the encounter, and from Punic barque
Sheared her high crest. Thereon as fortune led,
Ship drave on ship; at first the Persian host,
A mighty flood, made head; but soon their ships
Thronged in the strait, of mutual aid bereft,
Each against other dashed with brazen beak,
Crushing the oar-banks of their proper fleet;
While the Hellenes ships, not without skill,
Circling around them smote; dead hulks of ships
Floated keel-upwards, and, with wrecks o'erstrewn
And slaughtered men, lost was the sea from sight,
Ay, shores and reefs were crowded with the dead.
In flight disordered every ship was rowed,
Poor remnant of the Persian armament.
Then as men strike at tunnies, or a haul
Of captured fishes, the Hellenes, armed
With splint of oar, or fragment from the wreck,
Batter'd, and clave with dislocated blows.
Shrieks and loud wailing filled the ocean brine,
Till all 'neath eye of swarthy night was lost.
But all our losses, though for ten whole days
I told them over, could I not recount.
Of this be sure, that never in one day
Perished of men so vast a multitude.

There have been a number of very excellent translations of Æschylus. The rendering given above is the work of a woman, Anna Swanwick, Litt. D., an eminent Greek scholar, who by reason of her accomplishments,

is certainly entitled to the admiration of all. Her work is equal at least to that of any of the eminent scholars who have enriched literature with their labors in rendering into English verse the musical drama of *Æschylus*.

Professor Symonds, commenting on "The Persians," the first work of its kind of which we have any knowledge, says: "The real point of that fearful duel of two nations, which decided the future of the human race, the contrast between barbarians and men in whom the spirit was alive; between slaves driven to the fight, like sheep, and freemen acting consciously, as their own will determined; between the brute force of multitudes and the inspiring courage of a few heroes, has never been expressed more radiantly than in this play."

CHAPTER XXIV

HIMERA.—DEFEAT OF HAMILCAR IN SICILY, BY THERON AND GELON OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 480

HIMERA — Hi-me-ra — [*Ἱμερα*]. A Greek city on the north coast of Sicily at the mouth of the river Himera, about twenty-five miles east of Panormus (now Palermo), eleven miles west of Cephalœdium, and about ninety-five miles northwest of Syracuse. Agrigentum, a city ruled by Theron, was on the river Acragas on the southern coast of Sicily directly south of Himera.

THERE are two theories with regard to the presence of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily, during the second Persian War. According to Diodorus, when Xerxes was maturing his plans for the invasion of Greece, he sent ambassadors to Carthage, and entered into negotiations with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian King, whereby that sovereign agreed to send an expedition to invade Sicily, and engage the Greek colonies and cities on that island, to the end that they might thereby be prevented from lending aid to their countrymen in Hellas. At the instigation of the Persian monarch, Hamilcar planned to invade Sicily at the time when Xerxes was to invade Greece.

Herodotus, however, does not seem to have been aware of any such negotiations between the Persians and the Carthaginians, and he assigns an entirely different reason for the Punic invasion of Sicily. He declares (vii, 165) that Gelon would have led an army into Greece to aid his kinsmen against the hosts of Persia, even although he was denied supreme command as set forth in a previous chapter, and would have been

obliged to serve under the Lacedæmonians had it not been that Terillus, a deposed King of Himera, was instrumental in bringing into Sicily at this particular time a Carthaginian army of 300,000 men. The reason given for this act on the part of Terillus was because Theron, King of Agrigentum on the southern shore of Sicily, drove King Terillus out of Himera, and took his city. Whereupon the fugitive monarch, with the aid of his son-in-law Anaxilaus, tyrant of Rhegium, who had great influence at Carthage, applied for redress to Hamilcar, and besought him to right the wrong he had suffered at the hands of Theron, and reinstate him as tyrant of Himera. Anaxilaus gave to the Carthaginian his children, the grandchildren of Terillus, as hostages to induce him to enter Sicily to avenge the wrong done to his father-in-law. Hamilcar yielded to the entreaties of the Sicilians, and espoused their cause. He assembled a powerful army consisting of three hundred thousand men, and a fleet of two thousand sail, supplemented by three thousand transports to be used for carrying the horses, chariots, provisions and supplies.

Whatever may be said as to how the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was brought about, it seems certain that the presence of the Punic invaders prevented the Greeks in Syracuse from lending aid to their countrymen at the time Xerxes was advancing through Thessaly. Herodotus says that the defeat of Hamilcar at Himera occurred on the very day that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Salamis, while Diodorus says it occurred on the day of the defeat of Leonidas of Thermopylæ.

Hamilcar made great preparations for the war in Sicily. His army included not only Phœnicians, but a large number of mercenaries, including Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Elisycians, Sardinians and Corsicans. In addition to these land forces, aggregating three

hundred thousand men, his fleet of two thousand ships, was assembled in what is now known as the bay of Tunis. It was accompanied also by three thousand transports which were convoyed with the expedition. Hamilcar in person took supreme command of this formidable armament. Being of royal lineage, he was doubtless the ancestor of Hamilcar Barca, and of his son Hannibal the Great, who fought the last Punic war, and is known to posterity as one of the greatest masters of strategy in military annals.

Shortly after this expedition put to sea, perhaps midway between the shores of Africa, and the western coast of Sicily in the waters of the Mediterranean, known at that period as the Libyan sea, a violent tempest arose. Hamilcar lost in this storm the transports containing the horses and chariots, and many of his ships also were damaged. Hamilcar put into the bay of Panormus under the shelter of the lofty peak now known as Mount Pelegrino, which shelters the bay of Palermo. Here he landed his troops, and spent several days repairing his ships which had survived the storm.

Having rested his men after the severe voyage, he marshalled them in order, and began his march eastward along the rocky and mountainous shores of Sicily to Himera, distant about twenty-five miles from Panormus. His fleet sailed in line with the infantry along the coast, carrying the supplies and provisions. When the objective point of the expedition was reached, Hamilcar encamped his army about the city and prepared to besiege it. He extended his fortifications from the lines of the naval forces, with which he barricaded the shore, having dug trenches about the ships, which were drawn on the beach, the line of his fortifications having been carried to the hills which overtopped the city. The troops of Theron, which had sallied forth to oppose the Carthaginians, were attacked with vigor,

and driven within the lines of their fortifications. The bold and skilful manœuvres of the enemy struck terror into the hearts of the besieged, and Theron, though his forces were ample, became alarmed for his safety, and dispatched couriers with all haste to Syracuse, some ninety-five miles distant, at the eastern extremity of the island imploring Gelon, its Governor, to send him succor, with all possible expedition. Gelon, intending to give aid to his kinsmen in Greece, had already assembled an army consisting of fifty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, which he commanded in person. As soon as he learned of the condition of affairs at Himera, and of the presence of an invading army from Carthage, he set out with his entire command to the relief of Himera, proceeding by forced marches. When Gelon arrived near the city, he deployed his troops to the best advantage and fortified himself both with a wall and a deep trench.

Hamilcar meantime was doing all the mischief he could to the Sicilians in the neighborhood of his camp. He was accustomed to send out large bodies of foragers. These usually divided themselves into marauding parties, and scoured the country far and near in search of provisions and supplies of all kinds. The first move on the part of Gelon was to operate with his cavalry to break up and capture these bands of marauders. He was successful in his raids, the enemy being deficient in cavalry, and in a short time took more than ten thousand prisoners. His success greatly revived the spirits of the besieged, and shed lustre on the arms of Gelon.

The latter now began to plan how he might compass the defeat of the enemy by some clever strategy. He sought to devise some way by which to mislead and deceive the Carthaginians, and destroy their forces without danger to himself or to his army. His great desire was to burn the enemy's fleet in order to deprive

them of their only means of escape, in case of defeat, and if possible, kill Hamilcar, believing that the death of their leader might serve to demoralize and discourage his followers, who were mostly mercenaries and hirelings, and render them helpless in a strange land, harassed and annoyed on all sides by active and vigilant enemies who were not fighting for conquest, but seeking to preserve their country from the hand of the spoiler, and the dominion of the invader.

After Gelon had broken up the bands of marauders and foragers by the dexterous use of his cavalry, Hamilcar sought to invoke divine assistance. He began preparations to celebrate a grand festival in honor of Poseidon (Neptune) and to offer sacrifices in his camp, in which both the army and navy should join. In the meantime, being greatly in need of cavalry, his own horses and chariots having been lost at sea, Hamilcar sent a courier to Selinus directly across the island on the south shore, some sixty miles distant, requesting the Selinians, who were supposed to favor the cause of Terillus, the exiled despot of Himera, to send to his aid a strong body of horse. The courier was requested, in case the horsemen were sent, to have them enter his camp on a certain day designated by Hamilcar.

Gelon was interrupted in his tent one day about this time by the announcement that one of the enemy's scouts had been captured. The prisoner was brought before the commander-in-chief, and searched. On his person was found a letter written by the tyrant of Silinus, to Hamilcar, stating that the aid he required would be furnished, and that a body of cavalry was about to be dispatched which would arrive at the camp of the Carthaginian on the day appointed by Hamilcar. This incident gave Gelon the opportunity he sought, and enabled him to devise a plan to entrap the Carthaginians. He sent a body of his own cavalry to per-

sonate the horsemen which Hamilcar was expecting, disguised as if they were Selinian troops. They were instructed to proceed secretly by night to places nearest and most convenient to enable them to enter the camp of the enemy at dawn, on the day appointed for the arrival of the Selinians. They were ordered to enter the Carthaginian camp representing to the enemy that they had been sent from Selinus to aid Hamilcar, and carry out the deception by producing the letter the Selinian tyrant had written to the Carthaginian general. As soon as they were admitted into the camp they were ordered to kill Hamilcar, make a sudden attack on the Carthaginians, and set fire to their ships. Gelon also posted his spies on the adjacent hills and ordered them, as soon as the horsemen were admitted into the fortifications, to give notice by raising aloft some conspicuous object, as a sign to apprise their commander when the assault should be made by his troops. Gelon drew up his army-in-waiting, to co-operate with the cavalry while they were attacking the enemy within the fortifications.

The plan was successfully executed. Gelon's horsemen were admitted to the enemy's camp at sunrise, when the Carthaginians were engaged in offering sacrifices and suddenly threw themselves upon the unsuspecting enemy, slew Hamilcar, who was engaged in sacrificing, and seeking favorable victims. They then set fire to his ships. The signal was instantly given by the spies from the hill tops, and Gelon rushed into the enemy's camp, the entrances having been thrown open by his own troops within. The enemy perceiving the treachery and the ruse which had been employed, determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible.

The trumpet sounded and the barbarians succeeded in drawing their forces out of their confused camp in good order and made a terrible onslaught on the forces of Gelon. The struggle was fierce and bloody. The

carnage was appalling. Suddenly when dense clouds of black smoke from their burning ships began to settle over the field of slaughter, news of the death of Hamilcar reached the troops and spread among them like wildfire. Despair now seized the barbarians and they fled precipitately from the field. Gelon ordered that no prisoners should be taken, reminding his men that the enemy were invaders from foreign shores. Diodorus says that half of the army of Hamilcar, namely, one hundred and fifty thousand men were killed at Himera. The remnant who fled succeeded in getting away, and reached a spot on that rough and mountainous coast which was fortified by nature. This afforded a brief respite from the fury of the enemy. The country where they were was dry and barren, and because they could get no water and while dying of thirst they surrendered themselves.

Diodorus, who was a Sicilian, indulges in unstinted praise of Gelon, also a Sicilian, and declares that his fame now surpassed that of any commander of his age, because he says no general before ever planned such a clever strategy, or slew so many barbarians or took so many prisoners in one battle. The Sicilian historian refers to the cunning device practised by Themistocles, who deceived Xerxes through his messenger Sicinnus and induced him to enter the straits of Salamis with his ships, where they were crushed by the Greeks on the following day. But Diodorus, while giving great praise to Themistocles, places the feat of Gelon first, urging in his favor the fact that he never betrayed his country and fled like Themistocles did, but enjoyed a long and prosperous reign in Syracuse, as did his successors for three generations. He argues also that the feat of Gelon at Himera was not inferior to that achieved at Plataea, and reminds us that Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, afterwards became a traitor to his country, and like Themistocles, died in disgrace.

Herodotus gives a slightly different version of the death of Hamilcar than that given by Diodorus. He says, according to the account given by the Carthaginians themselves, that the battle at Himera lasted all day from morning till late in the evening. That during that time Hamilcar continued in the camp offering sacrifices, and observing the omens, and burning whole victims on a huge pyre. That when he saw the defeat of his army, as he was pouring libations on the victims, he threw himself into the flames and was consumed.¹ Thus perished Hamilcar in the flames at Himera, as the Phœnicians relate.

¹ Herod. vii, 167.

CHAPTER XXV

THEMISTOCLES

IT may be said of Themistocles that his talents, his energy, his mastery of the art of strategy, his resourcefulness, and his sagacity, made him indispensable to his countrymen in time of war; his greed, his avarice and his utter disregard of all limitations imposed by law, made him intolerable in time of peace. The perseverance and untiring energy which characterized his efforts to arouse the patriotism of his countrymen, and to persuade them to take arms and defend their homes against foreign invasion, in the unequal struggle with the hosts of Xerxes, merits unqualified praise and admiration. The decisive victory of Miltiades, at Marathon, was regarded by Themistocles as only the beginning of a long struggle with Persia. The indefatigable energy of the latter; the patriotism he inspired and his wonderful strategy in bringing on the navel engagement in the straits of Salamis, against the express wishes of Eurybiades, the Spartan commander of the fleet, resulted in a decisive victory, which saved his country a second time from chains and slavery. The triumph of Themistocles in that engagement was equally as important, as the signal success achieved by Miltiades at Marathon. If the armies of Datis had triumphed at Marathon, or had Xerxes been successful at Salamis, Greece would have sunk into insignificance, as an integral part of the Persian empire. In the second invasion of Hellas, conducted by Xerxes, in person, Themistocles was to Greece what Washington was to the American

colonists in their struggle for independence against the fleets and armies sent across the Atlantic by the British sovereign. To Washington more than to any other one man, the English colonists in America were indebted for their success. To Themistocles more than to any other one man, Greece owed her independence during the second Persian War. He was the most conspicuous man of his age, and one of the greatest strategists of antiquity. In that regard he may be classed with Hannibal, the most consummate master of strategy perhaps that ever lived.

Themistocles was indeed a military genius, if we may be permitted to apply that term to a commander early in the fifth century B. C., a period when the game of war had not been reduced to a science. Recondite tactics were practically unknown prior to the time of Epaminondas, the Spartan general, who was killed at Mantinea early in the fourth century (B. C. 362). Like the military men of his age, Themistocles was not only a successful general, but excelled as an admiral. He was perhaps more skilful in command of a fleet than in command of an army. His achievements on the sea were approached only by the great Cimon, son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon. Themistocles was the John Paul Jones of his age, and was properly regarded as the father of the Athenian navy. The fleet with which he afterwards saved his country at Salamis was built from the income derived from the silver mines at Laurium, which Themistocles induced the assembly to use for that purpose, rather than distribute it among the Attic tribes. He constantly reminded his countrymen that they must make the sea their domain, if they would build up and maintain their supremacy. "He took from his countrymen," says Plato, "the spear and the shield, and bound them to the bench and the oar." In this regard his judgment was sustained by Pericles, under whose guidance the Athenian empire flourished

and expanded, and attained the height of its power and influence.

Themistocles was of the tribe of Leontis. We are not informed as to the year of his birth, nor the date of his death. The authorities seem to indicate, however, that he died at the age of sixty-five. His death occurred in Magnesia, a city in Ionia, situated a short distance north of the river Mæander. If we may assume that he died B. C. 464 he was born in the year B. C. 529. If this date is correct he was thirty-nine years of age when he fought at Marathon. In that engagement he marched with his tribe side by side with the tribe of Antiochis, led by Aristides, his great contemporary. Plutarch says that the enemy fought for a long time "making opposition there against the tribes of Leontis and Antiochis. Themistocles and Aristides being ranged together fought valiantly." The former, if he was at that time one of the strategoi, at the critical moment, voted with Aristides to give battle, and attack the Persians on the plain of Marathon, a place sacred to Hercules. Notwithstanding his valuable services and his decisive victory at Salamis, Themistocles became involved in political intrigues and among other delinquencies was accused of bribery, a crime not considered especially heinous in Hellas in that age. Finally his enemies became so aggressive that ten years after he had been elected Archon Eponymus, he was ostracized and retired to Argos.

From the narrative of Thucydides, we must infer that the ostracism of Themistocles took place B. C. 471. He says that when the exiled Athenian sent the letter to Artaxerxes, referred to below, that monarch had just succeeded to the throne on the death of his father Xerxes. The authorities agree that Xerxes died 465 B. C. This date is sufficient evidence of the fact that Themistocles must have presented himself to the Great King in that year. "Aristotle's Constitution

of Athens," a lost work of the great philosopher of antiquity, which had not been seen by mortal eye for nearly eighteen centuries, was discovered in Egypt in 1890, written on rolls of papyrus. In this book, Aristotle presents some new views of history. He declares (Ch. 25) that in the archonship of Conon, 462 B. C., Æphialtes brought about a revolution in which the council of Five Hundred, instituted under the Constitution of Clisthenes, was stripped of its prerogatives from which it derived its guardianship of the constitution. In this revolution, Aristotle says, Æphialtes was assisted by Themistocles, who at that time was a member of the Areopagus, but was expecting to be tried before it on a charge of treasonable dealings with Persia. If we accept the evidence, thus presented in Aristotle's work, the date of the ostracism of Themistocles could not have occurred earlier than 461 B. C., four years after the death of Xerxes. The conflicting statements cannot be reconciled. The weight of authority indicates that the narrative of Thucydides is correct, and that 471 B. C. is the correct date of the ostracism of Themistocles.

When the treason of Pausanias was revealed, Themistocles was implicated as a co-conspirator and having fled secretly, he succeeded in reaching the City of Ephesus, in Ionia. He went to Susa and took refuge as a suppliant in the Court of Artaxerxes Longimanus, son of Xerxes, whose fleet Themistocles had defeated fifteen years before at Salamis. In B. C. 465 he had just succeeded to the throne, on the death of his father. The distinguished fugitive offered his sword to the Persian monarch and promised to aid him in any expedition he might wish to undertake for the conquest of Greece. He sent a letter to Artaxerxes which has been preserved by Thucydides in which he writes: "I, Themistocles, have come to you, I, who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries so long as I was

compelled to defend myself against your father; but still greater benefits when I was in safety, and he in danger, during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me." Here the writer related how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution his countrymen to withdraw, and how, through his influence as he pretended, they had refrained from destroying the bridge across the Hellespont to cut off his retreat. "Now, I am here," he continues, "able to do you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. Let me wait a year and then I will myself explain why I have come."¹

He captivated Artaxerxes with his blandishments, and was made governor of Magnesia. The King also assigned to him for bread the latter city, which produced a yearly revenue of fifty talents, a sum equal to more than \$50,000. For wine he was assigned Lampascus, in the Troad, the richest wine-growing district then known. For meat he had the city of Myus in Ionia, about fifteen miles south of Magnesia. Themistocles, however, did not long survive after receiving these favors at the hands of the Persian monarch. He sickened and died presumably 464 B. C. In this connection Thucydides remarks, that in some quarters it was said, that Themistocles poisoned himself, because he felt that he could not accomplish what he had promised to the King. In other words it was believed that he was goaded by remorse and rather than lift his sword against his countrymen, he chose to perish by his own hand.

To illustrate his overweening ambition, as indicated by his jealousy of Miltiades, stimulated by the growing fame of his great achievement at Marathon, Plutarch says that he frequently passed sleepless nights, and avoided his usual places of recreation, and by way

¹ Thucyd. i, 137.

of explanation told those who wondered at these things, that "the trophy of Miltiades would not let him sleep." Ambition was the scarlet sin that robbed this extraordinary man of rest and sleep. His utter fearlessness and contempt for all sorts of religious superstitions which prevailed in that age, is demonstrated by his method of interpreting the answer of the Pythoness at the Temple of Delphi, whither the Athenians had sent a delegation to consult the oracle, as to the threatened invasion of Hellas by the innumerable hosts of Xerxes, then mobilizing at Sardis.

Scarcely had the envoys finished the customary rites about the sacred precincts, and taken their seats within the sanctuary, when the oracle delivered the prophecy, which filled them with gloom and despondency. It was not a prophecy at all, but a fierce and uncalled for denunciation in the nature of a curse, and wound up with a demand that the suppliants get out of the sanctuary. It began as follows:

"Wretches, why sit ye here? Fly, fly, to the ends of creation,
Quit your homes and your city of the violet crown."

All was lost, all ruined, they were told. Fire and the impetuous Ares speeding in a Syrian chariot hastens to destroy you; and your shrines and towers will be given to fiery destruction. Black blood shall trickle from the roofs of your dwellings, prophetic sign of impending destruction. Get away from the temple; and brood on the ills that await you.

Seeing the despondency occasioned by this infamous prognostication, Timon, a man of influence at Delphi, persuaded the suppliants to enter the temple with olive branches, and consult the oracle a second time. Whether Timon was seeking a bribe from the envoys we are not informed. The Athenians then supplicated the priestess as they were advised, and asked for a

further prophecy more favorable to them. Otherwise, they declared, they would never leave the sanctuary, but would remain till death released them from their despondency. The second answer was not much of an improvement on the first. It declared that Athene had not been able, with her prayers and supplications, to soften Olympian Zeus. "But when the foe shall have taken whatever the limit of Cecrops holds within it, and all which divine Cithæron shelters, Zeus grants to Athene that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assaults of horse and foot, but turn your backs to the foe and retire. A day will come when you will meet him in battle. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed time or at the harvest."¹

When this prophecy was made known at Athens many interpretations were put upon it. Some supposed the "wooden wall" referred to an ancient barricade, which once defended the citadel on the acropolis. All were filled with dismal forebodings. Then Themistocles gave his interpretation. He declared that the "wooden wall" in which the gods told them to put their trust was their ships, and that their salvation lay in the Athenian navy, not in the barricades on the acropolis. He reminded them that the language referred not to wretched Salamis, but to divine Salamis, indicating that the island was endeared to them and beloved by the gods. The result proved the unerring sagacity and judgment of this remarkable man.

His forbearance and complete self control was shown at the conference of commanders, on the night before the memorable naval engagement at Salamis. Eurybiades, with others from Corinth and the Peloponnesus, had overruled Themistocles and voted to withdraw the

¹ Herod. vii, 141.

fleet from the straits at dawn on the following morning. The latter, nothing daunted, continued to argue as to the wisdom of remaining where they were. His persistence so enraged Eurybiades, that rising in his place he advanced with threatening words, and shook his staff at the Athenian. "Strike, but hear me," was his only reply to the Admiral. He might have drawn his sword and smote the offender. But as Carlyle observes, to forbear, and waive redress for the insult, in order to extinguish his resentments, soothe his hearers, and keep the fleet where it was for his country's sake, exhibited the highest patriotism and displayed true greatness.

The way in which Themistocles outwitted the Lacedæmonians, who sought to prevent the Athenians from rebuilding the walls about their ruined city, which, after the slaughter at Thermopylæ, had been captured and burned by the Persians, furnishes a further illustration of his sagacity and resourcefulness. After the victory at Mycale, which tradition says was won on the same day that the hosts of Mardonius were defeated at Plataea, the Peloponnesian fleet went home. The Athenians, however, under the command of Xanthippus with their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, continued the war, and besieged and took the city of Sestus. They then returned to Attica, in the spring B. C. 478, and brought back their wives and children from Træzen, Ægina and Salamis whither they had taken refuge at the approach of Xerxes, and set about to rebuild their city and reconstruct its walls. Thucydides relates, what then occurred, substantially as follows:

The Lacedæmonians, who were decidedly averse to walled cities impelled by the importunity of their allies who feared their growing navy and the spirit which animated the Athenians in the Persian War, requested them not to restore their walls, but in order to place all cities upon an equality to join with them in razing

the fortifications of other towns. They concealed their real designs, but in support of their request, advanced the argument that if the Persians should again invade Greece they would find no fortified place in which to make their headquarters as Mardonius had lately done in Thebes. The Peloponnesus in such an event, they argued, would furnish a safe retreat for all Hellas and a good base of operations. And now comes Themistocles with his sage advice and wise council. In order to get rid of the Spartans the Athenians suavely replied that the matter would be taken under advisement and the envoys quietly departed. Themistocles then proposed that he himself should repair to Sparta, and that they should give him colleagues who should not follow at once, but wait until the walls had reached a height, when they could be used as a defense. He urged that that work should be carried on with all possible dispatch, and that everybody including women and children should assist. He said he would himself manage the business in Sparta, and departed. On his arrival at the capital of Lacedæmon, he did not at once present himself officially to the ephors, but continued to make excuses, and when asked "why he did not appear before the assembly," he said "that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had been detained by some engagement." He was daily expecting them, he said "and wondered why they did not appear." (Thucyd. i, 90.)

"The fox barks not when he would steal the lamb."

The Lacedæmonians were well disposed towards Themistocles. After his great achievement at Salamis, he visited Sparta, and was honored as no foreigner had ever been. As a token of esteem, he was presented with a chariot and loaded with honors. The magistrates, therefore, were induced to believe him. But when every-

body who came from Athens reported that the walls were being rapidly constructed, and had already reached a considerable height, they were astounded. Then the wily Themistocles displayed his craft and cunning. He begged the ephors not to be misled by reports, but to send to Athens select men whom they could trust to make a personal inspection and report what they had themselves discovered. He then secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain these envoys quietly, and not permit them to depart until he and his colleagues Aristides and Lysimachus (who had arrived in the meantime, and reported that the walls were of sufficient height) had returned in safety.

The Athenians accordingly detained the envoys, and when the Lacedæmonians became aware of this, Themistocles blandly informed them that Athens was now a walled city, and could protect her citizens.

The most wonderful achievement in the annals of war was his victory over the Persians at Salamis. Immediately after that event, he became the most conspicuous man in Hellas. The world was filled with his fame. He was regarded everywhere as the wisest among all the Greeks. When he visited Sparta, the Lacedæmonians accorded him the highest honors. They presented him, Herodotus says (viii, 124), with a crown of olives, as the prize of wisdom and dexterity, and on his departure he was escorted as far as the borders of Tegea by the order of the Knights, a body of three hundred picked Spartans, a most unusual honor which was never conferred by the Lacedæmonians upon any one before or since. According to Diodorus, he received also on his visit a sum of money double the amount that was given to any other commander who fought at Salamis. Lord Rosebery, referring to Napoleon, observes that besides that indefinable spark which we call genius, the Corsican represented a combination of intellect and energy which has never perhaps been

equalled, never certainly surpassed. He carried human faculty to the furthest point of which we have accurate knowledge. Until his time he says, no one could realize that there could be so stupendous a combination of military and civil genius, such comprehension of view, united to such grasp of detail, such prodigious vitality of body and mind.

Did any of the wonderful military achievements of Napoleon surpass the feat accomplished by Themistocles at Salamis in the Second Persian War?

The eminent historian Thucydides (471-396) a contemporary of the great Athenian thus briefly sketched the prominent characteristics of Themistocles. "He was a man whose natural force was unmistakable. This was the quality for which he was distinguished above all other men. From his own native acuteness, and without any study, either before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest future. Whatever he had in hand, he had the power of explaining to others, and even where he had no experience he was quite competent to form a sufficient judgment. No man could foresee with equal clearness, the good or evil event which was hidden in the future. In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and with the least preparation, was of all men the best able to extemporize the right thing to be done." (Thucyd. i, 138.)

CHAPTER XXVI

PLATÆA

PLATÆA — pla-te-a — [Πλαταια]. A historic city in the Valley of the Asopus, in Bœotia, under the shadows of Cithæron, the mountain range that forms the boundary between Bœotia and Attica. It is eight miles southwest of Thebes, and four miles south of the river Asopus, which flows between the territory of Platæa and Thebes, and thirty-one miles northwest of Athens. Here the Persians, under Mardonius, were defeated by the Greeks under Pausanias, September B. C. 479. This defeat and the reverse of the Persians on the same day at Mycale, ended the Second Persian War.

THE final campaign of the Second Persian War in Europe began and ended with the battle of Platæa, B. C. 479. It may be regarded as the most memorable engagement in the history of Greece. It was equally as important as Marathon because, although the Persians suffered ignominious defeat there, they mustered new armies and new fleets with which they sought to conquer Greece. It was equally as important as Salamis, because at the latter only the fleet of Xerxes was vanquished, while his formidable army remained unharmed. At Platæa, Mardonius endeavored to retrieve on land the disastrous defeat suffered by the Persians at sea the previous year. Marathon was the first battle fought by a Persian army in Greece, Platæa was the last. At Platæa, the fruits of Marathon and Salamis were made permanent. Greece there won finally her liberty and independence. The momentous results of the struggle caused her to regard the field of Platæa as hallowed

ground, and henceforward the historic city was consecrated as the battle monument of Hellas.

Three hundred thousand Persians with about fifty thousand Greek allies, under Mardonius, were defeated at Platæa by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their allies, who numbered one hundred and ten thousand, under Pausanias, King of Sparta. This was the largest Greek army ever assembled fighting as allies. Mardonius was killed, his forces routed by the army of Liberation, and the Persian wars in continental Greece were brought to a close. The victory at Mycale (q. v.) off the island of Samos, and the headland of Mycale in Ionia, achieved on the same day on which the battle was fought at Platæa, brought disaster to the Persian arms in Asia.

To ameliorate the shock and bitter disappointment which the Persians sustained in view of their inglorious retreat, after the battle of Salamis and to save his own reputation, Mardonius, who was instrumental in urging and advising the invasion of Greece, besought Xerxes, who had ordered the entire army, to retire with all expedition to Asia, to permit him to remain in Thessaly, with three hundred thousand men. With these troops, augmented by Grecian auxiliaries, who went over to Xerxes, and fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia, he promised Xerxes that he would complete the subjugation of Greece in the following spring. The request was granted. In May or June B. C. 479, Mardonius quitted his winter quarters in Thessaly. He marched through the pass of Thermopylæ, unopposed into Bœotia, invaded Attica, and made his headquarters in the partially burned city of Athens, whose inhabitants had again fled for safety to the island of Salamis. The Persian commander held out the most flattering inducements to persuade the Athenians to make terms with him, and to become an ally of Persia. He offered to rebuild Athens on a magnificent scale, fill its treasury

with gold, and make the Athenians supreme, and lords of Greece. The lofty patriotism of Athens is reflected in the reply which was sent to the Persians in response to his proposals. Aristides gave the answer to Alexander, King of Macedon, the envoy selected by Mardonius. "Tell Mardonius," said Aristides, "that as long as the sun shall keep the same path in the heaven, we will never make peace with Xerxes, and will wage war with the Persians for the country they have wasted, and the temples they have profaned and burnt." Can any one doubt, that if these terms had been offered to the Spartans, as they were offered to the Athenians, that the offer of Mardonius would have been accepted.

Meantime, the Spartans, fearing that the Athenians might ally themselves with the Persians, sent ambassadors to prevail upon them not to make terms with Mardonius, and promised to send at once a strong army to succor Athens. These ambassadors were present in the council when the patriotic refusal of Athens to accept the overtures of the Persians was communicated to Alexander. Aristides then to assure the Spartans that Athens would do her duty to her country, told their ambassadors to tell the Lacedæmonians that all the treasure on the earth, or under it, was of less value to the people of Athens, than the liberty of Greece.

The Lacedæmonians, however, were not possessed of the lofty ideals which prevailed in Attica. During the time these negotiations were progressing, the Spartans and their allies busied themselves in completing the fortification on the isthmus of Corinth to prevent an invasion of the Peloponnese. This work had been pushed vigorously the previous year, when Xerxes threatened the Dorian peninsula, and was restrained only by his defeat at Salamis. The Lacedæmonians and their allies believing that they could defeat the Persians if they should attempt to enter the Peloponnese, delayed sending the promised succor to the Athenians or to the

Megarians and Platæans. They did not in the slightest degree appreciate the patriotism of their countrymen who for love of liberty rejected the alluring proposals of Mardonius, but remained steadfast in their loyalty to Greece, and defied the threatening power of Persia. The Athenians were imbued in declining the tempting offers of the invaders with a commendable spirit of patriotism and devotion to the best interests of Hellas. The selfish conduct of the Lacedæmonians in seeking to shut out the Persians and permit Athens and her two allies on the hither side of their fortified wall to shift for themselves, showed that the Peloponnesians were neither patriotic nor public-spirited, nor possessed of even common honesty towards their own kinsmen in Central Greece. Their conduct on this occasion illustrates the difference between the enterprising, active, alert Ionian and the dull, stupid, phlegmatic Dorian. Indeed, had the Peloponnesians continued to ignore the claims of the Athenians, the latter, deserted by their kinsmen, save only Megara, and patriotic Platæa, might finally have been forced to become an ally of Persia, under the proposals of Mardonius, who wanted to make the Athenians not subject allies, but independent allies and give Athens control of Greece. The stupid and selfish Spartans, however, were at length reminded by Chilos, a Tegean, that the fortifications on the isthmus of Corinth would avail nothing against the combined fleets of the Persians and Athenians, should the latter form an alliance with Mardonius, as the Peloponnesian peninsula was on all sides, save at the isthmus, open to the sea.

The Spartan ephors, now for the first time, seemed to realize the danger of delay. They found that they could not with safety segregate themselves from Central Greece. On the night of the day the council was held, they sent forward an army of Spartans under Pausanias, their King. They then dispatched to Attica

and Salamis their swiftest couriers to apprise the Athenians that troops were on their way to aid in the liberation of Greece. The chosen rendezvous was Eleusis in Attica. Here the Athenians, under Aristides, crossed over from Salamis and joined the Peloponnesians. Allies arrived daily at Eleusis.

News of the Spartan advance was quickly communicated by his couriers to Mardonius, who feared to remain longer in Attica. He deemed it prudent to evacuate Athens. He recalled a body of horse which had been sent to ravage Megara. He had allies in Thebes and elsewhere in Bœotia, and decided to retreat to its more friendly territory. That city had warmly espoused his cause, and in Bœotia Mardonius determined to conduct his campaign for the subjugation of Hellas. His line of retreat from Athens was northward over the road leading to Dekelia, from there he advanced into Bœotia to Tanagra on the Asopus, and thence northwest to Thebes. He encamped north of the Asopus, near the city, where he collected all his forces in the hope of being able to defeat Sparta and Athens, and their allies in a pitched battle, on the plain on the banks of that river which divides the territory of the Platæans and Thebans, the latter being allies of Mardonius.


In order to form some idea of the operations on the Asopus, it is encessary to ascertain the character and topography of the ground on which the armies contended. The battle-field of Platæa embraced the territory lying between the city of Thebes on the north, and the city of Platæa on the south. These cities are about eight miles apart, the latter being southwest of Thebes. The Asopus rolls about midway between them. It flows from west to east across Bœotia and empties into the straits of Eubœa. The southeastern portion of the field is skirted by a range of hills, a spur of the Cithæron range, at the foot of which a branch of the

Asopus flows north into the main stream. In these hills are the villages Erythræ and Hysia, the latter being the most southerly. About seven miles to the north-west of Plataea stands the historic city of Leuctra, where, more than a century after the battle fought by Pausanias, Thebes, under the leadership of Epaminondas, gained the supremacy in Greece, and defeated the hegemony of Sparta. The river Cœræ flows down to the plain from Mount Cithæron, in front of the city of Plataea. Its branches proceed from their sources a short distance apart, Herodotus says about three stades (600 feet to a stade), and unite near the city, forming the main stream, which flows west and southerly into the Corinthian gulf. The land between these branches of the Cœræ is called the Island. The northern slope of Mount Cithæron forms the southern boundary of the field. This range also forms the boundary between Bœotia, Attica and Megaris.

Three principal roads cross the Asopus, and extend from Thebes south, through this territory. The most easterly runs to Panacton, through Attica to Athens. The middle road runs to Eleusis in Attica; the most westerly extends directly to Plataea, and thence south through the mountain passes to the Isthmus, and ports on the gulf of Corinth. The temple of the Plataean Here (Juno) occupied some point in or near the city of Plataea. The fountain of Gargaphia, which supplied the army of Pausanias with water for a time, is south of the Asopus, some distance west of the Molœis, a branch of the Asopus, and near the middle and eastern roads leading from Thebes. Not far from this fountain was the sacred grove of the hero Androcrates, near the extreme right of the Greek line, when aligned in its second position. Much speculation exists as to the location of the temple of the Eleusian Demeter (Ceres) around which the main battle was fought. It was not far from this temple that Mardonius was killed. Mr.

G. B. Grundy, who spent much time on the field and compiled an elaborate map showing its topography, places the location of this temple south of Gargaphia in the plain beyond the foot of the long ridges extending from Cithæron, near the valley of one of the small tributaries of the Asopus. Herodotus says that while the barbarians fought near the grove in which the temple stood, not one was seen to enter the sacred enclosure, or to die in it, but most of them fell round the precinct in unconsecrated ground. Mr. Grundy thinks the grove and temple stood on elevated ground. Mar-donius directed large quantities of timber to be cut down, and between the city of Thebes and the river, constructed a fortified stockade, more than a mile square, ten stades, Herodotus says (600 feet to a stade), with immense towers at the corners, and over the entrances to the stockade. This fortified camp was built as matter of precaution, should it become necessary to seek refuge in case of defeat. He deployed his cavalry from the river Skolos, a tributary of the Asopus, so as to threaten Erythræ and Hysia, and the entrance to the Platean territory.

The army of Pausanias consisted entirely of infantry. He had no cavalry, and but few archers. It will be observed in this connection that the Persians were skilfully trained horsemen, and expert archers. As soon as the Athenians under Aristides reached Eleusis, the soothsayer having consulted the slain victims and having pronounced the signs favorable, Pausanias began his march into Bœotia, without waiting for all his allies, who were instructed to join him. His army marched through the passes of the Cithæron and when they reached the northern slope of the mountain, were posted among the hills and ridges to Erythræ. Here Pausanias learned that the barbarians were encamped and strongly entrenched on the Asopus. He decided to form his line opposite the enemy. Here, on the slopes



of Mount Cithæron, opposite Erythræ, the Greek army took up its first position. The second position was south and west to the spring of Gargaphia, and the river Asopus. The third position was south and slightly west to what was called the Island, namely, a stretch of land between the branches of the river Cœræ, which flowed southwest from Platæa into the Gulf of Corinth. The Greek infantry when they formed their first line among the hills, at the foot of Mount Cithæron, refused to march out on the plain. Pausanias had no cavalry to oppose the Persian horsemen. Mardonius had commissioned as his first cavalry officer, Masistius, a Persian of noble birth. He was a skilful officer, a man of large stature and commanding presence. His armor consisted of a breastplate of golden scales, over which he wore a rich scarlet tunic. He rode a white charger, reared on the Nisæan plain in Medea, famed for its horses. The animal was richly caparisoned, and was controlled with a golden bit. This Masistius was the Maherbal, the Murat, the Sheridan of the Persian army at Platæa.

Mardonius sent his cavalry under command of Masistius to dislodge the enemy from the hills. They were armed with bows and javelins and though archers, fought as cavalry. The position of the Megarians on the line of battle exposed them to the concentrated attacks of Masistius. They did not consider themselves a match for the Persian cavalry and finding themselves outnumbered, sent word to Pausanias that they must be relieved or they would be compelled to abandon their posts. Pausanias then called for volunteers to relieve the Megarians. A body of three hundred Athenians, picked men, commanded by Olympiodorus, undertook to confront Masistius, and his body of cavalry. They were hoplites supported by a body of perhaps 3,000 archers. The contest was fierce and for a long time neither side would yield. The barbarians from time to

time charged in divisions, and being received by showers of arrows, wheeled and returned to the attack. During one of these charges, led by Masistius, the latter's milk-white charger, as the division was about to wheel, was struck in the flank by an arrow, and rearing on its haunches threw its rider. The Athenians knew from the conspicuous uniform of the wounded man that the Persian leader lay on the ground. They rushed upon him, and tried to kill him, but his golden armor resisted their assaults, until a spear or javelin was driven through his visor, pierced his eye, and caused his death. His soldiers were not aware at the moment that their leader had been killed. When they learned that he had fallen and was taken into the enemy's lines, the entire contingent of horse charged in a mad attempt to recover the body. Other troops in the line now came to the support of the Athenians and succeeded in driving off the enemy. The Persians being no longer able to hold their ground were forced to retire without recovering the dead body of their leader. Mardonius and the entire Persian army made great lamentations on account of the severe loss they had sustained. They shaved their heads and their beards, and filled all Bœotia with their wailings.

The Greeks were correspondingly elated. They took the body of the dead general and placed it in a conspicuous position in a cart, and drove it through their lines, that every soldier might see the remains of the commander who, next to Mardonius, was considered the best man in the Persian army.

After this incident the Greeks determined to leave the neighborhood of Erythræ, and take a new position past Hysia, in the Platæan territory, and here they drew themselves up, nation by nation, "near the fountain of Gargaphia, and the precinct of the hero Androcrates, on slight elevations and the level plain." The exact location of this second line forms the subject of discus-

sion concerning which modern historians are unable to agree. The language of Herodotus is given above. The difficulty arises from the inability to correctly locate the fountain, and the precincts sacred to Androcrates. We may safely assume, however, that Pausanias deemed it imperative to take up this new position. The reason assigned by Herodotus was that the Platean territory appeared to be much more convenient for them to encamp in "and it was better supplied with water." Hysia was much nearer the main Theban road, and commanded important passes of the Cithæron, through which fresh troops and supplies would have to come from Attica. Doubtless, the Persian cavalry hindered the Greek infantry and prevented them from obtaining water from the Asopus, or its tributaries. Pausanias, for reasons which appeared to him sufficient, abandoned his position near Erythræ, and moved his forces to the south and west, which commanded the spring of Gargaphia, which furnished an abundant water-supply. It was the ancient fountain of Diana, near which was the rock of Actæon, on which he was accustomed to repose when fatigued with the chase. Here it was said Actæon had seen the goddess bathing in the fountain.

Ever since Pausanias had entered Bœotia, he had constantly been receiving reinforcements. When he deployed his army in his new position, they were aligned nation by nation. Those who contributed to the army of liberation in the aggregate 110,000 men, are as follows:

1. Spartans (on the extreme right),	5,000	8. Epidaurians	800
2. Lacedæmonians (Period),	5,000	9. Trœzenians	1,000
3. Tegeans	1,500	10. Lepreates	200
4. Corinthians	5,000	11. Mycenæans Tirynthians	400
5. Potidæans	300	12. Phliasians	1,000
6. Arcadians (of Orchomenus)	600	13. Hermionians	300
7. Sicyonians	3,000	14. Eretrians and Styrians	600

15. Chalcidians	400	19. Æginetans	500
16. Ambraciots	500	20. Megarians	3,000
17. Leucadians and An- actorians	800	21. Platæans	600
18. Paleans	200	22. Athenians (on the extreme left),.....	8,000

Of these troops there were both heavy armed and light armed. The Spartans were also accompanied by their Helots who were light armed. Every Spartan was accompanied by a contingent of seven Helots. The army of Pausanias, therefore, may be summarized as follows:

Hoplites (Heavy armed)	38,700
Light armed Helots (7 to each Spartan).....	35,000
Other light armed troops.....	34,500
Thespians	1,800
Total Greek forces.....	110,000

It may be observed, also, that Xerxes permitted Mardonius to choose the troops that he wished to remain with him to complete the conquest of Hellas. They consisted of picked men in the expedition, namely, all of the Immortals except Hydarnes, their commander, who refused to be separated from Xerxes. The Persian cuirassiers also were retained and all the Medes, Sacæ, Bactrians and Indians both horse and foot, with picked troops drawn from other nations. His troops at Platæa numbered 300,000 and about 50,000 Greeks who formed an alliance with him.

Mardonius took up his position, as has been observed, on the opposite bank of the Asopus, facing the enemy. Both armies were desirous of engaging but feared to do so until the sacrifices were declared favorable. In that age, war had not yet been reduced to anything like a science. The soothsayer, or diviner, controlled the movement of armies. The advice of the soothsayer depended on what indications were derived from the

animal sacrifices which were offered to the gods, and the signs and portents which they revealed.

The soothsayer who accompanied the Greeks was Hippomachus. He advised that the victims were favorable so long as they stood on the defensive, but not if they began battle or crossed the Asopus. It is a singular coincidence that the soothsayer in the Persian camp, advised Mardonius precisely the same as the soothsayer in the Greek camp had advised Pausanias. He told the Persian commander that the victims boded well so long as the Persians remained on the defensive. Thus by the will of heaven, apparently, the opposing armies were obliged to remain inactive, as neither could safely attack the other, with promise of success.

Seven days had passed, and no general engagement had taken place. A Theban scout, who had been active in reconnoitering close to the enemy's line, brought intelligence to Mardonius, that supplies and fresh contingents were constantly coming in through the mountain passes. On the eighth day after the armies faced each other, Mardonius was advised to send at dusk a strong detachment of cavalry to a pass in the mountains which opens into Platæa, known as the Oak-Heads; but designated by the Bœotians as the Three Heads. They overtook a detachment of Greeks in the pass and captured five hundred beasts of burden, as they were about entering the plain. They slew all the cattle, and nearly all the men who had been sent with them. After this incident two days more passed but no general engagement had yet taken place.

Eleven days had now passed since the opposing armies faced each other in line of battle. During that time their operations consisted in sorties and raids of the Persian cavalry in their attempts to harass and annoy the Greeks among the foot-hills and passes of the Cithæron and cut off their supplies, sent through the mountain defiles, and prevented them from obtaining

water from the Asopus. The net results were the death of Masistius, the chief officer of the Persian cavalry, and the capture and slaughter of five hundred beasts of burden bringing supplies to the Greek army and a large part of the detachment accompanying them. There had been no general engagement, but during that time fresh bodies of Greeks had been arriving almost daily, until the army of Pausanias now numbered 110,000 men as above enumerated. The soothsayers of both armies had consulted the sacrificial victims and both commanders had received similar advice, that it would be inadvisable to take the offensive. The delay was irksome and tedious. Mardonius became impatient. He determined to break the fetters of superstition which compelled him to remain inactive. He held a council of war. The wisest advice was given by Artabazus. He seemed to understand the Greek character thoroughly. He told Mardonius that bribery was the most powerful weapon at his command and in the end would surely bring about the purpose he sought to accomplish. He argued that the Persians had gold and silver plate and utensils in abundance, and large quantities of gold coin. He advised that this should be used liberally to bribe the leaders in the army of Pausanias to corrupt them, and create dissensions in their camp. The result, he predicted, would lead to their disintegration. He argued that numbers of the enemy from corrupt motives would soon ally themselves with the Persians, as the Thebans and Thessalians had done. The views of Artabazus were supported by the Thebans who urged the adoption of the policy he had outlined. But Mardonius was proud and high-spirited. He regarded the methods proposed by Artabazus as base and cowardly and construed them as a reflection upon the courage and martial spirit of his army, and as tantamount to a confession that the Persians were unable to defeat their enemies in battle, but were obliged to resort to bribery

as the only means whereby they could prevail. He realized that he could not conduct his campaign on military principles or exercise any strategic manœuvres, so long as the movements of his army were dictated by soothsayers, who derived their information solely from the knowledge obtained from signs indicated by the smoking entrails of fresh slain victims, which were offered as sacrifices to the gods.

He finally inquired if any man in the council knew of any prophecy which foreshadowed the defeat of the Persian arms. None dared speak, well knowing the impatient temper of their commander at this particular time. Then Mardonius himself announced the prophecy with which he was familiar, which declared that if their arms should sack the Temple of Delphi, they would meet defeat and destruction at the hands of their enemies. But Mardonius declared that his troops would not attack the Temple of Delphi, and that he had not the slightest intention of doing so. And as this was the only divine utterance on the subject, it could have no possible application. He then gave orders to attack the enemy early the next morning and bring on a general engagement. Herodotus says that the prophecy which Mardonius related, with respect to sacking the Temple of Delphi, was well known. It had no relation to the Persians, but referred to the Illyrians and Encheleans. But he says there was a prophecy delivered by Bacis, which foretold the destruction of the bow-bearing Medes, despite Lachesis and the fates, when the destined day shall come.¹

Herodotus, at this stage, introduces the story of the visit of Alexander, King of Macedon, who came in disguise to the Greek camp to disclose to the Athenians the intention of Mardonius to attack on the following day. This action on the part of Alexander was prompted as

¹ Herod. ix, 43.

he himself declared, because in his veins ran Hellenic blood. "I also am a Greek," he declared, "and do not desire to witness the defeat of my countrymen. I am Alexander of Macedon."¹

A distinguished Greek scholar, in a paper entitled the "Greeks at Platæa,"² seeks to discredit this incident related by Herodotus. He declares that the dramatic declaration of Alexander, when he had delivered his message to the Greek generals, whereby he revealed his identity, was at least wholly unnecessary, because the writer assumes that Alexander was speaking directly to Aristides, commander of the Athenian forces. Aristides knew Alexander personally, because early in the season, the latter was chosen by Mardonius as his messenger, to visit Athens, and delivered to their leader, Aristides, his flattering proposals to make the Athenians nominal masters of Greece, not as subject allies, but tribute allies, and to create an Athenian oligarchy under the supervision and control of the Persian monarch, such as Thebes was. The writer assumes that this circumstance is enough to discredit this incident related by Herodotus. The fact that Alexander was personally acquainted with Aristides, without more, is wholly insufficient to discredit the incident, or to impeach in the slightest the narrative of the historian. It is probable that Aristides, who commanded the extreme left of the line, was present at the interview. It is possible, also, that Pausanias may have been present with other officers, not personally known to Alexander. The fact that Alexander disclosed his identity was perfectly natural, after he had given the important information. Those present, who did not know the messenger who came to them at night, in disguise, could verify his statement by referring to Aristides, who did

¹ Herod. ix, 45.

² Journal of Hellenic Studies, 1898.

know him. The declaration disclosing his identity, therefore, was far from being improbable, and added force to the statements made by Alexander.

When Pausanias was advised that he was to be attacked at daylight next morning, he determined to make a change in his line, so as to shift the position of his troops, in order that the Athenians and not the Lacedæmonians should face the native Persians, in the army of Mardonius. His line of battle in his second position, extended from the middle Thebes road, west, to cover the fountain of Gargaphia, a short distance south of the main stream of the Asopus. The right wing of the Greek army was at Gargaphia, the line then extended in a westerly direction past the grove of the Platæan hero Androcrates. The Lacedæmonians had the post of honor on the extreme right wing. The next most honorable position was on the extreme left, which was assigned to Aristides and the Athenians. The Tegeans took post on the left of the Lacedæmonians. The centre was occupied by the other cities and nations, as they called themselves, who composed the Greek army.

And now when it was believed a general engagement was about to begin, we read with astonishment that Pausanias, a Spartan, in whose veins ran the blood of Hercules, sought to change places in the line, yielding to the Athenians, the post of honor, the post occupying the place fraught with the greatest danger. Because the native Persians and Sacæ, the flower of the army of Mardonius, occupied the left of his line, which was opposite the Greek right, Pausanias ordered the Athenians from the left to the right of the line, assigning as a reason that the Athenians had tried the mettle of the Persians at Marathon, while his Spartans had never fought directly with them. And this proposal from a Spartan of royal blood, despite the sacred memories of Thermopylæ, destined to make the name of Sparta

immortal. Shades of Leonidas, cover the shame and temporary weakness of Pausanias.

Aristides, when he heard that his Athenians were to occupy the post of honor on the extreme right, received with genuine satisfaction the welcome intelligence. From the first he had expressed the desire to lead the right wing.

The Athenians, when on the extreme left, faced the Bœotians and other Greeks who had allied themselves with Mardonius. The Spartans, therefore, were placed on the extreme left opposite the Bœotians, while the Athenians who had been ordered to the right, now faced the Persians and Sacæ, the bravest men in the army of Mardonius.

When morning broke the Bœotians soon discovered that they were to fight Spartans and not Athenians. Mardonius, as soon as he learned the fact as to the new alignment, determined to fight with the Athenians and began to lead the Persians from his left opposite the Greek right. Herodotus observes that "when Pausanias saw that this was being done, perceiving that he was discovered, he led the Spartans back to the right wing; and Mardonius, in like manner, led his Persians toward the left."¹

Mardonius then sent a herald to Pausanias to challenge him to fight with an equal number of Lacedæmonians against an equal number of Persians, and let the armies abide the result of the duel. He upbraided Pausanias, charging that he and his Spartans who claimed to be the bravest of men, should shrink from direct conflict with barbarians. Pausanias, however, declined the challenge. Mardonius did not bring on a general engagement that day, as had been anticipated, but sent his cavalry to raid and harass the enemy. They shot their arrows and hurled their javelins from their horses

¹ Herod. ix, 47.

into the Greek infantry, and succeeded in driving them from the fountain of Gargaphia for a sufficient length of time to enable them to choke and fill up the spring, which, it seems, was their sole source of water-supply at this time, as it was impossible for Pausanias to get water from the Asopus, "by reason of the cavalry and the arrows."¹

A council of war was held in the Greek camp. The enemy's cavalry had practically cut off their water-supply, and were patrolling the mountain passes, making it impossible for the Greeks to get supplies for their army. It was resolved for these reasons to take up a new position on the Island between the forks of the *Ærœ*, in front of the city of *Platæa*. In that locality, there was abundance of water, and the many streams and ridges would largely protect them from the enemy's cavalry. It was determined to make the move in the second watch of the night, in order that the enemy might not see them setting out, and to escape pursuit by the Persian horsemen. It was resolved, also, that when they reached their new position between the forks of the *Ærœ* they would detail half their forces into the passes of the *Cithæron*, in order to bring in the attendants who had gone for provision, for they were shut up in the mountains.

When night brought relief from the arrows of the enemy's cavalry, and hostilities were suspended by reason of the darkness, a large part of the army marched away, "without any intention of going to the place agreed upon," while others fled towards the City of *Platæa*, and in their flight arrived at the Temple of *Here* (*Juno*) which stands before the city more than two miles (twenty stades, 12,000 feet) from the fountain of Gargaphia. Before the precincts of this sacred temple, they stood to their arms. Then Pausanias or-

¹ Herod. ix, 49.

dered the Lacedæmonians to proceed in the same direction, being under the impression that the other troops had gone to the Island, the place agreed upon. But the departure was hindered by a Lacedæmonian captain named Amompharetus, who had not been present at the council of war. He was astonished at the movement of the troops and declared impetuously that he would never fly from foreigners "nor willingly bring disgrace on the name of Sparta." A quarrel ensued which delayed the movement of the Peloponnesians until nearly dawn. Meantime, the Athenians, who occupied the extreme left, sent a herald to ascertain the movements of Pausanias. The herald arrived and was made aware of the conduct of Amompharetus. Finally, Pausanias lost all patience and declared that the obstinate captain was mad, and had lost his senses. He then addressed the herald which had been sent by the Athenians, and informed him of what had occurred, and bade him request the Athenians to act in harmony with the Lacedæmonians with regard to their departure from their present position. Amompharetus, however, continued to be obstinate, and refused to obey the orders of Pausanias. The latter, then fearing to delay his departure till broad day, withdrew his forces just before dawn, and kept to the rising ground, and the base of Cithæron, to avoid the enemy's cavalry, but the Athenians marched towards the plain. Amompharetus, then finding himself and his band alone, slowly retreated towards the main body, and joined Pausanias "at the river Molœis, at a place called Argiopiis, where stands a temple of the Eleusian Demeter (Ceres)" which is a little more than a mile (ten stades) from their former position at the fountain of Gargaphia.

When it was day, the Persian cavalry, as was their custom, rode out to harass and annoy the enemy. When they approached the vicinity which the Greeks had occupied the previous day, they found no enemy to oppose

them. They then rode on till they came upon the troops of Amompharetus, and pressed them closely. This cavalry force, however, were raiders and marauders, who carried on their operations independent of the main body of troops, far in advance of the Persian lines.

When Mardonius was advised by couriers from the cavalry, who operated south of the Asopus, that the Greeks had retired under cover of the night, he summoned three of his Greek allies, Thorax of Larissa, and his two brethren, who dwelt in Thessaly, and addressed them as follows:

“Sons of the royal house of Aleuas, what have you to say now when you see the place occupied by the Greek army deserted? You who dwell in their neighborhood reported to me that the Lacedæmonians never fled from battle, but were the bravest of mankind. But you recently saw them change their place in the line; and now, as all can see, they ran away in the night. When the time came for them to fight with the bravest warriors in all the world, verily they showed plainly that they were men of no worth, but had gained distinction among worthless Greeks. I can excuse you for praising the courage of men of your acquaintance, because you were ignorant of the worth of the Persians. But I marvel at Artabazus, that he should fear the Lacedæmonians, and on that account gave us foolish advice, bidding us break camp and remove to Thebes, and be there besieged by the enemy. As to this I shall take pains to acquaint the King. But of this hereafter. Now the enemy must be pursued. We must be avenged for all the wrongs they have inflicted, and which the Persians have suffered at their hands. We must not allow them to escape.”¹

Having made this brief address, he crossed the Asopus with the main army, for the first time during

¹ Herod. ix, 58.

his operations in Bœotia. Mardonius mounted on a blooded charger led the advance, and ordered the infantry forward at a double-quick. He directed his march against the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans only, whom he believed to be in actual flight; because, on account of the hills, he could not see the Athenians who had turned into the plain. When the commanders of the other divisions of the barbarians saw their general lead his Persians and Sacæ across the Asopus, they immediately took up their arms and standards, and all advanced pell-mell with a shout, in a throng without observing either rank or order, believing they were about to overwhelm the Greeks.

Meantime, Pausanias, when he saw the enemy's cavalry approaching, sent a courier to the Athenians, entreating them to come to his aid. From the tenor of the despatch, it would seem that Pausanias was under the impression that all of his army save only the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, who were with him, and the Athenians, who had marched forward on the plain, had deserted the field. The message is as follows:

“Men of Athens! Now that the crisis has arrived which is to decide the freedom or slavery of Greece, we twain, Lacedæmonians and Athenians, are deserted by all the other allies, who have fled from us during the past night. Nevertheless, we are determined what to do — we must endeavor, as best we may, to defend ourselves, and succor one another. Had the horse fallen upon you first, we with the Tegeans (who remained faithful to our cause) would have been bound to render you assistance against them. But since the entire body has fallen upon us, it is your place to come to our aid, as we are sore pressed by the enemy. If, however, you are so straightened that you cannot come, at least send us your archers, and be sure you will earn our gratitude. We acknowledge that throughout the entire war there has been no zeal to be compared to yours, and

entertain no doubt that you will listen to our request."

As soon as Aristides received the despatch, he resolved to go to the relief of the Spartans. As the Athenians were marching to their assistance, the Thebans and other allied Greeks on the side of the Persians, whose place in the line the day before was opposite the Athenians, fell upon them, and so harassed them, that they were unable to give to Pausanias the succor they desired. Thus it transpired that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, aggregating about 53,000 men, were left alone to fight the flower of the Persian army, led by Mardonius in person.

And now as the decisive conflict was about to begin, the Greeks began to offer sacrifices. For some time the victims were not favorable. While the Greeks thus remained inactive, awaiting the word of their soothsayer to pronounce the victims favorable, the enemy showered their arrows upon them with deadly effect. Many were killed and wounded during this period of inactivity. For the Persians made a rampart of their wicker shields, which they planted in the earth in their front, and from behind this improvised barricade shot clouds of arrows into the ranks of the enemy. The victims remained unpropitious, till at last, appealing for divine aid, Pausanias raised his eye towards the temple of Here (Juno) which stood in front of the city of Plataea. He called on the goddess, and besought her not to disappoint the hopes of Greece.

While he was still praying, his hands outstretched in supplication, amid the hail of arrows and javelins showered upon them by the enemy, the Tegeans, unable longer to remain inactive under the destructive darts of the Persian archers, advanced apparently on the impulse, before the Lacedæmonians received orders to attack. While Pausanias was yet supplicating the victims became favorable; the soothsayer foretold victory,

and then, after their long delay, the Peloponnesians advanced. The Persians, then laying aside their bows, prepared to meet the enemy in a hand to hand conflict.

At this point it might be profitable to pause and reflect upon the injustice of those modern critics, who seek to discredit the narrative of Herodotus, and declare that he was unjust, because he failed to recognize the merits of Pausanias as a great general. Some of these writers seem to think that Pausanias was a wonderful strategist and was not given credit by Herodotus for making his turning movement from Erythræ to the fountain of Gargaphia. It is obvious, however, that Pausanias did not depend upon military strategy at all in conducting the movements of the Greeks at Platæa. At the critical moment in that engagement Pausanias made no move when first attacked. He did not seem to contemplate strategy or seek to execute any sort of movement which might give him an advantage on the field. When attacked he prayed. When assaulted by the expert archers of Mardonius, when his men were falling about him, he was looking towards the Temple of Juno, his hands raised in supplication. This was in accordance with the superstition of his age.

In the fifth century B. C. public men engaged in important enterprises were accustomed to seek knowledge concerning future events by the art of divination. They depended in military affairs, in the great majority of instances, upon revelations made through the agency of soothsayers, who were supposed to be able to interpret signs and omens. Their armies were instructed as to their movements not by their commander who employed clever tactics, or who was particularly skilled in military training, but who relied on the diviner's art. When a critical situation arose, animal victims were sacrificed to the gods, to whom the soothsayer appealed for divine guidance. From the signs or

tokens revealed by the smoking entrails of the victims, he interpreted the answer to his supplications. These answers, it was believed, foretold future events. Thus, as at Plataea, the movements of the Greeks were directed, not so much by their commander, not by the skilled soldier, but by the prophetic seer.

It is obvious, also, that the military tactics of that period were exceedingly primitive. No general had, as early as B. C. 479, conceived the idea of deploying troops in echelon. Epaminondas, it is said, having been the first to devise the movement which was resorted to at Leuctra. Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, refers to the engagement at Plataea, and observes that the Lacedæmonians kept "together in the order of a phalanx" and in the final struggle forced the shields from the hands of the Persians. But though the phalanx was known to the Egyptians and Persians, and was resorted to at the battle of Delium, in the Peloponnesian War, it was first developed to a high degree of efficiency by Epaminondas, and was finally perfected by Philip of Macedon, and was thereafter designated as the Macedonian phalanx. We must also remember that Plutarch wrote nearly six centuries after the battle of Plataea, and after the art of war had developed to a point of efficiency, which was wholly unknown to military men in the time of Herodotus.

Pausanias, standing with his hands outstretched in supplication, gazing toward the temple of Juno, his troops falling about him under the severe assault of the Persian archers, presented a remarkable spectacle. But Plataea saw another sight. It has been observed that the Tegeans, unable longer to withstand the fierce assaults of the enemy, charged their lines without waiting for the prophetic utterance of the soothsayer. But we are told as soon as the Tegeans attacked, the victims became favorable, and victory was predicted. Then Pausanias ordered the Peloponnesians to charge. The

carnage was terrible. The Persians withstood them laying aside their bows. Herodotus, the only contemporaneous authority, gives this interesting description of the engagement (ix, 62 et seq.) using Cary's translation.

"First of all a battle took place about the fence of bucklers; and when that was thrown down, an obstinate fight ensued near the temple of Demeter (Ceres) and for a long time, till at last they came to close conflict, for the barbarians, laying hold of the enemy's spears broke them. Indeed, in strength and courage, the Persians were not inferior, but they were lightly armed; and were moreover ignorant of military discipline, and not equal to their adversaries in skill; but rushing forward singly, or in tens, or more or fewer in a body, they fell upon the Spartans and perished. In that part where Mardonius happened to be, fighting from a white horse, at the head of a thousand chosen men, the best of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries vigorously. As long as Mardonius survived they held out, and, defending themselves overthrew many of the Lacedæmonians. But when Mardonius fell, and the troops stationed round him, which were the strongest had fallen, then the others fled, and gave way before the Lacedæmonians. . . . Although the rest of the Greeks in the army of Mardonius behaved ill on purpose, the Bœotians fought with the Athenians for a considerable time. For those Thebans who sided with the Medes displayed no little zeal, so that three hundred of the most valiant among them fell by the hands of the Athenians. . . . At last the Bœotians too were routed and fled to Thebes."

Artabazus was never in sympathy with the schemes of Mardonius; he had under his command forty thousand men. After Mardonius had advanced across the Asopus, and brought on a general engagement, Artabazus drew up his divisions in order. After a time he

led out his forces towards the Asopus, as if he intended to cross the river and join in the engagement, but being in advance of his troops, when he saw the Persians scattered and broken, flying towards Thebes, he rode back along his lines and gave orders to retreat, not towards Thebes, but towards Phocis, his object being to get out of Greece as quickly as possible and reach the Hellespont at the earliest possible moment. That part of the Greek army which formed the centre, which fled to the Island, and were drawn up close to the temple of Here (Juno) in front of the City of Platæa, when they learned that Pausanias was gaining the victory, took up their arms and pressed forward without any order, and taking the upper road across the hills and skirts of Cithæron, marched straight towards the temple of Demeter (Ceres). The Megarians and Phliasiens followed over the road on the plain at the foot of the ridges. The latter, not having advanced in compact order, were attacked by a body of Theban cavalry, who killed six hundred of them. The others, in order to evade the Thebans, retreated into the Cithæron mountains.

The barbarians and their allies fled across the Asopus, and took refuge in the wooden fortress, which Mardonius had erected between the City of Thebes and that river. They succeeded in ascending into the towers before the Lacedæmonians came up. On the arrival of the pursuers, a sharp conflict took place. But the Spartans were not skilled in attack upon fortified places, but when the Athenians came up, after a hard fight, a breach was made in the stockade and the Greeks led by the Tegeans poured into the enclosure. The fortified camp which Mardonius had constructed then became a charnel house, in which thousands of the barbarians and their allies perished. It is said that, excluding the contingent of forty thousand men led into Phocis by Artabazus, the entire Persian army and its

allies were all slain, except about 3,000. This scanty remnant alone survived the battle.

The list of casualities among the Greeks was comparatively small. Of Spartans there perished ninety-one; of Tegeans, sixteen; of Athenians, fifty-two. Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, says that of the Greeks there perished in all thirteen hundred and sixty; and that the fifty-two Athenians who fell, all were of the tribe of *Æantis*. This apparent discrepancy between these two authors may be reconciled, if we assume that Plutarch included, in his estimate, the six hundred Megarians and Phliasians, who had fallen in the attack made upon them by the Bœotian cavalry, and that the remainder of those who fell in order to make up the total of thirteen hundred and sixty, included Helots who accompanied the Spartans.

The operations of the Persian army in Bœotia occupied about twelve days. The result was the death of Mardonius, who was slain by a Spartan named Arimnestus, by a blow on the head with a stone as had been foretold by the oracle, and the practical annihilation of his army, with the exception of the contingent of forty thousand men, under Artabazus, who were not engaged at all. Thus ended the battle of Plataea, which rendered impossible for all time the extension of the empire of Cyrus on the continent of Europe.

Scarcely had the Greeks achieved their victory over the Medes when, according to the account given by Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, a violent quarrel arose, as to whom, as between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, the first honors of right belonged, and who was entitled to erect the trophy to commemorate their triumph. Both nations claimed it. By reason of this dissension ruin was impending. The weakness arising from diversity, and the strength presented by unity and concord was never more apparent than on this occasion. The violence of the quarrel might have re-

sulted seriously had not the patriotism and constancy of Aristides saved his countrymen from themselves. He counselled the commanders, and pacified and finally persuaded them to leave the matter in dispute to be decided by a vote. One member of the council said the honor would have to be accorded to some city other than Sparta or Athens, if civil war was to be averted. The Solomon of the occasion happened to be Cleocritus, the Corinthian. When he arose to speak, all supposed he was going to ask for the honor on behalf of Corinth. But he won the applause of his hearers when he advised that in order to eliminate all contention and bitterness, they should give the reward and glory of the victory to the Platæans, at whose gates the victory was won, because such a selection could give offense to none. His suggestion was heartily seconded by Aristides on behalf of the Athenians, and then Pausanias voted aye on behalf of the Lacedæmonians. So the breach was healed, and all were reconciled; but the Lacedæmonians and Athenians each erected a trophy apart to themselves.

When the Greeks had broken into the fortified camp on the banks of the Asopus, where the enemy had taken refuge, the Tegeans fell upon the gorgeous tent or pavilion of Mardonius which they plundered. There was collected, also, when the battle was over, an immense amount of valuable booty including vast quantities of gold and silver coin and plate and tents decked with gold and silver, gilt couches and plated and golden bowls, and caldrons of gold and silver, and golden goblets and drinking vessels. The bodies of the slain were stripped of bracelets and necklaces of gold and of garments, encrusted and embroidered with gold, and numbers of scymetars, adorned with gold and precious stones. Xerxes, also, when he undertook his expedition for the conquest of Greece, sought to mitigate the hardships and rigors of a military campaign, by surround-

ing himself as far as practicable, with the elegance and luxuries of a Persian court. He, as well as his nobles and commanders, were accompanied by their favorite women in charge of the eunuchs collected in their harems. They were also surrounded by numberless slaves and servants, and had horses and camels and beasts of burden in abundance. Mardonius and his chosen officers, after Xerxes had returned to Susa, retained their luxurious harems, and their slaves and these formed part of the spoils of war which fell to the more frugal and abstemious Greeks, who seem to have been wholly unacquainted with these elegant surroundings, characteristic of oriental luxury.

The Helots were directed to collect the spoil. They stole what articles they were able to conceal about their persons, which they afterwards sold to the Æginetæ, as if it had been brass. When all the treasure had been collected, a tithe was set apart for the Olympian Zeus (Jupiter); a tithe to the Isthmian Poseidon (Neptune) and a tithe to the Delphian Apollo. One-tenth of the spoils was awarded to Pausanias and the remainder, including the balance of the Persian concubines and slaves, the horses and camels and beasts of burden, were apportioned among the victors. Pausanias was delighted with the elegant equipage, golden furnishings and various colored hangings of the Persians. He ordered the bakers and cooks of the household of Mardonius to prepare a supper, exactly as they would prepare it for their master, and was astonished at the profusion set before him. He then, in order to emphasize the contrast, directed to be prepared the simple frugal repast, to which the Laonians were accustomed. He then gathered his officers about him to note the great difference and remarked, "Men of Greece, I have called you together to show you the folly of the commander of the Medes, who having such fare as this, has come to us, who have such poor fare, to take it from us."

Among the spoils dedicated to Apollo was the golden bowl taken from the tent of Mardonius. This was placed upon a golden tripod placed upon a column of three brazen serpents, twisted round each other, their heads with gaping mouths supporting the golden bowl. This trophy was deposited in the temple of Delphi, and is known to posterity as the serpent of Delphi. Upon it Pausanias, upon his own authority, and without consulting with any one, placed this inscription:

Pausanias, Grecia's chief, the Mede o'erthrew
And gave Apollo that which here ye view.

The pride, vanity, arrogance and treachery of Pausanias subsequently proved his ruin. The Lacedæmonians at once caused the inscription to be erased, and upon the coils of the serpent of brass was inscribed in archaic Greek characters the names of the cities and states or nations who fought at the battle of Platæa.

The ancient relic, one of the most precious remains of antiquity, has been preserved through more than twenty-three centuries. During the second Sacred War waged by Philip of Macedon, the golden tripod was confiscated by the Phocians, but the bronze stand remained in the temple of Delphi for centuries. The modern Pausanias, traveller, archæologist, geographer and critic, who flourished about 160 A. D. visited Delphi, nearly seven hundred years after the battle of Platæa. He saw the serpent and wrote an account describing it. About a century and a half after the time of the modern Pausanias, Constantine the Great, early in the fourth century of our era, took the serpent from the temple of Delphi and placed it in the Hippodrome at Constantinople, where it still remains, a venerable relic of the past, and a memorial to the valor of the Greeks who fought at Platæa. The column of twisted serpents is bereft of the heads having been injured by the Turk,

Mahomet the Second, who with a stroke of his battle-axe, broke the under jaw of one of the serpents. The remnant of the stand on which the tripod and golden bowl of Mardonius rested is eighteen feet nine inches high, and is believed by scholars and archæologists, and among them Canon Rawlinson, to be the veritable stand of the original tripod. Professor Rawlinson says that "chemical solvents have been skilfully applied, and the characters now appear to have been well and deeply cut, the orthography has proved to be regular; and the form of the pedestal is recognized as stately and appropriate." Upon it also is found traces of the erasure of the elegiac couplet, which Pausanias caused to be inscribed upon it, without authority from any one, as stated by Thucydides (i, 132).

After those who had fallen in the engagement had been buried with appropriate honors, a council of war was held, as to what ought to be done with the leading citizens of Thebebs, who had joined the Medes, given aid and comfort to the enemy, and fought with barbarians against their own countrymen. It was resolved to march at once to the gates of the city, and demand that the two conspicuous traitors, whose names were well known, should be surrendered into their hands. The army marched to the gates of Thebes, and demanded the two men Timagenides and Attaginus. The demand was refused, and the army of liberation began to besiege the rebellious city. They laid waste the surrounding territory and vigorously attacked the walls for a period of twenty days when at the request of Timagenides himself, the Thebans agreed to surrender the men, but Attaginus made his escape. When his sons were surrendered in his stead Pausanias refused to hold them, saying, the children had no part in the offense. Other offenders were, however, surrendered, all of whom were taken to Corinth and executed without trial.

Artabazus, in fear, pursued his retreat through

Phocis and Thessaly. He was afraid that if the inhabitants learned that Mardonius had been killed and his army defeated, they themselves might be surprised, attacked and cut to pieces. Artabazus, therefore, told the Thessalians that he was sent into Thrace with all despatch on important business; that Mardonius and his army were close behind and might be looked for shortly. Artabazus succeeded in reaching Byzantium, but a great part of his army perished on the road, many being cut to pieces by the Thracians, others dying from hunger and excess of toil.

On the same day that the Greeks gained their great victory at Plataea, their countrymen, who sailed from Delos in the fleet commanded by Leotychides and Xanthippus, the father of the illustrious Pericles, obtained a decisive victory over the Persians at Mycale in Ionia. This campaign in Asia Minor will now be considered.

CHAPTER XXVII

WARS FOR PERSIAN EXPULSION

MYCALE — Mik-a-le — [Μυκαλή]. A headland in Ionia, on the coast of Asia Minor, stretching westward into the Ægean Sea, separated from the island of Samos by a narrow channel less than a mile wide. It is at the base of Mount Mycale, the last peak of the Messogis range extending from Lydia to the extremity of the peninsula, which terminates in the promontory or headland of Trogyllium. Miletus, on the north shore of the peninsula, is fifteen miles southeast. In the channel which separates Samos from the mainland and on the shore of the continent, the Persians were defeated, on the 23d of September B. C. 479, the same day that Mardonius was killed and his army defeated at Platæa.

PLATÆA and Mycale. Both fought on the same day. Both contests were waged by Greeks against Persians, and in both the Greeks were victorious. At Platæa was secured the liberty and independence of European Hellas. At Mycale the Ionian Greeks were delivered from the gauling tyranny of Persian despotism. At Platæa, the death of Leonidas was avenged. At Mycale the murderous raids, conducted by Artabazus against the Greek colonies of Potidæa and Olynthus, were likewise avenged. At Platæa the wars of liberation were ended, and the remnants of the invading army of Xerxes driven from the soil of Hellas. At Mycale was begun the wars of expulsion, designed to drive the Persians from the western shores of Asia Minor, from Thrace and the northern and eastern islands of the Ægean sea. On the day when these two engagements took place, Greece entered upon a new career. Her arms had driven the invader from her shores, and had

begun also a series of campaigns to drive the hosts of Persia from Europe and Asia Minor. At Mycale was laid the first stone in the foundation on which was constructed the supremacy of Greece and the future glory of the Athenian empire.

These two battles, fought September 22, B. C. 479, one on the plains of Bœotia, near the base of the Cithæron Mountains, the other on the headland in Ionia, at the foot of Mount Mycale, constitute the final Persian disasters in the third and last expedition for the invasion of Greece. The first expedition fitted out by Darius was wrecked on the rocks of Mount Athos B. C. 492. The second was shattered on the plain of Marathon, B. C. 490. The third and most formidable of all, under Xerxes, was defeated at Salamis, B. C. 480. This was supplemented, B. C. 479, by the dual victory of the Greeks at Platæa and Mycale. This double defeat of the barbarians not only extinguished the hopes and ambitions of Xerxes to extend the sceptre of Cyrus and Darius in the west, but destroyed his power over his Greek subjects in Asia Minor. The final effort of Persia to enslave Hellas and to retain its supremacy in the Ægean, later met disaster at the mouth of the Eurymedon on the coast of Pamphylia, B. C. 466, where Cimon, the son of the great Miltiades, completed in Asia Minor, the work which his illustrious father begun at Marathon.

When Xerxes fled to Asia, after his overwhelming defeat in the naval engagement at Salamis, his son-in-law, Mardonius, the ablest man in his empire, could not endure the spectacle of the most formidable army ever collected, retreating from Europe, without having engaged the enemy, except at Thermopylæ, where a few hundred men led by Leonidas were massacred. He prevailed upon Xerxes to permit him to retain a part of the army in Thessaly, in order that as soon as the spring opened he could advance into Attica, and defeat the

Hellenes, conquer Greece in a land engagement and retrieve the name and glory of Persia. The Persian fleet, however, sailed across the *Ægean*, and was stationed by Xerxes in Ionia, to guard the island of Samos and other Greek islands on the coast of Asia Minor and prevent them from throwing off the Persian yoke and achieving their independence.

The Grecian fleet, during the winter B. C. 480-479, collected at the island *Ægina* in the Saronic Gulf. The Greek colonists in Asia Minor were anxious to revolt and gain their independence. To aid in this design they secretly sent ambassadors to Sparta and to the Greek fleet at *Ægina*, commanded by Xanthippus, the Athenian, and Leotychides, the Spartan, who claimed direct lineal descent from Hercules. They besought their countrymen to sail to Samos, in order to assist the Samians and other Greek colonists to gain their liberty and independence, assuring them that as soon as their fleet came to Samos, the inhabitants would turn against their Persian masters, and with the aid of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, they would be able to overthrow the power of Xerxes. The Greek admirals, however, aware that Mardonius was in Thessaly with a powerful army, with which he contemplated conducting military operations against Attica in the spring, consented to sail only as far as the island of Delos, which lies nearly midway between Greece and Asia. It is 100 miles southeast of *Ægina*, and 75 miles southwest of Samos. Herodotus says the Greeks at first would not sail further east than Delos, and that the Persians, or barbarians, durst not sail further west than Samos. Thus the winter passed.

While the Greek fleet was at Delos, the Samians sent three other ambassadors to entreat them to come to their relief. By a strange coincidence, the name of one of these ambassadors was Hegesistratus, which means "leader of the army," who was very insistent, and as-

sured Leotychides that the moment the Ionians saw the Greeks they would revolt from the Persians and that the barbarians could not withstand them, or if they did, the Greeks would not find booty anywhere half so rich. He reminded him also that the stake for which they were playing was not Samos alone, but the Greek islands in Asia Minor, north of Caria, and the cities of the Hellespont. He also reported that the Persian ships sailed badly, and were not fit to fight, after the injuries inflicted on them at Salamis. Finally, Leotychides said to the ambassador, "Friend, what is your name." The answer came like an inspiration, "Hegesisistratus" (leader of the army). "I accept," said Leotychides, regarding the name as an omen of success and good fortune, "only pledge me your faith that the Samians will be our zealous allies." They immediately gave the pledge, and made oath of confederacy with the Greeks. Sacrifices were offered, the auguries were favorable, and the Greek fleet sailed east from Delos with all speed to Samos, and when they reached the island, took their station near a landing on which was erected a temple to Here (Juno). The Persians, at the approach of the Greeks, fearing a repetition of the disaster at Salamis, concluded that they would not risk a naval engagement but would fight on land. They permitted the Phœnicians to sail home, and then sailed to the headland of Mycale, on the continent, and put themselves under the protection of the land forces there, an army of 60,000 men under Triganes, who surpassed all the Persians in beauty and stature. Under the protection of this army, the commanders of the navy beached their ships and threw up a rampart of stone and wood. They cut down the fruit-trees, drove sharp stakes around the rampart and prepared to sustain a siege.

The Greeks, when they learned that the enemy declined to fight at sea, and had gone to Mycale to join the Persian land forces, sailed thither. Leotychides

employed the tactics used at Artemisium by Themistocles. He believed that the Greek allies in the Persian camp would turn against their oppressors, when assured of the support of their countrymen. He accordingly sailed as close as possible to the land, and then made loud proclamation in the Greek tongue, which the Persians, Herodotus tells us, could not understand. "Men of Ionia," he called out to his kinsmen on shore, "when we engage each of you remember first of all, Liberty, and next the watchword Hebe, and let him who does not hear this, learn it from those who do."

The Greeks then beached their vessels and formed in line of battle on the shore. The Persians were suspicious of the Samians. They knew that a warning of some kind had been given to them from the ships of the Greeks. The barbarians, by way of precaution, disarmed the Samians. The troops from Miletus, being originally Greek colonists, could not be trusted at this critical juncture any more than the Samians. They were sent from the field to guard the mountain passes, in the rear of the army, and to prevent surprises from that quarter.

The Persians were then drawn up in order of battle and brought their bucklers together to serve as a rampart and prepared to receive the advancing Greeks.

The tradition of the battle of Mycale has preserved the story that through the interposition of Heaven, in some mysterious manner, the Greeks, who were now advancing on the Persians in the afternoon of the 22d of September, learned that their countrymen had advanced against them at Plataea that very morning; that Mardonius had been killed and his broken and defeated army was even then flying before the victorious Greeks. This was the rumor they heard, as they advanced to meet the enemy on the headland of Mycale. They were told that a herald's staff was seen lying on the beach, through which this mysterious intelligence had been in

some way communicated. The rumor sent a thrill of triumph through the ranks, inspired the soldiers with greater courage, and made them eager to complete at Mycale in Asia, the discomfiture which Persia had suffered in Bœotia, while invading Greece across the *Ægean*, more than two hundred miles to the west.

The battle was stubborn and well contested for a time, but the barbarians were unable to withstand the fierce assaults made upon them by the Greeks. Their fortifications were taken, and they fled in disorder. The native Persians fought with great bravery, and were the last to retreat. Mardontes and Tigranes, with the pride of the old soldiers of Cyrus, refused to quit the field, and died fighting. The Samians revolted in the midst of the battle, and did all they could to aid their countrymen, doubtless arming themselves with weapons of their fallen oppressors. When the retreating barbarians attempted to escape, the Milesians, whom they had posted in the rear, in the passes and defiles of Mount Mycale, now in full sympathy with their kinsmen, led the Persians into false trails and ambushades, and finally fell upon them and massacred the barbarians, while they were attempting to elude their pursuers. After the battle, the Greeks collected great quantities of booty and secured several chests of money, which they loaded on their vesesls, and having burned the ships and fortifications of the enemy, sailed away.

The direct results of the battle of Mycale was the formation of a bund or coalition, among the Greek islands in Asia Minor, Samos, Chios and Lesbos, who formed a Confederacy to stand together, and maintain their freedom and independence. This coalition was the beginning of the greater and more formidable alliance, brought about by Athens after the capture of Sestus and Byzantium, known as the Confederacy of Delos.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CONQUEST OF THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE — XERXES THE AHASUERUS OF THE BOOK OF ESTHER — CRUELTY OF QUEEN AMESTRIS (VASHTI) — CRUCIFIXION OF THE PERSIAN GOVERNOR OF SESTUS

SESTUS — Ses-tus — [*Σηγρος*]. A port on the Hellespont in the Thracian Chersonese (now the peninsula of Gallipolis), opposite Abydos in Asia. Sestus derives its celebrity from song and story. It was the home of Hero, the beautiful priestess of Aphrodite (Venus), the lover of Leander who dwelt in Abydos, across the channel, and nightly swam the Hellespont to woo her. Leander, the glory of Abydos, and Hero, the charm of Sestus, have been called the Romeo and Juliet of antiquity. Sestus and Abydos were the points in Europe and Asia where were constructed the termini of the bridge of Xerxes, over which he crossed with his immense multitudes on his expedition against Athens. Sestus was besieged and taken by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, B. C. 479 after his victory at Mycale.

AFTER their victory at Mycale, Leotychides and Xanthippus returned to Samos, and there received the Æolians, Hellespontians and Ionians, their confederates in war. A conference was held with these allies to consider as to the best manner in which to take advantage of their success. It was at the urgent solicitation of these Asiatic Greeks that their kinsmen in Europe were prevailed upon to sail from Delos to Samos; where off Mount Mycale they destroyed the remnant of the Persian fleet which had escaped from Salamis.

The enthusiasm inspired by that victory throughout the Greek cities in Ionia was instantaneous. Their patriotism was stimulated. They pleaded with their kinsmen from the mother country to make the fruits of

their success permanent. They urged the formation of a confederacy of Asiatic Greeks, believing that if their kinsmen in the west acted in harmony with them, they would be enabled to secure the independence they enjoyed before the Ionian War, and break forever the despotic power of Persia, which reduced them to bondage. They argued that by their united efforts the results of the Ionian War could be reversed, and the advantages gained by Darius at the battle of Lade, and the conquest of Miletus would be nullified.

At this conference the mother country was represented only by its two principal cities, Athens and Sparta. These city-states had always dominated the affairs of Greece. They had fought together at Artemisium and Salamis, at Platæa and Mycale. These victories, except the last named, if we may class Artemisium as a victory, had been won in Greece, and resulted in the expulsion of Persia from the shores of Hellas. Mycale was won on the continent of Asia, and resulted in the liberation of certain of the Ionian Greeks from the Persian yoke. The wars of liberation in Greece were over. The struggle for liberty in Asia Minor had just begun. The wars for the liberties of Greece were wars of expulsion, whereby the Persians were driven out. The war begun at Mycale must likewise be a war of expulsion. Persia must be deprived of her cities and fortified places in the eastern *Ægean*, in *Æolus*, *Ionian* and *Caria*, and their inhabitants restored to their political freedom, and permitted to again enjoy the blessings of peace under the guarantees of civil liberty. The despotism of Persia must be broken, and Grecian autonomy must be re-established if the fruits of Mycale were to be made permanent.

When and how was this result to be accomplished? Sparta and Athens must decide. On this occasion was prominently displayed that lack of harmony and spirit of jealousy between these two cities, which continued to

increase as the breach widened between them, till the friction became unbearable, broke up the unity of the Hellenic nation, and finally resulted in the Peloponnesian War, which ruined Greece.

After Mycale, therefore, the question was how to protect the Greek cities of Asia Minor from the tyranny of Persia. Leotychides did not favor a confederacy of Ionian cities supported by a European Greek navy. The Spartans were not enterprising. They were parsimonious in the extreme and did not seem to be desirous of securing the commercial advantages, which were sure to result from foreign conquests. Sparta was not a commercial city, but an armed camp. The state consisted of a military brotherhood, rather than a commonwealth of enterprising citizens seeking to increase their prosperity by commercial enterprises and to secure thereby the luxury and refinements which come with increasing wealth and business success.

Sparta suggested that the Asiatic Greeks should quit Ionia and Æolis and return to the land of their forefathers. They argued that those Greeks in Europe who had allied themselves with Persia should be expelled to make room for the Greeks who should return to the land of their ancestors. They urged that disloyal Greeks should no longer be permitted to dwell in Hellas. They should be attainted, their lands and cities forfeited to the state, and conferred upon those Asiatic Greeks, who should return to the country whence came their ancestors.

This proposition did not appeal either to the Ionians or to the Athenians. The idea was repugnant to their notions of dignity and propriety. The thought that the Greeks, after defeating the Persians, both at home and in their own empire, should suddenly abandon their kinsmen who had established themselves in Asia Minor, and desert their cause, was altogether distasteful to Xanthippus. Athens was an enterprising commercial

centre. It had planted numerous colonies about the frontiers of civilization. When this conference was held Athens lay in ruins, having been almost entirely destroyed by Xerxes and Mardonius, but with the expulsion of the Persian arms from the shores of Greece, the patriotism and enthusiasm of the Athenians, led by Themistocles and Aristides, was never more intense. Athens must at once be rebuilt. Her colonies must be protected. Her commercial greatness must be extended until Athens should become the mistress of the *Ægean* and the most powerful city in the world. Such were the dreams of her admirals and statesmen.

Xanthippus was an energetic and enterprising commander and appreciated the advantages gained at Mycale. The more he pondered on the situation the more he became convinced that the suggestions of Leotychides would be offensive to the Athenians. The proposition could not be entertained. To take the Asiatic Greeks away from the land where their ancestors had sustained prosperous cities for more than two centuries would be humiliating in the extreme. Xanthippus accordingly suggested to the Spartan admiral that they grant the request of the Asiatic Greeks, and assist them to throw off the yoke of Persia. Those from the Hellespont who had attended this conference at Samos, especially requested that the united fleet should sail thither, and drive the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese, and take Sestus the portal through which Xerxes entered Europe, over the bridge he had constructed from Abydos.

But the phlegmatic temperament of the Dorian was too dull to comprehend the great advantages to be secured by continuing the campaign in Asia. He was, however, curious to learn whether the bridge which Xerxes built remained intact, over which another army might be led into Europe. More than a year had elapsed since Xerxes fled with his fleet and army from

the shores of Greece. But there were in those days no means of swift communication, and we are told, the Greek admirals were ignorant as to whether the bridge across the Hellespont had been kept intact by the Persian King. Leotychides, therefore, consented to accompany Xanthippus to the Hellespont that he might ascertain and report the facts as to whether this bridge which constituted a military highway from Asia to Europe still remained intact. Stormy weather detained the fleet at the mouth of the Hellespont but it finally sailed to Abydos, and thence across the channel, immediately opposite Sestus. To the great relief of Leotychides, he learned that the bridge of Xerxes had been destroyed by the winds and tempests, but fragments of the huge cables of which it was in part constructed, were still to be seen on the shore, where they had been carried by the wind and tides. He secured pieces of these cables which he took aboard his ship to carry to Sparta as a memento of the memorable campaign of the previous year.

Before the fleet lay Sestus, a most important point. Its possession and occupation by the Greeks meant the control of the Thracian Chersonese and the Hellespont. Xanthippus urged Leotychides to tarry, and aid him in laying siege to the place. He pleaded his cause in vain. The Peloponnesians declined to take part in this ambitious and patriotic enterprise for the glory of Greece and humiliation of Persia, and the Spartan sailed home with his fleet.

The Athenian, however, saw the great advantages of securing the control of the Hellespont. He concluded with the aid of the Ionians, Hellespontians and Asiatic Greeks to conduct a siege for the capture of Sestus.

Xerxes was at Sardis when he learned of the death of Mardonius and the defeat and destruction of his army at Platæa. The news of these reverses seemed to mortify his pride, and extinguish whatever ambition he

may have had when he led into Europe the most formidable armament the world had ever seen. He became apparently indifferent to the success of his arms and devoted his entire time to the gratification of his lusts and passions. He devoted himself to the erotic pleasures of his court, and indulged in the ribald revelry which characterized his drunken feasts in order to drown the memories of the shame and humiliation occasioned by the failure of his expedition to Greece and the decisive reverses sustained by his arms in Europe and Asia.

In this connection Herodotus relates an incident in the life of Xerxes involving his illicit relations with his own kin. It was an amour tinged with a bloody tragedy resulting in the death of his brother Masistes, one of the Persian officers who survived the battle of Mycale. It exhibits also the cruel malignity and jealous hate of Xerxes' favorite wife, who in her blind fury, caused the wife of the unfortunate Masistes to be horribly mutilated although the victim of her vengeance was absolutely innocent, and entirely free from blame in the matter. The story is interesting because it gives us an opportunity to look back more than twenty-three centuries into the past, and get some idea of the absolute power of the Persian King over the lives of all of his subjects, including those who frequented his court, formed part of the royal household, embracing even the members of his own family.

It presents not only a vivid picture of the degrading morals of that age and the horrors of an eastern seraglio, but possesses added interest from the fact that many scholars believe that Xerxes and not Darius was the Ahasuerus of the Book of Esther, and that the cruel and malignant Amestris was Vashti, his favorite queen, whom he subsequently divorced. The story finds a parallel in the dramatic scene in the life of Herod the Great, who at his birthday feast granted the request

of Herodias, who at the instigation of her mother, demanded that the head of John the Baptist be delivered to her in a charger.

The incident took place after Xerxes had bestowed unusual honors upon Xenagoras and made him satrap of Cilicia, because he had saved the life of his brother Masistes, who was attacked by Artayntes, whom Masistes had upbraided for incompetency at the battle of Mycale.

His sister-in-law, the wife of his brother Masistes, resided in Sardis, during the sojourn of Xerxes in that city at the time of the disaster at Mycale, and was frequently invited to his court. The King conceived a strong passion for her, and pressed his attentions unceasingly. She, however, gave no heed to the many tender messages sent to her by the King, and steadfastly refused to yield to his solicitations. As she was the wife of his own brother, Xerxes hesitated to use violence, to accomplish his purpose. Instead, he conceived the idea of causing his own son by his queen Amestris to marry his niece, Artaynta, the daughter of the wife of Masistes. After the usual ceremonies of the betrothal, Xerxes, unmindful of the military operations which threatened his dominions in Ionia, took his departure for Susa. At the royal palace in his winter capital he received, with great pomp and ceremony, the bride of his son, the daughter of his brother's wife, with whom he was enamored. But at Susa a change came over him. He seemed to lose his admiration for the wife of Masistes, but conceived a passion for his son's bride, to whom he transferred his affections. Artaynta carried away by the arts and flatteries of Xerxes yielded to his desires and solicitations. Amestris, it seems, was desperately in love with her husband, and gave him a costly robe of many colors, which she had wrought with her own hands, like the coat that Jacob gave to his son Joseph, as a token of his love.

The King was much pleased with the robe, the gift of his favorite wife, and wore it frequently. On one occasion, he put it on, when he went to visit his daughter-in-law Artaynta. He was so pleased with his visit to her on that occasion that he requested Artaynta to make any request she pleased and swore that whatever it might be it would be granted. To his great surprise the girl asked him for the robe he wore, the costly garment his wife had woven with her own fingers. In vain Xerxes besought her to substitute for the robe whatever she wished, — cities, heaps of gold, an army which would obey no other commander. Though his power was absolute he seemed to dread the consequences of complying with her request. Amestris would surely detect his secret love for his daughter-in-law, which she already suspected. But Artaynta was steadfast and at last he reluctantly gave her the robe. She was very proud of the gift and often wore it. It was not long until the whole story came to the ears of Amestris.

The queen, strange to say, harbored no resentment against Artaynta, but determined to torture and kill her mother, the wife of the King's brother, for somehow she conceived the idea that the mother alone was the author of the intrigue with her husband. She waited till the annual banquet which Xerxes was accustomed to celebrate on his birthday. On that day the King made a great feast, to his lords high captains, chief officers and courtiers. It was an occasion worthy the powerful head of a great empire. The halls of the palace shone with the riches of his vast kingdom where were "white, green and blue hangings, fastened with cords of fine linen and purple to silver rings and pillars of marble; the beds were of gold and silver, upon a pavement of red, and blue and white and black marble."¹ Thus the

¹ Book of Esther, i, 6. The better opinion seems to be that Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was the Ahasuerus of Esther.

feast of Ahasuerus is described in the Book of Esther. The wine was served in goblets of gold, the vessels being highly wrought and of diverse designs and patterns. On this great feast-day, but at no other time, the King soaps his head and delivers gifts to the Persians; for the law governing the feast declares that no one who craves a boon at the King's table on that day shall be denied his request.

Taking advantage of her opportunity his queen Amestris asked Xerxes to grant the boon she craved and said if he desired to please her he would bestow upon her as a gift the wife of his own brother Masistes to deal with as she chose. For a long time Xerxes refused to listen to this shocking and monstrous proposal, which required that he should put the life and happiness of his sister-in-law at the disposal of his queen. But the law of the feast was allowed to prevail. The King yielded and gave the unfortunate woman into the power of Amestris.

Xerxes then sent for his brother and bade him put away his wife and marry his niece, a daughter of Xerxes, whom he offered to give to him, instead of his present spouse. Masistes told his brother that it was indeed a great honor to be permitted to marry a daughter of the King. But he said he dearly loved his wife, who had borne him children to whom he was deeply attached. He begged Xerxes not to use force to compel him to obey his wishes, but pleaded to be permitted to live with his wife. In a rage Xerxes said that Masistes should neither marry his daughter nor live with his wife. Masistes, in great distress, went out from the presence of the King, saying, "Master, thou hast not yet taken my life."¹

During this interview between Xerxes and his brother, Amestris sent for the spearmen of the royal

¹ Herod. ix, 3.

body-guard and commanded them to seize the wife of Masistes, and wound and lacerate her beyond recognition. The spearmen did as their queen had directed and at once proceeded with the butchery. They cut off her two breasts, her nose, ears and lips and cast them to the dogs. In order that she might never be able again to speak to her husband or children, they tore out her tongue by the roots, and thus bleeding and disfigured they sent her to her home.

Such were the morals and manners of the Persian court in the age of Xerxes.

When Masistes reached his house and saw the mutilated and ruined body of his wife, he took counsel with his children. He decided to make war on his brother. With his sons and a body of adherents he set out for Bactria, a people by whom he was greatly beloved, intending to stir up an insurrection in that country. But his plans having been betrayed, he was murdered by the King's emissaries, before he reached his destination. Thus Masistes failed in his purpose to visit condign punishment on the cowardly wicked and cruel Xerxes.

If this story of Masistes is correct, Xerxes was not at Sardis but at Susa when the Greek fleet sailed to the Hellespont and laid siege to Sestus.

The purpose of Xanthippus and his allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, after Leotychides had sailed away and abandoned the further prosecution of the campaign, was to take Sestus. It was the most important city on the Thracian Chersonese. That peninsula at the eastern extremity of Europe runs three days' journey, about sixty miles into the sea, and terminates in the promontory of Mastusia. It is washed on the west by the waters of the gulf of Melas and the sea of Thrace (the *Ægean*) and on the east by the narrow Hellespont, which separates it from the adjacent shores of Asia. This peninsula is the last fron-

tier of Europe. Along its shores in that day were populous cities and towns, separated by stretches of woods interspersed by green pastures and arable lands. On the eastern shore were Pactye, Crithote, Gallipolis, Cœla, Sestus, Madytus, and far to the south, Elæus. On the west near the neck of the peninsula was Cardia founded by the uncle of the noted Miltiades long before the Scythian expedition of Darius, Alopeconnesos, Limnæ and Araplus. Sestus, however, was the principal port on the Hellespont and its possession would not only enable its captors to reduce the peninsula but would give them control of the Hellespont, and the carrying trade from Byzantium and the Euxine. Its importance appears from the language of Thucydides (viii, 62) who says it was "the post for the defense of the entire Hellespont."

When Xanthippus conducted his operations, Artayctes was in command of the Persian garrison at Sestus. He was not prepared to stand a siege, as the Greeks came upon him unexpectedly and he had not sufficient time to provide himself with provisions and other things necessary to enable him to make any considerable resistance. He was a wicked and cruel tyrant. He had incurred the hatred of the inhabitants of Elæus, a city at the southern extremity of the peninsula, where stood the temple dedicated to the memory of the hero Protesilaus. His name was hallowed because it was said he was the first Greek killed in the Trojan War. He commanded a squadron in the fleet of Agamemnon and was the first to leap from his vessel on the shores of Asia, and fell a victim of the spear of the noted Hector. His tomb was within the edifice at Elæus, surrounded by a sacred grove. There were accumulated sacred offerings and a great store of vases of gold and silver, works in brass, robes and richly embroidered garments. All this wealth had been obtained by the Persian Artayctes, with the consent of Xerxes,

when the latter crossed the Hellespont with his army. After the army of invasion had left the Chersonese, on its western march Artayctes took the treasures from the temple at Elæus and brought them to Sestus. Not satisfied with the wealth he had secured, he determined to insult the Greeks by destroying the sacred grove about the temple which he cut down and made these hallowed precincts, cornfields and pasture lands. His base instincts prompted him to still further outrage the feelings of the Hellenese on the Chersonese. He even polluted the sacred shrine, by harboring there his concubines, when he visited Elæus for pleasure or recreation. Now the day of retribution drew nigh. He was about to receive condign punishment at the hands of Xanthippus.

The Greeks vigorously prosecuted the siege. It was getting late in the autumn and those in the fleet began to murmur at being kept abroad so long. But the captains would not listen to their entreaties to return to Greece until they had taken Sestus or until their own countrymen ordered them to return.

It was not long until the Persian garrison began to suffer for want of provisions. Great numbers had flocked to Sestus from the neighboring towns, when they learned that that stronghold was being besieged and among them Œobazus, who had been stationed at Cardia. But these contingents required to be fed. The provisions of the garrison were soon exhausted. They were reduced to such extremity that they boiled the cords of their beds, which were made of thongs, cut in strips from the hides of animals, and ate them. When there was nothing left to eat, Artayctes and Œobazus, with the native Persians, made their escape by night, and fled having let themselves down from the wall at the back of the town, where there were stationed but few of the blockading forces. At dawn the citizens threw open the gates of their city. It was at once occupied

by the army of Xanthippus, who detached a strong body of troops to pursue the flying Persians. Œobazus fled to Thrace, where he was captured and he and his companions were put to death by the half civilized tribes of that region. Artayctes, who had been the last to quit his post, retreated northward, and was overtaken at Ægospotami, where that stream flows into the Hellespont, about ten miles north of Sestus, opposite Lampsacus, on the coast of Asia, the spot which seventy-five years later marked the closing scenes of the Peloponnesian War. And now unusual punishment was about to be meted out to the impious and cruel Persian commander, who had wantonly outraged the religious feelings of the Hellenese and whose temples he had defiled. All the prisoners taken at Ægospotami, including Artayctes and his son, were brought back to Sestus in chains.

The story is told of the premonition entertained by Artayctes concerning his fate. His keeper was broiling fish, when suddenly they squirmed and quivered in the pan, as if still alive. The soldier was at a loss how to interpret the phenomenon. Then his prisoner, Artayctes observed: "Fear not, Athenian stranger, because of this marvel. It has not appeared on thy account, but on mine. Protesilaus of Elæus has sent it to show me, that albeit he is dead and embalmed with salt, he has power from the gods to chastise his injurer."¹

He then offered immense bribes to secure the liberty of himself and his son, and said he would give two hundred talents for the life of each. But the men from Elæus who wished to avenge the memory of their hero, Protesilaus, entreated Xanthippus to put him to death. Then the Athenian commander ordered that the impious Persian be led to execution. The place chosen for the purpose was the spot where the western ter-

¹ Herod. ix, 120.

minus of the bridge of Xerxes had stood, though according to another account, it was on a knoll above the town of Madytus. He was nailed to a plank which was hoisted aloft, securely planted in the earth, and left hanging there until death released him from his agony. To aggravate his punishment, his son was brought to the spot where the parent hung, and was stoned to death beneath the eyes of his dying father. Having reduced Sestus and secured control of the Hellespont which was garrisoned by his allies, the fleet of Xanthippus returned to Greece, laden with the rich spoils of this memorable campaign. He took with him also the remnants of the shore cables from the bridge of Xerxes, to be placed in their temples and dedicated as mementos of the deliverance of Hellas from the yoke of Persia.


At this point we must take leave of Herodotus, who closes his entertaining detailed and interesting history with the siege and capture of Sestus. This venerable author is in the main our only source of information as to the period of the Persian Wars, and posterity is indebted to him and to his successor Thucydides, for the knowledge we possess of the events constituting the early history of Greece.

CHAPTER XXIX

CYPRUS AND BYZANTIUM

CYPRUS — Si-prus — [Κύπρος]. An island off the coast of Phœnicia and Cilicia. It occupied a strong strategic position as a naval base, commanding Egypt and the Delta of the Nile, Phœnicia and the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, Cilicia, Pamphylia and Lycia, constituting the southern coast of Asia Minor, the island of Rhodes and the eastern entrance to the Ægean Sea. Partly reduced by a Peloponnesian and Athenian fleet under Pausanias, B. C. 478.

BYZANTIUM — Bi-zan-shi-um — [Βυζάντιον]. A city on the extreme verge of Europe, situated on a peninsula at the apex of the triangle facing Asia, formed by the Bosphorus on the east, the Golden Horn on the west, and the waters of the Propontis (Sea of Marmora) on the south. It extends on both shores of the Golden Horn. On the peninsula proper the city is now designated Pera and Galata, and is connected with ancient Byzantium, now Stamboul, at two points by the Galata and Golden Horn bridges. The city in Bithynia in Asia across the Bosphorus, known to the ancients as Chalcedon (Χαλκηδών) is now Scutari. Byzantium A. D. 330 was designated Constantinople, so christened in honor of himself by the Emperor Constantine. Besieged and taken from the Persians by the Spartan admiral, Pausanias, B. C. 478.

UR information as to the events which transpired in Greece covering the period of forty-eight years intermediate the fall of Sestus B. C. 479, and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War B. C. 431, is rather meagre. Herodotus concludes his interesting and entertaining history with a brief account of the expulsion of the Persian forces from the port city of Sestus, on the Hellespont¹ (q. v.). The civil and military affairs

¹ Chap. 28, *ante*.

which occurred intermediate that event and the surprise at Plataea B. C. 481, which was the first military operation in the long war between Sparta and Athens, has been sketched briefly by Thucydides in the chapter which constitutes his introduction to his noted history of that disastrous conflict. This authority is supplemented chiefly by the information which can be gleaned from the lives of the men of that period, written in such entertaining fashion by Plutarch of Boeotia and from the later history of Diodorus of Sicily.

The battle of Mycale in Asia Minor was fought on the same day that Pausanias defeated Mardonius at Plataea. No permanent confederacy had then been formed for the purpose of freeing the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian yoke. But immediately after the battle of Plataea, while the army was still encamped on the field, and while Leotychides and Xanthippus were absent, conducting their campaign in Asia Minor, a general assembly of representatives of all the Greeks was called, to supplement the first pan-Hellenic Greek Congress held on the Isthmus under the guidance of Themistocles, to make preparations to resist Xerxes. The purpose of this second conference was to devise ways and means to guard against any further invasion which might be undertaken by the barbarians for the subjugation of Hellas. At this assemblage a decree was proposed by Aristides, and adopted by the Assembly, that the Greek states should send representatives who should assemble annually at Plataea and should there celebrate every fifth year the Eleutherian games to commemorate their freedom. It was decreed further that a levy should be made upon all Greece for ten thousand spearmen, and one thousand cavalry, constituting the land force, and also a fleet of one hundred triremes. This was to be the standing army and navy to protect Hellas against the barbarians. But the Plataeans, it was agreed, should be exempt, and were not to be called

upon to furnish troops either for the land or naval forces.

When Leotychides returned to Sparta, after the successful campaign at Mycale, it was agreed that a fleet should be sent to the East to assist in the expulsion of the barbarians from Cyprus, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The squadron consisted of fifty ships, twenty furnished by the Peloponnesians and thirty by the Athenians. The chief command was given to Pausanias, the victor of Plataea. The Athenians were led by Aristides, and Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon. We are not informed that Xanthippus accompanied the expedition, although his ability as a commander was evidenced by his victory at Sestus. It is highly probable that he was chosen strategus that year as Themistocles was. Their services doubtless were needed at Athens, as the city was then being rebuilt on a grand scale, within the new walls, which had been erected in spite of the protest of the Peloponnesians. This fleet was organized in the spring, B. C. 478, the year after the battle of Plataea, in conformity with resolutions passed while the Greeks were still encamped there. The Asiatic Greeks were in readiness to coöperate with them, and contributed a number of ships. We have no accurate information as to the number of triremes which joined Pausanias in the East, but Professor Curtius estimates that perhaps fifty vessels were added to the expedition making the fleet of Pausanias in the aggregate about one hundred triremes.

Pausanias conducted his squadron first to the island of Cyprus. The fact that this island was made the first objective of the Greek fleet, shows the extent of the ambitious schemes entertained by the Hellenes. Their country was now independent. The move upon Cyprus shows that the expedition sent out by authority of the pan-Hellenic council at Plataea was sent as

an army of invasion and conquest. The position of the island made its occupation extremely important as a military base. It was essential in connection with the island of Crete to the command of the Mediterranean. It formed the naval base for operations against Egypt, as it commanded the Delta of the Nile. It was at the gateway to the eastern *Ægean*, and lay in the path of vessels from the eastern Mediterranean to the islands on the western shores of Asia Minor. It commanded the coasts of Syria and Phœnicia, of Lycia, Pamphylia and Cilicia. We have no detailed information with regard to the operations of Pausanias at Cyprus. Thucydides in his introductory chapter to his history of the Peloponnesian War gives us what information we have in part of a sentence. He says (i, 94), "they (the Athenians and Peloponnesians) first made an expedition against Cyprus of which they subdued the greater part, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Persians, and was taken while he (Pausanias) was still in command." The commerce of Greece, however, was not dependent so much on the reduction of Cyprus, as upon the control of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, which commanded the trade of the Euxine and to a certain extent all of the Greek colonies in Thrace, and around the borders of the Propontis and the Euxine. Byzantium was perhaps the most important point in Europe so far as this trade was concerned. It was necessary also to drive the Persians from their strongholds at Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, and from Thasos and other islands in the northern *Ægean*, or Sea of Thrace.

Pausanias, therefore, concluded not to consume the entire season in the conquest and reduction of Cyprus, being content with having reduced the greater part of it, he determined to make an attack on Byzantium.

This ancient city on the Bosphorus which possessed

such great commercial advantages derived its early celebrity also from the poems of antiquity.

Prior to the seventh century B. C. the work of colonization had not begun in the regions about the Bosphorus, the Propontis and the southern shores of the Euxine. The early traditions of that locality beyond the records of authentic history belong to the shadowy domain of legend and fable. Before Agamemnon sailed from Aulis with the Greeks, in his hollow ships to invade the Kingdom of Priam, Jason and his companions, in the ship Argo, penetrated to the extreme confines of the world and sailed to Colchis in search of the Golden Fleece. His course took him through the Hellespont, the Propontis, the Bosphorus, past the site of Byzantium, and along the south coast of the Euxine to its eastern borders to the land of mystery, where Medea, the sister of Circe, exercised her sorcery and magic art to aid Jason in his quest.

Pindar, in the Fourth Pythian Ode, doubtless refers to the site where ancient Byzantium was afterwards built, when he relates how Jason offered sacrifices when he reached the Bosphorus at the mouth of the Euxine. Here is Cary's version of Pindar's lines:

Conducted by the breezy south,
They reached the stormy Euxine's mouth;
There a shrine for Neptune reared;
Of Thracian bulls, a crimson herd
Were ready; and heav'n founded stone,
Wide spread, to lay the altar on.

It was not until B. C. 656, that the navigator Byzos, a son of Neptune, sailed away with his companions, recruited in Argos and Megara, and founded Byzantium. Tacitus says they were directed thither by an oracle of the Pythian Apollo, who, when asked where they should build a city, replied, "that they should seek a situation opposite to the habitations of blind

men." The riddle had reference to the Chalcedonians, who first visited the locality, and saw the advantages of the site on the coast of Europe, yet blindly crossed to Asia and chose an inferior site on the opposite side of the strait. The work of colonization was extended by the Megarians and Milesians, who subsequently founded Selymbria on the north coast of the Propontis, opposite Cyzicus on the south coast, and Heraclea, Sinope and Trapezus on the south shore of the Euxine, and Sestus and Abydos on the Hellespont.

Byzantium, B. C. 478, was garrisoned by a large Persian force, commanded by kinsmen of Xerxes. The Greeks besieged it vigorously. Finally the garrison was forced to surrender and Pausanias became master of this most important stronghold at the mouth of the Euxine. We have no record concerning the details of the siege. Whether the enemy were reduced by famine, or opened their gates through treachery, we can only conjecture. All we know is that the Persians were driven from their most important stronghold in Europe. The conquest was completed by the reduction of Chalcedon, now Scutari, designated by the oracle, "The City of the Blind," situated on the opposite shore of the Bosphorus, in Bithynia, in Asia. With the reduction of these cities the Bosphorus passed from the control of Persia to the control of Greece. The reduction of Sestus and the Thracian Chersonese, the year before, by the fleet under Xanthippus, made the Hellenese masters of the Hellespont, and being now in possession of the Bosphorus they controlled unobstructed the great highway of commerce from the Euxine through the Propontis to the Ægean. These were the important advantages which resulted from the two successful campaigns in Asia Minor, and were the first fruits of the efforts of united Hellas to emancipate their countrymen in the east from the dominion of Persia.

The reduction of Byzantium was the last achieve-

ment of Pausanias. Soon after his occupation of that important port, about B. C. 478, he opened negotiations with Xerxes in which he sought to sell his sword to Persia, marry the daughter of the Great King, subjugate Greece, and make it an appendage to the Persian Empire. The capture of Byzantium, also, was the last triumph of united Greece. The arrogance, vanity and treachery of Pausanias rendered his conduct insufferable and by reason of his selfishness and tyranny, the captains and generals of the Greeks refused longer to serve under him. They came to Aristides, and requested him to be their general. When the reports of his conduct reached the Ephors at Sparta, he was recalled and relieved of his command. On his departure Aristides and Cimon were chosen commanders, and the officers and men thereafter refused to serve under Dor-kis, who was sent by Sparta to command in Pausania's stead. At Byzantium, therefore, Greek unity ceased. Sparta withdrew from the allies, whose fleets and armies were operating in the Thracian Chersonese, and Athens assumed the hegemony in the affairs of Greece, which resulted in the upbuilding of the Athenian Empire.

In view of the fact that the Peloponnesians declined to coöperate any further with the Athenians and their allies, the latter, B. C. 478, set about to form a new confederacy with the Asiatic Greeks under the leadership of Aristides and Cimon, known as the Confederacy of Delos.

CHAPTER XXX

CONFEDERACY OF DELOS, B. C. 478

DELOS — dè-los — [Δῆλος]. An island of the Cyclades in the Ægean Sea, sacred to the Greeks as the birthplace of the twin deities, Apollo and Artemis (Diana). It is about midway between the shores of the Peloponnesus and the east coast of Asia Minor, and was selected as the capital of the new confederacy from which the latter takes its name.

AFTER Pausanias was recalled by the Ephors of Sparta because the seamen and soldiers of the Greek fleet at Byzantium refused any longer to serve under him or to obey his orders, Sparta sent Dorkis, a new admiral, to take the place of the victor of Plataea. The captains and members of the expedition, however, had appealed to Aristides and Cimon to take command of the fleet, so that when Dorkis arrived it was too late for him to urge his claims as commander. Sparta declined to serve under an Athenian admiral, and Dorkis withdrew the Peloponnesian ships, abandoned the expedition and sailed back to Greece. This movement on the part of the Peloponnesians transferred from Athens to Sparta the leadership which the former had previously exercised. It became necessary, however, in order to prosecute the war for the expulsion of the Persian arms from the islands in the Sea of Thrace and to establish the independence of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, to procure funds and establish an alliance imposing upon its members the obligation to contribute money, men and ships necessary to support a fleet, requisite to the undertaking. This was the object sought to be attained by the formation of a new

confederacy. The alliance among the Greeks represented in the conference on the battle-field of Platæa was pan-Hellenic. Sparta, however, and her Peloponnesian allies having withdrawn from the expedition in the east after the recall of Pausanias, it became necessary that Athens should take the lead. The Confederacy of Delos, therefore, was essentially an Athenian enterprise.

The date of the formation of the Confederacy of Delos, which has been generally placed about B. C. 476, has now been definitely ascertained to have been B. C. 478. A few years ago Aristotle's treatise on the Constitution of Athens was discovered in Egypt. The author declares that after the discredit brought upon the Lacedæmonians by the misconduct and treachery of Pausanias, Aristides guided the public policy of Athens. "It was he," says Aristotle, "who arranged the tribute from the various allied states, which was first instituted two years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes."¹

This powerful league was the instrument which enabled Athens to build up an empire, and to become during the period of her supremacy, the most noted city in the world. The formation of that Confederacy is a conspicuous illustration of the power of unity. The alliance formed at Platæa was intended to be pan-Hellenic and was designed to bring about what might with propriety be termed the United States of Greece. The coalition, however, as has been observed was impaired by reason of the jealousy and indifference of the Lacedæmonians, who, after the recall of the Spartan admiral Pausanias, who had been its head, declined to longer remain a party to the alliance. Sparta, however, had no real sympathy with Athens, because the former never would countenance a democratic form of

¹ Aristotle's Athenian Constitution. Ch. 23.

government. Sparta was and had always been an oligarchy. Athens was a republic, an imperial republic, but nevertheless strongly attached to principles of democracy. Athens was Ionian, Sparta Dorian. The Athenians were active, ambitious, public-spirited, patriotic. The Spartans were narrow, tyrannical, phlegmatic and antagonistic to any form of popular government. This radical difference between the politics and temperament of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians was never reconciled, and finally resulted in the downfall of Greece, and the subjugation of her people. It was this radical difference, also, that enabled Athens, in spite of Sparta to use the powerful organization represented by the Confederacy of Delos and the wealth contributed to its Treasury, to prosecute the wars which expanded her power into an empire, and to use that wealth to beautify and adorn the capital of Attica. When Pericles succeeded on some plausible pretext in removing the treasury of the organization from Delos to Athens, and to expend its treasure raised and assessed for military purposes, for the personal aggrandizement of his native city, his enemies, as Plutarch observes, publicly berated the great statesman, and charged him with squandering the treasure which was contributed by Athens and her constituent allies, as a necessity for the war, and wantonly lavishing it upon the City "to gild her all over and adorn and set her forth as it were some vain woman, hung round with precious stones and figures and temples, which cost a world of money."

The organization of this military and political alliance was the result of apprehension on the part of the Hellenes of further inroads and invasions of Persia.

The defeat of the Persian army at Plataea, the death of Mardonius, and the destruction of the Persian fleet at Mycale on the coast of Asia Minor, and the reduction of Sestus and Byzantium, put an end to the de-

signs of Xerxes for the subjugation of continental Hellas. The aspirations of the Hellenes took new life, after the great victory at Salamis, and the triumph over Persia at the battle of Platæa and restoration of the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks. It was obvious, however, that Persia, though its armies had evacuated Greece, was still a powerful enemy. Its occupation of many cities and ports in Macedonia and Thrace was a constant menace to Greek commerce in the Hellespont and the Euxine. The Greek colonists in Asia Minor and in the cities and islands of the eastern Ægean and in the Cyclades archipelago, not under the domination of Xerxes, were constantly in dread of the Persians, and their numerous allies, for her empire when Xerxes invaded Greece embraced the civilized world, save continental Hellas.

Just as the American colonies, after they had secured their independence of the mother country, found it essential in order to maintain their liberties to form a confederacy, and enter into an alliance offensive and defensive under Articles of Confederation, so Athens, in order to maintain her independence and commercial supremacy and to protect the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks, found it essential to form a pan-Hellenic Confederacy with all Greeks in Asia Minor, both Ionian and Dorian, and with the insular cities, and communities scattered through the Ægean Sea. Dread of Persian conquest and invasion was the centripetal force that gave cohesion to this political confederacy, which had its geographical centre or capital on the island of Delos, in the bosom of the Ægean.

The Confederacy had its genesis in an expedition fitted out B. C. 478 the next year after the battle of Platæa, under command of the Spartan Pausanias, which immediately went to the relief of the Greek cities in the island of Cyprus, then under the Persian yoke, and having liberated them, sailed north into the Helles-

pont and Bosphorus, and took the ports of Sestus and Byzantium (q. v.) thus securing uninterrupted communication for Greek fleets and Greek commerce from the Euxine to the Ægean. Although Athens contributed more ships to this expedition than did Sparta and the Peloponnese, the Athenians being under the immediate command of Aristides and Cimon, yet the Spartan Pausanias was commander-in-chief of the expedition, this honor, no doubt, being the result of his having achieved the highest distinction as the victor of Plataea.

After these achievements, while the fleet was in the Bosphorus, Pausanias, notwithstanding his great reputation as a successful and patriotic general, grew to be overbearing and cruel. Avarice became in him stronger than patriotism. He grew weary of the stern discipline and frugal customs of his country, and like a Sabyrite, sought the luxury and ease indulged in by the Lotus-eaters in the palaces at Sardis and Susa, Persepolis and Ecbatana. He sought to sell his sword to Persia, one of the conditions being that the daughter of the Great King should be given him in marriage, Pausanias having agreed on his part to conquer Hellas for the Persian monarch. Before his treason could bring forth fruit, Pausanias was recalled and died in disgrace B. C. 496, while seeking refuge from condign punishment.

When Pausanias sailed home to the Peloponnese, he took his triremes with him, and the Athenians, Aristides and Cimon, were chosen admirals and at once took command of the fleet. The Spartan government sent out Dorkis to take the place of Pausanias, but when he arrived with his triremes, Athens was in control, having gained an advantage by reason of the cruelty and tyranny of Pausanias, which it refused to yield, and never relinquished for a period of seventy years.

After the retirement of Aristides, Cimon succeeded to the supreme command of the naval forces in the *Ægean*. Under this illustrious son of Miltiades, and his successor, Pericles, Athens achieved her highest renown. The hegemony of Athens under the Confederacy of Delos, culminated in the Athenian empire, Athens having finally secured the maritime control of eastern Europe and the *Ægean* sea.

After the recall of Pausanias, Sparta, always jealous of Athens, refused to coöperate in the plans of the Confederacy, and advocated a return of the Ionian and Doric Greek colonists to Hellas, rather than to police the *Ægean*, and protect them where they were. The plans of Sparta were not followed, and the latter refused to enter the Confederacy, but devoted her energies to establish Lacedæmonian dominion on land, while her rival Athens, was establishing her supremacy on the sea.

The constituent members of the new Confederacy willingly agreed to make contributions both of ship and money. Among them were the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the *Æolic* Lesbos and Tenedos, the *Ægean* islands of Thasos and Naxos, also cities on the continent of Asia Minor including Miletus. Byzantium, on the Hellespont, was also a member.

The island of Delos, from which this Confederacy derives its name, lies in the *Ægean*, midway the Peloponnese, and the west coast of Asia Minor, immediately between the islands of Syros and Myconos, and about ninety miles almost due west of Patmos, immortalized more than five centuries later, as the island to which St. John the Divine was banished (A. D. 96), where the apocalyptic vision was revealed, an account of which is contained in the New Testament scriptures, in the wonderful Book of Revelations.

The various municipalities and states which com-

posed the Confederacy of Delos, under the rules of the coalition sent their representatives to a Synod which met periodically in the temple of Apollo and Artemis, on the sacred island of Delos. Each member of the Confederacy agreed to contribute its quota in money, ships and men. The amount of the assessment was required to be ratified and approved by the Synod, in which all the members were represented.

After the treasury of the Confederacy had been removed from Delos to Athens, for the reason assigned by the Samians and others that there was danger in case it remained longer in that remote island, that it might fall into the hands of the barbarians, Athens, which was President of the league, became its sole disbursing agent. To insure protection to the constituent members of the Confederacy against Persian invasion, was the specific object and purpose for which the allies consented to tax themselves. They agreed to contribute each respectively its pro-rata share of the common fund, either in ships and men, or their equivalent in money. The amount of the annual assessment first adjusted by Aristides and approved by all as essentially just and fair, was \$460,000 (460 talents). In the time of Pericles the annual tribute had been increased and was then \$600,000 (600 talents¹).

¹ The monetary table in use at the time consisted of drachmas, shekels and talents, as follows:

100 drachmas	1 shekel
60 shekels	1 mina
60 minas	1 talent

The money value of a talent in use in Syria, Palestine and Phœnicia is variously estimated approximately from \$1,700 to \$2,000. The Attic talent contained 60 minas or 6,000 Attic drachmas, equal to 56 pounds and 14 ounces. As a denomination of silver money, it was equal to about \$1,000. — *Century Dictionary*.

The Athenian empire had reached the period of its greatest prosperity when Pericles was in control of affairs. It is interesting in this connection to note the conduct of the great statesman with respect to the use of this war fund paid into the treasury of the Confederacy. He appropriated a large part of it, not in the prosecution of military operations conducted for the purpose of protecting the constituent members of the Confederacy from Persian invasion, but to maintain and extend the Athenian empire, and to wage war, not of Greek against Persian, but of Greek against Greek, to punish, keep in subjection and subdue refractory members of the league, and to beautify and adorn the capital of Attica, which under the guiding genius of Pericles became the most attractive and ornate city in Europe.

Fear of Persian invasion, the cause which made a common war fund necessary for the protection of Hellas had long ceased to exist. The Athenian arms under the illustrious Cimon and Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, had completely humbled the power of Persia. After her crushing defeat on land and sea at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia (B. C. 466), what further need was there to continue the annual tax, imposed upon themselves by the members of the Confederacy, save only to police the *Ægean* to suppress marauding pirates, who infested its waters. After the Peace of Cimon, Persia abandoned the idea of further conquests in Europe or of the Islands of the *Ægean*, or the re-conquest of the continental Greek cities of Asia Minor. The arms of Persia had been not only driven to the coast-line. They had been driven inland so that not even a letter carrier, or single horseman or courier was seen to approach within four hundred furlongs of the sea. What need then to continue the tax, much less increase the burden from four hundred and sixty to six hundred talents.

Mr. Grote observes that this increase may have been more apparent than real. His argument is based on the assumption that many members of the Confederacy, from time to time, elected, instead of contributions of men and ships, to pay over their equivalent in money, under the rules and regulations of the league. For this reason, the money tribute showed an increase. Just prior to the commencement of the Peloponnesian War, the tax aggregated six hundred talents. Before the end of the war, the amount was thirteen hundred talents, more than a million and a quarter of dollars.

Be this as it may, it would seem that the conduct of Athens, in appropriating the moneys of the league to its own aggrandizement, after the object for which the tax originated, no longer existed, was unfair and unjust, to the other members of the Confederacy. Discontent arose and caused Naxos, first (B. C. 466) and then Thasos (B. C. 465) to revolt. They were kept in subjection by the Confederacy and were taxed to support the armament which subdued them.

The argument of Pericles by which he sought to justify his course, in appropriating the money from the treasury of the Confederacy, will not bear judicial scrutiny. He argued that Athens was not obliged to account to its allies for moneys paid into the coffers of the league, so long as Athens defended her allies, and prevented the barbarians from attacking them. Many of the allies, he contended, did not supply one horse, or man, or ship, but money only, "which money," he said, "is not theirs that give it, but theirs that receive it, if so be, they perform the conditions upon which they receive it." He argued also, that he used only the surplus over and above what was actually necessary for military purposes, to improve and adorn the capital of the Confederacy so as to reflect eternal honor and credit upon all.

Aristides would, doubtless, had he lived, have char-

acterized this argument as showing a course of conduct of extreme selfishness, as to Athens, and as most unjust and unfair to every other member of the Confederacy. It is morally certain that the members of the league would never have voluntarily consented to tax themselves to build temples and public buildings in Athens. When the fear of Persian invasion ceased, the right to levy and collect the tax ceased also.

But, as has been observed, the formation of the Confederacy of Delos, was the nucleus of the Athenian empire. Athens, as the head, and as the strongest and most influential member of the league, used the organization to furnish the means of extending and strengthening that empire, and compelling its weaker members to contribute annually to that object. Athens argued also that in its strength, the weakest ally found its sure protection, and its constant defense.

It is true that Pericles was ambitious; that he used the moneys contributed by the allies for purposes other than that for which they were contributed. But Pericles, in addition to his ambition, possessed also high and ardent patriotism, and used his best endeavors to make the Confederacy not an Athenian league merely, but to have it become universal throughout Greece, and as far as possible pan-Hellenic in character. He knew, perhaps, better than any man of his time, that the struggle between Athens and the Lacedæmonians was bound to come. He did all in his power to postpone the evil day. In order, if possible, to prevent so great a calamity to his country, he sought a remedy by attempting to unite Greece. To this end, the assembly, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree to summon to Athens, representatives of all Greeks, whether in Europe or Asia, to a general assembly to consult and advise as to the welfare of Greece, and to devise ways and means concerning commercial intercourse, and the navigation of the sea, that

every Greek, no matter from what part of the world, might pass to and fro, and trade securely, and be at peace among themselves. Commissioners were sent out, pursuant to this decree among the Ionians and Dorians in Asia Minor, among the islands on its western shores, including Lesbos and Rhodes; into Thrace, along the Hellespont, and to Byzantium, into Bœotia and Phocis, into the Peloponnese and Thessaly, and into Acarnania and Ambracia. These commissioners were deputed to induce and persuade the Greeks they visited to send representatives to Athens to take part in the great convention called to settle the peace and regulate the affairs of Greece.

It was a patriotic and highly laudable undertaking, worthy of the genius of Pericles. Had success crowned his efforts, there would have been no Peloponnesian war, and united Greece would have stood against the world in condition to anticipate the enterprises of Alexander, and the subsequent dominion of the Roman empire. The enterprise, however, was thwarted, by the envy and jealousy, which the oligarchical Lacedæmonians always entertained towards its democratic rival in Attica. Sparta secretly worked against Athens, and conspired to destroy any prospect of Greek unity, determined never to follow where its rival led. In this jealous rivalry we have the secret of the downfall of Athens, and the ultimate ruin of Greece. The Confederacy of Delos never became pan-Hellenic as originally designed. It remained Athenian, and enabled Athens to contend with the Lacedæmonians for supremacy for twenty-seven years, until exhausted financially, and debauched and corrupted with Persian gold.

During the first ten years of the Confederacy, its principal achievements, aside from its efforts to rid the Ægean and the coasts of Hellas and Asia Minor of the pirates, which preyed on the commerce of Europe and Asia, were the siege and capture of Eion on

the river Strymon in Thrace, B. C. 471 (q. v.), the reduction and conquest of the island of Scyros, B. C. 470, and the reduction of Carystus, on the southern extremity of the island of Eubœa, B. C. 468 (q. v.). Athens, during these years, had dominated the Confederacy, controlled its naval forces and established a maritime empire. In B. C. 466, the Persians were defeated on land and sea, at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, and the danger to Greece and its insular possessions from Persian invasion was at an end.

The contest with Sparta, for the hegemony on land, which followed, are known as the Hellenic wars, which were finally concluded after the Athenian defeat at Coronæa (q. v.). After this disaster Pericles concluded the treaty known as the "Thirty Years' Peace," B. C. 445 (q. v.), which postponed the Peloponnesian War for fifteen years. The "Thirty Years' Peace," however, was finally broken at Sybota, B. C. 432 (q. v.), and this engagement was immediately followed by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war at Plataea, B. C. 431.

CHAPTER XXXI

ARISTIDES

THE two conspicuous figures in the Persian Wars, after Miltiades, were Themistocles and Aristides. They fought together at Marathon, and in the naval engagement at Salamis. Aristides led the Athenians at Plataea, and in conjunction with Pausanias who commanded the Lacedæmonians and their allies in that battle, accomplished the signal defeat of Mardonius, and drove the last of the Persian invaders from the shores of Hellas.

These distinguished men were playmates in youth, and political rivals through life. They were the leading figures in the stirring scenes enacted after the defeat of Mardonius at Plataea. But in the administration of civil affairs, the patriotism, purity and sterling integrity of Aristides, is in striking contrast with the avarice, dishonesty and treasonable conduct of his contemporary. Every patriot in the Athenian commonwealth applauded the rectitude which characterized the public services of Aristides. He was universally regarded as the most upright and unselfish man in public life. He was designated by his fellow citizens, and is known to posterity, as Aristides the just.

The most valuable service rendered by him, as a civil magistrate, was rendered after the Lacedæmonians had retired from the active prosecution of the war to expel the Persians from Asia Minor and the islands of the Ægean sea. After the defeat of the enemy at Mycale,

the Lacedæmonians took no further part in the campaign and returned to the Peloponnesus. The Athenians, under the command of Xanthippus, however, continued the war of expulsion, and formed a league or a confederacy with the Ionians and those in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and not many months after the victory at Mycale defeated the Persians and took the city of Sestus in the Hellespont. This league, known as the Delian Confederacy, marked a new era in the political history of Athens and formed the basis of conditions which subsequently developed in the up-building of the Athenian empire. This Confederacy was designed to protect the cities in the Ægean and the coasts of Asia Minor, which had been rescued from the oppression of the Persian monarch from falling again under the dominion of the Great King. Its treasury was established on the sacred island of Delos, and is known in history as the Confederacy of Delos. The purpose of the Confederacy was to equip a fleet to be used at all times to police the Ægean and protect every member of the league from foreign invasion. The agreement was that each member of the combination should contribute its *pro rata* share of ships and men to carry out the purposes for which it was formed. Some of the smaller cities were so poor that they could contribute only part of the expenses of fitting out a single galley. It was accordingly agreed that those who were unable to furnish ships or crews should contribute an annual sum or stipend into the common treasury. The delicate task of fixing the proportionate amount to be contributed by each City or State either in ships, crews, equipment or money, was by common consent delegated to Aristides, who was universally commended for his justice and impartiality. In the execution of his great task he assessed the valuation of the wealth of the various members of the league, and the amount each should contribute. His

decision was regarded as eminently just and fair, was accepted by all parties in interest and thereafter continued in force for half a century.

The envious and jealous disposition of his countrymen as distinguished from their patriotic devotion, when threatened with foreign invasion, is shown by their conduct towards Aristides who was ostracized about 483 B. C., three years before the battle of Salamis. Others had been banished for political activity by reason of which it was asserted they might become dangerous to the State. Aristides was ostracized chiefly at the instigation of Themistocles, his political rival, and one of the most unscrupulous men in public life. Unfortunately, Aristides, while performing his duties as magistrate, frequently heard causes in private. The custom was exceedingly pernicious, because while practised by one of unsullied reputation and strict probity, the custom, if it became universal, was likely to lead to grave abuses, because of the opportunities it afforded to an unscrupulous judge to enrich himself and corrupt the fountain of justice. Such a thing as a private Court cannot exist in a free State. In a later age the Court of Star Chamber cost Charles I his head. Themistocles, one of the leaders of the popular democratic party, declared that this practice was resorted to by Aristides to destroy the Courts of judicature and pave the way for a monarchy in his own person. He stirred up such a feeling of resentment against his rival that some even declared they were weary of hearing him extolled for his virtues, and called "the just." Following the lead of Themistocles the electorate based their action against Aristides, ostensibly upon the ground that the latter sought to displace the democracy and establish in its stead a monarchical form of government.

The principal service rendered by Aristides at the battle of Salamis was on the islet of Psyttalea, which

lies between the Piræus and the eastern extremity of the island of Salamis. It is low and rocky, clothed with shrubs, and is about a mile in length, and not more than two or three hundred yards broad.¹ By a clever piece of strategy, Themistocles sent his slave Sicinnus to the enemy's fleet as a pretended spy. He informed the Persian admiral that the Greeks were disheartened and intended to escape from the straits at dawn on the following morning, and if Xerxes would block both ends of the channel with his fleet, the Greeks, who were greatly discouraged would surrender rather than risk a fight, as their ships were outnumbered more than two to one. Xerxes accordingly landed a large body of troops on Psyttalea, and then about an hour before midnight the Persians advanced their western wing towards Salamis (Herod. vii, 76). Those who had been stationed on this rocky bar at the extremity of Salamis, consisted of a select body of the bravest of the native Persians among whom, Plutarch says, were men of high rank, including three nephews of Xerxes, the sons of his sister Sandauce. Near the close of the engagement, in order that none of the enemy marooned at Psyttalea might escape, Aristides took a body of heavy armed Athenians who had been stationed along the shore of Salamis, and made a descent on the little island and slew all the Persians who occupied it (Herod. viii, 95). The attack by Aristides began late in the day, and the slaughter continued

“Till all, 'neath eye of swarthy night was lost.”

The massacre of those near and dear to him took place under the eye of Xerxes himself, who witnessed it from his golden throne on the heights of Attica, and caused him to weep and tear his garments in rage and despair. This assault by Aristides at Psyttalea is

¹ Leake, *Demi of Attica*, p. 267.

thus graphically described by Æschylus in his poem entitled "The Persians." It will be remembered that the poet himself took part in the battle, and was an eye-witness to what he describes.

The drama opens with a chorus reciting the Persian conquests, while awaiting the tidings from Xerxes' fleet and army. Atossa, the Queen-mother, enters, and recites her dreams and dismal forebodings for the safety of her son. A messenger approaches as the chorus sings:

"For here a courier speedeth, whose gait proclaimeth him
Persian, and he will bring us clear news of weal or woe."

The messenger enters and proceeds to recite the misfortune that befell his countrymen. He declares:

"Corpses of men ill-fated choke the coasts
Of Salamis, and all the region near."

He then proceeds to give an account of the engagement. As to the number of vessels the messenger, addressing Atossa, thus proceeds:

"Had conquest waited upon numbers, queen,
Then Persia's ships were victor, for the fleet
Of Hellas counted but three hundred ships,
And other ten selected, in reserve.
But Xerxes, this I know led fifty score,
While those for swiftness most preëminent
Two hundred were and seven."

He then gives a detailed description of the battle, including an account of the stratagem of Themistocles in sending Sicinnus, a pretended spy, to the Persian fleet.

The attack on the islet of Psyttalea, which was led by Aristides, he thus describes to queen Atossa:

An isle there is that fronteth Salamis,
Small, with bad anchorage, whose sea-washed beach
Dance-loving Pan doth haunt; thither the King
Sendeth these chiefs, that, when the worsted foe
Should in the isle seek safety, Persia's sons
Might slay the host of Hellas, easy prey,
And from the briny channels save their friends,
Ill-guessing the to-come; for when the god
The Hellenes crowned with glory of the fight,
On that same day, with shields of well-wrought brass
Fencing their bodies, from their ships they leapt,
And the whole isle encompassed; so our men
Knew not which way to turn; oft-time by stones
Pelted from foeman's hand, while arrows keen,
Thick raining from the bow-string, smote them down;
Rushing at last with simultaneous shout,
The Hellenes hacked and carved the victims' limbs,
Till they, poor wretches, all of life were reaved.
But Xerxes groaned, seeing the depth of ills;
For on a lofty height, hard by the sea,
His seat he held, o'erlooking all the host.
His garments rending, a shrill cry he raised,
To his land troops forthwith dispatch'd command,
And sped in flight disordered. Thine it is
To wail this sorrow added to the first.

The character of the Lacedæmonians, who were exceedingly jealous and envious, as contrasted with the staunch patriotism and sterling integrity of Aristides, and the Athenians, whom he was chosen to represent, is illustrated by an incident which occurred shortly before the battle of Platæa under the following circumstances.

Xerxes, after his defeat at Salamis, became panic-stricken. His brother, Ariabignes, who commanded his fleet, was killed in that engagement, and others of his royal house, including three of his nephews, were slain or taken prisoners on the islet of Psyttalea. He became solicitous about his personal safety, for, after all, Xerxes was a coward. Notwithstanding the fact that his land forces, now stationed in Attica, constituted the most formidable body of troops ever assembled, had not been engaged at all at Salamis; notwithstanding the fact that not more than a third of his great fleet

had been disabled in the sea-fight with Themistocles; notwithstanding all this, fear seized upon the heart of Xerxes. He thought only of his personal safety, for what if the cunning and crafty Hellenes, in their swift ships should speed to the Hellespont, and destroy the bridge of boats over which his countless myriads had poured for seven days and seven nights from the shores of Asia to the shores of Europe. Once his father Darius, with a great army, had crossed the Ister (Danube), on a bridge of boats, and after a fruitless campaign in Scythia hurried back to the river, and made good his retreat over the bridge, which had been guarded in his absence, to his own dominions. His consternation, however, he concealed from the Greeks and from his own people (Her. viii, 97). Mardonius, who commanded his land forces was a man of spirit and personal courage. He perceived that Xerxes took his defeat greatly to heart, and suspecting that he intended to return to Asia, and fearing lest he might be punished for having persuaded the King to undertake the war, he concluded to either conquer Greece or perish gloriously in aspiring to such a noble achievement. He conferred with Xerxes, and suggested the further prosecution of the war, but if the King desired to return to Asia, with the main body of his troops, he asked to be permitted to choose 300,000 men to remain, and avenge Salamis, and conquer Greece. This plan was adopted and Xerxes, late in September, or early in October, B. C. 480, departed for his own dominions.

In this connection it is interesting to note the account given by Herodotus of the conduct of Xerxes, who, before acting on the suggestion of Mardonius, that he return to Asia, sought the advice of a woman. Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, was the only one of his commanders who advised against the engagement at Salamis. He was secretly overjoyed at the prospect of abandoning the campaign, but for appearance-sake

conferred with his commanders, and to Artemisia, he gave a private audience. She told him that under the circumstances it would be proper for him to withdraw from the field of operations and return to Susa. That he should defer to the wishes of Mardonius, who requested permission to remain and prosecute the war. If he succeeded, well. If he failed, it was no great loss, so long as the King's person was safe. She continued with this amazing declaration, which serves to indicate the manners of the age, and the power of the Great King over the lives of his most distinguished subjects and illustrious generals, who were but slaves and chattels. "If Mardonius fall," she continued, "it matters nothing — they will have gained but a poor triumph — a victory over one of thy slaves! Remember, also, thou goest home having gained the purpose of thy expedition, for thou hast burnt Athens." (Herod. viii, 102.)

To Aristides, also, was due the sage advice which probably saved Greece after the battle of Salamis. Themistocles conferred with Aristides and advised that the Athenians proceed with expedition and destroy the bridge of boats over the Hellespont, before the arrival of Xerxes, and make Asia a prisoner within the confines of Europe. Aristides, however, saw danger in the plan. He reminded Themistocles that the Greeks had fought an enemy, who regarded his expedition as a holiday excursion, and cared for nothing but pleasure and luxury. If the Greeks should close the gateway leading from Europe, the enemy would be driven by necessity. "Xerxes," he said, "was master of such great forces that he will no longer sit quietly with an umbrella of gold over his head, looking upon the fight for his pleasure. In such a strait he will attempt almost anything. He will be resolute and appear himself in person upon all occasions. He will correct his errors and supply what he has formerly omitted through remissness and will be better advised in all things. It is

not to our interest, therefore, to take away the bridge, that is already made, but rather to build another if it were possible that he might make his retreat with the more expedition." Themistocles deferred to the better judgment of Aristides, and devised a plan to get rid of Xerxes at the earliest possible moment. He resorted again to strategy, and found among his captives one of the King's eunuchs, whom he sent to inform his master that the Greeks intended to sail with all dispatch and destroy the bridge of boats over the Hellespont. He bade the messenger declare further to Xerxes, that Themistocles was secretly concerned for his safety, and for that reason had urged the eunuch to tell his master to make haste, and pass over into his own dominions, and in the meantime Themistocles would do all in his power to delay or hinder his countrymen from pursuing him.

In the spring, 479 B. C., Mardonius, before he advanced his army from Thessaly, sent Alexander of Macedon, as his ambassador to bring about an alliance between the Persians and Athenians whereby the latter should remain a free State, and stipulated further that the temples which Xerxes had burned should be restored. When the Lacedæmonians learned that Mardonius sought such an alliance, they became alarmed and sent representatives to Athens, to seek to defeat the plans of Mardonius. After hearing both Alexander and the Spartan ambassadors, the Athenians resolved to reject the overtures of Mardonius, and Aristides was chosen to prepare the decree, and declare the decision. He told Alexander, that the Athenians well knew the power of the Medes, and it was not necessary to have that fact paraded and cast in their teeth. Their love of liberty was so great that they would offer whatever resistance they could to the armies of Persia. That all efforts to dissuade the Athenians from their firm resolution would be worse than useless. "Go tell

Mardonius," he said, "that this is the answer of the Athenians. So long as the sun keeps on his present course, we will never form an alliance with Xerxes. On the contrary, we will oppose him unceasingly, trusting in the aid of the gods and heroes, whom he has lightly esteemed, and whose images and temples he has burnt with fire. Come among us no more, therefore, to seek to persuade us to unholy actions. You, Alexander, are our guest, and friend of our nation, and no harm shall befall you at our hands." (Herod. viii, 143.)

Then addressing the Lacedæmonians Aristides observed that the fear they entertained that the Athenians might make terms with the barbarians was a base fear. "Not all the gold that earth contains," he said, "not the fairest and most fertile of all lands, would bribe us to take part with the Medes, and help them to enslave our countrymen. While one Athenian remains alive, we will never form an alliance with Xerxes." (Herod. viii, 144.)

Alexander afterwards remembered the kind words of Aristides and rendered him valuable service by disclosing to him important information at the battle of Platæa. After one of the preliminary skirmishes, in which the Persian cavalry commander Masistius lost his life, and the days of mourning for that gallant officer were over, Mardonius determined to bring on an engagement. The soothsayers, consulting the sacrifices foretold victory both to Greeks and Persians, provided they stood upon the defensive, but disaster if they made the initial assault. But the Persians had now only a scant supply of provisions. After consulting his officers, Mardonius resolved to cross the Asopus at daybreak the next morning, and make an unexpected attack on the enemy. About midnight, Alexander of Macedon stole into the Greek camp, and desired the guard to send for Aristides, the Athenian, to whom he disclosed the enemy's plans. "I arrived here," he said

to Aristides, "through the greatest dangers in the world for the good-will I bear you lest you should be dismayed by a sudden onset of the enemy. To-morrow Mardonius will give you battle, urged, not by any hope of success, but by want of victuals. The prophets prohibit him the battle, the sacrifices and oracles being unfavorable, the army is in despondency and consternation; but necessity forces him to try his fortune, or sit still and endure the last extremity of want." (Plutarch—Aristides.) Thus warned the Greeks gave orders to the captains, and the army was put in position to resist the assault Mardonius had planned, at day-break on the following morning. The battle was joined as expected and the result was the utter defeat and rout of the Persians. Mardonius was killed while leading a charge at the head of a select body of cavalry. Thus were the liberties of Greece preserved at Plataea.

Aristides was the son of Lysimachus of the tribe of Antiochis. We have no precise data from which to determine accurately the year of his birth, or the date or place of his death. Plutarch tells us that, according to some, he died in Pontus in Asia, while on public business; others that he died in Athens of old age. He was a friend of Clisthenes and supported him in the revolution which resulted in the overthrow of the Alcmaeonidae, the abolition of the constitution of Solon, and the establishment of the ten tribes. These changes occurred about twenty years before the battle of Marathon. He must have been a very young man at that time, perhaps not more than twenty-one. If this assumption is correct he was born about 531 B. C., and consequently he was forty-one, when he held the office of strategus, and led his tribe at Marathon. Plutarch says his monument in his day was to be seen at Phalerum. It was erected by the city, he having left no property, not even sufficient to defray his funeral expenses. He was survived by two daughters, who it is

said were endowed from the public treasury by a grateful people. These details, however, are based largely on conjecture. We have no authentic or positive information on which to base a detailed account of his declining years, the circumstances of his death or the fortune of his descendants.

CHAPTER XXXII

ATHENS, UNDER CIMON, BECOMES A MARITIME POWER

THE Confederacy of Delos, sketched in a preceding chapter, was organized under the guidance of Aristides. His superior wisdom, impartiality, and absolute integrity enabled him to win the confidence and respect of all parties to the alliance. It was Aristides who adjusted the quota which each member should contribute to the Confederacy. We have no knowledge as to the length of time required to perfect the organization of this alliance among the Greek states. Although the league was projected B. C. 478, it was seven years before anything definite was accomplished, if we assume the siege of Eion was the first achievement under it, as that event occurred about B. C. 471. The formation of this league was the last great service rendered by Aristides in behalf of his countrymen. At his solicitation he was succeeded as admiral by Cimon, the son of Miltiades.

Next to Themistocles, Cimon was the most distinguished admiral in Hellenic annals. Supported by the resources of Athens, and her allies under the Confederacy of Delos, Cimon succeeded not only in expelling the Persians from Thrace and Macedonia and the islands of the Ægean sea, but the success of his arms at the Eurymedon, enabled Athens also to become master of the western coast of Asia Minor. Under Cimon the Ægean became a closed sea, under the jurisdiction of the Attic commonwealth.

Our knowledge of the chronology of the events which occurred from the reduction of Byzantium, B. C. 478, and the battle of the Eurymedon, B. C. 466, is rather vague and unsatisfactory. The information we have is derived chiefly from Thucydides (i, 98), who mentions briefly the achievements of Cimon, in the following order. The first victory he says was the reduction of Eion, on the Strymon, which was in possession of the Medes which was taken after a siege. This was probably B. C. 471. Then the island of Scyros was taken from the Dolopian pirates and colonized by Athenian kleruchs. This event was supposed to have occurred B. C. 470. Then war was waged against the Carystians on the island of Eubœa, who surrendered, reserving certain conditions B. C. 468. Naxos then revolted from the Delian Confederacy and was subjugated B. C. 466, the year in which Cimon achieved his double victory on the Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon then took the island of Thasos, the second member of the Confederacy to secede B. C. 465. The occupation of this island led to the colonization of the mainland in Thrace near Thasos.

A review of these achievements in their order will show the successive steps by which the power and influence of Athens was attained. First as to Eion, a Persian stronghold in Thrace, at the mouth of the Strymon, on the Gulf of Strymon, in the upper Ægean, or Sea of Thrace. The objective point of Xerxes when he invaded Greece was Athens. The Persian monarch assumed that when he had reduced that city and conquered the Peloponnesians, his task would be accomplished, because Athens and Sparta were practically the only cities in Hellas which refused to recognize his authority. Nearly all the other states in Greece had acknowledged his sovereignty. Many cities sent heralds to the Persian ambassadors, bearing earth and water, symbols of obedience and loyalty to the Great

King. Not only were there Persian sympathizers and allies on the Hellenic peninsula, but in Thrace on the Hellespont, and in a number of the islands of the *Ægean*, the Medes had established themselves.

In this connection Herodotus (viii, 106, 107) observes, "Before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace, and the Hellespont, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks, after that invasion, with the single exception of Mascames, governor of Doriscus, who could never be taken, though many attempts were made upon the fortress. Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defense sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Boges, governor of Eion."

Herodotus tells us that Xerxes never ceased to praise Boges, because that commander might have capitulated, surrendered Eion, and marched out unharmed and returned to Asia, but he would not, lest the King should think he saved his life through cowardice.

The fate of Boges was weird and dramatic. When all provisions were exhausted and there was nothing left to eat, Boges deliberately raised a great pile, which he set on fire. Next he slew his children, his wife, his concubines and his servants and threw their bodies in the fire. He then threw all the gold and silver in the tower from the fort into the Strymon. Boges then cast himself into the flames and was consumed. Thus perished Boges in the flames at Eion, as did Sardanapalus at Nineveh, nearly a century and a half earlier.

Plutarch, in his life of Cimon, says that the latter not only took Eion, but also conquered the neighboring country. First he defeated the Persians in battle and shut them up within the walls of their town. He then fell upon the Thracians in the country beyond the Strymon, which furnished food to the town, drove out the inhabitants and took possession as conqueror. Having cut off all supplies, Eion was reduced to starva-

tion. Afterwards in this territory, Athens built the City of Amphipolis, on the site of the Thracian town called the Nine Ways.

Athens appreciated the valuable services rendered by Cimon in conquering Eion, and the adjacent territory which contained among its valuable resources, rich mines of gold and silver. In commemoration of this victory, the people permitted a stone to be erected and to have inscribed thereon these lines in honor of the men who fought there:

Of bold and patient spirit, too, were those,
Who, where the Strymon under Eion flows,
With famine and the sword, to utmost need
Reduced at last the children of the Mede.

The next recorded achievement of Cimon was the reduction of the island of Scyros, supposed to have taken place the following year, B. C. 470. It occupied an isolated position in the Ægean about fifty miles east of the northerly point of Eubœa and one hundred and twenty miles south of the island of Thasos. It is about fifteen miles long, and from two to five miles wide.

It is not probable that a battle took place when Scyros was reduced, because the inhabitants had invoked the aid of Cimon, whom they invited to succor them from the judgment and fine pronounced against them by the Amphictyonic Synod on conviction for piracy. The inhabitants of Scyros were Dolopians, a barbarous and cruel people, who neglected all husbandry and devoted themselves to piracy, which they had carried on for generations. Some merchants from Thessaly had come to the shores near the harbor of Ctesium. They were set upon and robbed of their goods, and contrary to the usual rules of piracy, in those days, were also imprisoned. Having escaped from the island, these Thessalians appealed to the Amphictyonic council of which not only the Thessalians

but the Dolopes themselves were members. The Dolopian pirates were directed to make public restitution of the plunder. Rather than abide by the decree, fearing doubtless personal violence, the Dolopians appealed to Cimon to succor them with his fleet; and to secure their own safety, declared themselves ready to deliver their town into his hands.

The *Ægean* sea, at this time, was guarded by the fleet collected by the Confederacy of Delos, under the leadership of Athens, whose generals were in command. Hence this period, between the expulsion of Xerxes and the Peloponnesian War, is designated as the period of the Athenian hegemony, and later, the Athenian Empire, as her power and influence increased from time to time. Her efforts to augment her supremacy is shown in the instance of Scyros, for Cimon, when he took possession of the island, expelled the barbarous and piratical Dolopians, and it was immediately colonized and inhabited by Athenian *kleruchs*, or out-citizens.

Scyros now belonged to Athens. Its possession was associated with sacred memories, because within its rocky bosom reposed the ashes of Theseus, the most famous of Attic Kings, the mythical hero of Attic legend, the champion of liberty and friend of the oppressed. He it was who killed the flame-spitting bull of Marathon; and, with the aid of Ariadne, slew the Minotaur, the monster King Minos had confined in the labyrinth of Crete, and relieved Athens of her mournful tribute of daring youths and blushing maidens. The memory of Theseus furnished the inspiration for Athenian valor. When the fate of Greece hung in the balance on that memorable day at Marathon, the Athenians thought they saw an apparition and beheld Theseus in full armor, charging at their head against the Persians.

B. C. 476, the Athenians were commanded by the oracle at Delphi to bring home the bones of Theseus

from Scyros. It was extremely difficult to recover the relics, or find the spot where his ashes reposed, on account of the inhospitable and savage temper of the barbarous people who inhabited the island. When Cimon took Scyros, his first ambition was to find the remains of the hero. Plutarch says, that in his search for the tomb he was aided by an eagle, which he saw upon rising ground pecking with her beak, and tearing up the earth with her talons. Believing this to be by divine direction to aid him in his search, Cimon dug up the spot indicated by the eagle, and found "a coffin of a man of more than ordinary size, a brazen spear head, and a sword lying by it." These he took to Athens, and the remains were received with splendid processions, and sacrifices as if it were Theseus returning alive to the city. His tomb is in the temple of Theseus which still stands near the ancient agora, one of the most memorable monuments of antiquity.

Cimon then chastised the inhabitants of Carystus for some delinquency concerning which we have no detailed information. Nor do we know the precise date of this event. In that day Carystus was one of the four principal cities on the island of Eubœa, and was situated at its southern extremity at the head of a deep bay. The city farthest north was the ancient Histiaotis, near the headland of Artemisia. Eretria was on the west coast, a short distance north of the bay of Marathon. Chalcis was at the Euripus on the west coast, the narrowest part of the Eubœan channel. All we know about the attack of Cimon on Carystus is what Thucydides tells us, namely, that they surrendered on conditions. What these conditions were we are not informed.

About the time when Athens added the island of Scyros to her dominions, discontent arose among the allies under the Confederacy of Delos. The island of Naxos seceded from the league B. C. 466. How long this discontent existed, prior to the rebellion of Naxos,

we have no means of knowing. Perhaps the allies saw that the Confederacy was being used by Athens for her own aggrandizement in order that she might build up an empire, at their expense. Why should the cost of the expedition that reduced Scyros be paid out of the treasury of the Confederacy? The Athenians doubtless had a plausible answer to the objections raised. They could say to the Naxians that the object and purpose of the league was not only to drive out the Persians from the Islands of the Ægean, but to expel the pirates who infested its waters. There was, however, a valid reason for the continued existence of the Confederacy. The Persians were at that time preparing to make one more final effort to secure their prestige and expel the Greeks from her insular possessions on the western shores of Asia Minor. Perhaps some of her ambitious admirals even contemplated a third invasion of Hellas. A new expedition was then being fitted out in Pamphylia at the mouth of the river Eurymedon. Orders had been given to assemble a fleet and army at that place from which military operations were to be conducted against the Asiatic Greeks. Cimon, after the reduction of Naxos, defeated this expedition, an account of which will be given presently.

Naxos was famous for its wines. It was one of the largest of the Cyclades situated about ninety miles southeast of Cape Sunium, the southern extremity of Attica and twenty miles southeast of the Island of Delos. It extends about twenty miles from north to south. Its greatest width is fifteen miles. Twelve years had elapsed since the Confederacy was organized and Naxos was the first member of the alliance to rebel. B. C. 466 the Naxians refused longer to comply with the rules and regulations of the league and declined to contribute to its treasury or to furnish its quota of men and ships, in conformity with the assessment levied

upon it. They declared that the league was a voluntary confederation from which they had the right to retire of their own volition. Athens, as the head of the Confederacy, asserted that the allegiance of its constituent members, though voluntarily assumed, became obligatory and binding so long as a majority desired that it should be maintained. That Naxos could not be relieved of its obligations without the consent of the other members. The Naxians declined to pay their share of the tribute money, and a fleet was sent to conquer them, and make them subject allies of Athens. This armament was under the command of Cimon. Naxos, being weak, was not able to hold out long against the strong fleet of the Confederacy commanded by the most skilful admiral since Themistocles. The island was reduced after a siege, and was the first of the allies under the Confederacy to be subjugated, as Thucydides says, contrary to the agreement. He observes that the Athenians were offensive in their demands by using compulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing to do hard work.

From this, we may infer, that where a poor weak ally could not raise the full quota of tax in money, Athens compelled them to send men, taking them away from their flocks, their vineyards, and their farms, and compelling them to perform onerous tasks and duties as seamen in the fleet. He observes further in this connection (i, 99) that Athens was no longer popular in the league, "and while the Athenians did not join the service on an equal footing, it was easy for them to bring to subjection those who revolted. For this, the allies had themselves to blame; for owing to their aversions for expeditions, the greater part of them, to avoid being away from home, agreed to contribute money, instead of ships as their quota of the expense; and so the fleet of the Athenians was increased from the funds which they contributed, while they them-

selves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war."

Thus Naxos lost her liberty and became subject to the authority of Athens. The next member of the league to be subjugated was Thasos, B. C. 465, an account of which will be given presently.

The next important event in the order of time was the defeat of the Persian arms at the mouth of the Eurymedon, a river in Asia Minor which rises in Pisidia and flows south through Pamphylia into the Mediterranean known to the ancients in that locality as the Sea of Lycium. The mouth of the Eurymedon is 130 miles northeast of the northern shore of the island of Cyprus. Cimon, B. C. 466, the same year in which he reduced the island of Naxos, with a fleet consisting of 250 Athenian triremes augmented by a squadron of 100 ships furnished by the allies of the Confederacy of Delos, attacked and destroyed a Persian fleet composed mostly of Phœnician vessels aggregating about two hundred ships, which was followed on the same day by a land engagement in which the Athenians attacked and routed the Persian army, which was assembled on shore to protect the fleet.

While Cimon was operating against Naxos, he received intelligence that the Persians were assembling with the aid of the Phœnicians, and again threatened military operations and incursions among the Greek colonies and cities in Asia Minor, and the islands off the coast of Ionia and Caria. As soon as Naxos surrendered, Cimon sailed across the Ægean one hundred and fifty miles and expelled the Persians from several towns on the coast of Caria and Lycia. The enemy then determined to make a stand in Pamphylia at the mouth of the Eurymedon, where they had assembled a large fleet and army. The former mustered two hundred vessels, and eighty more were expected daily from the island of Cyprus to reinforce them, under Tithrau-

stes and Pherendates. When Cimon learned that the reinforcements were hourly expected, he determined to strike the enemy before their arrival. The Persians manœuvred for delay desiring to postpone an engagement until their allies came. For the same reason Cimon was anxious to begin hostilities. He made a vigorous attack. The Persians were unable to withstand the onslaught of the Athenians, retreated to the shore and sought the protection of their land forces at the mouth of the Eurymedon. Cimon destroyed the fleet which was driven on the beach. Then he determined to destroy the Persian army as the sun was still high, and crowd into a single day, his victory on sea and land. This great feat he accomplished. He disembarked his men and followed up his naval battle with a vigorous attack on the land forces. The engagement was spirited and well contested, but Cimon succeeded in defeating the enemy which was completely routed, and quit the field in terror, leaving a large number of prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

Then with a display of energy, which caused the wonder and admiration of his countrymen, Cimon sailed to the island of Cyprus, to intercept the Phœnician reinforcements before they could learn of the defeat of their allies. He overtook them off the coast of that island, and in a vigorous naval engagement defeated them, and destroyed their entire armament.

Such was the battle of the Eurymedon, and the wonderful triple victory of Cimon, which was commemorated on the tripod dedicated to Apollo, as one of the most glorious exploits in Grecian annals. Plutarch observes, referring to this engagement, that Cimon in one day carried off two victories, wherein he surpassed that of Salamis by sea, and that of Platæa by land. After these achievements of the Athenians, aided and supported by the Confederacy of Delos, her authority on the sea became supreme. It is said that when tidings

from the Eurymedon reached Susa, the chagrin and mortification of Xerxes was such as to impair his health. He took to his bed and never recovered. The following year, B. C. 465, not very long after defeat of Persia at the Eurymedon, which was in the fall, B. C. 466, Xerxes was assassinated while he slept, by the captain of the guard and the chief eunuch of the palace. He was succeeded by his son Artaxerxes I.

The success of Cimon at the Eurymedon was followed by the celebrated peace, known as the Peace of Cimon, whereby the Persians stipulated that their armies should not approach the shores of the *Ægean* within a horse's course, and that their vessels of war should not appear off the coast of Lycia. Others claim these stipulations were not embodied in the treaty, but that through fear the Persians acted as if they were so bound by a treaty.

Cimon next drove the Persians from the Chersonese, then subdued the native Thracians and then besieged the island of Thasos which he conquered after a siege of two years.

The reduction of Thasos by the fleet of Cimon was in direct violation of the protection which Athens professed to afford to every member of the Delian Confederacy. Thasos was taken by the Athenians not because that island refused to contribute its quota of ships and money as required by the articles of the Confederation; on the contrary Athens deliberately destroyed its own ally for the purpose of robbing its inhabitants of the mines which they had discovered near the coast of Thrace. Her conduct on this occasion showed that that city no longer pretended to be the president of the Confederacy of Delos, but had absorbed that organization and used its resources for its own benefit. The Athenian empire was established and Athens was supreme.

Thasos is in the northern *Ægean*, five miles off the

southern shore of Thrace and about forty miles east of Eion and Amphipolis on the river Strymon. It is about eighteen miles long from north to south and about fifteen miles in width. B. C. 465, Cimon, after his victory at the mouth of the Eurymedon the previous year, was sent with a powerful fleet to blockade the ports of Thasos. Like Naxos, Thasos was a member of the Confederacy of Delos.

The reasons assigned by Athens to bolster up its pretext for sending a squadron to subjugate the island, however, did not arise from any disposition on the part of Thasos to repudiate its obligations to the Confederacy. The quarrel arose respecting territory in Thrace, which had been occupied by colonists and citizens of Thasos, and the development of rich mines of gold and silver, which were being worked by the Thasians, possession of which they refused to yield to citizens and colonists from Athens. After the capture of Eion, six years previously (B. C. 471), Athenian prospectors frequently visited the country in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Strymon, which was but forty miles from Thasos. The Thasians, whose home was in the immediate vicinity, their island being located but five miles from the shore of the continent, had become possessed of considerable territory in these near-by regions. Disputes between the Athenians and Thasians, as to the right to the possession of mines and lands, were frequent.

After the Persians had been driven from Eion the Athenians attempted to found a settlement at a place called Ennea Hodoi, the Nine Ways, on the Strymon, three miles above Eion. The attempt was a failure, owing to the hostility of the fierce and barbarous natives known as the Edonian Thracians, who made successful raids on the settlers, and prospectors, in the absence of sufficient military protection, which was withdrawn, Cimon having departed after the reduction

of Eion. The Athenians, however, had discovered gold in Mount Pangæus, a few miles east of the Strymon, and in the vicinity of Ennea Hodoi, where they afterwards founded the city of Amphipolis. In the strife which arose we have no record of any attempt on the part of Athens to submit these controversies to arbitration. The Athenians had the power of a giant, and they used it like a giant, and crushed their weaker allies by force of arms. Cimon, with a strong fleet, was sent to reduce the island of Thasos. While the blockade was in force, Athens sent a colony of ten thousand citizens to form a settlement, and build a city on the site of Ennea Hodoi. Disaster overtook this colony, which we might be justified in saying was a visitation of retributive justice for their unjust course towards the Thasians. The new colonists were surprised and attacked by the Thracians, and almost the entire contingent was massacred. The Athenians, however, did not raise the blockade at Thasos, by reason of this misfortune.

The Thasians were hard pressed by a superior force. They were unwilling to abandon what they claimed they were clearly entitled to. They believed that they should have been protected in their rights by Athens, which was their ally, and the head of their Confederacy, instead of being driven by force not only to give up their lands and mines in Thrace, but to surrender their island home, and become subjects and practically slaves of Athens. Under the circumstances, they could do nothing but appeal secretly to the Lacedæmonians for succor. The latter heard their appeal, and were anxious to lend them substantial aid, and make war against Athens.

The hand of Providence interposed. A calamity befell Sparta, which it was impossible to foresee, and which no human power could possibly avert. An earthquake swallowed up the city of Sparta (B. C.

464). The capital of Laconia, on the banks of the Eurotas, lay in ruins, and during the great convulsion of nature which caused the buildings and temples to topple and fall, and more than 20,000 of its citizens perished. Sparta, however, had been an oppressor, as well as Athens. For years they had sought to enslave the Messenians, and the Helots, their neighbors on the west. The military operations against these people are known as the Messenian Wars. The oppressed Helots, taking advantage of the calamity which had befallen their enemy, immediately revolted and marched against Sparta, which had been almost annihilated by the earthquake. They were repulsed, and aided by the Messenians, fortified themselves in Mount Ithome, near Messene, the capital of Messenia. These hostilities which continued for some years are known as the Third Messenian war.

It was unfortunate for Thasos that these events which were absolutely unavoidable, intervened at this particular time. The Lacedæmonians were absolutely powerless to aid her, and the Thasians, after a gallant defense of more than two years, were forced to surrender. Their fortifications were razed. The Athenians took their fleet, and confiscated all their possessions in Thrace. They were also compelled to pay the costs of the war and a large annual tribute into the treasury of Athens.

Thus, one by one, the weaker members of the Confederacy of Delos began to lose their independence, and the power of Athens in the Ægean became supreme.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE—ATHENS SUBJUGATES HER ALLIES AND ATTAINS IMPERIAL SU- PREMACY—HER HEGEMONY BECOMES AN EMPIRE AND ATHENS AN IMPE- RIAL CITY

THE term empire, in connection with the political history of Athens, seems altogether inappropriate, and somewhat confusing. To associate the idea of imperialism with the first city in Hellas seems repugnant to the traditions of her people and the reputation she attained as the champion of popular government. From an early period the Attic commonwealth seems to have been the foe of despotism and the foremost advocate of political liberty. Under the constitution of Solon, it was a republican oligarchy; it became a republic under the constitution of Clisthenes, and under the guidance of Themistocles, Pericles and Ephialtes, it developed into an absolute democracy. When, therefore, Thucydides speaks of the Athenian empire, it becomes necessary to analyze the facts in relation to the political conditions of that day in order to comprehend his meaning. The necessity of Hellenic unity grew out of the dangers of the Persian invasion, and the efforts of Darius and Xerxes to enslave Greece. United effort was essential also to expel the Persians not only from the shores of continental Hellas, but from the islands of the Ægean and the coast of Asia Minor, in order to restore the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks, originally established in the east as colonies of the mother country.

The first Congress of Hellenic States was held in the old temple of Poseidon, on the Isthmus of Corinth, and was brought about through the efforts of Themistocles in anticipation of the invasion of Hellas by the expedition headed by Xerxes in person. The second Pan-Hellenic coalition was composed of representatives who met on the battlefield of Platæa, after that memorable engagement. These organizations, doubtless, were designed to be permanent. It was intended that the various states of Greece should send representatives, who should meet annually to suggest measures and devise means to secure the welfare and prosperity of the entire community. There were but two cities, and only two of commanding influence and power capable of forming alliances with neighboring states, since every coalition after the Persian Wars and prior to the Theban supremacy, acknowledged the hegemony of either one or the other of these cities, namely Sparta and Athens. Unfortunately for Hellas, these cities were not only bitter rivals, but acknowledged entirely different systems of government. Sparta was an oligarchy, Athens a republic. The domination of Sparta extended not only over a great part of the peninsula south of the Gulf of Corinth, but on the Isthmus and with those states in central and northern Greece, who were jealous of the prosperity of Athens. This inordinate jealousy and political rivalry prevented the unity of Hellas. Athens, for patriotic reasons, permitted Sparta to take the lead until the conduct of Pausanias, after the reduction of Byzantium, B. C. 478, became so offensive and tyrannical, that the soldiers and seamen in the fleet absolutely refused to serve under him. He was recalled by the Ephors of Sparta, who commissioned Dorcis to serve in his stead. But the command, long before the arrival of Dorcis, had passed to Aristides and Cimon, and Athens instead of Sparta became the leader of united Greece.

Sparta refused to follow in any enterprise where Athens led. The Peloponnesians were recalled, and declined to serve longer in the common cause against Persia. This was the beginning of Hellenic disunion. It created a breach between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians which was never healed. Under the circumstances, the league formed on the Isthmus, and later re-organized at Platæa, ceased to exist. The United States of Greece was a dream never to be realized. Athens then determined to fight Persia without the aid of the states in the Peloponnesus. Nothing remained for her except to form a new combination with the Asiatic Greeks. This alliance is known as the Confederacy of Delos, and is treated in a former chapter.

Unfortunately, we have no information as to the nature and character of the charter or constitution which bound the Confederacy together, in which the relative duties and obligations of the respective parties to the compact were set forth. We may assume, however, that it was an agreement which imposed mutual obligations whereby the states consented to send representatives annually to Delos. They were to meet in the temple of Apollo-Artemis. All were to retain their independence and all were placed on a footing of absolute equality, each member having an equal vote. The Treasury of the league was to be at Delos, and that city was to be the capital of the Confederacy. The union was voluntary, and the amount assessed upon each state was to be levied with its consent. We are not informed as to whether the Articles of Confederation contained any provision as to the rights of the majority, or any guarantee to protect the liberties and independence of the respective members. It was an alliance offensive and defensive dictated by necessity, with the strong state of Athens as its president. Obviously the union was sought to secure objects similar to those embraced in the Constitution of the American Union,

namely, "to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty."

Statesmanship in that age was unequal to the task of securing these results, by reason of the rivalry and jealousy which existed among the free States of Hellas. It was found to be impossible, for these reasons, to bring about a union of States under a common Constitution, to form a distinct and greater political unit and create a nation in its nature perpetual and indissoluble. The Constitution of the United States secured to the American people "an indestructible union, composed of indestructible States," a result which the primitive Articles of Confederation improvised after the final struggle with England failed to accomplish. The Statesmen of Hellas did not possess that sterling political integrity which recognizes the fundamental political truth, that every form of popular government as distinguished from monarchical institutions, must rest upon the fundamental principle, that the government derives its powers from the consent of the governed.

Athens formed a coalition with weaker states, and promised to protect them from foreign invasion and to help them to establish and maintain their independence. It induced them to contribute with their consent to the expenses of the Confederacy. They were told that they should all be entitled to representation on terms of equality and that all should be entitled to vote on every measure for the common defense. In other words they were assured that they should have the right to vote as to the amount of the tax they should be required to contribute into the common treasury. The Confederacy was established upon the assumption that the taxes they should be called upon to pay should be war taxes, which were to be devoted only to military purposes. The members of the coalition evidently supposed that

when the necessities of war ceased, their taxes should be proportionately decreased.

The weak and inexperienced cities and states which joined the Confederacy were not capable of discerning the importance of keeping the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government separate and distinct, but permitted Athens, the President of the Confederacy, and more powerful than the other members to exercise both executive and judicial functions. The Athenians insisted that all disputes which might arise should be litigated in Athens and adjusted pursuant to Athenian law. The result was fatal to the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks. On their political ruin and with the resources they were compelled to contribute, Athens built up an empire. For some years, the Athenians presided over the affairs of the Confederacy, ruling with justice and equity in a manner that seemed to give entire satisfaction, but gradually dissatisfaction arose among the allies. About the time that Naxos seceded from the league, B. C. 466, some of the allies complained that the Athenians were using the resources of the Confederacy, not only to keep the Persians from oppressing them, but to promote her own ends, and extend and increase her political power to build up an empire. Naxos, though the largest of the Cyclades, was unable to regain her independence, but was conquered by the power exercised by Athens as president of the Confederacy, and instead of remaining an independent State, holding membership in the league, it became a subject ally, compelled to pay tribute against her will.

But the Athenians grew more tyrannical and despotic in the case of Thasos. That island revolted, B. C. 465, not because it was unwilling to pay its *pro rata* share into the common treasury. It seems that Naxos had in all things complied with the rules and regulations of the league, and was guilty of no delinquency, or disregard of any of the obligations im-

posed upon it. But the Thasians extended their operations in Thrace on the mainland, near their island home. There they discovered valuable mines of gold and silver. The Athenians coveted these mines, and Athens, in her official capacity, as president of the Confederacy, and in violation of every principle of justice and honor, confiscated the mines. This dishonorable act was accomplished with the aid which was afforded by the ample resources of the league, and the mines of Thrace were taken from the Thasians and turned over to the Athenians. Their property was confiscated and they had no redress. Incensed at the wrong and exasperated by the indefensible conduct and high-handed usurpation of Athens, the Thasians revolted. For two years the island was besieged by Cimon, with a fleet supported from the revenues of the Confederacy. The Thasians appealed to the Spartans for succor, but that city, before it could respond to the appeal, was destroyed by an earthquake, and Thasos, unable to secure assistance from any other source, was conquered and reduced to slavery. The power of Athens was irresistible. The Athenians had absorbed the Confederacy of Delos, planted her colonies everywhere, until her jurisdiction extended over an empire.

More than thirty years after this event, when war was impending, and the Peloponnesians threatened to invade Attica, because they claimed that Athens had violated the treaty known as the Thirty Years' Peace, an embassy was sent to Sparta to avert, if possible, the threatened calamity. The ambassadors sought to convince the Peloponnesians that they had not broken the treaty, and that her conduct had always been just not only to Sparta, but to her own allies in the Confederacy of Delos. They attempted to justify the establishment of the Athenian Empire, and argued that the reason why the Peloponnesians were not included in the enterprise was because they voluntarily abandoned it

and refused to remain with the Athenians in order to assist them in destroying the power of Persia. The ambassadors urged the Ephors and the assembly to consider that the Athenian Empire was not acquired by force, but that the allies of their own accord urged Athens to be their leader.

Thucydides (i, 75) has preserved the address supposed to have been delivered on that occasion, B. C. 432, the year before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

“Consider, Lacedæmonians,” said the Athenian ambassador, “the energy and sagacity which we then displayed. Do we deserve to be so bitterly hated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an empire? That empire was not acquired by force. But you would not stay and make an end of the barbarians, and the allies came of their own accord and asked us to be their leaders. The subsequent developments of our power was originally forced upon us by circumstances. Fear was our first motive; afterwards ambition; and then interest stepped in. And when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies, when some of them had already revolted and been subjugated and you were no longer the friends to us, which you had once been, but were suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we, without great risk, relax our hold? For the cities, as they fell away from us, would have gone over to you. And no man is to be reproached who seizes every possible advantage when the danger is so great.

“An empire was offered to us; can you wonder, that acting as human nature always will, we accepted it, and refused to give it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, ambition, fear, interest. We are not the first who have aspired to rule; the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power; and there

was a time when you thought so too. But now, when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could? Men, who indulge the natural ambition of empire deserve credit, if they are in any degree more careful of justice than they need be. How moderate we are would speedily appear if others took our place. Indeed, our very moderation which should be our glory has been unjustly converted into a reproach."

From this argument it would seem that the political doctrine of the Athenians, at least so far as her weaker neighbors and allies were concerned, was that might makes right. That justice consists in the right of the strong to oppress the weak, for as the Athenian ambassador puts it, "the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger." They seemed to have no idea of justice, and no conception of the divine attribute of mercy. "Did justice," the Athenian asks, "ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could?" This political maxim would justify piracy and murder. It was claimed also that these qualities which permitted the strong to oppress the weak are inherent in human nature. And yet they declared that Athens did not acquire their empire "by force."

A strong light is thrown on the conduct pursued by Athens in subjugating her allies and the motives which actuated her in an address delivered by one of the envoys sent from Mitylene. The occasion when this address was delivered, was at an audience, at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian War, B. C. 428. The Lesbians sought to persuade the Peloponnesians to permit an alliance with Lesbos, to be made with them against Athens. The island of Lesbos was one of the members of the Confederacy of Delos. Athens had from time to time reduced all of her allies to slavery except Chios and Lesbos. These remaining members

of the Confederacy were in constant dread that they would likewise be subjugated by the imperial head of the Confederacy. The Lesbians took advantage of the war waged by the Peloponnesians against Athens to revolt from the Confederacy of Delos, and throw off her allegiance to Athens. They were told to come to Olympia. After the games and festivals were over, they met in the temple, with the council and the speaker in behalf of the envoys, urged his appeal. In his argument he showed how Athens had treated her allies, and how she had subjugated them one after another until she had established an empire, on the ruins of the Confederacy. Thucydides (iii, 11) gives a full report of the address delivered on that occasion. The part of the speech showing how Athens acquired her supremacy is as follows:

“Now our alliance with the Athenians first began when you ceased to take part in the Persian War, and they remained to complete the work. But we were never the allies of the Athenians in their design of subjugating Hellas. We were really the allies of the Hellenes, whom we sought to liberate from the Persians. And while in the exercise of their command they claimed no supremacy, we were very ready to follow them. But our fears began to be aroused when we saw them relaxing their efforts against the Persians, and imposing the yoke of their dominion upon the allies, who could not unite and defend themselves, for their interests were too various. And so they were all enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians. We, forsooth, were independent allies, freemen — that was the word — who fought at their side. But judging from previous examples, how could we any longer have confidence in our leaders? For they had subjugated others to whom, equally with ourselves, their faith was pledged. And how could we, who survived, expect to be spared if ever they had the power to destroy us.

"Had all the allies retained their independence," continued the envoy, "we should have had better assurance that they would leave us as we were; but when the majority had been subjugated by them, they might naturally be expected to take offense at our footing of equality. They would contrast us, who alone maintained this equality, with the majority who had submitted to them. They would observe, also, that in proportion as their strength was increasing, our isolation was also increasing. Mutual fear is the only basis of an alliance, because he who would break faith, is deterred from aggression by the consciousness of inferiority. And why did they permit us to be left independent? Only because they thought that to gain an empire, they must use fair words and win their way by policy and not by violence. On the one hand, our position was a witness to their character. Because, we having an equal vote with them, we could not be supposed to have fought in their wars against our will, but those whom they attacked must have been in the wrong.

"On the other hand they were thus enabled to use the powerful against the weak. We were to be left until the last, because when the weaker states were removed, the stronger would fall, an easier prey. If, however, they had begun with us while the power of the allies was still intact, and we might have afforded a rallying point, they would not so easily have mastered them. . . . What trust, then, could we repose in such a friendship or such an alliance as this? The civility which we showed to one another was at variance with our real feelings. They courted us in time of war, because they were afraid of us, and we, in time of peace, paid like attention to them. The faith, which is generally assured by mutual good-will, had, with us, no other bond than mutual fear. We were constrained to remain allies from fear, not from love, and whichever of us

first thought they could safely venture, would assuredly have been the first to break it."

Thus, as suppliants, standing in the temple of Olympian Zeus the envoys from Lesbos besought the aid of the Spartan oligarchy to enable them to be released from bondage imposed by the Athenian republic. The argument advanced shows the purpose and design of Athens, in subjugating her weaker allies, with the co-operation of the stronger. The republic had expanded into an empire, but in doing so, their conduct, as Mr. Grote observes, contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind — the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control.

CHAPTER XXXIV

INTERNECINE WARS—THE STRUGGLE FOR A LAND EMPIRE IN HELLAS—TANAGRA, CENOPHYTA AND CORONEA

IT has been shown how Athens established a maritime empire, through the instrumentality of the Delian Confederacy. She had without the aid of the Peloponnesians expelled the Persians not only from Thrace and their insular possessions in the Ægean, but from Cyprus and the shores of Asia Minor. After the "Peace of Cimon," Athens was supreme on the seas.

The prosperous career of the Athenians excited the envy and jealousy of Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies. Ægina and Corinth were unable to compete with their Attic rival to secure commercial advantage on the seas. Athens had also been able not only to build up and wall in her city; she had also protected her harbors and port cities on the Piræus and at Phalerum, by building her walls about them, which were extended inland to connect with the walls of Athens. The Peloponnesians were unable to arrest her growth and prosperity, or to prevent her from becoming the first city in Europe.

The reason that Sparta was not in position to arrest the progress of her rival was because she was fully occupied in seeking to repress the formidable revolt of the Helots and their allies the Messenians, who had taken refuge in their strong fortifications on Mount Ithome, from which it seemed impossible to dislodge them. This rebellion, which occurred B. C. 464, is known as the Third Messenian War. It lasted nine

years until B. C. 455. The situation of Sparta must have been critical, indeed, when she twice invoked the aid of her old rivals, the Athenians, in the Messenian War. This request for aid was extended because the Athenians were reputed to be skilful in siege operations. The last suggestion to apply to Athens for assistance may have originated with Cimon, whose friendship for the Lacedæmonians was proverbial. Cimon was the leader of the oligarchical party. His political rival was the illustrious Pericles. Cimon was popular, notwithstanding the unpopularity of his party, and he prevailed upon his countrymen to send an army to Laconia to aid the Spartans against the Helots and Messenians, B. C. 461. When the Athenians arrived before Ithome, and displayed their superior tactics in the mode of storming fortified places in which species of warfare the Lacedæmonians were deficient, the latter became uneasy at the bold and original spirit of the Athenians. Thucydides says that the Lacedæmonians reflected that the Athenians were aliens in race, and feared that if they were permitted to remain they might be tempted by the Helots to change sides. They concluded, therefore, that it might be wise to dispense with their services. Accordingly they told Cimon that they could conduct the war without assistance from the Athenians and dismissed them. This treatment was regarded by the latter as an insult, and attributed to some secret suspicion which had arisen in the minds of the Lacedæmonians. On their return the nominal alliance which had till then existed with the Lacedæmonians against the Persians was abandoned. Indeed public feeling ran so high that Cimon himself felt the displeasure of the majority of his countrymen and he was sent into exile.

At this time (B. C. 459-457) the affairs of Athens were influenced and controlled largely, if not entirely, by Pericles. Aristides slept with his fathers, having

died about B. C. 468. Themistocles died in exile in the dominions of Artaxerxes, about B. C. 464. Ephialtes had been assassinated by a Theban in the pay of the leaders of the oligarchical party. Cimon was in exile, the decree of ostracism having been passed about B. C. 460. Pericles, the powerful leader of the Athenian democracy, had now become the foremost man in Greece. He clearly foresaw that sooner or later the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would be engaged in a deadly struggle, in which one or the other must inevitably perish, as a political power in Hellas. Greece was not big enough for both. In order to strengthen Attica, in preparation for the evil day, Pericles entered upon a foreign policy which attested his abilities as a statesman and diplomat.

The Messenian War still occupied the time and energies of the Lacedæmonians, and the Athenian leader seized the opportunity to make allies in the Peloponnese. Argos was extremely jealous of Sparta, because the latter sought the leadership in the peninsula to the exclusion of the Argives, who prided themselves on their mythical renown and the fame accorded their heroes in the *Iliad* of Homer. While the Spartans were seeking to dislodge the Helots from their strongholds at Ithome, Argos reduced Mycenæ, Tiryns and some neighboring cities in Argolis. Pericles, then, about B. C. 458, formed an alliance with Argos against Sparta. This was followed by a clever stroke of policy, whereby the Thessalians also were induced to become a member of the alliance. He then made successful overtures to Megara, and succeeded in inducing that important state, whose territory embraced the Isthmus of Corinth, to join the Confederacy. This gave the Athenians and their allies control of the gateway to the Peloponnese, and the passes of Mount Geraneia, through which an invading army must pass to reach Central Greece. It gave them also a strategic naval

base at Nisæa on the Saronic gulf, that being the port town of Megara on the south. From this port naval operations could be advantageously conducted against the island of Ægina, which lay about fifteen miles south of Nisæa. The importance of Megara was still further augmented by the fact that Athens thereby secured through this alliance the important city and harbor of Pegæ on the Crisæan, or Corinthian gulf. These alliances, negotiated by the superior diplomacy and statesmanship of Pericles, gave Athens an immense advantage. Through her allies she practically controlled Hellas. The Isthmus gave her command of the gulf of Corinth, the Saronic Gulf, and consequently free access to the Ionian and Ægean seas, and the shores and port towns of the entire Peloponnese. She could menace Bœotia on the north and the island of Ægina on the south. The passes of the Geraneian Mountains which stretched as a bar across the Isthmus extended from the Saronic Gulf to the Gulf of Corinth. These defiles formed the gateway through which hostile armies were obliged to pass from the south to invade Attica, and from Bœotia on the north to join her allies at Corinth. The political wisdom and foresight of Pericles, in negotiating these foreign treaties, is obvious, in view of the threatening attitude of the Lacedæmonians. After the Athenian defeat at Tanagra, to which reference will be made presently, these alliances with neighboring contiguous states possibly saved Athens.

After Pericles had concluded these various treaties he turned his attention to Ægina. The thrifty and enterprising people of that island and the merchants and tradesmen of Epidaurus and Corinth made these states the principal commercial rivals of Athens. They became alarmed at the growing power of their rival especially in view of her new allies. Impelled by necessity, therefore, Epidaurus and Corinth formed

an alliance to protect Ægina, to prevent the island from falling under the dominion of Athens. These allies fitted out a strong fleet. But the fame of the Athenian navy, and the superior training of her seamen, made her invincible. A naval engagement (B. C. 458) occurred off the island, which resulted in the destruction of the Peloponnesian squadron. Seventy ships were captured by the Athenians. They then debarked a strong land force under the command of Leocrates, and laid siege to the city of Ægina, the capital of the island.

Corinth now sought to relieve Ægina, by making an attack upon Megara, upon the assumption that the Athenians would be unable to assist the Megarians, by reason of the fact that they had a large force absent not only in Ægina but also in Egypt, whither they had gone to the assistance of Inaros, a Libyan King, who had undertaken to aid the Egyptians to overthrow the Persian yoke in the land of the Pharaohs. They believed, also, that if the Athenians went to the assistance of Megara they would of necessity be obliged to raise the siege of Ægina. But the resources of Athens were not exhausted as long as there were boys and old men in the city capable of bearing arms. These youthful and aged warriors were mustered under Myronides, who led them to the Isthmus. The Corinthians had seized the heights of Geraneia, and thence made a descent with their allies into the Megarian territory. An engagement took place between the Corinthians and the old men and boys sent from Athens under Myronides. The victory was claimed by both sides, but finally the Corinthians retired and the Athenians erected a trophy. When the troops reached Corinth they were derided and taunted for having fled from an army of boys and aged men, and unable to endure their shame and mortification, after twelve days preparation, again returned to the field of battle, and claiming to have prevailed

over their enemies, erected a trophy. Then Myronides, with his unique contingent, returned to aid the Megarians, and those who had erected the trophy were slain. He then made an assault and charged and routed the enemy. The Corinthians retreated, but a large number missed their way and got into a private enclosure, surrounded by a ditch, from which there was no exit. The Athenians took advantage of their plight and closed the entrance with heavy armed troops. The light troops were thrown about the enclosure and stoned those within, all of whom perished.

In view of these alliances which Pericles had made with neighboring states, and the reverses which the Peloponnesians had sustained, the Lacedæmonians became alarmed. They had every reason to be disturbed at the growing power of Athens, and fearing that she might acquire a land empire, in addition to her maritime supremacy, they were exceedingly anxious to form an alliance with Thebes, to prevent her rival from extending her influence in Bœotia. The invasion of Doris by the Phocians and the capture of Delphi, which city the Phocians had taken from the Delphians, in what was known as the Holy War, afforded them the opportunity they sought.

The four states which border the northern shores of the gulf of Corinth, in their order from east to west, are Bœotia, Phocis, Locris and Ætolia. The states of Phocis and Locris form the southern boundary of the little state of Doris, whose territory is about as extensive as the District of Columbia. Its inhabitants were Dorians, and kinsmen as well as allies of Sparta. The town of Delphi in which stands the temple of Apollo, is situated in Phocis. Over its sacred precincts the Phocians claimed jurisdiction. The Delphians, however, asserted that the limitations of the holy territory, where the temple stood, were not confined to the adjoining precincts and grounds about the edifice, but

were coterminus with the city of Delphi. In this contention they were bitterly opposed by the Phocians. The Delphians had the sympathy and support of the Dorians and in order to maintain the supremacy of their city, they sought also the aid of Sparta and the Peloponnesians. The latter had always been liberal in support of the temple and were able to secure favorable responses from the Pythian, when it became necessary to consult the oracle. They enjoyed this high privilege to such an extent that the Alcæonidæ, whose family had been banished from Athens by Hippias, were obliged to bribe the priestess in order to secure favorable responses, when occasion arose, in which the Spartans were concerned, because the Pisistratidæ were encouraged and aided by the Spartans in their usurpations against the popular party in Athens.

Sparta, at the time of the affair at Tanagra, B. C. 457, was still involved in the Messenian War, and engaged in the siege of Ithome. But the Dorians having attempted to aid the Delphians against the Phocians, the latter sent an army into Doris to punish the inhabitants for their interference. This gave Sparta a pretext for sending an army into Bœotia ostensibly to aid the Dorians. The real object was not only to take the city of Delphi from the Phocians, but to form an alliance with the Bœotians against Athens. The Spartans were able to spare fifteen hundred hoplites from the operations at Ithome, and these were reinforced by ten thousand Peloponnesian allies. This army of eleven thousand five hundred men under command of Nicomodes marched to the state of Doris, but upon their approach the Phocians retired. Delphi was restored to the Delphians, and the Lacedæmonians were free to carry out their plans to prevent the Athenians from gaining an ascendancy in Bœotia. Thebes, after the battle of Platæa, had lost her power and influence, because she took part with the Medes against Hellas.

But the question with the Lacedæmonians was whether Athens or Sparta would be able to establish supremacy in Bœotia. In order to form an alliance with the Thebans, the Lacedæmonian army repaired to Thebes. That city was then engaged in restoring her fortifications, and seeking to regain her lost power. Thebes was an oligarchy. The Lacedæmonians were supporters of oligarchical government. Pericles had beaten Cimon and the oligarchical party in Athens, which had attempted to defeat the democrats, and establish an oligarchy in Attica. Some of the wealthy men, who had sought to overthrow democracy at home, now repaired to Thebes to secure the influence of its citizens, and to urge them to form an alliance with the Lacedæmonians, in order that when the opportunity offered, they might be able, with the aid of the forces from the Peloponnesus, to coöperate and overthrow the democratic party headed by Pericles, and establish an oligarchy in Attica. The aristocrats were particularly incensed because Pericles, with the efficient aid of Ephialtes, passed a law which made any citizen, without regard to his property qualifications, eligible to the Archonship. They also succeeded in stripping the ancient council of the Areopagus of much of its power. The battle between oligarchy and democracy was being fought bitterly, and the oligarchical party was at its wit's end. The democrats feared an attempt on the part of traitors in Athens to seek the aid of the Lacedæmonians, whose army was in Bœotia.

Thucydides mentions another reason why the Lacedæmonians might have been anxious to have the support of the oligarchical party in Athens. The wisdom of Pericles in forming alliances with the neighboring state of Megara now became apparent. The return of the Lacedæmonian army from Phocis presented difficulties. If they went by sea, across the Gulf of Corinth, they would certainly have been intercepted and attacked

by an Athenian fleet. If they marched through Bœotia into Megara they would be obliged to pass over and through the defiles and passes of Mount Geraneia, and the Athenians were in Megara, and held the port of Pegæ, on the Corinthian gulf. They concluded, therefore, to remain at Thebes, and determine how they might return with the least risk and danger to themselves. They encouraged the malcontents in Athens to join them against Pericles. The Athenians were aware of the embarrassment of the army in Thebes and suspected treachery at Athens. It became necessary, therefore, to act promptly and prevent if possible the escape of the enemy from Bœotia. They mustered fourteen thousand men, which included a thousand Argives, and contingents from other allies, and among them a body of Thessalian cavalry, as Thessaly at this time was an ally of Athens.

Tanagra is a small town on the Asopus, in Bœotia, close to the northern frontier of Attica about fifteen miles east of Thebes, and five miles south west of Delium. It is about thirty miles almost due north of Athens. Here the Lacedæmonians encamped on their march from Bœotia. The fact that they did not take the risk of returning over the Thebes road to the west of Tanagra, which runs through or near Platæa, and thence into Megara, sustained the belief in Athens, that the Lacedæmonians expected to coöperate with the oligarchical party who had planned a revolt against the adherents of Pericles.

A bloody engagement took place at Tanagra, B. C. 457. The object of the contestants was to secure supremacy in Bœotia. It was the first spear thrust, the first open clash, directly between the forces of Sparta and Athens, after the recall of Pausanias, B. C. 478, and the domination of Athens as President of the Confederacy of Delos. The struggle resulted in the temporary defeat of the Athenians. This was said to have

been occasioned by the treachery of the Thessalian cavalry, who suddenly in the midst of the fight deserted to the enemy. But the engagement was not decisive, and no effort was made by the Lacedæmonians to follow up their victory by seeking to reduce Athens. But their success enabled them to proceed unmolested through northern Attica, and through the passes of the Geraneian mountains to Corinth and the Peloponnese.

Pericles was of the tribe of Acamantis and led his tribesmen at Tanagra. Cimon, who had been banished because it was claimed he had secretly espoused the cause of the Lacedæmonians, and as leader of the oligarchical party was not to be trusted, wished to blot out forever this slander against his good name. He wanted to prove his patriotic devotion to his country's cause, by joining the Athenians in their efforts to defeat the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra. He was of the tribe of Cœneis. He put on his armor, ranged himself among his own tribe and begged Pericles to permit him to fight with the rest against the Spartans. But the council of Five Hundred would not trust him, and believed that his presence in the army was to aid the enemy rather than to promote the cause of Athens. He then besought about one hundred of his followers to show to their countrymen by their valor and fortitude their absolute innocence of the insinuations as to their loyalty. As an incentive to deeds of patriotic devotion, he stripped off his armor, the armor he had worn at the memorable battle of the Eurymedon, and set it up among his devoted followers, who rallied round it in the heat of the engagement. Bearing the arms of Cimon, they went into the conflict and displayed unusual courage. Nearly all of them perished at Tanagra, in defense of Athens. The Athenians were convinced by this conduct on the part of Cimon that the decree of banishment against him was unjust. It was reversed, and the vote in the assembly was taken on the

motion of Pericles, who introduced the resolution to rescind the ostracism against his political rival, which he himself had procured. The aristocratic party at Athens gained nothing by the Lacedæmonian victory at Tanagra, and took no measures to ally themselves with the Thebans or Spartans. But the advantages lost by the Athenians in that engagement were recovered sixty-two days later at Œnophyta, where they gained a decisive victory over Theban and Bœotian forces, which gave to Pericles and his party supremacy in central Hellas, and enabled Athens to establish her land empire.

When Cimon was recalled after the battle of Tanagra, he became reconciled with Pericles, and the conspiracy against democracy died. Athens, united, planned an attack on Thebes, the ally of Sparta, not only to wipe out the stain of her defeat at Tanagra, but to acquire supremacy in Bœotia, which was essential in order to enable her to establish a land empire.

Œnophyta is on the border between Bœotia and Attica, about three miles south of Tanagra, where the Athenians had defeated the Thebans, B. C. 456.

The former, under the leadership of Myronides, says Thucydides (i, 108) on the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, marched against the Bœotians, and having defeated them in an engagement at Œnophyta, made themselves masters of the country of Bœotia and Phocis and demolished the walls of the Tanagreans. They took as hostages one hundred of the richest men in Locris, and finished their long walls."

The walls here referred to connected Athens with her two harbors or port towns in the Saronic Gulf, Phalerum and the Piræus. The walls about the city were finished about B. C. 478, the year after the defeat of the Persians at Platæa. It was after the Athenian victory at Œnophyta, that the walls extending to the sea were finished, one to the harbor of Phalerum, the

other to the Piræus. These were known as the "long walls," as distinguished from the city walls proper. The wall extending to Phalerum connecting the outer city wall with that about the port was about four miles long, and the wall to the Piræus about four and a half miles in length.

Soon after, Ænophyta, the city of Ægina, was forced to capitulate. The Athenians became masters of the island. The Æginitans were obliged to dismantle their walls, surrender their ships and pay a forced tribute into the treasury at Athens.

The victory at Ænophyta made Athens master of northern and central Greece. Her supremacy was established on land and sea, and she reached the height of her power and glory. She was mistress of the Ægean, of Cyprus and of the west coast of Asia Minor. She had reduced Ægina to slavery, and her alliances at home made her master of the territory of northeastern Argolis, Megara, Phocis, Locris, Bœotia and Thessaly. The exploits of Tolmides and Pericles, which will now be referred to, extended her dominions to Achaia, also to Acarnania, and Ætolia, so that her jurisdiction extended to the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Corinth.

B. C. 455, the year after the victory at Ænophyta, the Athenian admiral Tolmides was assigned to the command of an Athenian fleet, and sent on an expedition to burn and plunder the coasts of the Lacedæmonians. He circumnavigated the Peloponnesian peninsula, destroyed several port towns and sailing north into the Ionian Sea, proceeded into the Gulf of Corinth, making conquests in Achaia, and Acarnania, Ætolia and Locris. He reduced Naupactus at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, took the Corinthian town of Chalcis in Ætolia, and made a descent on the city of Sicyon, and defeated its army in the field. About this time the Third Messenian War ended, the Helots

and their allies, after nearly ten years of hostilities, surrendered on condition that they might be permitted to depart with their wives and families, and under the protection of Tolmides, were conducted to Naupactus, where they settled and became allies of the Athenians.

The achievements of Tolmides, B. C. 455, were supplemented the following year by extensive operations conducted by Pericles. With a fleet of one hundred galleys he sailed out of the harbor of Pegæ, or The Fountains, on the northern coast of Megara, in the gulf of Corinth. His first objective was the city of Sicyon in the State of Corinth, whose arms had suffered defeat the previous year at the hands of Tolmides. He landed with one thousand hoplites. An engagement took place, in which the Athenians were successful, in that they drove the enemy from the field, but were unable to take their city. Pericles did not deem it expedient to interrupt his raid in the enemy's country by a prolonged siege of a walled city. He sailed to the shores of Acarnania, and after ravaging her coasts, in the localities occupied by Corinthian and Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, returned to Attica.

While Athens thus strengthened her influence and extended her power in Greece, her arms were defeated in Egypt, whither they had been assigned to aid Inarus, the Libyan King, in his rebellion against the Persians. In that disastrous war, in the valley of the Nile, the Athenian forces and the Libyan insurgents were driven out of Memphis, and were practically annihilated, after a series of campaigns in the land of the Pharaohs, covering a period of about six years.

An attempt was made, B. C. 455, on the part of Athens, at the request of her Thessalian allies to restore Orestes, the exiled son of the Thessalian King, but in this, though aided by a force of Bœotians and Phocians, who were now their allies, the Thessalian cavalry, by

their superior tact and destructive raids, forced the Athenians and their allies to retire. Pericles then, B. C. 454, sailed on a second expedition from Pegæ, and coasted as far as Sicyon and again defeated their army. But as Pericles was merely on a marauding expedition, he made no attempt to besiege the city, quitted Sicyon, crossed the gulf of Corinth to the shores of Acarnania, and besieged and attacked Œniadæ, but failing to reduce it, returned home.

The Lacedæmonians were exhausted with ten years of intestine war, occasioned by the revolt of the Helots and their Messenian allies, and were weakened by the great calamity which had befallen their city which was practically destroyed by an earthquake, just before the outbreak of the revolution in Messenia. For three years after the close of the Third Messenian War, they remained inactive and then, B. C. 452, concluded a five years' truce with Athens. They doubtless welcomed this respite in order that they might prepare for the final struggle for the supremacy of Greece. Athens, being now at peace, planned an expedition against Cyprus, B. C. 452. The Athenians sent out a powerful fleet of two hundred ships under Cimon, to subdue the island. While the great admiral was engaged in this campaign conducting operations against Citium, B. C. 449, he died, before his ambitious designs were accomplished.

For nine years Athens had been supreme on land and sea. She did not retain her supremacy in Hellas, by maintaining garrisons in the various cities and towns within her dominions and subject territory. She did not rely upon military occupation to secure the retention of her power, but sought to maintain her supremacy, by establishing everywhere republics instead of oligarchies. This policy was based upon the assumption that the masses loved liberty, rather than semi-slavery which was the condition which prevailed under

an oligarchy. Accordingly, a democracy was established at Thebes, and in the other cities and towns throughout the allied territory, because Pericles believed that the expulsion of the oligarchical party, where such parties had formerly prevailed, and the substitution of a popular party, would suffice to hold the towns and cities in their allegiance to Athens. This hypothesis proved to be a delusion.

After the battle of Cœnophyta (B. C. 457), and after democracy had been substituted for oligarchy in Central Greece, the leaders of the oligarchical party in Bœotia, Locris, Eubœa, Ægina, and elsewhere, became exiles. They were, in a sense, expatriated, and continually plotted with the enemies of Athens, ready to rise and attack the Athenians when dissensions and discords, which they continually fomented, afforded an opportunity of success. Although the Five Years' Peace had not yet expired, and the insurgents and revolutionists for that reason were unable to secure aid from the Lacedæmonians, they nevertheless continued to stir up strife and disorder, and aroused a spirit of rebellion in the frontier towns of Bœotia. Complaints were made continually by those who supported the democracy in these localities, and the Athenians determined to put down this incipient rebellion.

Tolmides was anxious to undertake an expedition to the frontiers of Bœotia, to restore peace and tranquillity, among the inhabitants who looked to Athens to maintain their supremacy against the oligarchical party. He had won fame and distinction on his expedition around the shores of the Peloponnese, having circumnavigated the peninsula, ravaged the sea and plundered the coasts of the enemy, he had taken Naupactus, and displayed marked ability as a naval and military commander. His success in the past made him rash and over-confident. This rashness contributed to his defeat at Coronea, where he lost his life, a disaster which

cost Athens the ascendancy she had acquired in Hellas, and the loss of her land empire.

Coronea is a town near the western frontier of Bœotia, about ten miles southeast of Chæronea, the birthplace of the illustrious Plutarch, and five miles west of the southern shore and marshes of Lake Copais. These towns, and others on the frontier, had fallen into the hands of the oligarchical exiles, from the various Bœotian towns, and were hostile to the republicans.

Tolmides, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, recruited largely from the first families in Athens with a body of auxiliary troops, hastened to the relief of the border towns in Bœotia. Pericles advised caution and admonished Tolmides to wait until he could muster a larger force. The young bloods of Athens, however, were ambitious and ready to follow their renowned commander. In their enthusiasm they disregarded the sage advice of the cautious and prudent Pericles. Tolmides also was impatient to advance; the people sided with him, and he was ordered to the frontiers of Bœotia. He directed his march to Chæronea and Orchomenus, which were then in possession of the insurgents. He was successful in driving the enemy from these places. He stationed a garrison in Chæronea, to protect the inhabitants from future disturbances, and marched south to Coronea, where the enemy had secretly assembled in force. When he reached that town, he was surprised, and in the bloody engagement which followed, B. C. 447, the valiant Tolmides was killed; his forces were overwhelmingly defeated, and many Athenians were made prisoners.

The result of the disaster at Coronea was far-reaching, and its consequences led to the disintegration of the land empire of Athens. By reason of the fact that many of the Athenian prisoners attached to the army of Tolmides were of distinguished families, Pericles, in

order to secure their release, was obliged to submit to the most disgraceful and humiliating terms, just as Sparta twenty years later, B. C. 425, after the defeat at Pylus and Sphacteria, where Brasidas was wounded and many of the noble Dorian families were made prisoners, was forced to conclude a treaty of peace with Nicias, on terms involving the disgrace of Sparta.


In order to enable the Athenians to secure the release of their prominent and influential citizens, after the battle of Coronea, they were compelled to evacuate Bœotia. The relinquishment by Athens of this important State, the closest neighbor of Attica on the north, was the beginning of the end of her land empire. The allied exiles, elated by their great success, became active in Phocis, Locris and Eubœa, overthrew their republics, reestablished in the two states first named oligarchical government, and dissolved their allegiance to Athens.

The victory of Athens at Œenophyta and her defeat at Coronea marked the rise and fall of her land empire, for what she gained at Œenophyta she lost at Coronea.

But while Sparta was successful on land, she was unable to defeat her rival as a maritime power. Athens was still mistress of the seas. The duel between these noted cities was finally fought to a finish, in the Peloponnesian War, a struggle which continued for a period of twenty-seven years. That conflict was postponed through the diplomacy of Pericles, who was successful soon afterwards in negotiating a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, which is known as the Thirty Years' Peace.

CHAPTER XXXV

CIMON

CIMON, the only son of Miltiades, was of the tribe of Ceneis. His services to his country were equally as important as those rendered by his illustrious father. He expelled the Persians from Europe, the Ægean sea, and the coasts of Asia Minor, and as commander-in-chief of the Athenian navy established the Athenian Empire.

We can but conjecture as to his age. The ancient writers do not mention the year of his birth. He died, B. C. 449, while conducting naval operations against the island of Cyprus. He participated in the battle of Salamis, B. C. 480, having acquitted himself with honor, and rendered material assistance to Themistocles, at that critical period of his country's history. Plutarch says that at that time he was very young, and his years were not strengthened by experience. If we assume that "very young" means that he was twenty-three, when that engagement took place, he must have been born B. C. 503. Consequently he was but fourteen years of age at the time of his father's death, B. C. 489, the year after the battle of Marathon; and attained the age of fifty-four, at the time of his death, B. C. 449. Cimon possessed all the abilities of his father, coupled with the shrewdness of Themistocles and the integrity of his compatriot Aristides. Plutarch says "he was as daring as Miltiades, and not inferior to Themistocles in judgment and incomparably more just and honest than either of them." In him were united the qualities

which peculiarly fitted him to lead the armament gathered through the instrumentality of the Confederacy of Delos, and enabled him to build up the Athenian Empire, with Athens as the greatest commercial mart in Europe, and the most powerful city of the world.

Owing to the injustice of Attic Law, Cimon became the victim of his father's delinquencies. Miltiades was prosecuted by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, for "deceiving the people" in connection with his ill-fated expedition to the island of Paros. He was convicted, but in view of the great services he had rendered his country, his judges refused to inflict the death penalty, but imposed a fine upon him of fifty talents, equivalent to more than \$50,000. He was unable to discharge the obligation, and died in prison, according to some authorities, shortly after his trial. Cimon was greatly attached to his father, and such was his devotion, that when Miltiades died, Cimon, according to Diodorus,¹ in order to secure his corpse for burial, willingly surrendered himself, and took his father's place in prison.

Under the law of Athens, Cimon, his heir, became responsible for the fine which had been imposed upon his father, and in addition lost his civil rights, which could not be restored until the obligation against the estate was discharged. Had not a fortunate chain of circumstances relieved Cimon of the disabilities in which he was placed by reason of his poverty, the avenues of opportunity would have been forever closed to him, and Athens would have lost the benefit of the distinguished services, which he subsequently rendered to his country.

Under Attic Law, the heir inherited the estate of his ancestor, but he took the inheritance *cum onere*, that is, subject to the payment of the debts of the ancestor.

¹ Diodorus, Frag. 51.

² See Gardner and Jevons Manual of Greek Antiquities; Attic Law, p. 548.

The injustice of the law was embraced in the provision, that these debts were not only a lien upon all the property of which the ancestor died seized and possessed, but became also personal obligations of the heir, which the latter was bound to pay. If the property of the decedent was not sufficient to discharge them, the heir was nevertheless bound to pay them from his own means, or from property which he had acquired by his own efforts, or from whatever source. If Cimon had not received from his brother-in-law, Callias, the money with which to pay his father's fine, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, would have had no political rival in Cimon the son of Miltiades; because until all the obligations of the ancestor had been discharged, his heir was disfranchised, and not eligible to public office.

The law with regard to imprisonment for debt established by the cultivated and enlightened Athenians at this period was unduly severe. It lacked the humane provisions contained in the laws of the Babylonians enacted nearly two thousand years earlier. In 1913 there was discovered in the valley of the Euphrates a tablet containing many of the missing laws from the Code of Hamurabi, who ruled in Babylon, 2100 to 2300 B. C., nearly two thousand years before the time of Cimon. These laws in many respects are similar to the laws of Moses. Among the Normans and Anglo-Saxons to the time of the Norman conquest, the creditor was permitted to seize the debtor and sell him as a slave. It seems that under the Code of Hamurabi, which has recently been unearthed, the debtor, when he had stripped himself of his property, was permitted to take a receipt for his goods and estate which he had surrendered, in the presence of two witnesses, and was then entitled to his discharge, just as a debtor under our bankrupt act is entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy. This Babylonian statute was doubtless confined to ordinary debts, recoverable in a civil action. Whether

it applied to a debt imposed as a penalty for crime, we are not informed.

Although Miltiades left but one son, he was survived also by a daughter, Elpinice, who after their father's death continued to reside with her brother Cimon. Elpinice was an exceptionally attractive and accomplished woman. She was a favorite with the artist Polygnotus, whose paintings adorned the portico of the Propylea on the Acropolis. The artistic eye of the eminent painter was attracted by her perfect figure, pleasing countenance, fair complexion, and the wealth of golden hair that crowned her temples. Indeed, Pericles, the rival of Cimon, greatly admired her charms and accomplishments, and was numbered among her suitors. As both Cimon and his sister were without means, it is said the law did not take notice of the illicit relations which it was whispered existed between them. These stories, however, we may safely assume were without foundation and originated with political enemies of Cimon. This belief is justified by the fact that among the distinguished men, in her circle of acquaintances, was Callias, the son of Hipponicus, one of the wealthiest men in Athens, noted for his munificence, and generosity. He became enamored of Elpinice and sought her hand in marriage. It would seem that under Attic Law, in order to marry her, Callias was obliged to first secure the consent of her brother, Cimon. However this may be, the consent was obtained, and Cimon gave his sister to her wealthy suitor. Whether there was any legal obligation on the part of Callias to pay the debt of her father or her brother, before he could lawfully wed Elpinice, we are not informed, but when the ceremony was performed, the fine imposed on Miltiades and for which Cimon became personally liable, was paid. This act, whether prompted by the love Callias bore his wife, and the esteem he entertained for her brother, removed all social and political barriers from the path

of Cimon, and he became eligible to the honors which his countrymen subsequently conferred upon him.

When Themistocles, after the battle of Thermopylæ, advised the Athenians to forsake their city and the shores of Attica, carry their arms on ship board, and fight Xerxes, in the straits of Salamis, while many deemed it rash and almost madness, Cimon gathered about him a large number of the young men of Athens, and forming them into a procession, marched at their head to the citadel carrying in his hand a bridle, to offer to the goddess as an indication that the salvation of Athens was not with cavalry, upon the land on the back of the war steed, to await the assailing horse and foot, but upon the sea, where horse and bridle were of no avail. He then offered the bridle in his devotions to the goddess, took from the walls of the temple a buckler, proceeded thence to the port, with his companions, and went aboard the fleet. Thus Cimon "gave confidence to many of the citizens."

What we know of his life consists practically in the record of his naval campaigns. The name of Themistocles is immortal, because he alone is entitled to credit for the engagement at Salamis, which was fought at the most critical time in the history of Greece. Salamis was the turning point of the Persian War, and made success at Platæa, the following year, comparatively easy, by reason of the great reputation won by the Greeks at Marathon and Salamis.

But the numerous and continued successes of Cimon added to the glory of Greece and the aggrandizement of Athens. He not only compelled the Persians to evacuate Europe, but drove them back from the shores of Asia Minor, so that not so much as a letter carrier, or a single horseman was ever seen to come within four hundred furlongs of the sea.

After the treason of Pausanias, when the Grecian fleet refused longer to obey him, they petitioned Aris-

tides and Cimon to take command. Aristides was an enemy and rival of Themistocles. They differed politically. Aristides believed in a moderate aristocracy. Themistocles was the great champion of democracy. Themistocles was bold and ingenious, and interfered with the plans of his rival Aristides. The latter, however, was very popular and reputed the most just man in Athens. He loved Cimon, used all his influence to promote his fortunes, and urged his appointment as admiral. So great was the popularity of the latter that at Byzantium, when the fleet rebelled against the selfish, vain, arrogant and treasonable Pausanias, the former was sent out as admiral with Aristides.

His first success was on the coast of Thrace, near the mouth of the Strymon, B. C. 471. He invaded the interior, cut off the base of supplies from Eion and Amphipolis, took Eion (q. v.) and put Thrace and the region about the river Strymon in possession of the Athenians. This country was rich in timber, adapted to agriculture, and contained rich mines of gold and silver.

After Eion, Cimon led an expedition against the piratical island of Scyros (B. C. 470), from which he expelled the Dolopian pirates and annexed it as Athenian territory. He fought the Carystians who dwelt on the island of Eubœa, and quelled the revolt which they had instigated, and prevented hostilities from spreading over the island. He was sent B. C. 467 to the island of Naxos, a member of the Confederacy of Delos (q. v.), and the first among the allies to revolt from that alliance, and reduced its inhabitants to submission.

His greatest military achievement was his double victory at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, B. C. 466. The Persians were collecting their forces preparatory to a fresh attempt to subjugate Greece. A fleet and a land force was on the Eurymedon await-

ing the arrival of a contingent of eighty Phœnician vessels. Cimon attacked and defeated the fleet, and then as the army drew towards the sea, paused as if in doubt whether to attack, his men being wearied by the slaughter in the first engagement. But seeing the men grow enthusiastic, as if eager to finish on land, the work they had begun on the sea, they disembarked and set upon the Persians, who withstood with firmness the shock of the first impact. The Athenians finally routed the barbarians, put them to flight, and plundered their tents and pavillions. "Cimon," says Plutarch, "like a skilled athlete at the games, having in one day carried off two victories, wherein he surpassed that of Salamis by sea, and that of Platæa by land, was encouraged to try for yet another success." Accordingly, Cimon set off to engage the fleet of eighty Phœnician sail which had come in sight at Hydrum, and having overtaken the enemy destroyed them before they had learned of the defeat of their allies in Pamphylia. Then the King of Persia made peace and engaged that his armies should come no nearer the sea than the length of a horse's course.

Cimon's fame increased and his public career ran smoothly until B. C. 465, when he was sent with a fleet to the northern Ægean or sea of Thrace, to reduce the island of Thasos. It is situated about five miles off the mainland, and about forty miles east of Eion and Amphipolis, on the river Strymon. The island is eighteen miles long from north to south, and some fifteen miles across. Like Naxos, Thasos was a member of the Confederacy of Delos. The former was the first of the allies to renounce its allegiance to the league. But the reasons assigned by Athens to bolster up its pretext for sending a squadron to subjugate Thasos, did not arise from any disposition on the part of the Thasians to repudiate their obligations to the Confederacy. Their quarrel with Athens was with regard to certain

territory on the mainland in Thrace, and the right to participate in the revenues of certain gold mines at or near Mount Pangæus, which were being worked by the Thracians, from which the Thasians received the profits. After Cimon had reduced Eion on the Strymon, six years before (B. C. 471), as narrated above, the value of these mines aroused the cupidity of the Athenians, who sent a colony of ten thousand into the country inhabited by the Edoni, in the vicinity of the Nine Ways, which afterwards became the site of Amphipolis. They then advanced into the interior. The Thracians, whose country was threatened by the newcomers, united with the Edonians. A battle ensued at Drabescus in Edonia, which resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the colonists, who were massacred almost to a man. The inroads of the Athenians interfered materially with the interests of the Thasians, who had formed a sort of commercial partnership with the Thracians who worked the mines. It was believed at Athens that the Thasians secretly aided the Thracians in the affair at Drabescus, and this it is believed was the cause of the war. The former had become possessed of considerable territory on the mainland in these nearby regions. Their island was only forty miles distant from the mouth of the Strymon, but half a day's sail from Eion. We have no detailed account of the quarrel between the Athenians and the Thasians at this time. There is no record of any attempt on the part of Athens to submit to arbitration her differences with her ally. The Athenians had the power of a giant, and used it like a giant. Cimon was ordered to Thasos with a strong fleet, with instructions to reduce the island to subjection. He defeated the Thasians in a sea fight, and blockaded their ports. It was the battle of the strong against the weak. The Thasians believed they were in the right, and that they should have been protected in their rights by Athens, who was their

ally, and the head of their confederacy, instead of being forced not only to give up their lands and mines in Thrace, but commanded to surrender their island home, and become subjects and practically slaves of Athens. In view of the unfair conduct of the Athenians, perhaps the slaughter of their colonists may be regarded as an act of retributive justice, visited upon them by divine providence. The Thasians, notwithstanding they were besieged by a fleet under the command of the invincible Cimon, determined to resist to the last. Liberty was sweet, and the Thasians, as a last resort, appealed secretly to the Lacedæmonians for succor. The latter heard their appeal and prepared to furnish them substantial aid, and make war upon Athens.

The hand of providence interposed. Just as the Lacedæmonians were about to send an army to invade Attica, an earthquake shook the valley of the Eurotas and destroyed the city of Sparta, B. C. 464, and more than 20,000 of its inhabitants perished. Sparta, however, had been an oppressor as well as Athens. For years they had warred to enslave the Messenians and the Helots, their neighbors on the west, and keep them in bondage. The military operations against these people are known as the third Messenian War.

When the earthquake demolished Sparta, and destroyed thousands of her people, the downtrodden and oppressed Helots took advantage of the calamity to secure their freedom. They immediately revolted and marched into the valley of the Eurotas. They were repulsed and driven into Messenia, and with the aid of the Messenians, fortified themselves in the mountains, and occupied the inaccessible heights of Mount Ithome, not far from the city of Messene. The struggle to subjugate these people continued for a period of nearly ten years.

By reason of the earthquake, and the war which en-

sued, the Spartans were unable to keep their promise to aid the Thasians, by sending an army secretly to invade Attica. On the contrary, they were obliged to seek the assistance of the Athenians to enable them to dislodge their enemies from Mount Ithome. This peculiar combination of circumstances involved Cimon, whose love for the Lacedæmonians prompted him to come to their aid. He used all his influence to persuade his countrymen to send an army to Messenia, at the behest of Sparta. The Democratic party in Athens, led by Ephialtes and Pericles, opposed Cimon. They did what they could to persuade the Public Assembly to deny his request. They argued that the latter was more friendly to the Spartans than was consistent with loyalty to the Athenians. That the former were the secret foes of Athens and would destroy her supremacy if they could, and that Cimon, in seeking to befriend them was guilty of disloyalty. They insisted that as soon as the island of Thasos had been subjugated, he should forthwith proceed to the mainland and invade Macedonia and Thrace, and make her territory part of the Athenian Empire.

As has been observed, the island of Thasos was but half a day's sail from the mouth of the Strymon, and after the reduction of Thasos the way was open to invade Macedonia. But Cimon chose rather to devote his energies to aid the Lacedæmonians in their struggle with the Helots, than to gain new conquests on the shores of Thrace. At all events, after the surrender of the Thasians, he did not land his troops on the mainland, nor make any attempt to march against the armies of Alexander of Macedon.

His conduct, in this regard, brought upon him the severe criticism of his enemies. He was openly charged with having been bribed by Alexander, because he neglected the opportunity to invade his kingdom and was accused also of treason for failure to act upon the

demand that he conquer the territory of the enemies of Athens. Charges were preferred against him, and he was put on trial for his life.

Then, as has been observed, history repeated itself. Cimon, the son of Miltiades, was tried by Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, as Miltiades, the father of Cimon, years before had been tried for his life by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles. But so great was the popularity of Cimon, and so valuable and extensive were the services he had rendered to his country, and the riches he had secured to the public treasury of Athens, that Pericles became mild and perfunctory in his prosecution, and Cimon was acquitted. Whether the influence of Elpinice, sister of Cimon, who at the time was the beautiful wife of Callias, whose charms, prior to her marriage had attracted the attention of Pericles, influenced his conduct on this occasion we are not informed.

The struggle of the common people for popular rights continued at Athens. After the death of Aristides, who was a leader of the conservative party, and the banishment of the great democratic champion, Themistocles, the conservatives sought the influence of Cimon, whose popularity made him one of the first citizens in the State, and he became the leader of the conservatives or aristocratic party.

He was a distinguished general, a genial, open-handed, big-hearted sailor, fond of the good things of this life, to an extent, which gave credence to reports that when off duty, he was inclined to indulge sometimes to excess in convivial pleasures. As a diplomat and politician he was no match for Pericles, who succeeded Themistocles, as leader of the democrats and at this time was prominent in politics, sharing public honors with Ephialtes, the incorruptible. While Cimon was in Athens his influence in public affairs seems to have prevented the leaders of the democracy from securing

legislation in the interest of the masses. But when Cimon went to sea, prosecuting his campaigns against the Persians, the popular party in Athens led by Ephialtes, supported by Pericles and other leaders succeeded in remodelling the constitution of Solon, as modified by Clisthenes, so as to throw open the office of Archon to any citizen who desired to become a candidate for that position. Formerly, no one could be a candidate unless he possessed a requisite amount of property to the end that none but the wealthy should be eligible. It is true that suffrage was universal, but the power of the common people was nullified, because they were not permitted to choose their candidates. The office of Archon was most important, and although elected annually, yet when an Archon served honorably, he became, when his term of office expired, ex-officio, a member of the powerful and dignified council of the Areopagus.

This body, composed of ex-archons, was one of the oldest and most influential among the Athenians. It continued long after the Roman conquest, and retained its ancient jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to religion and morals during the first century of the Christian era. When Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ, stood upon Mars Hill (Hill of Ares), in the city of Athens (A. D. 53), they took him before this ancient court, the Areopagus, and before that tribunal, he delivered his great address on the worship of the unknown God, and there declared the sublime doctrine of the resurrection!

The new laws, passed by the party of Ephialtes and Pericles in Cimon's absence, embraced these fundamentals; first, the office of the archon was open to all citizens; second, archons were elected by ballot, and the right of suffrage was universal; third, the Areopagus was stripped of practically all of its powers and duties, except the cases involving questions of re-

ligion and morals, and certain cases of homicide. The jurisdiction and functions taken from the Court or Council of the Areopagus were conferred upon the dikasts, who were chosen from the entire body of citizens and who sitting as jurors, decided all questions of law and fact in the cases tried before them. So Athens became a pure democracy.

When Cimon returned from his campaigns, he did what he could to bring back the old order of things, and restore the aristocracy, as it had flourished in the time of Clisthenes. His efforts were bitterly contested and brought upon him and his party most violent attacks of the democrats. Old slanders against him were revived, among others, the charge that he was intimate with his sister Elpinice, prior to her marriage with the wealthy Callias. He was charged also as being closely allied to the Lacedæmonians. Plutarch has a verse of the poet Eupolis reflecting on Cimon as follows:

“He was as good as others that one sees,
But he was fond of drinking and of ease;
And would at nights to Sparta often roam,
Leaving his sister desolate at home.”

At the time Cimon was tried for his life and acquitted as above narrated, public opinion favored him to such an extent that the Public Assembly granted his request that an army be sent to aid the Lacedæmonians, who were fighting to suppress the revolt of the Helots, and Cimon was honored with supreme command.

The Athenians, however, had not been long in Mesenia, acting as allies of Sparta, when suddenly the Lacedæmonians concluded that it was bad policy for them to accept the aid of their rivals. Notwithstanding their unbounded confidence in Cimon, and the love and esteem they bore him, they notified the Athenians that their services were no longer required. When they

returned home their countrymen expressed freely their indignation at this insult and the humiliation put upon them by Sparta. Every Athenian, among the conservatives, who had expressed friendship and partiality for Sparta, felt the displeasure of the people, which was strongly manifested in speech and action. The most conspicuous object of their displeasure was their leader, the genial aristocrat, and distinguished Cimon. The democrats put all the blame on him. His party was beaten and its leader was ostracized for a period of ten years.

At heart, Cimon was loyal to Athens, and, while still an exile, proved his loyalty by offering his services to his countrymen to fight the Spartans at Tanagra (B. C. 457), q. v. The latter unable to prevent Athens from building her long walls about the Piræus, determined to organize an alliance, and to enlist Thebes as an ally to check the operations of Athens in Bœotia. It was at this time that the Lacedæmonians, on pretext of lending aid to her Dorian kinsmen, who had been attacked by the Phocians, sent an army to their relief, and succored the Dorians. On its return, the army stopped at Thebes, in Bœotia, to strengthen the bond of allegiance between that city and Sparta. The Athenians sought to prevent the return of the Lacedæmonians, and encamped at Tanagra on the borders of Bœotia, where an engagement took place (q. v.), which resulted in the defeat of the Athenians. Cimon, who under the decree of ostracism, was then in retirement in Bœotia, went to the Athenian camp, and besought his countrymen to permit him to fight for Athens, but his request was refused. Then Cimon, determined to silence forever all suspicion as to his loyalty, organized some volunteers under Euthippus, who had also been censured because they were suspected of being too friendly to Sparta, and advised them to take part in the battle, in which he was forbidden to participate,

They fought with such conspicuous bravery that neither their loyalty nor that of Cimon was longer doubted. Shortly after Cimon was recalled by a decree which was drawn and presented to the Assembly by Pericles himself, the great democratic leader, and rival and the enemy of Cimon.

The facts and circumstances, in connection with the recall of Cimon, led to the conclusion that Pericles in view of the force of public opinion in Cimon's favor, so arranged matters, that the latter should be put in command of a fleet sent out of Greece and kept abroad as much as possible. He doubtless argued that while at sea, Cimon might augment the glory of Athens; and while abroad he could not influence the Athenians in such a way as to interfere with the political aims and ambition of its first citizen. The political rival of Pericles at that time was Thucydides. We have no authentic account as to what part Cimon took in political affairs after his return from exile. On account of his friendship for the Lacedæmonians, Pericles induced him to use his influence to secure a treaty of peace with Sparta, which service he accomplished B. C. 452, and negotiated what is known as the Five Years' Truce.

It was after he had secured this treaty that Cimon was assigned to duty abroad. He was put in command of a fleet of two hundred galleys, with instructions to proceed to Cyprus and from that point conduct operations not only to reduce that important island, but also to assist the Egyptians who had revolted against the rule of Artaxerxes, under the leadership of Inaros, King of the Libyans. After his death, the rebels continued the war under Anyratens, in the fens of the Nile. Cimon dispatched a squadron of sixty ships which sailed to Egypt, and with the remainder he proceeded to blockade Citium.

This was his last campaign. About the time he embarked he was admonished by the soothsayers and

diviners, that dire portents had manifested themselves, which these worthies advised presaged his death.

These warnings, we are told, were revealed to Cimon in a dream, in which he heard the furious barking of dogs mingled with human voices, which echoed the refrain which Plutarch quotes:

Come on, for thou shalt shortly be
A pleasure to my whelps and me.

We are told that Astyphilus, a friend of Cimon, skilled in divination, interpreted the dream as a premonition of the death of the great admiral. His reading of the vision was to the effect that a dog is the enemy of him he barks at, and always rejoices when his enemy is dead. The human voices mingled with the barking signified the Medes, for in their armies were found both Greeks and barbarians.

But Cimon loved his country. He loved adventure and excitement, and notwithstanding the doleful predictions of soothsayers and diviners, set out on his last expedition to win fresh glory for Athens, and humiliate and defeat his enemies. His aim was the ruin of the Persian Empire. Doubtless, had he lived, he might have carried his arms into Asia, and anticipated Alexander in the conquest of the East. He deputed sixty triremes to sail to Egypt, and with the remainder of his fleet sought to dislodge the Persians and their allies, the Sicilians and Phœnicians, from the island of Cyprus.

It was off the harbor of New Salamis, on the southern coast of the island that Cimon fought his last battle. The City of Citium was the scene of his last siege. Seventeen years had passed since the Athenian admiral, at the mouth of Eurymedon, on the coast of Pamphylia, won his greatest victory, the results of which emancipated Europe and Asia Minor from the dominion of Persia. The fates had decreed that he should end his

labors on the coast of Cyprus less than two hundred miles southeast of the scene of his greatest victory. His forces had been suffering from famine, and for this reason alone, they were obliged to retire from Citium. Cimon, who had been ill and confined to his bed, died, before the Phœnician fleet, then on its way to relieve the beleaguered city had arrived. When his end was approaching he gave orders that his officers should conceal the news of his death.

“Now twilight lets her curtain down,
And pins it with a star.”

“There is darkness on the mountain,
There is darkness on the main,
And the stars between the breaking clouds
Are hanging like a chain,
A chain of golden glittering gems
Let down into the sea.”

In the solemn hush of a summer's evening the soul of the great admiral passed. His race was run; his career was finished. But the spirit of the great commander still lived. In the engagement which followed, shortly after his death, although the voice of Cimon was stilled forever, the glorious memories of his achievements inspired his countrymen. When the enemy's fleet arrived they were attacked and overwhelmingly defeated. The Athenians then disembarked, and vanquished the land forces, who opposed them, and thus accomplished a feat at Cyprus, similar to that which, at the Eurymedon, rendered imperishable the fame of Cimon.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE, KNOWN AS THE PEACE OF PERICLES — CONTEMPORANEOUS EVENTS

PERICLES, B. C. 445, negotiated a treaty of peace between Athens and Sparta and her allies. The events which followed the defeat of the Athenians at Coronea (B. C. 447), referred to in a preceding chapter, made it imperative for Athens to seek peace with the Lacedæmonians. Had Pericles failed to negotiate the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, the battle of Coronea (B. C. 447), and not the surprise at Platæa (B. C. 431), would have marked the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

As to the details of this important treaty we know very little. Thucydides is our informant. He refers to the incident briefly ¹ as follows: "Pericles, having returned from Eubœa, not long after [he had subdued the revolt in that island] made a truce with the Lacedæmonians and their allies for thirty years, giving back Nisæa, Pegæ, Trozen and Achaia, places in the Peloponnese, of which the Athenians were in possession." It appears also in another connection (Thuc. i, 78), that the treaty contained a provision that all disputes or differences which might arise between the contracting parties should be settled by arbitration; and that neither should assume to entertain the complaints

¹ Thucyd. i, 115.

brought by the allies of the other; but that all such controversies should be adjusted by the heads of the respective alliances.

We know the principal features of the treaty from this record of Thucydides, namely, that Athens was required to abandon all the acquisitions which she had secured in the Peloponnesus and agreed to permit Megara, which was in control of the Isthmus of Corinth, the gateway to Attica, to remain as a member of the Spartan alliance. Pericles deemed these sacrifices, great as they were, necessary in order to avert war, and to enable her to retain intact her maritime empire. His experience and prudent foresight made him sensible of the fact that war with the Lacedæmonians was inevitable. He seems to have anticipated it for years. Plutarch tells us that among the few recorded sayings of this great statesman was that "he saw already war moving on its way towards them out of the Peloponnesus."

He doubtless concluded, when he lent his influence to secure the Thirty Years' Peace, that Athens must elect either to engage in a destructive war, the results of which were altogether uncertain, in order to build up again her land empire, or to abandon it entirely, in order that the integrity of her maritime power might continue. A most important feature of the treaty was, that for war, arbitration should be substituted. Had this provision been lived up to, the treaty might have lasted the entire period of its limitation. To appreciate the importance of this compact, it will be profitable to review briefly the events which led up to it, some of which are set forth in the preceding chapter.

Athens had been able to build up her land empire, chiefly by reason of the fact that at that particular time, the Lacedæmonians were in no condition to undertake a war against her, having suffered from the earthquake (B. C. 464), which destroyed their city in the

valley of the Eurotas. In addition to that calamity they were obliged to prosecute the Third Messenian War, waged against their authority by the revolting Helots, a contest which occupied a period of nearly ten years (464-455). Their resources, on this account, were exhausted to such an extent that they remained inactive for three years after that event, and then, B. C. 552, they concluded a Five Years' Truce with Athens. Thus, while the Lacedæmonians were not in a position to interfere with the ambitious designs of Pericles, Athens, under the leadership of that remarkable man, accomplished her ambitious designs to secure supremacy in northern and central Greece, as she had already, through the instrumentality of the Delian Confederacy, acquired supremacy on the seas. The events by which Athens built up her land empire are sketched in a preceding chapter. After the victory at Cænophyta, the Athenians finished their long walls, connecting the capital of Attica with the Piræus. A powerful fleet was assigned to Tolmides (B. C. 456), who circumnavigated the Peloponnese, burned the arsenals of the Lacedæmonians (the Five Years' Truce not then having been made), took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians in Ætolia, and defeated the Sicyonians in a battle during a descent on their lands in Argolis, near the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth, and secured control of Achaia. The island of Ægina was reduced to slavery, which gave the Athenians control of the Saronic Gulf. In the following year, Pericles repeated the plundering expedition which had been previously made by Tolmides. He sailed with one hundred galleys from the harbor of The Fountains, known also as Pegæ, in Megara (B. C. 455) along the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth, and descended on the territory of the Sicyonians, and further reduced Achaia. He then ravaged the coasts of Acarnania. In order to secure a brief period of further repose, after the long

and tedious Messenian War, the Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Cimon, who contemplated a campaign against Cyprus, were persuaded to negotiate the Five Years' Truce, B. C. 452-450. This treaty enabled the Athenians to fit out a formidable fleet of two hundred sail, which was sent to Cyprus under Cimon, and from that strategic base were enabled to undertake the invasion of Egypt, as allies of the Libyan King, Inaros, to further weaken the power of Persia. The absence of Cimon, on this expedition, left Pericles supreme in Athens. He died the following year, B. C. 449, while engaged in the siege of Citium. The Athenians had also made alliances which gave them supremacy in Bœotia, on the Isthmus, and in Achaia. Thus the alliances of Athens included the countries along the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Corinth, and her land empire was established.

At Coronea, B. C. 447, the success of Athens was reversed. The immediate results of that engagement was the loss of Bœotia. The Five Years' Truce was about to expire, and the Lacedæmonians would then be free, and in a position to concentrate all the enemies of Attica in northern and central Greece, into an alliance, including the Megarians, whose territory embraced the Isthmus.

When the Bœotians gained their independence, they instigated the Eubœans to revolt, and throw off their allegiance to Athens. Colonies of Athenian kleruchs had been established on that island, to whom had been given the lands of the Eubœans, and the latter were ready to join the revolution to regain control of their estates, and establish their independence. The importance of Eubœa to Attica is obvious. The hostile state of Argolis lay directly to the west, separated from Attica by the Saronic Gulf. The island of Eubœa lay directly east, separated from her only by the straits of Eubœa. The narrow island extends north, immediately

east of Bœotia. At the Euripus, the coasts of Bœotia and Eubœa almost touch, the channel at that point being less than a mile wide. Her four principal cities were Histiaë on the extreme north, not far from the headland of Artemisia; Carystus on the extreme south; Eretria about midway the island, on the western shore, and Chalcis on the Euripus, a few miles north of Eretria.

Pericles saw that the revolt in Eubœa must be subdued at the earliest moment. He mustered a strong force and began a campaign against the rebels. He was not permitted to prosecute the war. Scarcely had he begun operations when he received news of the most alarming import. Corinth, Sicyon and Epidaurus had formed an alliance and persuaded the Megarians to join them, to enable her to throw off her allegiance to Athens. The troops of the allied forces had been admitted to the City of Megara. The Athenian garrison was massacred, except a small remnant who made their escape to Nisæa. Thus while Pericles was absent in Eubœa, the Peloponnesians had secured control of the Isthmus and the mountain passes of Geraneia. By reason of the efforts of the united exiles, who had triumphed in Bœotia, the revolt spread into Phocis and Locris. All Central Greece was in revolt. What made matters still more serious for Athens was the fact that the Five Years' Truce, which had protected Athens from the direct attacks of the Lacedæmonians, had now expired. The mountain passes across the Isthmus were in control of her allies, so that a Peloponnesian army could march unmolested from the southern peninsula, directly into Attica. The time had come for the Lacedæmonians to strike her rival a decisive blow. Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, the King of Sparta at this time, was a mere youth. The Ephors, therefore, as a matter of extra precaution, attached to his person, Cleandrides, to aid him by his superior wisdom and

prudent counsel. This Cleandrides was the father of Gylippus, who afterwards overpowered the Athenians at Syracuse. An army of Lacedæmonians, with their Peloponnesian allies, was dispatched under Pleistoanax to invade Attica.

It was a dark hour for Athens. She was threatened with invasion by the united forces of the southern peninsula, and Pericles, the ablest man in Greece, absent in Eubœa with an Athenian army, sent there to quell a revolt which had spread throughout that island.

The Public Assembly acted promptly. Pericles was recalled, and proceeded at once at the head of his forces to meet the army of invasion which was then encamped on the plain of Eleusis almost within sight of Athens. Pericles determined, under no circumstances, to hazard a battle on Attic soil, if he could avoid doing so. What if his arms were defeated. It meant the irretrievable ruin of his country. In this critical situation, Pericles relied, not on the strength of his arms, but on the weakness of human nature. He argued that bribes might be used to accomplish that which he might not be able to accomplish in any other way.

Avarice was one of the besetting sins of the Hellenic race. It had ruined Themistocles. It had ruined Pausanias, the father of Pleistoanax. It was destined, also, to ruin Gylippus, the son of Cleandrides, and as the sequel shows it ruined Cleandrides himself on the occasion of his campaign in Attica, with his King, on the present occasion.

Indeed, Plutarch, in his life of Pericles, observes in this connection, as to the corruption of Cleandrides, that this covetousness was an hereditary disease, transmitted from father to son. Eurybiades took a bribe from Themistocles, in order to induce him to remain at Artemisium, when Leonidas, his King, was in peril at Thermopylæ. Even the Pythian priestess in the temple at Delphi could not resist the blandishments of those

who desired oracles, published from her sacred tripod, suited to accomplish their personal or political ends. These prophecies were in fact procured to enable Pleistoanax to obtain pardon for the crime of bribery, charged on this occasion. Athens was rich. In the temple of Athene, on the Acropolis, were the chests filled with the golden tribute paid into its treasury by the constituent members of the Confederacy of Delos. Pericles had gold at his command. Gold, he concluded, afforded a solution of the difficult problem with which he was confronted. Pleistoanax was very young. Cleandrides was susceptible. Negotiations were had with the enemy, and as a result of these conferences, the Peloponnesian army took its departure from Attica, and returned to the valley of the Eurotas. The inference was irresistible, that the Spartan King and his prudent adviser were bribed by the diplomatic Athenian statesman.

Mr. Grote hesitates to give entire credence to the assumption that the peaceful return of the Peloponnesians to their country after they had entered the plains of Attica, without striking a blow, was the result of the corruption of the Spartan King and his associate. He argues that we may well doubt whether the Peloponnesian forces were strong enough to undertake the risk of attacking Athens, now completely walled and protected from the Acropolis to the sea. He refers to the deliberation and caution, observed by Archidamus, during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, at the head of a more commanding force. It may be observed, also, in addition to what Mr. Grote has said, that Pericles was on that occasion attended by a strong force, probably eight, perhaps ten thousand hoplites. He returned afterwards to Eubœa with an army of eight thousand heavy armed. If this force was augmented on his return from that island by auxiliaries from Athens when he marched thence to Eleusis to

meet the invading forces of the enemy, we are justified in assuming that these auxiliaries numbered at least two thousand. We have no record as to the number of troops in the army of Pleistoanax, so that we cannot judge as to the numerical strength of the respective forces. It is not possible, therefore, to measure the risk Pericles must have assumed, had he determined to engage the invaders on the plain of Eleusis.

However, this may be, it seems certain that the Spartans believed that their King, and his associate had been bribed. On that charge they were tried, on their return to Sparta, and convicted. Both were banished. It is a singular coincidence that Pleistoanax, who was long a penitent in the sacred precincts near the temple of Athene in Tegea, in Arcadia, procured his restoration by bribing the Pythoness, and through her influence, somehow, the Spartan King was permitted to return to his dominions. Cleandrides died in exile, sentence of death having been passed upon him during his absence.

This charge of bribery seems to be further corroborated by the fact that when Pericles rendered an account of his expenditures, shortly afterwards, he stated a disbursement of ten talents, as laid out upon fit occasion. The item was not investigated, but the assembly allowed it without question. Indeed, some affirm that every year Pericles sent privately to Sparta the sum of ten talents, with which he compensated those in office to keep off the war, not to purchase peace, but to gain time in which to be better able to prepare for hostilities. This then seemed to be the primary object of the Thirty Years' Peace, namely, to gain time to prepare for war.

After the last file of hoplites in the army of Pleistoanax had disappeared beyond the borders of Attica, Pericles lost no time in returning to Eubœa to complete

the task of suppressing the revolt in that island, an undertaking which had been suddenly interrupted by the appearance of a Peloponnesian army within the borders of Attica. He left Athens with an army of eight thousand heavy armed, and was accompanied also by a fleet of fifty ships. He reduced the city of Chalcis on the Euripus, and drove out all the wealthy inhabitants who favored an oligarchy, and the city became a tribute ally of Athens. He then proceeded to the extreme north of the island, and attacked the ancient city of Histiaæ. It was situated near the sea, and its inhabitants had attacked an Athenian vessel, which they plundered, and then massacred the crew. For this offense, Pericles depopulated the city, changed its name to Oreus, and turned it over to a colony of Athenian kleruchs. In a short time he had reduced the whole island, secured its allegiance, and settled it by agreement. The suppression of this revolt, in the territory adjoining the channel on the east of Attica was absolutely essential to the peace and safety of Athens.

The task had been accomplished in Eubœa. But the reconquest of that island could not secure to Athens enduring peace. Pericles knew that the respite he had secured when he induced Pleistoanax to retire with his army from Attica was but temporary. The war cloud hung heavy over the Peloponnese. It was only a matter of time when it would advance over Attica, and all Hellas would be involved in a destructive war. The shame and mortification occasioned by the ignominious conduct of Sparta's King, who after invading Attica at the head of an army of Spartans and Spartan allies, returned to the valley of the Eurotas without striking a blow, kindled the wrath of his countrymen. Even the dread of the Athenian navy, which had plundered the seas, and ravaged the coasts of the Peloponnese, could not deter nor long delay the cherished ambition of Sparta to destroy Athens. Although the Athenians

had lost their allies in Bœotia, in Phocis, in Locris, and in Megara, they still retained Achaia, and Trozen, Nisæa and Pegæ. Pericles knew that Athens could not hold these states; that she was not in position to defend them permanently, and that she must temporarily at least abandon the Peloponnese. Then why not make a virtue of necessity, and trade these places to purchase peace, and the repose which Athens sorely needed? Her fleets and armies had been actively engaged in military operations for more than a generation. Since the battle of Salamis, Athens had warred against Persia, driven her from Europe, expelled her from the sea and compelled her to retire from the coast of Asia Minor, and confined her activities to the limitations of her ancient dominions. Not content with this she sent fleets and armies to Egypt to aid the revolution of Inaros, the Libyan monarch, to destroy her power in the land of the Nile. She had waged domestic war also and built up a land empire, which she was obliged to relinquish after her defeat at Coronea.

Pericles was moved by these considerations to secure for his countrymen a long respite. Peace under the circumstances became at this critical juncture more acceptable than war, and the great warrior statesman of Attica, who commanded her fleets and armies, now bent all his energies to purchase peace, while Athens had yet something to give to placate the jealousy and envy of the Peloponnesians. Trozen, Nisæa, Pegæ and Achaia — the surrender of these places indicated her willingness to abandon the southern peninsula of Hellas, the Isthmus and the control of the Gulf of Corinth. But Pericles was willing to make the great sacrifice in order that Athens might retain the integrity of her maritime empire, and enter upon a period of repose, an era which was destined to make Athens the centre of art, literature, and philosophy in the ancient world, and render her fame immortal.

He concluded, therefore, a treaty of peace with Sparta, by which the contracting parties bound themselves to refrain from hostilities and cease war for a period of thirty years.

CHAPTER XXXVII

ATHENS AT PEACE

THE causes which led to the Peace of Pericles, referred to in the previous chapter, may be summarized as follows:

For more than a generation prior to the Thirty Years' Peace (B. C. 445), Athens had been engaged in war. Since the battle of Salamis and the destruction of the city by Xerxes (B. C. 480), her fleets and armies had been constantly employed against Persia. In the Ægean and in Asia Minor Cimon had destroyed the dominion of Darius and Xerxes, and in its stead had planted the Athenian Empire. The death of that great admiral (B. C. 449) opened the way for peace with Persia. The defeat of the Athenians at Coronea, made it imperative that they should seek peace with the Lacedæmonians. The alliances which Pericles had negotiated in northern and central Greece, after the battle of Œenophyta, had been dissolved. Eubœa had revolted. A Spartan King at the head of an invading army had entered the borders of Attica. Bribery had been resorted to, to prevent a war with the Peloponnesians. Pericles then wisely concluded that Athens, at this time, was not prepared to engage with Sparta, in a struggle for her existence. The best interests of Athens required peace. To preserve the integrity of her maritime empire, peace was absolutely essential. The diplomacy of Pericles brought about the desired result, and the Thirty Years'

Peace was concluded B. C. 445. An account of this treaty and the causes which led to it are sketched in the last chapter.

As a result Athens secured repose. She had no land empire, but was the head of the greatest maritime empire in the world. She was also the richest city. Her revenues, with the exception only of the Persian empire, exceeded the revenues of any other country. The source of her wealth was the annual assessment paid into her treasury by her tribute allies. The number of these tributary cities is said to have been not less than one thousand. Some years before the Thirty Years' Peace, presumably about B. C. 460, the treasury of the Delian league which was originally in the temple of Apollo on the island of Delos, was removed to the temple of Athene, on the Acropolis at Athens. Mr. Grote says that it is impossible to state the precise time when the character of this great Confederacy was changed from a body of armed and active warriors, under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute payers, defended by the military force of Athens — from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute and awaiting Athenian orders. At the time of the Peace of Pericles, B. C. 445, it was no longer an independent Confederacy of independent allies, or independent states, represented in a general Congress, or Synod, which met annually in the temple at Delos, but formed part of an imperial empire, under the jurisdiction of Athens. With the exception of Chios, Samos and Lesbos, every member of the Confederacy was obliged to pay into the treasury at Athens its annual tribute, the amount of which was levied by the Athenians. The three islands above referred to were still permitted to remain independent allies of Athens. Each was allowed to retain its armed force, ships, and fortifications, the sole obligation being to furnish military and naval

aid when required, but they were under no obligation to pay tribute.

The amount of revenue derived from the subject allies in the Delian Confederacy, in the time of Pericles, was not less than six hundred talents annually, equal to considerably more than half a million dollars. The annual assessment in the time of Aristides, when war was actively carried on against Persia, was four hundred and sixty talents. Yet after peace had been concluded with Persia, the annual tribute had increased to six hundred talents. From the tribute cities of Athens, in her outlying colonies in Italy, Magna Græcia, in Thrace, and elsewhere, her annual income aggregated at least four hundred talents, nearly half a million dollars. So that the Athenians received into their treasury every year an income of at least one million talents, equal to more than one million dollars, which, in that age, was regarded as a princely revenue.

Athens now became not only a great commercial city, a centre of wealth and influence, carrying on extensive mercantile relations with every country, but also the centre of philosophy, literature and art. War had ceased with Persia, but the great war fund originally contributed by the allies of Athens to fight Persia, was still exacted, but instead of being used to carry on war, it was used to adorn and beautify Athens, which became noted as the most beautiful of cities; the remains of whose ancient glory and faded splendor still attracts the wonder and admiration of mankind. This era in the history of Athens from the Thirty Years' Peace, B. C. 445, to the commencement of the Peloponnesian War, B. C. 431, is known in history as the Golden Age of Pericles.

The period of repose, which gave Athens the opportunity to establish enduring fame in philosophy, in literature and art, was interrupted by two wars. The first arose on account of a quarrel between the island

of Samos and the city of Miletus, both allies of Athens, over the government of Priene, a city in Ionia, known as the Samian War, and an armed conflict between Corinth and Corcyra, with regard to their allies in Epidamnus (called Dyrrhachium by the Romans) in Illyria, on the coast of the Adriatic, and Potidea, in the Chalcidian peninsula in Thrace. In this latter war, Corcyra was accepted by Athens as her ally, and the aid which the Athenians gave her at the battle of Sybota, B. C. 432, enabled her to defeat the Corinthian fleet. On this account Corinth and Megara, the ships of the latter having been forbidden to trade in Athenian ports, made common cause, and finally being allies of Sparta, induced the latter to adjudge, that Athens had broken the treaty — the Thirty Years' Peace. The result was the Peloponnesian War, which resulted in the ruin of Athens, and the destruction of her empire.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE SAMIAN WAR

SAMOS — Sa-mos — [*Zamos*]. An island in the *Ægean* Sea, off the promontory of Mount Mycale in Ionia. It is situated about twenty-five miles northwest of Miletus and forty-five miles southwest of Smyrna. The island is twenty-eight miles long. Its greatest breadth is twelve miles.

IN B. C. 440, the fifth year of the Thirty Years' Peace, the island of Samos revolted from the authority of Athens. Pericles, with whom was associated the poet Sophocles, in command of an Athenian fleet, besieged and blockaded Samos, and after a war which continued for a period of nine months reduced the island to subjection. These military operations are known as the Samian War, and their successful termination added to the fame and influence of Pericles, who was at that time the most conspicuous figure in Greece.

In B. C. 440, Chios, Lesbos and Samos were the only members of the Confederacy of Delos who were independent allies of Athens. The others were subject allies. They were not permitted to retain their own navies or fortifications, but were compelled to pay their annual tribute into the treasury of the Confederacy, and in consideration of such payment were entitled at all times to its protection. After the disastrous defeat of Tolmides at Coronea (B. C. 447), Athens lost her supremacy in central Greece. The Peloponnesians, as a result of that victory, having destroyed the Athenian hegemony on land, endeavored also to accomplish the defeat of her supremacy on the sea. Revolts were in-

stigated in Eubœa and elsewhere, and in view of the threatening power of her enemies, Athens, acting upon the sagacious and prudent counsel of Pericles, sought peace with the Lacedæmonians. After negotiations, which continued for two years, a treaty was negotiated (B. C. 445), known as the Thirty Years' Peace (q. v.).

During the interval of comparative repose, which resulted from this treaty, Pericles beautified and adorned Athens, with elaborate temples and costly public buildings, which made it the envy of all Greece. The members of the Confederacy chafed under the oppression to which they were subjected in being compelled to pay tribute into the treasury of the league, which was used for the aggrandizement and splendor of the capital of Attica. Athens, also, as the head of the Confederacy, drew to herself jurisdiction of all criminal cases, and it is believed of civil controversies as well. Her decision was binding also, in all disputes as to municipal affairs among her independent and subject allies.

The immediate cause of the Samian war grew out of a quarrel between Samos and Miletus, with regard to the possession of Priene. The latter was situated in Ionia, on the south coast of the promontory of Mycale, immediately north of Miletus, on the opposite peninsula, the gulf which separates them being about nine miles wide. Priene is about twenty miles east of Samos. In this struggle Miletus was defeated. Samos took the city of Priene, and established there an oligarchical form of government. Again we have the old bone of contention between democracy and oligarchy, which kept Greece in a constant state of unrest. As a last resort, Miletus probably relying on the influence of Pericles, the great democratic leader, endeavored to persuade the Samians to submit the question as to the possession of Priene to Athens, as sole arbitrator of the dispute between them. In this Miletus was sup-

ported also by the democratic party in Samos, who were bitterly opposed to the oligarchy, which had been set up in Priene. Samos, however, declined to submit to arbitration, and insisted on her right to govern Priene, as she saw fit.

In this connection history touches the love romance in the life of Pericles, and reveals his association with his mistress, Aspasia, the most distinguished courtesan of her time. Renowned for her beauty, her wit and her intellectual attainments, Aspasia was a conspicuous figure among the public men, the philosophers, and poets whose names have made the fame of Greece immortal. She was born in Miletus, and obtained her introduction to men of prominence and power in emulation of Thargelia, whom Plutarch declares was a courtesan of the old Ionian times "a great beauty, extremely charming, and at the same time sagacious. She had numerous suitors among the Greeks, and brought all who had to do with her over to the Persian interests." It is said she had fourteen husbands. Aspasia was courted and caressed by Pericles, it is said, not only on account of her personal beauty, her wit, and charming manners, but on account of her knowledge and skill in politics. We are told that Socrates used to visit her with some of his acquaintances, and even those who frequented her company, took with them their wives to listen to her discourses.

The Milesians, having been defeated by the Samians, now desired that the powerful arm of Athens might intervene to protect her and punish her rival. They appealed to Aspasia, their country-woman, who, by reason of her influence with Pericles, was regarded as a powerful factor among statesmen and politicians at Athens to intercede with her lover in their behalf. They did not appeal in vain. Pericles proposed to the Assembly that a decree be enacted, declaring war upon Samos, in favor of the Milesians, because the Samians

refused to lay down their arms and have the controversy with Miletus decided by arbitration before the Athenians. And war was declared. It has been said that this controversy was brought about by Pericles to please Aspasia. In view of the fact that Pericles was the greatest democrat of his time after Themistocles, and that the democratic party in Athens, was strong enough to overthrow the oligarchical adherents under the leadership of one so powerful as Cimon, there seems to be no foundation for the assumption that the influence of Aspasia was the cause which induced the Athenians to interpose in behalf of Miletus against Samos as to the government of Priene. The conduct of Pericles, and the strength of the democratic party in Athens, would seem to indicate beyond question that the latter would welcome the opportunity to intervene on behalf of Miletus in order to establish democracy not only in Priene but in Samos.

Pericles was placed at the head of a fleet of forty vessels. He sailed to Samos, broke up the oligarchical governments they had established, and having taken a number of hostages, sent them to the island of Lemnos, in charge of an Athenian garrison. Under existing conditions, there were but two sources to which Samos could appeal for relief; namely, to the Lacedæmonians, the old enemies of Athens, or to the Persians. The former were prevented by the Thirty Years' Peace from lending aid to the oligarchy in Samos, but Persia lent a willing ear. Pissuthæus, satrap of Sardis, interposed on behalf of the Samians, and sought to bribe Pericles, offering him large sums of gold to excuse Samos, and release the hostages. Pericles declined to interfere and returned to Athens. No sooner had the Athenians departed than the oligarchical party in Samos, with the aid of the satrap of Sardis, and with allies from Byzantium, which also revolted, secretly set out in the night and proceeded to the island of

Lemnos. The Athenian garrison there was overpowered, and the hostages released. With the aid of Byzantium, and the assistance of the Persian satrap, Samos again revolted and defied the power of Athens.

Pericles was again placed in command of a fleet of sixty vessels and sailed to Samos. A Phœnician fleet, at the instigation of Persia, was then off the coast of Caria, intending to coöperate with the Samians, and part of the squadron of Pericles sailed to meet them. The remainder of the Athenian fleet engaged the Samians off Tragia, a small island twelve miles south of Samos, and though the Samians mustered seventy ships, Pericles, who was in command in person, after a severe contest defeated the enemy. He was then reinforced by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos. With this superior force, Pericles landed on Samos, invested the city with three walls and established a blockade of the island. With fifty ships he then sailed to the coast of Caria to engage the Phœnician fleet, sent to aid the Samians. In the absence of Pericles from Samos, the blockade was broken, the Athenians were defeated, and for a period of two weeks the latter were absolute masters of the sea and adjacent coasts. On the return of Pericles, the blockade was again reestablished. Reinforcements also began to arrive. Seventy vessels joined the blockading squadron; twenty with Thucydides (not the historian), Hagnon and Phormus; twenty with Tleptolemus and Anticles, from Athens; and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. With these forces the Samian War was fought to a finish, and after a campaign of nine months the Samians surrendered to Athens, and Byzantium returned to her allegiance.

The terms of peace exacted by Athens required the Samians to demolish their walls and fortifications, surrender their fleet, furnish hostages as a guarantee against further rebellion and pay to their conquerors

the entire expenses of the war, aggregating more than \$1,000,000 (a thousand talents).

After this the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and advanced themselves to a great pitch of power. The Lacedæmonians watched the advance of her rival and saw it rise to a dangerous height. They considered it no longer endurable and were eager to find some pretext to make war upon her. The opportunity presented itself when Athens lent aid to Corcyra at the battle of Sybota. (B. C. 432) q. v.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE CORCYRIAN WAR—EPIDAMNUS—ACTIUM—SYBOTA

CORCYRA — Kor-si-ra — [*Κορκυρα*] — (now Corfu). A mountainous island in the Ionian Sea, about 150 miles north of the gulf of Corinth, opposite the coast of Epirus (now Albania). It is indented by a crescent-shaped bay, giving the island in contour the shape of a sickle. The channel which separates Corcyra from the mainland varies in width. It is but two miles wide at the north. Along the centre it varies from twelve to fourteen miles; opposite Cape Leucimme, on the south, its width is from four to five miles. It occupies a strategic position commanding the entrance to the Adriatic, and afforded a naval base for operations against the islands Cephallenia and Zacynthus, commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth.

EPIDAMNUS — Epi-dam-nus — [*Επιδάμνος*]. A city on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula, in the Adriatic, on the coast of Illyria about 120 miles north of the City of Corcyra, designated by the Romans Dyrrhachium. It was founded in the seventh century (627 B. C.) by Corcyra, with the aid of emigrants from Corinth, the mother city. Phalius, the leader of the colony, claimed direct descent from Hercules.

ACTIUM — Ak-shi-um — [*Ἄκτιον*]. A promontory in Acarnania, at the entrance to the Ambracian Gulf which separates Epirus from Acarnania. It forms the northern extremity of Acarnania and is distant about forty-five miles southeast of Cape Leucimme, on the southern promontory of Corcyra.

SYBOTA — Sib-o-ta — [*Σίβοτα*]. An island in the Ionian Sea, in the channel between the southern extremity of Corcyra and the coast, but a short distance from the shores of Epirus.

THE quarrel between Corcyra and Corinth, known as the Corcyrian War, was the immediate precursor of the Peloponnesian War, and was instrumental in precipitating that disastrous conflict. It was provoked by the interference of Corinth in the affairs of Epidamnus, which sought aid from Corcyra, and this being denied

the Epidamnians appealed to Corinth. The navies of the contending parties met in the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, off Cape Actium. Corinth suffered overwhelming defeat. Corcyra, having no alliance either with the Athenians or Peloponnesians, sought to make a treaty with the former, which was secured against the emphatic protest of the Corinthians. It was the interference of Athens, the new ally of Corcyra at the battle of Sybota, which prevented the Corinthians from conquering the Corcyrians. This act on the part of the Athenians was regarded as a breach of the Thirty Years' Truce, and led directly to the Peloponnesian War.

The Corcyrian War was a naval contest. Corinth was the oldest sea power in Hellas. Knowledge of navigation was possessed by the ancients long before the Trojan War. The Egyptians and Phœnicians built up a merchant marine, carried on commerce and established colonies on the remote frontiers of the world before the time of Moses. David, King of Israel, established commercial dealings with Hiram, King of Tyre, and his son Solomon entered into a trade agreement with him, and married his daughter. The navies of Hiram and of Solomon made protracted voyages the length of the Mediterranean, through the straits of Gibraltar to Tartessus (Tarshish) in Spain. Evidence is not lacking to sustain the assertion that at least two centuries before the Trojan War, Seti First, King of Egypt, constructed a canal through the isthmus of Suez from the Red Sea to the eastern waters of the Nile Delta, and thence to the Mediterranean. Indeed, there is proof to sustain the further assumption that the merchants of that remote age circumnavigated the continent of Africa.

However this may be, navigation did not become general in Hellas until wealth began to accumulate and cities were built on the seashore and fortified in order

to protect themselves against piracy which long prevailed. The Hellenese, owing to their weakness and isolation in remote antiquity, never united in any great enterprise before the Trojan War. The expedition led by Agamemnon with an armament of 1200 ships and 100,000 men was undertaken after the Greeks had gained considerable experience at sea. The fleet which sailed from Aulis in Bœotia to the plains of Troy was composed of war galleys, primitive biremes, without decks, except across the bow and stern, and were not adapted for commercial purposes. For several generations after the Trojan War, the Hellenese engaged in military enterprises on land occasioned by the quarrels which arose after the return of the heroes from Troy, in nearly every city. Those who were expelled from their homes in these intestine wars founded other cities and established colonies. As the Hellenese began to acquire wealth, and the revenues of their cities increased, they began to build navies, and make the sea their element. The Corinthians lived on the sea-coast on the isthmus and are said to have first adopted the better style of ships. Thucydides says that the oldest Hellenic triremes were constructed at Corinth. Four of these vessels were built there by the shipbuilder, Ameinocles, for the Samians, about 704 B. C. The Corinthians established a colony, and built the city of Corcyra B. C. 734, about the same time that she established a colony in Sicily. In less than a century after its establishment Corcyra had also become a formidable sea power and rebelled against the mother city. It was during this war that the fleets of Corinth and Corcyra engaged in battle, B. C. 664. This is said to have been the earliest naval engagement recorded in history.

At the outbreak of the war with Corinth, Corcyra had the most powerful navy in Hellas, except Athens. Corinth ranked next after Corcyra as a naval power. As has been observed Corcyra had been a commercial

rival of the mother city for more than two centuries before the outbreak of this war. In order to open new marts, and to give employment to her growing merchant marine, she planted numerous colonies in Illyria, Thrace, Macedonia and elsewhere. Among these was Epidamnus on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The colony prospered and increased in wealth and population. The usual controversy arose among the Epidamnians, between those who favored an oligarchy, and those who advocated a democratic form of government. Finally the contending elements resorted to force. The oligarchical party sought to overthrow the democracy which had been established. Owing to its location among the wild Illyrian tribes, it was frequently the object of attack by these outlying hordes, who periodically made incursions to Epidamnus in search of plunder. Thus strife prevailed within and without the unfortunate colony.

In the struggle between the oligarchical party and the democracy the latter finally prevailed, and drove the aristocrats into exile. These malcontents having been expelled from the city allied themselves with the Illyrians, and made war on the Epidamnians. They attacked the city both by land and sea. In their extremity, the Epidamnians sought aid from Corcyra, the mother city. Although the latter enjoyed a democratic form of government, yet there was within its walls, a strong oligarchical party who sympathized with the defeated exiles, and finally succeeded in inducing the Corcyrians not to extend aid to its colony at Epidamnus. The latter, now driven to desperation, after consulting the Delphic oracle, applied to Corinth for succor, agreeing to transfer to it its allegiance. Corinth deemed it proper to aid Epidamnus, since they regarded it as a colony, established jointly by Corinth and Corcyra, it being also the metropolis, or mother city of the latter. They organized an expedition for its relief, and, in

order to avoid the fleets of Corcyra, marched forces by land through Epirus, as far north as Apolonia, in Illyria, within forty miles of their destination, and thence by sea to Epidamnus. The oligarchical exiles, with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, then made a counter movement and sailed to Corcyra, to aid the latter against the Corinthians. The former had a formidable fleet of one hundred and twenty sail. They dispatched a squadron of forty vessels to Epidamnus, and demanded of the latter that they should restore the exiles, and dismiss their Corinthian allies. The demand was refused. The Corcyrians then blockaded the city, and menaced it with a land force of Illyrians. Corinth then fitted out a second expedition to raise the blockade, consisting of thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, augmented by allies from other Peloponnesian states, in all seventy vessels.

When news of this expedition reached Corcyra, the latter sent ambassadors to Corinth, requesting it to withdraw its forces from Epidamnus, and agreed that if it made any claim to the city, the Corcyrians were willing to submit the controversy to arbitration, under the common public law, a sort of law of nations among the Hellenic states, to which they held themselves amenable, and agreed to abide by the decision of such Peloponnesian cities as should be agreed upon as arbitrators. They were willing also to submit the case to the oracle of Delphi. The Corinthians answered that if Corcyra would withdraw its blockade and land forces from Epidamnus, it would consider the proposal. Corcyra replied that if Corinth would withdraw its forces they would withdraw theirs; or they would consent that matters should remain as they were, and establish a truce till the issues should be decided by arbitration. Corinth refused to listen to these pacific proposals.

War was now the only alternative. Corinth began

to assemble an armament consisting of seventy-five war ships and two thousand hoplites with which to give battle to the Corcyrians. The latter deprecated war. Although they had the second largest navy in Hellas, they had formed no alliance either with Athens or with the Lacedæmonians. They notified the Corinthians that if war was forced upon them, they would be compelled to seek an alliance with the Athenians.

The Corinthians disregarded every plea, and hastened their preparation for war. Three admirals, Aristetas, Callicrates and Timanor were placed in command of the fleet and Archetimus and Isarchidas were given command of the land forces. The expedition set sail for Epidamnus and sent a herald before them to declare war (B. C. 435 or 434).

The Corcyrians sailed out to meet them with a squadron of eighty vessels fully manned. When the Corinthians arrived at Actium in the territory of Anactorium at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stood, the Corcyrians sent a herald to them in a small boat forbidding them to advance further. The warning of the herald was not heeded, and when he brought back no peaceable answer, the Corcyrian fleet formed in line of battle, and engaged the Corinthians off Cape Actium, destroyed fifteen of their ships, and gained a complete victory over the Corinthians. On the same day the forces shut up in Epidamnus capitulated, and surrendered the place to the Corcyrians. All the prisoners, except the Corinthians, were sold into slavery. The latter were cast into prison to await the issues of the war.

Thus the Corcyrian War began off the historic cape in Acarnania. Four centuries later, on these waters where the Greeks contended, infatuated Mark Antony and his Egyptian queen fought with Octavius Cæsar and lost an empire (September 21, B. C. 31). In that memorable engagement "worlds were staked for ladies'

eyes." Lord Byron reminds us that the blue waters of the Ambracian gulf off Actium marks,

The Azure grave of many a Roman,
Where stern ambition once forsook
His wavering crown to follow woman.
Through cloudless skies, in silvery sheen,
Full beams the moon on Actium's coast,
And on these waves, for Egypt's queen,
The ancient world was won and lost.

The victory of the Corcyrians at Actium made them masters of the Ionian Sea. They followed up the advantage they had gained in that engagement by seeking to punish the allies of Corinth wherever they could. They sailed first to the island Leucas at the mouth of the gulf of Patras, which forms the entrance to the gulf of Corinth, attacked Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and devastated the country of the Leucadians. They then sailed south to the coast of Elis, and burnt the port of Cyllene where the Elians had established their docks and ship-yards, because the Elians had supplied the Corinthians with money and ships in their campaign against the Corcyrians. During the remainder of the summer season, their fleet was occupied in roving the seas in the vicinity and plundering the allies of Corinth.

The Corinthians, meantime, did all in their power to protect their allies, who suffered from the attacks of the Corcyrians. Their object was to increase the strength of their navy, so as to be able to retrieve the disaster they had suffered at Actium. Before the end of the summer, they assembled a fleet off the cape, the scene of their recent defeat, and established a camp and strong land forces on the shore to protect by their presence their allies on the island of Leucas and elsewhere in adjacent territory. To guard themselves from the incursions of the Corinthians, assembled at Actium, the Corcyrians assembled their forces at Cape Leu-

cimme, on the southern extremity of their island, distant less than fifty miles from Cape Actium, where the enemy was in force. Neither of the contending forces cared to risk a general engagement. The season advanced. Both parties remained inactive during the remainder of the fall, and when the winter set in, returned to their homes.

The Corinthians, after their defeat at Actium, began to build ships. They determined to assemble a great navy and conquer Corcyra. These preparations continued for the space of two years during which time the Corinthians augmented their forces and recruited soldiers and sailors from all parts of Hellas. These extensive preparations alarmed the Corcyrians, who realized that they could not contend alone with the growing power of Corinth and her Peloponnesian allies. They determined therefore to strengthen themselves by negotiating an alliance offensive and defensive with the Athenians. To this end they sent ambassadors to Athens. The Corinthians, when they learned that representatives from Corcyra were to appear before the Athenians to negotiate a treaty with them, sent ambassadors to Athens to prevent the alliance. The Athenians agreed to give both a patient hearing. The assembly met on the hill of the Pnyx and listened to the arguments presented.

The advocate of Corcyra spoke first. He urged that to grant their request would be expedient for the Athenians and would greatly inure to their benefit. He called attention to the fact that never before had the Corcyrians sought an alliance with any state in Hellas. But now, while engaged in war with the Corinthians, they found themselves isolated, and were suddenly made aware of the mistake they had made in not seeking an alliance. Their lonely position in the world demonstrated that their policy had been not wisdom, but folly. At Actium they had defeated the Corin-

thians single-handed, but now their enemy was gathering a powerful armament, from the Peloponnesus and all parts of Hellas, with which to attack them. They were not able to resist them successfully, and were compelled to ask the assistance of a powerful ally.

The next point advanced was the glorious opportunity that such an alliance would afford the Athenians. They were reminded that they would aid the oppressed, not the oppressor, and by negotiating a treaty they would win the lasting gratitude of Corcyra, and would secure the aid of the largest navy in Hellas, next to their own, than which nothing could be more annoying to their enemies. Athens would incur no danger and no expense by this voluntary accession of power, which would place at the disposal of Athens a navy larger than that of Corinth.

The Corcyrian envoy then predicted the speedy advent of the Peloponnesian War, which he declared was imminent. This telling point was urged as follows:

"If any one thinks that the war in which our services may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. He does not see that the Lacedæmonians, fearing the growth of your empire, are eager to take up arms, and that the Corinthians are all-powerful with them. They begin with us, but they will go on to you, that we may not stand united against them in the bond of a common enmity. They will not miss the chance of weakening us and strengthening themselves. And it is our business to strike first, we offering and you accepting our alliance, and thus forestall their designs instead of waiting to counteract them."

In answer to the point that they were a colony of Corinth their reply was that all colonies honor their mother city when she treats them well, but are estranged from her by injustice. That they had offered to arbitrate in the matter of Epidamnus, but Corinth refused to listen to or consent to a legal trial.

The next point urged was that Athens, by entering into the alliance, would not thereby violate the Thirty Years' Truce. In support of this proposition, the speaker quoted from the treaty the following clause: "Any Hellenic city which is the ally of no one, may join whichever league he pleases." It was, therefore, absurd to say that the Corinthians could man their fleet with recruits, not only from their own confederacy, but even from among Athenians, and then argue that the Corcyrians should be debarred from seeking an ally, and denounce as a crime the act of Athens in negotiating such an alliance. By so doing the Athenians were reminded that they would be thrusting away the Corcyrians, who are not their enemies, and instead of restraining the enemy and the aggressor, would permit him to gather fresh forces out of their own dominions. "Our enemies," said the speaker, "are your enemies, and this is the best guarantee of fidelity in an ally." It was pointed out also that the proposed alliance was not with an inland power, but with a maritime power, which it would be indeed a serious matter to refuse. Whoever is the strongest at sea, it is your interest to make him your friend. The Athenians were then reminded of the strategic position of Corcyra, located between the Adriatic and Ionian seas, and conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily. It stands in the way also of any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. In conclusion, the ambassador observed, "Hellas has only three navies; there is ours, there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. Now if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own, ranged at your side in the impending conflict."

In answer to this powerful plea of the advocate for Corcyra, the Ambassador, chosen to represent the interests of Corinth, arose and addressed the Assembly. He began by pointing out that the boasted neutrality of Corcyra was simply a cloak to conceal their crimes. They did not want an ally, who might publish their misdeeds to the world. They oppress the weak and perpetrate fraud whenever in their judgment circumstances will prevent detection.

The speaker then showed that Corcyra was the daughter city of Corinth, and as such she was entitled to the love and respect of her own colony. "If it should seem strange to you Athenians," he said, "that we have made war on our daughter city, you should remember always that they are fighting against us, on the plea that they were not sent out to be ill used. Surely you must recognize the fact that we did not establish them, and build them up in order that we might be injured and insulted by them. It is their duty to recognize the mother city as their leader and accord to us proper respect. If it seems extraordinary that we should go to war with them, our answer is that the injury they are doing us is unexampled.

"Epidamnus is our colony. Corcyra would not render aid to it when in distress, but when we came to her rescue, they seized it, and are now holding it by force, and their pretense that they offered arbitration is a hollow mockery and a sham because no such offer was made until they had recourse to arms, and they now fear our vengeance. And," continued the speaker, "as if the wrong which they have themselves done at Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and ask you to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and would have you receive them when they are at enmity with us."

It was then pointed out that the Athenians never derived any benefit from the power of Corcyra, but the

latter would be benefited by an Athenian alliance. "If the alliance is made," the speaker said, "although the Athenians would be innocent of the crimes committed by Corcyra, they will be held responsible for them by the Corinthians."

The ambassador then argued that Athens had no legal right to enter into an alliance with Corcyra, because such an agreement would constitute, so far as Athens was concerned, a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce. Admitting that the treaty permits any neutral city to join any league it pleases, this provision, it was urged, had no application to those who have in view positive injury to others, who are members or parties to the instrument. The argument was advanced that the language of the treaty should be construed, only to include those who are actually in need of protection, and can have no application to a city which has forsaken its allegiance to the mother city and which will bring to those who treat with them war instead of peace. Then followed this threat on the part of the speaker. "War the Corcyrians will bring to you if you will listen to them and not to us."

The advocate then appealed to the gratitude which the Athenians owed to Corinth. The former were admonished that if they must make an alliance to make it with Corinth, not with Corcyra, and were reminded of the Samian War, when Samos revolted from Athens in violation of the constitution of the Delian Confederacy. At that time the Peloponnesians were divided in opinion as to giving aid to the Samian rebels, the speaker said, and reminded his hearers that it was the Corinthians who voted in favor of Athens, and advocated the wholesome doctrine, which it now invoked, "that every one should be allowed to chastise his own allies." This proposition, it was asserted, was fully sustained by Hellenic law. Thus, by preventing the Peloponnesians from aiding Samos, the Athenians were enabled to chas-

tise her rebellious allies on that island. But it was urged further that when Athens was at war with Ægina before the Persian War, and was in need of ships, the Corinthians loaned them twenty vessels which enabled the Athenians to punish the Ægenitans. (There was no suggestion that at the time referred to Corinth¹ and Ægina were rivals and deadly enemies.)

Referring to the threatened Peloponnesian War, which the Corcyrians brought forward as a reason why Athens should join forces with them, the speaker suggested it might never come and for that reason the argument had no force. The speaker further begged the Athenians not to be influenced by the offer of a strong naval alliance, because by making the treaty Athens would do wrong, and to do right was better than to secure a maritime combination, to injure a state, that was seeking only to punish its daughter city. In conclusion the speaker said:

“We are now ourselves in the same situation in which you were placed, when we declared at Sparta that every one so placed should be allowed to chastise his own allies. We now claim to receive at your hands the same treatment we then accorded to you. You profited by our vote on that occasion. We should not now be injured by yours. Pay what you owe, knowing that this is our time of need, in which a man’s best friend is he who does him a service, and he who opposes him is his worst enemy. Do not receive into alliance the Corcyrians in spite of us. Do not uphold them in injustice. Consult your own best interests by acting justly.”

The Assembly after having listened patiently to the very able arguments, advanced by the respective parties, took under advisement the important question as to whether the alliance asked for by Corcyra should be granted or denied. We are told that two sessions were

¹ Herod. vi, 89.

held. In the first, opinion seemed to favor the request of Corinth, that Athens should deny the petition of Corcyra. At the second session, however, there was a change, wrought in all probability by the influence of Pericles. This assumption is justified in view of the character of the alliance agreed upon. Pericles never would consent, so far as his voice, and vote were concerned, to yield to the arbitrary demands of Sparta or her allies. This appears from his speech delivered a year later to the Spartan envoys, declining to consent to revoke the decree denying to Megara entry to her ports, or to withdraw her squadrons and land forces from Potidæa at the behest of the Lacedæmonians. It is obvious, also, that the principal fact which influenced their final action was their belief that the Peloponnesian War was at hand.

The Athenians guided by Pericles, were past masters in the art of diplomacy. They concluded, therefore, not to make an alliance with Corcyra, both offensive and defensive, because such a treaty would impose an obligation on the part of the Athenians to declare war against Corinth. Such an agreement would be clearly a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce. They, therefore, entered into a defensive alliance, which obliged them only to protect each other when attacked, and claimed that by so doing they were not guilty of any breach of the Truce. The Athenians believed that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable, and they determined not to permit Corcyra and her formidable navy to fall into the hands of Corinth. They knew that hostilities between Corinth and Corcyra would weaken the naval strength of the former. They desired also to have Corcyra as an ally by reason of its position in the Ionian Sea, which was advantageous in case an expedition was fitted out against Italy or Sicily. Bitterly disappointed, the Corinthians sailed away, to renew the war with Corcyra.

Athens immediately dispatched a squadron of ten ships to Corcyra, with instructions not to attack the Corinthians unless they sailed against the Corcyrians or any place belonging to her. In case their ally, the Corcyrians was attacked, the Athenians were ordered to protect her to the utmost.

The Corinthians assembled a fleet of 150 ships, made up as follows:

Corinthian vessels	90
Elean	10
Megarian	12
Leucadian	10
Ambraciots	27
Anactorium	1
<hr/>	
Total Fleet.....	150

The squadron sailed against Corcyra from the island of Leucas, and anchored off the mainland opposite Corcyra. The Corcyrian fleet consisted of 110 ships. They were accompanied by 10 Athenian vessels. The land forces encamped on the promontory of Leucimme. A thousand hoplites from Zacynthus volunteered to aid the army of Corcyra. The island of Sybota in the Corcyrian channel lay between the contending forces. Both fleets were numerous and covered a wide space of the sea. When preparations were completed the Corinthians took with them three days' provisions, and put off by night intending to give battle. At daybreak they discerned the Corcyrian fleet approaching to meet them. The squadrons were then drawn up in line of battle, and the engagement which followed is known in history as the battle of Sybota, fought probably in the month of June, B. C. 432.

When the engagement began, both sides had many heavy armed on the decks and many bowmen and dartmen. Thucydides, in his account of the fight, says that the battle was well contested, not so much in point of

skill, but like a land fight, because they trusted to the heavy armed who fought on the decks when the vessels ran along side of each other and remained stationary. "They fought with fierceness and strength more than with science." Brute force and rage made up for want of tactics. Never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous met in battle. On all sides was much confusion. Early in the day, the right wing of the Corinthians was worsted. They were routed by twenty ships of the enemy, who pursued them as they were in a scattered condition to the shores of Epirus, sailed up to their encampment, went ashore and burned and plundered their deserted camp. On the other wing, where all were Corinthian ships, the latter won a decisive victory, as twenty ships of the Corcyrians were absent, their crews being engaged in plundering the enemy's tents on shore. It was at this critical moment, that the ten Athenian vessels, no longer remained neutral, but took an active part in the engagement. The victorious Corinthians on the left wing pursued the enemy to the island of Sybota, and took thither their wrecks and most of their dead. Although it was now quite late, the Corinthians were about to renew the engagement. When the Pæan had been sung for them to advance, they observed twenty fresh Athenian ships, which had not yet been engaged, sailing towards them. They had been sent out and followed close after to reinforce the ten ships, which had been dispatched with the Corcyrians. Night coming on, hostilities ceased.

The next morning the Athenians and the Corcyrians, who had gone in camp the previous night at Leucimme, on the southern extremity of Corcyra, sailed over to the island of Sybota, to know if the Corinthians intended to further engage in battle, but the latter declined on account of the fresh contingent of Athenian ships which had come to the relief of the Corcyrians. As Corinth was not at war with Athens, they charged

the latter with violating the Thirty Years' Truce, in aiding the Corcyrians in battle against them. The Athenians answered the herald sent by the Corinthians to the effect that Athens was not commencing war and had not violated the Thirty Years' Truce. They assured the Corinthians that they would not hinder or molest them, unless they sailed against Corcyra, or to any of the places belonging to it, and in that case only would they assist the Corcyrians, who were allies of Athens. Thus Athens snatched victory from Corinth, in her attempt to conquer Corcyra.

Both sides erected trophies at Sybota, and on the continent as both sides claimed the victory; the Corinthians because they had secured the greater number of wrecks and dead bodies; the Corcyrians based their claim on the ground that the Corinthians, when they saw the fresh squadron of Athenian ships, rowed astern and did not renew the engagement. The Corinthians took not less than one thousand prisoners, and disabled about seventy of the enemy's ships. The Corcyrians destroyed about thirty ships of the Corinthian fleet. The number of killed and wounded is not recorded. The Corinthians then sailed homeward, and by means of treachery took the city of Anactorium (q. v.) in Acarnania, a short distance east of Actium. Thus the Corcyrian War was concluded. As was anticipated and clearly predicted, the Peloponnesian War began in the following spring after the battle of Sybota (March 31, B. C. 431), by the surprise at Plataea.

CHAPTER XL

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR AND ITS CAUSES

THE Peloponnesian War was the culmination of constant bickering and jealousy prompted by local pride and commercial rivalry, which interrupted Hellenic unity, and finally destroyed Greece. This spirit of disunion and selfishness was born in the Peloponnesus, where Sparta could brook no rival. Argos long held superior claims to leadership on the peninsula. That city traced its claims to political supremacy to the age of legend and fable, to Diomedes, king of Argos, the friend Agamemnon, king of Mycenæ, and his ally in the Trojan War. Argos also became the mother city of the Doric kingdoms of Epidaurus, Troezen, Scyrcion and Corinth. The Lacedæmonians would not recognize the claims of Argos, and sought to become the dominant power in the peninsula.

Very early in the fifth century B. C. about the time of the siege of Miletus by Darius, B. C. 496, Argos was humbled by the Spartan king, Cleomenes. In an engagement at Sepia, near Tiryns, the latter at the head of a numerous army slew six thousand Argives and deprived Argos of her ancient supremacy. A few years later, when Xerxes threatened the destruction of Hellas, Argos was asked to ally herself with the Greeks, to fight the invaders. She promised compliance, provided Sparta would consent to a thirty years' truce, and give her an equal share of the command of the allied forces. Sparta refused upon the specious pretext, that its form

of government forbade. Under the diarchy Sparta had two kings while Argos had but one, and it was not possible they said, to deprive either sovereign of his command. The king of Argos was informed, however, that if he desired he would be conceded an equal vote with these two. The offer was declined. Thus Sparta deprived Greece of the aid of Argos in the second Persian War.

Thebes refused also to aid her countrymen, because of her jealousy and hatred of Athens, for the reason that the latter would not permit the Thebans to subjugate the neighboring city of Platæa, across the Asopus, on the borders of Bœotia and Attica.

Sparta also tried to humiliate Athens in the sixth century B. C. When the latter was subject to political revolutions in the time of Pisistratus and his sons, Cleomenes sent a herald from Sparta, at the behest of Isagoras, directing that Clisthenes, who instituted the ten tribes, and founded the democracy of Attica, should be expelled and driven from Athens. His orders were backed by a Spartan army which invaded Attica, and banished seven hundred Athenian families. (This was the fourth time that the Dorians had invaded Athens. After the recall of Clisthenes, the warlike demonstrations became so threatening that Athenian ambassadors visited Sardis, for the purpose of inviting aid from Persia to make war against the Lacedæmonians. This plan, however, was never consummated, and was speedily abandoned.) Then Cleomenes, because the Athenians refused to restore Isagoras, took it upon himself to assemble an army of Lacedæmonians to attack them. He made an alliance in the north, with the Bœotians and Chalcidians in Eubœa, who attacked and ravaged the borders of Attica, while the Spartan was preparing to march on Athens. When Cleomenes reached Eleusis, Demaratus, his reigning associate, when the object of the expedition was disclosed to him,

refused to participate in the enterprise, and the Lacedæmonians returned to their homes. Then the Athenians sought to punish their enemies in the north and attacked and defeated the Bœotians and Chalcidians, for the part they had taken in the affair.

But these minor intestine wars and jealous rivalries were not, of themselves, sufficient to provoke the great Peloponnesian War, a contest which was to divide the country into two hostile camps, whose contending armies struggled for nearly a generation, and which finally resulted in the overthrow of the Athenian empire, and the destruction of Hellas.

After the quarrels and military disturbances above referred to, came the Persian Wars, which compelled Greece to forego her domestic hostilities, and unite her resources to repel a foreign foe. Then followed the wars for the expulsion of Persia from the Ægean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor. These supplemental wars may as well have been designated wars for Attic expansion, as for Persian expulsion. While these campaigns were conducted primarily to drive the Persian arms from Europe, they were incidentally the direct means of building up the Athenian Empire, which was established by the aid of the Delian confederacy. Sparta dropped out of these enterprises, when her admiral, Pausanias, was deposed as commander-in-chief, and when the Hellenic fleet refused to obey the admiral sent by the Spartan Ephors to take his place, and continued their allegiance to the Athenian commanders, Aristides and Cimon. The Lacedæmonians, when they could no longer lead, withdrew, and abandoned to Athens, the conduct of the war. Later, that city built her long walls to the sea, in spite of Sparta, and against her solemn protest, and the latter became her principal rival and pronounced enemy.

These wars for Athenian expansion resulted in the establishment of new Athenian colonies throughout the

western world. Protected by her powerful navy, these numerous trading ports increased, and poured their commercial wealth into the treasury of Athens, the mother city, which rapidly became the richest municipality in the world. Athens increased but Corinth decreased. It soon became apparent that if Athens was permitted to continue to absorb the world's commerce, Corinth, the most powerful ally of Sparta, would ultimately lose her colonies and her commerce, and sink into insignificance as a maritime power. Her trade in the *Ægean* and *Asia Minor* had dwindled. *Potidea*, an important colony in the *Chalcidian peninsula*, had abandoned her and sought alliance with Athens. *Pericles* had taken the island of *Ægina* and established ports in *Megara* on both sides of the isthmus of *Corinth*, established himself in *Achaia*, had entered *Argolis* also, and taken *Troezen*, an important port on the gulf of *Argolis*. When *Sparta*, at the close of the third *Messenian War*, permitted their enemies, the *Messenians* and *Helots*, to depart, after the fall of *Ithome*, *Pericles* established them as an Athenian colony at *Naupactus* (now *Lepanto*) in *Locris*, at the mouth of the *Corinthian gulf*. From this point they made war on all settlements established by *Corinth* in *Ætolia*, *Acarmania*, and *Epirus*, because *Corinth* was an ally of *Sparta*, and *Sparta* was the life long enemy of *Messenia*.

Thus Athens, reaching out for empire, planted her colonies on both shores of the *Corinthian gulf*, invaded the commercial territory of *Corinth*, and threatened her with financial ruin.

Of course *Pericles* in negotiating the *Thirty Years' Peace* was obliged to give up *Achaia*, *Troezen* in *Argolis*, and *Nisæ* and *Pegea* in *Megara*, but she later found occasion to make an alliance with *Corcyra*, a naval power commanding the *Ionian Sea*. It was originally a daughter city of *Corinth*, but revolted, gained

her independence and established her own colonies on the coasts of Illyria and elsewhere. Corcyra planted the flourishing city of Epidamnus on the Adriatic, about seventy-five miles north of the borders of Epirus. Corinth joined Epidamnus in her efforts to throw off her allegiance to Corcyra. This conduct on the part of Corinth was resented, and in retaliation for the interference of the mother city, Corcyra attempted to seize Corinthian ports in Acarnania and Achaia. These quarrels, which lasted for three years, are known as the Corcyrian War. (q. v.)

The power of Athens was shown at the battle of Sybota, B. C. 432 (q. v.), when the Corcyrian fleet was saved from the Corinthian navy by an Athenian squadron, and victory snatched from the Corinthians, after they had defeated their enemy in that memorable conflict off the coast of Epirus.

During this war the advantages gained by Corcyra by reason of the influence of her Athenian allies, was such that Corinth found herself involved in a life and death struggle to maintain her independence. Her salvation depended on her power to retain her supremacy. Athens must be humbled and driven out of the west, and from the Corinthian Gulf, or Corinth would cease to be a maritime power. She was the most powerful ally of Sparta. The time had now arrived when the latter must assist Corinth, and enable her to throw off the yoke of Athens. War, therefore, was inevitable, and the war came.

The conduct of the Athenians at Sybota was regarded by the Corinthians as a direct violation of the treaty known as the Thirty Years' Truce. As soon as the battle had ceased the Corinthians sent a messenger to the Athenian commander, who complained that Athens had no right to prevent the Corinthians from chastising their enemies, the Corcyrians. That if they wished to break the treaty, they should attack the

Corinthians first, and deal directly with them as enemies. The Athenians replied that they had not violated the treaty, but had only given aid to the Corcyrians, because the latter were allies of Athens. They declared further that they did not intend to harm the Corinthians, and that they would strictly observe all the terms and conditions of the treaty of peace. The answer, of course, failed to soothe the ire of the Corinthians.

Another cause of complaint against Athens arose from the fact, as has been observed, that Potidea occupied by a Corinthian and Peloponnesian garrison was being besieged and blockaded on land and sea by an Athenian fleet and army. But Athens, when charged with violating the treaty, on this account, used the same plausible excuse which was urged at Sybota, namely, that Potidea, though a Corinthian colony, had become an ally of Athens, and that the latter had a right to protect her allies.

Corinth was now thoroughly alarmed. The interference of Athens had become intolerable. Her troops were shut up within the walls of Potidea which was being besieged by an Athenian army under Phormio, while an Athenian fleet prevented supplies being carried to the beleaguered town. Corinth demanded that the Lacedæmonians must act. The allies were summoned, and sent their representatives to Sparta. They set forth at length, before the assembly, their many grievances against Athens, and contended that the latter had broken the Thirty Years' Truce, and were continuing to violate that compact. Megara complained that her ships had been excluded from every Athenian port, and from the Athenian markets in violation of the treaty. Those from Ægina claimed that they had been robbed of their independence contrary to the express terms of the treaty. Then the Corinthian ambassador, whose city had suffered most of all,

made a powerful plea, and urged Sparta to declare war against Athens. His argument has been preserved by Thucydides. "Who among you," said the envoy, "has a better right to speak than ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations to make, outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neglected by you. [Lacedæmonians] . . . What need of many words. Some of us, as you see, have been already enslaved. They are at this moment intriguing against others, notably against allies of ours. Long ago they had made preparations in expectation of war. Else why did they seduce from her allegiance Corcyra, which they still hold in defiance of us; and why are they blockading Potidea, the latter a most advantageous post for the command of the Thracian peninsula, the former a great naval power, which might have assisted the Peloponnesians. . . . We ought not now to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we are to be revenged. The aggressor is not now threatening, he is advancing."

At the time this matter was brought before the assembly, an Athenian embassy happened to be in Sparta on other business, and having heard the indictment launched against their city by the Corinthians, they asked permission to lay before the assembly some explanations to prevent the Spartans from being misled. The request was granted. The ambassador then recounted to the assembly the glories which Athens had achieved in the Persian Wars, and how their army and navy had saved Hellas from Darius and Xerxes. He reminded them also that the Athenian empire was not acquired by force, and finally suggested that the Lacedæmonians should not be induced to enter into a protracted tedious and expensive war at the instigation of those who were not themselves Lacedæmonians.

Archidamus, the Spartan King, thought that the Lacedæmonians should not be too hasty in the matter,

but should first complete their preparations to enable them to wage the war successfully. When Archidamus had finished his address, one of the Spartan Ephors, Sthenelaidas, arose to reply to the Athenian. He confessed, he said, that he did not know what the long speeches of the Athenians meant, but declared that if they behaved well in the Persian Wars, and were now behaving badly, they ought to be punished twice over, because they were once good men and have become bad. A vote was then taken, and the Spartans determined to stand by their allies. They accordingly voted that the treaty had been violated.

An embassy was sent to Athens, and the latter were informed that it was the judgment of the Lacedæmonians and their allies that the treaty had been violated. They were further notified that if they would avert war, they must raise the siege of Potidea, a colony of Corcyra; they must restore to Ægina her independence; and lastly, that they must at once rescind the decree whereby the Megarians were excluded from the markets of Athens, and the harbors of the Athenian empire.

To these demands the Athenians refused to listen. One of the reasons assigned for the refusal of Athens to rescind her decree involved the misconduct of the Megarians. The charge against them was that they had tilled the holy ground and the neutral borderland, and had received and protected the runaway slaves, who had escaped from their Athenian masters and fled to Megara. So the ambassadors departed.

A second embassy was sent to Athens some time after. They wanted to know whether Athens desired peace or war, and declared the conditions on which peace could be had. The message was as follows: "The Lacedæmonians desire to maintain peace, and peace there may be if you will restore independence to the Hellenese."

The time had now come for decisive action. The

Public Assembly convened on the hill of the Pnyx and discussed the issues of peace and war. Some favored war. Others declared that the decree excluding Megara from the markets of Athens should be rescinded and not be permitted to stand in the way of peace. Then Pericles arose to address the Assembly. He was the most conspicuous man in Hellas, the greatest orator of his age, and the most influential man in Athens. The words which fell from his lips on that occasion were to decide the destiny of his country. In his speech were bound up the issues of life and death, of war and peace. All seemed to realize as Pericles stood before them that when he descended from the bema and resumed his seat, the fate of Athens would have been decided.

All were eager to hear the first words of the address of this distinguished man. He began with great deliberation. "Athenians," he said, "I say, as I have always said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions change with the change of fortune. . . . The movement of events is often as wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever belies our calculation."¹

These were the opening sentences in the great speech of Pericles, that lit the spark of the Peloponnesian War, a conflict which was to continue for a quarter of a century, after the speaker has passed from the scenes of earth. He made a great argument on the merits of the controversy. His first point seems to be conclusive that Sparta was in the wrong. "The treaty says," he argued, "that when differences arise, the two parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the meantime

¹Thucyd. ii, 7.

both are to retain what they have. But for arbitration they never ask; and when it is offered by us they refuse it. They want to redress their grievances by arms and not by argument, and now they come to us using the language, no longer of expostulation, but of command." With regard to the demands made on Athens, as to Potidea, and the Megarian decree, Pericles said that "if you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals. . . . Any claim, the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbor and an equal when there has been *no legal award*, can mean nothing but slavery."

Finally Pericles suggested the answer to be given by the Athenians to the demands of the ambassadors. "Tell them," he said, "that we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians will not exclude foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta; for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other. Tell them that we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedæmonians allow their subject states to be governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lacedæmon, but for their own. Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty. Tell them finally that we do not want to begin war, but if attacked, we intend to defend ourselves."

This answer, he said, was just and would comport with the dignity of Athens. The peroration of the great orator and statesman, advocating armed resistance to her enemies is as follows: "All must be aware, however, that war will come. The more willing we are to accept it, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands on us. Remember that where dangers are great-

est, there the greatest honors are to be won by men and states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such empire as we have. What little they had, they forsook. They repelled the barbarian and raised us to our present height of greatness, not by good fortune, but by wisdom; not by power, but by courage. Let us be worthy of them, emulate their example, and resist our enemies with all our might, that we may hand down our empire to posterity unimpaired."

The influence of Pericles was irresistible. The Assembly voted as he had suggested, and adopted and approved in detail his answer to the Lacedæmonians. Having received the answer of the Athenians, the ambassadors departed and came no more. It is clear, therefore, that the affair at Epidamnus, the conduct of the Athenians at Potidea, and their interference at the battle of Sybota, in the Corcyrian War, were the direct and immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War. Hostilities, however, did not begin until after the surprise at Platæa, at the end of March, B. C. 431, the year following the departure of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens.

This protracted intestine struggle which destroyed the liberties and independence of Greece, covered a period of twenty-seven years, which may be divided into three periods. First, from the surprise at Platæa, B. C. 431 to the Peace of Nicias, B. C. 421. Strictly speaking this period includes the Peloponnesian War proper, because it was fought directly between Sparta and Athens, and their respective allies. Second, the Sicilian War, B. C. 415-413. This period embraces the expedition sent out by Athens to take Syracuse, and subjugate Sicily and the West. It was a foreign war for the aggrandizement of Athens and the extension of her empire. Sparta lent aid to Sicily and at the instigation of Alcibiades, who had been banished by the Athenians, sent to Syracuse Gillypus, her ablest general,

equal in skill and energy to Brasidas, under whose able leadership the Athenians were overwhelmingly defeated. Third, the Decelean War, B. C. 413-404, so called because Sparta established a permanent fortress at Decelea in Attica, about fifteen miles north of Athens. This period extends from the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Syracuse to the capture of her squadrons in the Hellespont at Ægospotami, B. C. 405, and the surrender of Athens to Lysander, the Spartan, B. C. 404.

After the defeat and destruction of the Athenian expedition at Syracuse, in which Athens was opposed by Sparta, with the aid of Persia and Sicily, Sparta, as has been observed, at the instigation of Alcibiades, practically carried the war into Attica by building a strong fortress at Deceleia. The empire which Athens sought to extend by conquests in the west, she was now called upon to maintain against the combined forces of Europe and Asia. The contest was confined chiefly to a naval war, because the dominion of Athens which she now strove to maintain embraced her insular empire, including practically the islands of the Ægean sea, and the coast cities of Asia Minor, Thrace, and the Hellespont. It was the final struggle for the integrity of the maritime empire of Athens, and resulted in its overthrow, and the supremacy of Sparta.

The war was declared by Sparta, as has been shown, on the part of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens, and its allies, chiefly through the influence of Corinth and Megara. The former complained that Athens in violation of the Thirty Years' Peace made after the reduction of Eubœa as a result of the battle of Ænophyta (q. v.), had furnished assistance to the island of Corcyra in its war against Corinth, the mother city, in the naval battle of Sybota (q. v.). The latter claimed that Megarian ships were forbidden

Athenian ports, and its commerce excluded from the markets of Attica.

The real cause of the war, generally speaking, was jealousy aroused among contiguous cities and states, by the growing power of Athens. The motive which finally induced Sparta to enlist with the Peloponnesian States in a Confederacy against Athens was her envy and hatred of Athens, now the head of the Confederacy of Delos, through which she had become the foremost commercial and maritime power in the world. (After the retirement of the Medes and Persians from Europe, which resulted from their disastrous defeats at Marathon, Plataea, Mycale, and on the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, Athens began to plant new colonies in Thrace, Asia Minor, and the islands of the Ægean to increase her navy, and wall in her city. She was the better able to do this after Sparta dropped out and declined after the recall of Pausanias to coöperate in the Confederacy of Delos (q. v.). Thucydides tells us that the Lacedæmonians voted that the truce (the Thirty Years' Peace) had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they had been convinced by the arguments of the allies, but because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that many parts of Greece were already tributary to her.) After the battle of Ænophyta, before the Thirty Years' Peace had been negotiated, Athens, through its supremacy in the Confederacy of Delos, had achieved dominion on the sea, and Sparta feared she would also achieve supremacy on land, and build up a land empire which would make her supreme, both on land and sea.

Thucydides has carefully catalogued the allies of Athens and Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War. When the names of the independent Cities and States are reviewed, the student can form a correct idea of the character and extent of the internal disputes which rent

Greece for years, and cost her her independence and her liberties. The roster of the allies of Athens and Sparta are stated by Thucydides,¹ as follows:

"Each party had the following states in alliance when they set to the war. The allies of the Lacedæmonians were these: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans (these were in friendship with both parties; and the Pellenians were the only people of the Achæans that joined in the war at first, though afterward all of them did). Without the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the states which furnished a navy were the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots and Leucadians. Those that supplied cavalry were the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The rest of them sent infantry. This then was the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

"That of the Athenians comprehended the Chians, Lesbians, Plateans, the Messenians at Naupactus, the greater part of the Acarnanians, the Corcyrians, the Zacynthians; also some other states which were tributary among the following nations; as the maritime parts of Caria, and Doris adjacent to it, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Greek towns (Thraceward); the islands, which were situated between the Peloponnese and Crete, toward the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyrians furnished a naval force, the rest of them infantry and money. Such was the confederacy on each side, and their resources for the war."

The principal events in this momentous struggle are embraced in the military annals of the time and may be traced in chronological order. The first period begins with the surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, B. C. 431.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 9.

This affair occurred before war was declared, while the states were enjoying peaceful intercourse visiting without a herald. Then follows the fall of Mitylene B. C. 427; capture of Platæa by the Spartans B. C. 427; capture of Sphacteria by the Athenians B. C. 425; defeat of Athens at Amphipolis B. C. 422. Second Period. Argive league defeated by Spartans at Mantinea B. C. 418; Melian Massacre (B. C. 416); Athenian defeat at Syracuse B. C. 413. Third Period. Callicrates, the Spartan admiral, defeated by the Athenians off the southern promontory of Lesbos near the island of Arginusæ, B. C. 406; capture of the Athenian fleet by Lysander at Ægospotami B. C. 405.

CHAPTER XLI

PERICLES — ANCESTRY — EDUCATION — EARLY PUBLIC CAREER

PERICLES was of royal lineage on both sides of his house. He could trace his ancestors to Theseus, mythical hero of Hellas and first king of Athens. From his father Xanthippus, victor at Mycale and hero of Sestus, he inherited the blood of Pisistratus, a direct lineal descendant of Pisistratus, son of Nestor, king of Pylus — the Nestor renowned for his wisdom and sagacity, whom Homer describes as one of the wisest heads among the Greeks who accompanied Agamemnon on his expedition to Asia.

From his mother Agarista, and granddaughter of Megacles, and also of the great Clisthenes who established the ten Attic tribes, defeated the followers of Pisistratus, and established the Athenian democracy, he inherited the blood of Alcmaeon, the last perpetual archon, and direct lineal descendant of Codrus, the last King of Athens. He was of the tribe of Acamantis and of the deme of Cholargus.

Thus in the ancestors of Pericles were represented the Alcmaeonidæ and the Pisistratidæ, two of the wealthiest and most influential families of the Athenian Eupatridæ, whose names from the time of Solon to the expulsion of Hippias were conspicuous in the struggle for power in Athens. But to the advantage of noble birth often attach the disadvantages which arise from political intrigue, which not infrequently

result in murder and intestine war. The Alcmaeonidæ, when Megacles was the head of his house and archon of Athens, suffered for their perfidy in the affair of Cylon, during a political insurrection late in the seventh century (B. C. 612) and were detested as accursed, having received tokens of the divine displeasure, visited upon them for their acts of perfidy and impiety for the slaughter of their enemies whom they induced to leave their place of refuge in the sacred temples on promise of immunity. This stain upon his house was revived against Pericles, by his enemies and by those who sought to avert war with the Peloponnesians, nearly two centuries after the curse was pronounced, and had been forgotten. So strong were the hatreds and superstitious prejudices, even in the golden age of Pericles, that it required all the abilities and superior intelligence of the great orator and statesman to prevent the memory of the old curse upon his ancestors from causing his political downfall, and wresting from him the reins of power.

The precise date of the birth of Pericles is uncertain. The probabilities are that he was born B. C. 499. He died in the autumn B. C. 429, two years and six months after the surprise at Platæa, which event occurred about March 31, B. C. 432. It is said that he lived to be seventy years old. If this conjecture as to his age is correct, he must have been born B. C. 499, nine years before the battle of Marathon. There was very little difference between the ages of Cimon and Pericles, his great rival. It is probable that Cimon was the eldest by perhaps three years, he having been born presumably B. C. 503. The assumption that the great statesman was born B. C. 499 rests wholly upon the conjecture that he was seventy years of age when he died. Some authorities fix the date of his birth four or five years later, B. C. 494 or 493. These dates are predicated upon the assumption that at the time of his

death Pericles was not more than sixty-four or sixty-five. But as there is no clear statement by any authority showing his age, the exact date of his birth must rest on conjecture.

By reason of the wealth and social position of his family, Pericles received all the advantages of the schools. He was instructed in every department of knowledge. He was trained in science and philosophy, in the arts, became proficient in music and excelled in polite learning and in all the accomplishments of his age. According to Plutarch he was taught natural philosophy by Zeno, who came to Athens from Elea, in Italy, with his preceptor Parmenides. The latter taught that being, or animate existence, was birthless and deathless, a phase of the doctrine of immortality. Zeno advanced the theory of the inconceivability of motion, and declared that it was an illusion of the senses, as well as the real existence of the phenomenal world. Zeno was greatly admired by Pericles by reason of his skill as a dialectician. Aristotle refers to him as the father of logic. In public debate, those who contended with Zeno, presently found themselves confronted by the horns of a dilemma from which it was often impossible to escape. Pericles was instructed in music by Damon. His teachings, however, included a wider scope than that of a mere musician. He taught political philosophy, and Plutarch says that he trained Pericles for his political contests "as a trainer prepares an athlete for the games." Another of his preceptors was an Ionian Greek, Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, a city not far from Smyrna, who lived many years in Athens. He must have attended the lectures of Anaxagoras during early manhood, as preceptor and pupil were nearly of the same age, assuming that Anaxagoras was born at the end of the sixth century, about 500 B. C. How much Anaxagoras may have imbibed of the teachings of the great Pythagoras of

Samos we do not know. Nor have we any means of finding out to what extent he taught the doctrine of the transmigration of souls advanced by this illustrious man. Pythagoras died about seven years before the battle of Marathon B. C. 497, when Anaxagoras was but three years of age. It will be profitable, in this connection, to inquire as to the state of learning, and the development of philosophy and science in the time of Pericles, especially in view of the fact that Anaxagoras was persecuted by the enemies of the former and because he was guilty of no crime known to the law so far as his accusers could discover, he was indicted at the instigation of Diopithes who, at the time officiated in the temple of Erechtheus, and was charged with impiety and disregard for the polytheistic religion taught by the priests. This charge of infidelity probably suggested itself, in view of the fact that polytheism was altogether repugnant to the idea, that the origin of the universe, was the conception of one supreme intellect, a doctrine, it is said, which was first advanced by Anaxagoras. His views in this regard are in some respects in harmony with the doctrine of monotheism taught by the Israelites, although we have no evidence that Anaxagoras had any knowledge whatever of the pentateuch, or the early books of the old testament.

Pythagoras imbibed his inspiration from Thales of Miletus, one of the seven sages of Greece (B. C. 640-546), and from his pupil Anaximander. Thales was one of the pioneers in scientific investigation and it is said that he foretold the eclipse of the sun which occurred a year after it was predicted, and which interrupted the battle of the Halys fought about B. C. 608, in the time of Nebuchadnezzar between the Medes and Lydians, who at high noon, seeing night suddenly succeeding day, desisted from fighting.

Pythagoras, in his investigations, sought for the

causes governing the laws of nature, and the results of natural phenomena. He conceived a scientific theory as to eclipses, as to meteors and rainbows, and the movement of the heavenly bodies. His notion in regard to the sun was that inasmuch as he regarded it as the source of heat, it was composed of a mass of blazing metal. Indeed it is claimed that Pythagoras and his disciples worked out the theory of the rotundity of the earth, and taught that it was a globe which hung self-balanced in space, and that it moved in harmony with other planets round a central luminary. Copernicus, it is said, evolved his heliocentric theory from the suggestions which he gleaned from the speculations of Pythagoras and his disciples, although the Pythagoreans did not distinctly teach the doctrine that the sun was the centre of our planetary system.

Anaxagoras taught that the heavenly bodies originally formed part of the earth, but were torn from it by some extraordinary convulsion of nature, and thrown into space. He accounted for their appearance in the heavens on the theory that they became globes of fire, being ignited in consequence of their rapid motion. Plutarch, however, does not hint that Anaxagoras taught the mystical doctrine of metempsychosis, or the transmigration, and the immortality of the soul taught by Pythagoras. This belief has been associated with the idea of the kinship of all living beings.

Anaxagoras must have learned from what Pythagoras taught, in connection with the study of mathematics and astronomy, the theory of numbers, and their correlation, as for example that two is but the relation of one to one. The Samian philosopher taught numerical symbolism, and declared that in the original one, all numbers are contained. This teaching forms the basis to-day of the modern atomic theory, that all matter is composed of ultra-microscopic particles, as devel-

oped by the electron hypothesis which originated with the study of electric discharges through highly rarified gases. Modern science declares that atoms of matter are composed of electrons, a doctrine too abstruse, to be comprehended by ordinary mortals. The measure of an electron is almost inconceivable. As compared with an atom, an electron is like a pin's head beside the dome of the national capitol. From the teaching of Pythagoras, Anaxagoras doubtless became familiar with the idea of the harmony of numbers, as applied to the harmony which prevails throughout the universe — laws assisting laws which are inter-dependent — whereby perfection results — perfection as the antithesis of chaos, which eliminates chance, the offspring of confusion. This sublime doctrine of Pythagoras has been poetically described as the rhythm of the universe, the music of the spheres. This conception leads to the conclusion that chaos is impossible because anarchy cannot exist, where law is supreme.

While Anaxagoras in some respects may not be considered so remarkable a man as Pythagoras, he was a great thinker, and was held in the highest esteem on account of his extraordinary gifts, and the advance he made in solving some of the mysteries of natural laws. Indeed, it is said he was the first to discard boldly every vestige of superstition with regard to the origin of matter and the creation of the universe. He denied that the world came into existence by chance, or by force or necessity. He believed that

"No atoms, casually together hurled,
Could ere produce so beautiful a world."

He taught that there was a first great cause, a supreme, sublime intelligence, which caused all existing matter to spring into being, and ordered the law of creation.

Herodotus tells a story in connection with Anaxago-

ras which serves to illustrate the difference in that age between the philosopher, seeking for causes and the sorcerers, the soothsayers, the magicians, and the seers who claimed to be able to interpret dreams and visions, and to foretell the significance of portents and omens and read the mysteries attendant upon abnormal conditions. A ram was discovered which had but one horn, which projected from its forehead. The animal was sent as a present to Pericles, who consulted Lampon, a soothsayer, as to what in his judgment this phenomenon indicated. At the time there were two parties seeking supremacy in Athens, the oligarchs, led by Thucydides and the democrats led by Ephialtes, with whom Pericles shared political honors. Lampon concluded that as Pericles had come into possession of the ram with but a single horn, this indicated that the two political parties would become united, and that democracy would become dominant. When Anaxagoras was consulted he requested permission to open the ram's skull, in order to demonstrate the hidden cause of the animal's deformity. He discovered that the brain was not fully developed, but was congested in the centre of the skull, from which the horn grew. The scientific methods employed by Anaxagoras gained distinction for him, but when in the course of time the oligarchs were defeated and Thucydides was ostracised, and Pericles became the leader of the democracy, and the head of the state, great praise was accorded to Lampon as a man wonderfully endowed with pre-science.

In that age the soothsayer and the prophet rather than the scientist and philosopher were consulted by the rulers of the earth to interpret visions and portents. Daniel read to Nebuchadnezzar the interpretation of his dream, foretold his humiliation and how he should become bereft of reason and transformed into a beast of the field. He read also to Belshazzar the mural inscription written by an invisible hand on the walls of

his palace. At a later period, Daniel saw a vision in which there came up out of the river a ram, which had two horns. Then there was revealed to the prophet the spectacle of a he goat which came out of the west which had but one horn projecting from between his eyes, and he saw the impact between the ram and the he goat and witnessed the destruction of the ram. When the goat waxed very great Daniel saw that its horn was broken, and four horns came from it, towards the south and the east and towards the pleasant land. Thus from this vision of the ram and the he goat was foretold the destruction of the kingdom of the Medes and the Persians and the conquest of the world by Alexander the Great, whom the best authorities agree was personified in Daniel's prophetic vision as the goat which came out from the west.

The teachings of Anaxagoras, whom Pericles admired and loved, exerted the greatest influence upon his character, filled his mind with lofty and sublime thoughts, which colored his life and conduct, and were reflected in the deliberate action and the calm and dignified bearing of his pupil, who became a most successful general, an accomplished diplomat and statesman, and one of the great orators of antiquity.

In his youth, Pericles, on account of his remarkable resemblance to Pisistratus, which was a subject of common remark, stood in fear of the people, lest in case he entered public life, his enemies might use this argument to secure his banishment, and vote for a decree authorizing his ostracism under the law. For this reason it is said he first devoted himself to military matters. It was not until after the death of Aristides, and after Themistocles had gone into exile, that he sought political advancement.

Early in his public career, he became active in connection with Ephialtes, one of the leaders of the democratic party in Athens. At this time Cimon, the hero

of the Eurymedon, was the idol of the people. His military fame filled the world. His naval victories had enriched Athens, broadened her empire, and made her the most powerful city of the age. If Pericles would achieve political distinction, he must defeat Cimon and destroy him in public esteem. Political events bring about singular historical coincidents. As Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, had ruined Miltiades, the father of Cimon in order to satisfy his ambition, the son of Xanthippus must ruin the son of Miltiades. Both could not succeed in Athenian politics. Although Cimon was popular with the masses, and was prodigal of his hospitality, and his gifts to the poor, he had no sympathy with those who sought to advance popular government. Politically he was an aristocrat and the leader of the oligarchical party. He believed in privilege and the supremacy of the wealthy classes in public affairs. He was the friend and apologist of the Lacedæmonians, who were the bitter enemies of his own city. He admired the Spartan system of government, and openly advocated the Spartan oligarchy which he seemed to regard as more desirable than Athenian democracy, as established by Clisthenes, and strengthened and enlarged by Themistocles.

From what has been said by Plutarch, we might be justified in assuming that there was practically no difference between the political faith of Pericles and of Cimon. The writer of the "lives" seems to infer that although Pericles was nominally a democrat and the advocate of popular government, yet at heart he was an imperialist, and had no real sympathy with the democrats. Circumstances, however, obliged him to choose at the outset of his career, whether he would follow his convictions, and join with the oligarchical party led by Cimon, or advocate the cause of the democracy and lead the party of Ephialtes. His proud and imperious nature would not permit him to follow

where Cimon led. He opposed the great authority of Cimon, and thereby became the advocate and leader of the democracy.

Pericles inherited an ample fortune. Part of his patrimony consisted of a country place just outside the city walls, on which were erected his suburban residence and other buildings attached to his estates. Archidamus, king of Sparta, and Pericles, before the commencement of hostilities, had been personal friends, who had frequently partaken of each other's hospitality. When the former approached the Attic plain, with an army of 60,000 men at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, after the inhabitants had deserted their farms and country places and flocked within the walls of the city, Pericles, in order to allay prejudice against himself, when the Lacedæmonians had advised the Athenians to expel him as a descendant of a polluted family, made an address in the Public Assembly in which he declared that while Archidamus had been his personal friend, such friendship should not operate to the injury of his countrymen; and that if, by reason of that fact, the enemy spared his lands and buildings while the property of others was destroyed, he would take pleasure in making a present of them to the Athenians. He therefore urged that the people should not harbor distrust or suspicion against him on that account.

Another instance from which some idea may be derived as to the extent of his fortune, occurred when Thucydides and his party charged Pericles with wasteful extravagance of the public moneys, which they said he squandered on temples and public buildings. In answer to the charge, at a public meeting, he asked the Assembly if in their opinion they thought he had laid out too much money in these costly edifices. According to Plutarch they answered that he was spending a great deal too much. If that is the case, an-

swered Pericles, "let the cost be charged to me personally, and let the inscriptions upon the buildings stand in my name." Then we are told that the fickle assembly whether out of surprise at the liberality and public spirit of the man, or out of emulation for the glory of the works, cried out bidding him spend on, and lay out what he thought fit from the public purse, and to spare no cost until all was finished.

Pericles was very painstaking and methodical and exercised great prudence in the care of his property and the management of his estates. The supervision of his private affairs was entrusted to a slave by the name of Evangelus whom it is said was either naturally gifted, or was instructed by Pericles, so as to excel every one in the art of domestic economy. He so managed that nothing was wasted. The crops and the entire yield of his fields were sold, when gathered, and everything necessary to supply his table was purchased in the open market. It is said that his methodical business habits were not pleasing to his sons, and that the female contingent in the household complained with regard to his method of housekeeping because every purchase that was made of articles for use in the home had to be accounted for daily with the greatest exactness. All receipts and disbursements were required to be itemized and to show the measure, the number of items and the price of the divers commodities purchased. This thrift, which might almost be termed parsimony, on the part of the great statesman, may account in a measure for the unfilial conduct and the outward disrespect of his son Xanthippus, who rebelled against his father's authority and frequently abused and maligned him in public.

Another matter which indicated the shrewdness and foresight of Pericles in public affairs, after he came into power was his scheme of colonization. In order to give employment and to furnish means to many citi-

zens, he procured the passage of a law providing that every year at least sixty triremes manned by Athenian citizens under pay, should be sent on cruises abroad extending over a period of eight months. In order to still further thin out the population, and to prevent the city from becoming overcrowded, and filled with groups of idle and mischievous meddlers, he devised a system, whereby property in foreign territories should be given to the individual colonists, who were designated out-citizens or "kleruchs" or as the word indicates, "lot owners." The law provided that these colonists, while residing abroad should not lose their rights of citizenship, but should continue to be, no matter where they settled, Athenian citizens and part of the Athenian electorate. They were pledged at all times, whether at home or abroad, to support the interests of the Athenian empire. Such colonies were planted in Eubœa, Ægina, Naxos, and elsewhere in the Ægean sea, in Chalcis, in Thrace, on the southern coast of the Euxine, in the Thracian Chersonese, at Thurii, and elsewhere on the eastern shores of Italy. The latter colony, however, was Pan-Hellenic. After the destruction of Sybaris, settlers from all parts of Greece were invited to locate there. On its site a new colony was founded, with a mixed population, called New Sybaris, which was afterward named Thurii, whither many distinguished Athenians migrated, among them the historian Herodotus. The colony on the Thracian Chersonese was conducted thither by Pericles in person about B. C. 453. He took with him one thousand colonists to reinforce and protect the Greeks who had previously settled in that fertile region. This was necessary because the barbarous Thracians were accustomed from time to time to make inroads from the north entering the peninsula across the narrow neck of land which joins it to the continent inflicting grievous injury and damage to the settlers by making

continued war upon them. On his arrival with the new colonists Pericles constructed a wall from sea to sea across this neck of land at its narrowest point, which did not exceed five miles in width from the Propontis to the Gulf of Melas, in the neighborhood of the cities of Cardia on the west coast and Pactya on the east. He constructed forts along this bulwark and thereby shut out the Thracians who lay all about the Chersonese and as Plutarch observes, "closed the door against a continual and grievous war" and rescued the Greek settlers from the evils of a predatory population both upon and within its borders.

Before the decree of ostracism against Cimon had been revoked and before the latter returned to Athens, Ephialtes, the incorruptible and fearless leader of the democracy, the advocate of political equality before the law, was assassinated one night while he slept. The oligarchical party had been defeated in their efforts to maintain the integrity of the Areopagus; they had been unable to check the reforms of the progressive element. The advocates of class privileges hated Ephialtes whom they could not control, and were unable to bribe. They blamed him as the author of their political misfortunes, and regarded him as the chief instrument by which their loss of power had been accomplished. They determined to rid Athens of this popular leader and in order to accomplish their wicked designs, they did not hesitate to employ the dagger of an assassin. The conspirators had no difficulty in finding in Bœotia a miscreant ready to do murder, and secured the services of Aristodicus of Tanagra, who assassinated Ephialtes in his bed.

The attempt by the oligarchical party to blame Pericles for the murder, alleging that he was moved by jealousy, and envy of the great reputation of his rival, failed utterly. The real assassin was known and the charges being palpably false, served to react on

those who made them, and Pericles became the most popular man in Athens and the chosen leader of the democracy. He exerted such an influence that the people elected him strategus annually, as long as he lived. Pericles practically on his assumption of leadership became the State. He had reached the commanding position attained in modern times by Louis XIV, when he declared *l'état, l'état c'est moi*.

The conduct of the Lacedæmonians, in dismissing their Athenian allies, sent at the instigation of Cimon, to aid in suppressing the revolt of the Helots, after the earthquake at Sparta, B. C. 464, caused the first open quarrel between Sparta and Athens. The Athenians believed that the true reason for the dismissal was lack of confidence in the loyalty of Athens, especially in view of the fact that it became known in some quarters that just before the earthquake, the Lacedæmonians had secretly planned to invade Attica to aid the Thasians in their struggle for independence. It cost Cimon also his popularity, and as has been observed resulted in his banishment. It also gave Pericles the opportunity he sought to supercede the great admiral in public esteem and confidence.

POSITION OF ATHENS WHEN PERICLES CAME INTO POWER

Athens, at the time Pericles came into power, was mistress of the sea. The victorious fleets of Cimon had enlarged her conquests and extended her jurisdiction until the Attic commonwealth became in fact a maritime empire. The great statesman who had succeeded Ephialtes, now bent his energies to establish the supremacy of Athens on land. His purpose was to humiliate and completely overshadow the Lacedæmonians, who were enlisting allies to destroy the power of her Attic rival, and defeat her ambition for supremacy in Hellas, and in the western world. Hostile

public sentiment occasioned by the treatment which had been accorded the Athenian allies, who, at the behest of Cimon had been sent to Messenia to assist the reduction of Mount Ithome, gave Pericles the opportunity which he sought and which he turned to his advantage to further advance his foreign policy. His first move was to induce the Public Assembly to rescind the anti-Persian alliance which had existed since the battle of Plataea, and to enter into an alliance with Argos, the open enemy of the Lacedæmonians. Athens and Argos then made an alliance with Thessaly in the north, from which military operations could be conducted against the Bœotians, who were allies of the Lacedæmonians. The Corinthians at this time were at war with the Megarians. The contest involved a dispute as to the boundaries of their frontiers. Pericles had no difficulty in making an alliance with Megara, in view of the fact that the Megarians were hard pressed by their enemies, the Corinthians. This arrangement was of the utmost importance to the Athenians, because it gave them control of the isthmus, the gateway into the Peloponnesus, and a naval base at Nisea and Pegæ, on the Saronic gulf and the gulf of Corinth respectively. From the former city their allies built two parallel walls connecting the port town directly with the sea. These walls were of great strategic advantage in operations against the island Ægina. The Athenians then made war on the Æginians. In this contest the latter and their Peloponnesian allies were defeated with a loss of seventy ships and the victorious Athenians, under the command of Leocrates, landed their forces on the island. The Corinthians then undertook a counter-movement against the Megarians, hoping that the Athenians would thereby be obliged to raise the siege of Ægina. They sought to take advantage of the fact that there were no available troops in Athens at this time of mili-

tary age. The troops not engaged in Ægina were absent in Egypt to assist Inaros in his revolt against Artaxerxes. They did not consider it possible that the old men and boys who remained in the city would leave their homes to undertake military operations or attempt an aggressive campaign in Megara. In this they were mistaken. Those under military age and those past the time when they could be expected to perform military service became enthusiastic. They volunteered to march into Megara to assist their allies to drive out the Corinthians and were led to battle under the command of Myronides. This novel campaign resulted in the defeat of the Corinthians, and Megara was again rid of her enemies.

The object of these alliances negotiated through the influence of Pericles was obvious. If the Athenians could effectually guard the isthmus, and command the waters that washed its shores, they could sail round the Peloponnesus at pleasure, and effectually obstruct the paths and defiles in the Geranea Mountains through which the Lacedæmonians were obliged to enter Attica. The Lacedæmonians soon became aware of the disadvantage at which they were placed by the Athenian-Megarian alliance. Prior to this alliance the Phocians undertook a campaign against Doris, and seized Citium, a Dorian city close to the western border of Locris. The Dorians appealed to their kinsmen in the Peloponnesus to protect them, and redress the wrong committed by the Phocians. The Spartans, from their forces, engaged in the siege of Ithome, sent fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand of their allies into Phocis, under the command of Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, to compel the Phocians to relinquish their conquest and restore the city they had taken from the Dorians. When this task was accomplished and the Lacedæmonians were returning through the friendly territory of Bœotia, they learned that

Megara was no longer their ally, and that the passes through the Geranea Mountains were strongly guarded. Under the circumstances the Lacedæmonians deemed it wise to tarry in Bœotia. They encamped in the territory of Tanagra, in the valley of the Asopus, close to the borders of Attica. They had another motive also in assembling their forces so close to the border. They were privately urged by the leaders of the oligarchical party in Athens to coöperate with the conspirators, and overthrow the power of the democracy, and put an end to the building of the long walls, being constructed to connect the port towns at the Piræus and Phalerum, with the walls of Athens.

The Athenians, suspecting treachery and fearing an attack from the combined forces of the Peloponnesians and Bœotians, sent an army under Pericles, who had been elected a strategus to engage the enemy. The result was the battle of Tanagra, where Pericles, though he fought bravely and displayed extraordinary courage in the field, suffered defeat and the Lacedæmonians managed to return through Megara to their own country. This engagement proved but a temporary obstacle to the policy of Pericles to establish the supremacy of Athens in central and northern Greece. To regain the prestige they had lost temporarily at Tanagra, the Athenians, two months after that engagement, sent an army across the Asopus under command of Myronides and engaged and defeated the Bœotians at Œenophyta. The contest was decisive and the victory complete. The oligarchical party in Bœotia were driven into exile and Locris, Bœotia and Phocis became subject to the jurisdiction of Athens. The Athenians took hostages also from the Opuntian Locrians on the gulf of Malis and northern straits of Eubœa. In view of the Thessalian alliance, Athens was now supreme in northern and central Greece. Her jurisdiction extended from the Gulf of Corinth to the vale

of Tempe, the Thermaic gulf and the borders of Macedonia.

Pericles used his power to harass and punish the Peloponnesians and Tolmides was assigned to circumnavigate the peninsula. His marauding squadron was everywhere successful. He ravaged the coasts of Argolis, Laconia, Elis, and Achaia, plundered the towns within convenient reach and did what damage he could.

Two years after Tolmides achieved his naval success in the Peloponnesus, Pericles sailed with a squadron from the port of Pegæ with one thousand Athenians, and ravaged the coasts of Argolis and Achaia. He also attacked Cœniadæ in Acarnania. On this expedition he defeated an army sent from Sicyon, to meet him when he landed near the city. This expedition strengthened his influence and added to his fame as a military commander.

As has been observed, the loyalty shown by Cimon and his followers at Tanagra caused a change in public sentiment with respect to the illustrious exile. His return to Athens was being discussed. Pericles saw the inevitable and planned that on the return of his rival, his own popularity should not suffer. By a master-stroke of diplomacy, the affair was arranged in such a way as to obviate the possibility that the return of the popular admiral would weaken the power of the democracy, or hinder the ambition of Pericles. It is probable that the great statesman may have used the influence of Elpinice, the artful and engaging sister of Cimon to further his designs. She undoubtedly appealed to Pericles to lend his influence to secure the revocation of the decree of ostracism against her brother, especially in view of the fact that Pericles was instrumental in having the decree passed. She had appealed to him before, when her brother was tried for his life, and Pericles was assigned as one of the

committee to prosecute the charges against him. Elpinice, by reason of her social position, the wealth of her husband and her brother, and the exalted position he occupied, and as leader of the oligarchical party, came constantly in contact with the eminent men of Athens, and was conversant with the political intrigues of her day. There is, therefore, nothing improbable in the assumption that she used her arts of persuasion, at this time, to secure his good will, especially in view of the fact that now Pericles was the leader of his party and the most influential man in Athens. Cimon had achieved his fame as a naval commander. It was altogether fitting and proper, therefore, that on his return, he should be honored by giving him command of the naval forces. He could be assigned to duty in foreign parts, and given the opportunity to win fresh laurels on the sea. His absence would relieve Pericles from any apprehension as to his political influence, an influence which might be formidable if he were in Athens, but which he could not well exercise while abroad. Elpinice would have her way in seeing her brother restored to the honors and dignities of his high station; and in minimizing his influence in political affairs at home, Pericles would reap the advantage he sought.

There is reason to believe, also, that the restoration of Cimon was the result of a compromise of some sort by which the prejudices and passions aroused by party feeling were, through his mediation, mollified and assuaged. He acted the part of peace-maker, and three years after the close of the second Messenian War, B. C. 452, he negotiated with the Lacedæmonians the Five Years' Truce. We are not informed what naval operations were carried on by Cimon prior to the time when he sailed to Cyprus with a squadron of two hundred ships. This expedition was sent out after the Five Years' Truce had been concluded with the Lacedæmo-

nians, and was the last undertaking of the Athenian admiral, who died at Cyprus, B. C. 449.

ATHENS LOSES LAND SUPREMACY — EXPANSION OF HER
MARITIME EMPIRE

The land supremacy established by Athens at Cœnophyta, B. C. 456, lasted ten years. The defeat of Tolmides at Coronea, B. C. 447, which marked the end of Athenian power in Central Greece, beyond the confines of Attica, was analogous, in many respects, to the defeat of the Spartans at Sphacteria, in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian War. Tolmides undertook his campaign in Bœotia, contrary to the advice of Pericles, who counselled caution, and advocated delay until a stronger army could be sent against the Bœotian oligarchs. His advice was disregarded. Many of the young men then in Athens belonged to old and illustrious families. They joined in the movement and volunteered their services. They believed that a thousand Athenians led by the renowned Tolmides would be more than a match for any army their enemies could muster, especially in view of the fact that the Bœotians were unable to secure the aid of the Lacedæmonians by reason of the Five Years' Truce which was still in force. Tolmides was killed at Coronea and some of the prisoners taken by the enemy were of the best blood in Athens. At Sphacteria many of the Spartans who had been made prisoners by the Athenians belonged to the most prominent families of the Lacedæmonians. As the Spartans were obliged to make peace after their defeat to save their most influential citizens, so Athens, after the defeat at Coronea was obliged to relinquish her supremacy in continental Hellas to save the lives of some of her most estimable citizens. The leaders of the oligarchical party, who had been in exile since their defeat at Cœnophyta returned. The democracies

which the Athenians had instituted were abolished and oligarchies were once more established in their stead.

The oligarchical party now became active not only in Bœotia, but in Phocis, Locris, Megara and Eubœa. As a result of their influence, the island of Eubœa rebelled, and refused allegiance to Athens. Megara also was induced to revolt. This disloyalty of the Eubœans of itself was a trivial affair. Pericles would have had no difficulty in suppressing it, but the fact that the Five Years' Truce with the Lacedæmonians had now expired, caused some apprehension. The elimination of this treaty released the latter from any further obligation to keep the peace, and refrain from molesting her ambitious rival. The situation demanded all the skill and diplomacy possessed by Pericles in order to save Attica from invasion, and secure the repose of Athens. The oligarchical party, after the expatriation of Cimon, was led by Thucydides (not the historian), a relative also of Cimon, and a man of great ability. His party was opposed to war with the Lacedæmonians and the further expansion of the Athenian Empire, at the risk of incurring the hostility of other states of Greece. But the war had actually begun, while Pericles was absent with an army to suppress the insurrection in Eubœa. Pleistoanax, the young King of Sparta, who shared the crown with Archidamus, was placed in command of an army with instructions to invade Attica. When Pericles learned that the Peloponnesians were advancing through Megara, he was compelled to abandon, temporarily, operations in Eubœa. He hastened to Attica, and arrived after the Spartans had crossed the border and were encamped on the plain of Eleusis. Athens was not ready for war with Sparta. Pericles was resourceful. He knew the power of money. Pleistoanax was young. Cleandrides, his coadjutor, who had been sent with the king to advise and give him the benefit of his mature judgment,

was susceptible. Pericles bribed them both. The Spartans evacuated Attica and returned to their own country. He then returned with five thousand hoplites and reduced Eubœa to subjection.

Pericles was now called upon to decide whether he would be content to relinquish Megara, Ægina, Trœzen in Argolis, and territory in Achaia, for the sake of peace, or whether he would go to war with the Peloponnesians. He considered that the integrity of his maritime empire with peace was more to his own interests and the interest of his countrymen than war with the Peloponnesians. He accordingly negotiated a treaty of peace with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, B. C. 445, which by its terms was limited to a period of thirty years. This pact may be regarded as the crowning act of diplomacy of the great statesman. It gave Athens repose for fifteen years, and is known as the Thirty Years' Truce. During this period Athens attained unparalleled prosperity and reached the height of her fame as the most renowned city of antiquity. It embraces the era which bears the impress of his genius and the genius of the distinguished men of the time, and is known as the golden age of Pericles.

The main obstacle now in the way of the ambition of the leader of the Athenian democracy, was the influence of the oligarchical party led by Thucydides. The policy of the oligarchs and their campaign cry was united Hellas. They advocated the establishment of amicable relations with all the cities and states in Greece. This idea was repugnant to the policy of the Athenian democracy. How was it possible to unite Hellas without creating either a pan-Hellenic oligarchy or a universal democracy. A house divided against itself cannot stand. Hellas could not exist half oligarchic and half democratic. It must be all oligarchic or all democratic. The Lacedæmonians and their allies would not surrender their autonomy, and their form of

government for the sake of Hellenic unity. The Athenians would not consent to Hellenic unity if the price was to be the abolition of their democratic constitution, as perfected by Ephialtes, and supported by Pericles. The difficulty was insurmountable and politically impossible. But there was involved another issue, relating to the disposition of the moneys contributed annually by the Athenian allies, who constituted the membership of the Confederacy of Delos.

This Confederacy was formed B. C. 478, when Cimon entered on his wars of expulsion to drive the Persians from Europe and the eastern shores of Asia. The members of the Confederacy, besides Athens, were the States and Municipalities situated on the islands of the *Ægean* Sea, and the Hellenic coast cities of Asia Minor. The object and purpose of the Confederacy was to secure a fund and supply ships and men to prosecute these wars of expulsion, and protect the members of the league from Persian invasion. The amount to be contributed by each member was adjusted by mutual consent. Athens was chosen as president of the league, and its treasury was to remain in the temple of Apollo on the sacred island of Delos. Each member paid into it a fixed tax or contribution or furnished its quota of ships and men. Long after the Persians had been driven from the *Ægean* sea, Athens continued to exact this war tax, which amounted to a sum equivalent to more than \$600,000 annually. After the lapse of about eighteen years, presumably about B. C. 460, Pericles exerted his influence to secure the removal of the treasury of the League from the island of Delos to the city of Athens, on the pretext that the funds would be safer in Attica than in the midst of the *Ægean*. The treasury was accordingly taken to Athens. It was no longer necessary to exact this tax, because the Persian wars, so far as the safety of the members of the Confederacy was concerned, had long since ceased. As

the tax was levied by consent, for a specific purpose, its exaction for any other purpose than that for which it was contributed was wholly unauthorized and illegal. Pericles, about the time the Thirty Years' Truce was concluded, without the consent of the league, began to use a large part of these war funds to beautify and adorn the city of Athens.

The allies protested. Why should these municipalities and states continue to contribute their substance and the fruits of their toil in order that the Athenians might lavish it to guild her city all over, "and to adorn and set her forth, as it were, some vain woman, hung round with precious stones, and figures and temples which cost a world of money." The members of the Confederacy complained at the injustice and objected to being forced to pay. Pericles, at the head of the Athenian democracy, the president of the league, overruled these objections, took the money by force and reduced to subjection those members of the league who refused to submit. His course was sustained by the Public Assembly over the protest of Thucydides and the oligarchical party, who contended not that the tax should be reduced, but that the money should be used solely to prosecute war against Persia in Egypt, Cyprus and distant parts of the world remote from the *Ægean*.

The argument of Pericles to support this great injustice with respect to diverting this war fund, is without merit. He claimed that the Athenians were not bound to account for the moneys received from their allies, if they maintained at all times their defense and prevented the barbarians from molesting them. He argued that the tax belonged not to those who paid it, but to those who received it. He entirely ignored the fact that whenever the tax was in excess of the amount necessary to police the *Ægean*, it should be reduced proportionately. On the contrary he con-

tended that if the amount of the revenues derived from the members of the league was more than sufficient for the purposes for which it was levied that, nevertheless, the Athenians had a right to expend the surplus, to adorn and beautify Athens, the head of the Confederacy, the pride of Hellas, and the most renowned city in the world. He argued that the works of art and magnificent temples and structures which made Athens great, also augmented her power and influence, and reflected the courage and patriotism of its citizens so as to command not only the respect and admiration of other states, but gave Athens a prestige that deterred those who might otherwise have been inclined to assail or humiliate the allies, whom Athens had sworn to defend.

When we consider the circumstances under which the money was contributed, it will be impossible to sustain the plausible argument of Pericles on any sound moral principle. It must rest solely on the plea of expediency or on the false theory often invoked by benevolent despots, that might makes right, or that the end justifies the means. We cannot ignore the fact that the money was given to Athens as President of the Confederacy in trust, for the uses and purposes agreed upon by all the members. Upon sound principles of equity, therefore, the trustee was bound to apply the money to those uses exclusively, unless by consent of the constituent members of the league it was made applicable to a different purpose.

Party spirit ran high and caused unusual excitement among the advocates who severally supported Thucydides on the one side and Pericles on the other. Thucydides finally concluded to appeal directly to the people for a vote of confidence. This course involved the alternative of ostracism. If the confidence was voted to his adversary, Pericles, and withheld from Thucydides, a decree of ostracism would follow against

the unsuccessful candidate. In other words the people were called upon to decide which of the two leaders should be ostracised. The result necessarily involved the political fate of the rivals who contended for political supremacy. Pericles defeated his antagonist. The majority in his favor was decisive and overwhelming, and resulted in largely disintegrating the combination that had been formed against him. All formidable opposition in the city practically ceased. Pericles secured control. The vast resources of his countrymen were at his command, "their tributes, their armies, and their galleys, the islands, the sea, and their wide extent of power, partly over other Greeks, and partly over barbarians, and all that empire which they possessed."

After this personal triumph, Pericles, according to Plutarch, was not the same man he was before. Athens became thenceforth an empire which went under the name of a democracy, and was controlled by the will of one man. Pericles was for all practical purposes the State.

There were no longer any obstacles to hinder the Athenian protagonist from carrying out his ambitious designs. The funds contributed by the Delian Confederacy were available, and he determined to make Athens the most renowned city in the world. Landor puts a speech into the mouth of Pericles, supposed to have been delivered when Archidamus was approaching Attica with an army of 60,000 men. "Impelled by the breath of Xerxes," he said, "the locusts of Asia consumed your harvests; your habitations crumbled away as they swarmed along; the temples of the gods lay prostrate; the gods themselves bowed and fell; the men of Athens rose higher than ever." Pericles now determined to restore the temples and images burned by the Persians, and make his city greater than any. His designs were successfully ac-

complished. The faded splendors of Athens, after more than twenty-three centuries, still attract the admiration of mankind. Posterity has not surpassed the artistic architectural beauty, the graceful images and statues produced in the age of Pericles. Modern scholars and lovers of the beautiful continue to wonder at the development which characterized Athenian art at that period of the world's history. To-day we love to dwell upon the achievements of the city of the violet crown, which has been characterized by Mahaffy as "the tomb of ancient glory—the home of ancient wisdom; the mother of science, of art, of philosophy, of politics—the champion of liberty, the envy of the Persian and the Roman—the teacher even still of the modern civilized world."

There can be little doubt, however, that the principal issue in the campaign between Pericles and Thucydides was not whether Athens was justified in using the funds of the Delian Confederacy to beautify and adorn the city and the hill of the Acropolis, but whether the democratic form of government then established should give way to an oligarchy. There can be no question either that during the campaign Pericles promised Hellenic unity, provided it could be brought about without imperiling democratic government at least in Attica. In furtherance of this design, according to the account given by Plutarch, the Public Assembly, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree authorizing a pan-Hellenic Congress, to assemble in Athens, composed of delegates from every Greek city in Europe and Asia. The object of this assembly was to confer as to the best mode of securing and devising ways and means to restore the Greek temples, which had been burned and destroyed by the armies of Persia, to fulfill the vows that had been made by the Hellenese for the safety of their land from the sword of the invader, and more important still to establish a maritime code or

proper laws and ordinances regulating the navigation of the seas to promote commercial prosperity and secure peace among the Hellenese. Twenty delegates were commissioned to execute the decree. Five were dispatched to Asia to summon the Ionians and Dorians and the islanders as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five to Thrace and the Hellespont as far as Byzantium; five to Bœotia, Phocis and the Peloponnesus, to the Locrians and over the continent to the Ambracian Gulf; the other five were sent to the gulf of Malis and beyond into Thessaly, as far as the confines of Macedonia.

This patriotic movement worthy of the genius of the Athenian statesman was thwarted through the envy and jealousy of the narrow and prejudiced Lacedæmonians and their allies, who secretly defeated the project and settled for all time the destinies of Greece which they preferred should remain divided, unless they themselves could control the enterprise, and become the official head of United Hellas.

CORCYRIAN AND CORINTHIAN WARS

The military operations, which disturbed the repose of Greece, after the Samian War, are known as the Corcyrian Wars, waged by Corinth, the mother city, against Corcyra (Corfu), her daughter city, in which the former sought to discipline the latter. Both states had been active in establishing colonies. Corcyra founded several on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. The most flourishing of these was Epidamnus in Illyria. About five years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Epidamnians were attacked by the barbarous Illyrian tribes dwelling in the contiguous territory and were reduced to extremity. In their distress they appealed to their mother city Corcyra for

succor. Their entreaties were disregarded and the Epidamnians, after consulting the oracles at the temple of Apollo at Delphi, appealed to Corinth and delivered their city to them. The Corinthians at once sent troops and colonies to Epidamnus. This prompt intervention kindled the anger of the Corcyrians. A fleet was sent to Epidamnus with instructions to demand that the latter expel the Corinthians who had hastened to relieve them. The request was refused. The Corcyrians then invested the city and called in as allies the barbarous Illyrian tribes. War was declared by Corinth against Corcyra. The former dispatched a fleet to Epidamnus which was intercepted by a Corcyrian squadron off the promontory of Actium in Acarnania at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. There, in sight of the temple of Apollo, visible from the decks of the hostile fleets, a great naval battle was fought in which the Corinthians were overwhelmingly defeated. As a result Epidamnus was forced to surrender and the unfortunate city came again into the possession of Corcyra. Both sides then appealed to Athens. Corcyra sought to form an alliance with the Athenians. This was strongly opposed by the ambassadors sent by Corinth. Pericles finally advised that the Athenians enter into a defensive alliance with Corcyra, and declined to accede to the petition of the Corinthians, praying that Athens remain neutral and permit them to discipline their daughter city, as Athens had disciplined their allies in Samos. The fruits of this defensive alliance resulted in the defeat of the Corinthian fleet off the island of Sybota, near the coast of Epirus, B. C. 432. When the Corcyrians were hard pressed, and disaster seemed inevitable, an Athenian fleet appeared and saved the day. Victory was plucked from the jaws of defeat. The Corinthians were forced to retire. The latter urged that this intervention was a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce. Her Pelopon-

nesian allies so decided, and all Greece was shortly afterwards involved in civil war.

Pericles is blamed in some quarters with being solely responsible for bringing on the Peloponnesian War. This conclusion is not justified by the facts. In his great war speech, the last address made by Pericles in the Public Assembly which immediately preceded the commencement of hostilities, he did advocate war. But this advice was also predicated on the assumption that the enemy would finally reject all overtures of peace. Pericles declared to the Assembly that Athens must not be the aggressor; that if war ensued the Lacedæmonians and their allies, not the Athenians, must be the aggressors. Thucydides, in all probability, was in the Assembly and heard the speech delivered. He has reported it fully, and preserved it for the perusal of posterity. When the arguments of Pericles are analyzed, there seems to be no room for doubt that Pericles did not urge Athens to make war. The address begins with this statement: "I say, Athenians, as I have always said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians." He then observed that when differences should arise, the treaty required that they should be submitted to arbitration. That the Peloponnesians had never asked for arbitration, and when the Athenians offered it they declined. He then reminded his audience that the Lacedæmonians required the Athenians "To quit Potidea, to leave Ægina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megarians." He observed further that if the Athenians yielded, their adversaries would think that they did so through fear and would immediately dictate more oppressive conditions. That the Athenians must either give way before the commencement of hostilities or, if they determined to go to war, which course Pericles advocated, then they must yield nothing. He then made this forcible observation: "Any claim, the smallest as well as the

greatest, imposed on a neighbor and an equal when there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery." He then set forth the resources of the Athenian empire and contrasted it with that of the Lacedæmonians.

In answer to those who declare that this address was tantamount to an open declaration of war, it is sufficient to refer to the answer which Pericles recommended in his speech should be sent to the ambassadors, who were about to return to Sparta. "Let us say to them," said Pericles, "that we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians will not exclude foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta, for the treaty no more forbids one than the other. That we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedæmonians allow their subject states to be governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lacedæmon, but for their own. Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty. That we do not want to begin war, but intend to defend ourselves if attacked."

The war speech of Pericles, therefore, after setting out the facts, constitutes an offer on the part of the Athenians to conform to the terms and conditions of the treaty (the Thirty Years' Truce) and submit all their differences to arbitration.

Diodorus, in the Twelfth Book of his history, gives his version of the immediate cause of the Peloponnesian War. He says that it was brought about by Pericles, in order to avoid being called to account for the moneys of the Delian League for which as treasurer of Athens, President of the League, he was accountable. The Athenians, Diodorus says, sought to secure dominion of the sea. He declares that Pericles had expended a great part of these public funds in connection with his

private affairs. Having been called to render an account of his stewardship he fell sick. During his illness his nephew, Alcibiades, not then of full age, called to see him, and having inquired as to the cause of his uncle's indisposition was advised as to his perplexity with regard to the public funds which were entrusted to his custody. Alcibiades suggested that instead of considering how he should account, it would be far better for him to devise some way to avoid giving any account at all. Pericles then began to consider how he might involve the Athenians in some great war. It happened at this time, according to Diodorus, that Phidias, at the behest of the enemies of Pericles, had been accused. It was charged that with the connivance and help of Pericles, he had embezzled large sums belonging to the goddess Athene, whose statue of ivory and gold had been carved by Phidias, and placed in the Parthenon. The charge was both for embezzlement and sacrilege. In this charge Anaxagoras, the philosopher and friend of Pericles, was involved also. Pericles was a good judge of human nature and believed it to be advantageous for him if possible to involve Athens in the war and make use of men engaged in idle gossip actuated by envy and jealousy, in order that amidst the excitement of war, they would be deaf to the accusations against him, and would have neither time nor leisure to call him to account. The Athenians had recently made a decree that the citizens of Megara should be cut off from all commercial relations with them, both by sea and land. The Megarians then petitioned the Spartans to aid them, to secure a rescission of this decree against Megara. Pericles, according to this account, saw his opportunity. He opposed the revocation of the decree, and advised recourse to arms. And the war came. Thus Diodorus, on the authority of Ephorus, the Greek historian, attributes to the alleged peculations of Pericles, the true cause

of the Peloponnesian War. Plutarch, however, who wrote probably a century after Diodorus, does not credit this version as to the genesis of the war, which destroyed the glory of Athens, and declares that the truth as to the accusation is uncertain. Moreover, he has passed the highest encomium on the character of Pericles, and comparing him with Fabius, declares that no man "had ever greater opportunities to enrich himself having had presents offered him from so many kings and princes and allies, yet no man was ever more free from corruption."

Thucydides, also, the illustrious contemporary of the Athenian statesman, does not attribute the Dorian War to this charge of peculation, nor to the Megarian decree, but claims that it was brought on by the blow struck at Potidea, arising out of the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra.

The beginning of this war was an important date in Hellenic annals. It marked an epoch in the history of Greece. Herodotus had then attained the age of 53; Thucydides the historian was 40; Pericles was 68. In this year also the tragedy of Medea, by Euripides, was first produced. Its author at the time was 48 years old. Fleets and armies were mobilized, the contending forces which were destined to bring destruction upon Hellas aligned themselves, and active preparations were made for the titanic struggle, destined to continue for more than a quarter of a century.

Archidamus, at the last moment, still hoped for peace. When his forces reached the borders of Attica, he dispatched as his envoy Melanippus, in the hope that an amicable adjustment might still be reached, and war averted. But Pericles forbade. He secured the adoption of a resolution by the Public Assembly to receive neither envoy nor herald, and Melanippus was sent back across the border before sunset on the day

he sought to reach Athens, and was not permitted even to disclose the nature of his message.

About the middle of June, B. C. 431, Archidamus began his work of destruction. He devastated Attica and laid waste its fertile demes, burning and destroying the harvests, the vineyards, the orchards. He remained in Attica less than forty days, and then his supplies having become exhausted late in July, he evacuated the country and returned through the friendly state of Bœotia.

Pericles now took up the sword, to retaliate upon the enemy for the injury that his countrymen had sustained at their hands. Late in September, at the head of an army of 13,000 hoplites, he entered the Megarid and laid waste the country with fire and sword, and carried his destructive warfare to the very gates of the city of Megara. These invasions and counter invasions embraced the operations in the first year of this memorable struggle. It was in the winter, 431 B. C., that Pericles was chosen to deliver the funeral oration, in memory of those who had fallen in the campaign.

In the spring of the following year, B. C. 430, Archidamus repeated the operations of the previous summer, and again invaded Attica. It was during this campaign that the scourge of pestilence more deadly than that of war, filled Athens with desolation and indescribable horrors. "Death was whetting his arrows, and the graves were open." The Athenians murmured and repeated the old adage that the Dorian War would come and a plague with it. Pericles became the object of their bitter attacks. He was blamed for the war and for the pestilence. His enemies and vicious and jealous rivals now gave full rein to their passions and prejudices, and bent their energies to discredit and ruin the great statesman, and drag him from power. Plots and conspiracies had already manifested themselves in efforts to strike down the close friends of Pericles.

Among his traducers was the notorious tanner Cleon, the idol of the lower classes. He was conspicuous for his brutal denunciation and vituperation. In the absence of proper libel laws, no reputation, however chaste, no character, however noble, escaped the assaults of this vulgar demagogue. He lacked the refinement and intellectual qualities of Aristophanes and the scholarly attainments of the satirists and comic poets of the day. But his coarse, vulgar wit, and picturesque and spectacular harangues caught the fancy of the masses and won the applause of the illiterate. Phidias, the greatest sculptor of any age; Anaxagoras, the renowned scholar and philosopher; the gifted and beautiful Milesian Aspasia, the wife of Pericles, all were marked for destruction. The integrity of Pericles himself was finally assailed and he was obliged to pay an unjust fine. Phidias died in prison; Anaxagoras became an exile; Aspasia was acquitted after a vigorous defense conducted by Pericles in person.

Bowed down by the terrible afflictions visited upon them by the ravages of pestilence, the citizens of Athens sought to blame Pericles and even sought to hold him responsible for the fatal scourge which had been imposed in the dispensation of divine providence. In his defense to these charges and accusations, Pericles, in the course of his speech, observed: "By this time your empire has become a tyranny, which, in the opinion of mankind, you may have unjustly gained, but which cannot be safely surrendered." In other words, he advised that the Athenians having built up the most flourishing empire in the world, no matter whether the means by which it was acquired were just or unjust, yet they could not now afford to lose it, at the behest of timorous or discontented citizens and substitute their glorious sovereignty for a condition which must result in political dissolution, disintegration and slavery.

In this connection we must remember, also, that the Lacedæmonians and their allies blamed their misfortunes on Pericles personally. All their shafts were hurled at the great statesman, whose influence dominated the Athenians, whose superior intelligence and clever diplomacy prevented them from securing commercial or political advantages, and whose successful foreign policy opened foreign markets to Athenian ports, oftentimes to the exclusion of her rivals in the Peloponnesus. They concentrated their efforts to persuade the Athenians to rid themselves of their protagonist, who in point of ability and political sagacity was easily the greatest man of his age. They resorted to religious prejudices, by reminding the Athenians that the "curse" of the goddess was visited upon the Alcæonidæ, in the affair of Cylon, and that this pollution was inherited by Pericles, the son of Xanthippus. They were reminded how his ancestor, Megacles, the head of the Alcæonidæ, had pursued Cylon, who took refuge at the altar where he was under the divine protection; how he was induced to quit the temple, on the promise that his life would be spared; and having relied on the false promise, was butchered by the Alcæonidæ. The murderers and their descendants were accursed by the goddess. The Lacedæmonians tried to persuade the Athenians to drive out the "curse," in the hope that even if they failed to persuade the people to banish Pericles, they might discredit him, by inducing them to believe that if war ensued it would result as a consequence of the pollution that rested on the first citizen of the empire.

The attempt not only failed, but was met by a counter demand that the Spartans drive out the "curse" of Tenaras, referring to the murder of certain Helots, who had taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon, at Tenaras, and who were taken thence, led away and slain. This act the Lacedæmonians them-

selves believed was marked by divine displeasure, evidenced by the earthquake which destroyed Sparta and resulted in the outbreak of the Helots and the Third Messenian War.

Although the Lacedæmonians failed in their attempts to discredit Pericles, the peace party in Athens, adherents of the oligarchical party of Cimon and Thucydides, and blatant demagogues and radicals led by Cleon, united their efforts and resorted to every means to bring Pericles into disfavor. They were aided by a contingent of malcontents among the democrats who were envious and jealous of the great statesman. The plan was to strike down first the friends of Pericles, and then to accuse the great statesman himself and bring him before the court on some pretext, which would entail disgrace and ignominy.

In order to carry out these plans, the conspirators enlisted the aid of a venal and corrupt priesthood, who sought to create religious prejudices. During the absence of Pericles, Diopithes, the priest of the temple of Erechtheus, became the sponsor of a law against heresy which was introduced and passed by the Public Assembly. Under this statute the philosophers, the most conspicuous of whom was Anaxagoras, friend and preceptor of Pericles, whose teachings it was asserted were opposed to belief in the gods as conceived by the theogeny taught by the priests in the sacred temples, became a capital offense. This legislation was aimed at Anaxagoras who was universally esteemed for his knowledge and attainments, and his discoveries in mathematics and astronomy. He taught that the physical universe was the work of design and did not come by chance. These teachings brought him into disfavor with the superstitious and ignorant and gave the enemies of Pericles a powerful weapon.

Before the conspirators could secure an indictment against this distinguished man, Pericles succeeded in

persuading him to escape and seek a refuge in the shores of the Hellespont at Lampsacus, in Mysia.

These malcontents then attacked Phidias who built the Parthenon. He was charged with peculation for having embezzled the gold entrusted to him with which to adorn the statues and works of art in the Parthenon. Pericles demonstrated the falsity of these accusations by taking off the gold plates from the marble, bronze and ivory image of Athene, the most imposing piece of sculpture in Greece. He weighed the gold in the presence of his accusers and it was found to be of the requisite weight and fineness.

But not content with the failure to sustain the charge of embezzlement, the great sculptor was accused of impiety for having traced in a group of figures wrought upon the shield of the goddess the lineaments of human faces, said to represent Phidias and Pericles. He died in prison awaiting trial. Aristophanes refers to this incident in the "Peace," a comedy produced in Athens, thus:

"Phidias was the first beginning; his indictment and undoing
First alarmed his friend and patron for his own approaching
ruin."

Next came the blow that struck nearest the heart of Pericles. A charge of heresy was brought against his wife, Aspasia, who might have suffered the fate which subsequently overtook Socrates, upon a similar accusation, had not Pericles, in person, pleaded her cause before the judges who presided at her trial. The indictment charged this beautiful and gifted woman as guilty of the crime of not acknowledging the gods of the country, as having spoken irreverently of the sacred customs of the Athenians, and the mysteries of Eleusis, with having joined in the debates of the philosophers who denied the gods, coupled with malicious charges of immodesty and immorality. The punishment of death

was invoked under the statute. Hermippus a comic poet, and friend of Aristophanes, who had in his plays libelled not only Aspasia, but Pericles as well, was chosen to prosecute the indictment, with the assistance and moral support of Diopithes, priest of the temple of Erechtheus.

Under the constitution as it then existed, it seems that the trial was conducted not in the court of the Areopagus, but before the Archon Basilous and his associate archons, and a panel of dikasts. Pericles could trust no one but himself with the conduct of the defense. The fate of the accused was to him dearer than life, and he determined to sacrifice himself, and if necessary, to share her fate. After the evidence was all in, and Hermippus had concluded his bitter arraignment, Pericles, pale and anxious, arose and addressed the magistrates and the dikasts. His argument before that tribunal has not been preserved but we may be justified in the assumption that he dwelt first on the element of intent. He contended for acquittal upon the ground that there could be no conviction in the absence of criminal intent, and that the essence of every crime was a guilty mind. The conduct of the accused must be viewed in the light of what she sought to accomplish. The purpose of philosophical discussion was not intended to treat the deity with disrespect or to malign the gods, but to enlighten and broaden the intellect and apply the test of reason in the discussion of the mysteries involved in the manifestations of nature, and the solution of the problems which relate to the supernatural.

If the prisoner was guilty of the charge of impiety, he declared, then he was guilty also of the same offense and reminded the court that if they should convict his wife, they must also convict her husband as her accomplice. Every word he uttered came from his heart, prompted by the tenderest feelings of affection. He

was unable to control his emotions and it is said the great orator and dignified statesman wept.

"Now is that noble vessel full of grief,
That it runs over, even at his eyes."

He reminded his accusers, as Hammerling observes, that he had erected the superb temples that adorned their city, and through his influence the sacred images on the Acropolis and within the sacred precincts of Eleusis were carved and adorned with infinite pains. Did these superb masterpieces indicate impiety? He had fought the battles of the republic, destroyed the power of the oligarchy, established a democracy and secured the liberties of the people. The result of a life of patriotic devotion tended to lessen rather than increase the growth of contentment and morality, and to inculcate a love of the refined and beautiful. In all his work for the public weal and general welfare of the citizens of Athens, his wife, the intellectual and gifted woman now on trial for her life, was his enthusiastic helpmate, and much of what had been accomplished was due to her. In view of these facts it would be inhuman and monstrous to tear from the breast of Pericles his lawfully wedded wife, and drag her to destruction before his eyes, at the behest of Hermippus, who had rendered no service to the state and nothing that would reflect credit upon him as a public man.

His impassioned address kindled enthusiasm among his hearers, when they reflected on the public services conferred upon the electorate by the son of Xanthippus. His illustrious ancestor they remembered was the hero of Sestus and Mycale, the final military achievements of the Persian Wars, undertaken by Darius and Xerxes. His pleadings went to the hearts of his countrymen, and when the pebbles which the jurymen had cast in delivering their verdict were taken from the urns, the white, which indicated life, far outnumbered

the black, which were indicative of death. Pericles had secured the acquittal of his wife, and achieved the greatest triumph in his long and successful career. His persecutors were confounded and chagrined, but were determined to ruin their enemy.

THE SAMIAN WAR — PERICLES AND ASPASIA

The sound of the sea, the sway of the song, the swing of the oar!
Out of the darkness, over the naked seas,
 Our galley is come,
 With a shiver and leap,
 As the blade bites deep
To the sway of back and the bend of knees,
 As she drives for home
Out of the darkness, over the naked seas,
To the sound of the sea, and the sway of song, and the sweep of
 oar.¹

Pericles now, B. C. 440, had attained his sixty-first year and reached the zenith of his fame. It was at this time that a quarrel arose between Miletus and the island of Samos, as to which should govern Priene, a city in Ionia on the northern shore of the gulf of Lade, directly opposite the city of Miletus on the south shore. The Samians claimed the right by reason of their ownership of territory on the mainland adjacent to Priene. It was of no particular consequence to the people of Athens whether Samos or Miletus governed the destinies of this Ionian city. But a political question was involved. If the Samians prevailed, then the government of Priene would be democratic. If Miletus succeeded, then it would be oligarchic. Priene, of course, was not permitted to choose, so that the quarrel involved only Samos and Miletus. They were both members of the Delian Confederacy. Neither would yield and a new war ensued in which the Milesians were

¹ The Greek Galley. — Lodge.

worsted. The latter then, notwithstanding she had appealed to the sword and lost, now appealed to Athens to decide the quarrel, upon the plea that under the articles of the Delian League, the latter had jurisdiction and authority to hear and decide the controversy. The democrats in Samos joined the democrats in Miletus to invoke the aid of Athens, to settle the dispute. The Samians, on the other hand, claimed that Miletus had elected to appeal to arms, and was bound by its election, and that it was now too late for Athens to intervene to reverse the arbitrament of war. For this reason they urged that the provisions of the constitution of the Confederacy of Delos were no longer applicable. They therefore refused to arbitrate with Athens as umpire. The Athenians decided that their authority had been challenged and in order to sustain their power and dignity declared that the failure of the Samians to submit to their jurisdiction was a violation of their treaty relations, and made war against Samos. There were some who declared that Pericles induced the Public Assembly to declare war to please Aspasia, the beautiful Milesian, with whom he sustained marital relations, although by the laws of Athens he was forbidden to marry her, by reason of the fact of her foreign birth.

The war with Samos, therefore, became memorable, because it throws light on the morals of the age and reveals not only incidents in the private life of Pericles, but discloses also the character of Athenian jurisprudence as it existed at that period, with respect to the laws of marriage and divorce. It demonstrates, also, the power exercised by Pericles, who was able to secure the election of his friend and intimate, Sophocles, one of the great poets of antiquity as strategus to assist in the prosecution of the war. Pericles desired the company of this gifted man, while engaged in the enterprise. At his suggestion, the Public Assembly

elected to a high military office of great responsibility, this man of genius, although there seems to be nothing to show that he was or claimed to be proficient in the art of war. Nevertheless, history relates that he discharged the duties of his office with great ability and contributed to the success of the war.

The laws of Athens were strict as to the proprieties governing the conduct of Athenian women, wives and daughters of Athenian citizens. They were compelled to live in practical seclusion, both before and after marriage. Marriages were arranged and negotiated by the near male relatives of the bride. The wife's activities, as a rule, were confined to the management of the household. They did not receive the mental training to fit them for literary pursuits, and to enable them to enjoy the advantages of polite learning. They were not so engaging and attractive in polite society, as to hold the attentions of men of culture and refinement of that age, when philosophy, literature and art were cultivated as in no other country.

If the married state became irksome, the law permitted the dissolution of the marriage contract by mutual consent, upon such terms and conditions as might be agreed upon by the male relatives of the respective parties.

The manners of the age, however, permitted and encouraged a class of free women in Athens to relieve the monotony of rigid social conditions, composed chiefly of foreigners; that is, those who did not possess the good fortune to have been born within the limited confines of Attica. These women, known generally as courtesans, came from the luxurious cities of Ionia, attracted by the wealth and prosperity of commercial Athens. In this class were frequently found women famed for their beauty and accomplishments, who found it not difficult to win the attentions, and gain the affections of eminent men, and were enabled thereby to

obtain a subtle and dangerous influence in state affairs and the political intrigues of the day. During the Persian Wars the beautiful and accomplished Targelia of Miletus was noted for the part she played in aid of the Persian cause.

In the time of Pericles, Aspasia, above referred to, also a Milesian, won the heart of that distinguished man, and occupied the chief place in his affections. His devotion was constant until death dissolved the golden chains with which Cupid bound them.

It was at the country seat of Sophocles, situated about a mile from Athens on the banks of the Cephissus, in the peaceful valley watered by that sylvan stream surrounded by olive groves, climbing vines and shady walks, interspersed with fragrant bowers and parterres of roses, that Pericles wooed the only woman he ever loved. Their constancy and devotion, it is said, inspired the poet when he wrote *Antigone*, a tragedy in which he describes in immortal lines the power of love.

Mighty power, all powers above!
Great, unconquerable Love.
Thou who liest in dimple sleek,
On the tender virgin's cheek.

Venus wills it from above.
Great, unconquerable Love.

All, thy maddening influence know,
Gods above, and men below,
All thy powers resistless prove,
Great, unconquerable Love.

Aspasia was universally conceded to be the most gifted woman of her age, renowned not only for her beauty, but for her rare intellectual accomplishments and literary attainments. The artists and poets, the philosophers and statesmen of that brilliant age, the most illustrious in history, were attracted by her genius and eagerly sought her society. They attended her

receptions and entertainments to listen to her discourses on subjects which received the attention of Socrates and Anaxagoras, of Polignotus and Phidias, of Pericles and Sophocles, and others of the circle of the eminent men of her time. We may judge somewhat of her unusual intellectual power, when we reflect that such men were attracted by her genius, and while she was but the female companion of Pericles and lived with him, nevertheless they attended with their wives and families, and listened with pleasure and wonder to her lectures and discussions on philosophy, literature and art.

Sophocles, the author of *Antigone*, above referred to, whose dramatic poems continue to delight men of refinement and culture; Phidias, the greatest sculptor of antiquity; Socrates, whose fame as a philosopher, after the lapse of more than twenty centuries remains undimmed, and other great men whose talents gave enduring renown to the age of Pericles, acknowledged the superior gifts of this remarkable woman. Her fame is linked with theirs. The slanders heaped upon her by the political enemies of her husband are entirely discredited, when we reflect that if she was admired solely by reason of her personal charms, her name and fame with nothing better upon which to rest would not have survived her own generation.

Pericles, though fortunate in his public career, was most unhappy in his marriage. His wife, Teliseppe, was nearly related to him. Before her marriage to Pericles, she had been the wife of Hipponicus, one of the wealthiest men in Athens from whom she was divorced, and her subsequent marriage to Pericles had been arranged according to custom and convenience, and was governed by family considerations. Love was not a factor in the affair. Teliseppe bore him two sons, the elder was named Xanthippus for his paternal grandfather. Paralus was the name of the younger.

Aspasia also bore him a son, to whom his father gave his own name. This son became distinguished as a military man. He was one of the strategi in command of the fleet at Arginusæ, and after defeating the Peloponnesians was subsequently, with other of his fellow generals, unjustly put to death by his ungrateful countrymen.

It is a strange coincidence that Pericles himself erected the barrier that operated as a bar to his domestic happiness. When he was at the height of his power, having two legitimate sons living, prompted by vanity and arrogance, he proposed a law defining citizenship. The statute declared that no one should be reputed a true citizen of Athens unless he could prove that both his parents were Athenians; that is to say, born within the confines of Attica. There is one phase of this statute which ill comports with the manners of that enlightened age. It was tested on an occasion when the king of Egypt sent some forty thousand bushels of wheat to be distributed pro-rata among the Athenians. The courts at once became congested with litigation involving the question of citizenship or legitimacy under the statute. Many suffered by reason of false accusations. Plutarch says that a little less than five thousand persons were convicted, unable to make a case in conformity with the required test as to parentage. He declares that these unfortunate litigants were sold into slavery. Certainly this severe punishment could not attach under the statute to any person by reason of the accident of birth. It is inconceivable that any civilized legislative body would enact a law of that character, whereby a man could be declared guilty of a crime simply for being born. The punishment referred to by Plutarch, which required that the guilty party be sold into slavery, must have resulted by reason of some act involving false accusations, or wilful and corrupt perjury, committed in order to enable the party

to share in benefits to which he knew he was not entitled.

However this may be, certain it is that under the law Pericles was forbidden to marry Aspasia, who was not an Athenian, after his divorce from Teliseppe, and that his youngest son Pericles was illegitimate for the same reason. When the plague was at its height Pericles lost both of his legitimate sons, whereby he was left childless in his old age. But when the great statesman, in the last year of his life, was acquitted of the charges preferred against him by his enemies, and was induced to accept again the office of strategus, he asked the Public Assembly to repeal the law defining citizenship, which he himself caused to be enacted. He also asked that his son Pericles should be enrolled as a citizen of Athens with full rights and privileges, and that his union with Aspasia should be legalized. These requests were granted by the Public Assembly, who were eager once more to secure the advice, guidance and leadership of this remarkable man.

Pericles conducted the war against Samos with unfailing energy and in the incredibly short space of nine months had succeeded in reducing the Samians to complete subjection. The war involved a formidable task, and threatened to become a serious menace to the power of Athens. Byzantium rebelled. The Persian monarch opened his treasury and sent a Phœnician fleet to aid the Samians. But the skill, vigilance and superior abilities of Pericles were more than a match for Greeks, Phœnicians and Persians. The Thirty Years' Peace held the Lacedæmonians in check, although there seemed to be considerable difference of opinion among the Peloponnesians as to whether Athens had the right to discipline her independent allies. In this discussion Corinth sustained the authority of Athens and aided her materially in inducing the Lacedæmonians to remain neutral. Subsequently the

Corinthians complained bitterly of Pericles, and charged him with ingratitude because he advocated the cause of Corcyra, a daughter city of Corinth, whom the latter sought to discipline, and because the Athenians aided the Corcyrians at the battle of Sybota.

The Samian War was regarded as the greatest military achievement of Pericles, and added materially to his great reputation. He was wont to observe that Agamemnon consumed ten years in taking a barbarous city, but in nine months he had conquered the Samians, the greatest and most powerful of the Ionians.

It has been claimed by some authorities that Pericles brought about the war to please Aspasia. There seems to be no ground for this assumption; but we are justified in the belief that Pericles was delighted that the opportunity was afforded him to make war, not only because he regarded it an imperative duty to sustain the dignity and authority of the Athenian empire, but also because it gave him an opportunity to show his devotion and love for Aspasia, who doubtless enjoyed the keenest satisfaction in seeing Pericles at the head of an undertaking that would give prestige and reflect glory upon her native city. We may assume, also, that Aspasia used all her influence to aid the cause of Miletus. It is highly probable that that ancient city, famed for its scholars and philosophers, and its achievements in art and literature, celebrated also as the home of Thales, one of the seven sages of antiquity, was quick to take advantage of the position occupied by their countrywoman, who had won the love and esteem of the most powerful man in Athens. It is altogether probable, too, that the members of the embassy from Miletus, who were sent to Athens to invoke its aid in her behalf, first held a secret conference with Aspasia. The object of this visit was not only to induce Aspasia to use her influence with Pericles to advocate the interests of Miletus,

but also to ascertain the real views of the popular statesman on a subject so important.

The eminent scholar, Walter Savage Landor, has written suppositive correspondence, which presumably passed between Aspasia, then in Athens, and Cleone, the friend of her youth and companion of her childhood in Miletus. These fascinating letters present pictures full of light and color, and illustrate how the Samian War and topics of public interest were regarded by Aspasia and her friend in Miletus. In one of her letters Aspasia refers to the Samian expedition, at the time the Athenian fleet was about to sail from the Piræus. She writes (Epistle CXII):

“Pericles goes in person to command the expedition against Samos. He promises me it will soon be ready to sail, and tells me to expect him back again within a few months. Artemon is preparing machines of great magnitude for the attack of the city. He teaches me that the Samians are brave and wealthy, and that no city is capable of such a resistance. Certainly never were such preparations. I hope, at least, that the report of them will detain your enemies at home, and at all events that, before they land, you will leave Miletus and come to me. The war is very popular at Athens; I dare say it is equally so at Samos, equally so at Miletus. Nothing pleases men like renewing their ancient alliance with the brutes, and breaking off the more recent one with their fellow-creatures.

“War, is it, O grave heads! that ye
With stern and stately pomp decree?
Inviting all the gods from far
To join you in the game of war!”

At the close of the war, we have a letter from Miletus written by Cleone in which she tells Aspasia the glorious news that the Samians had been vanquished, and that Miletus, with the aid of Athens, had triumphed. She writes (Epistle CXVII):

"Samos has fallen. Pericles will have given you this information long before my letter can reach you, and perhaps the joy of the light-hearted Athenians will be over ere then. So soon dies away the satisfaction of great exploits, even of such as have swept a generation from before us, have changed the fortunes of a thousand more, and indeed have shaken the last link in the remotest. We hear, but perhaps the estimate is exaggerated, that the walls of Miletus, of Ephesus, of Priene, are in comparison to Samos as the fences of a farm-yard are to them. Certain it is that the vanquished fleet was more formidable than the united navies of Corinth and of Carthage, which are rated as next in force to the Athenian."

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR — LAST DAYS OF PERICLES

Thus Pericles recovered from his misfortunes and rose superior to the malice and cunning of his enemies. He pushed vigorously his plans for offensive operations against the Lacedæmonians, in order thereby not to divert the popular mind, but to retaliate for the miseries his countrymen endured from the double scourge of war and pestilence. A fleet was fitted out which he commanded in person, with which he made a descent upon the Peloponnesus.

A notable fact in this connection is exhibited by the energy and determination displayed by Pericles in planning his last campaign. He was in his sixty-ninth year, but he pushed forward his military preparations with his old time ardor and enthusiasm. Archidamus, at the head of a marauding army, was in Attica. The plague which had raged in Athens for months was at its height. Nothing daunted by these misfortunes, Pericles decided that as soon as the enemy returned to the Peloponnesus, he would follow close in their wake, and burn and destroy their coast towns, and inflict

upon the Lacedæmonians all the damage possible. To this end he fitted out an expedition comprising a fleet of one hundred triremes, having on board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry conveyed in horse transports, constructed for the first time by the Athenians out of their old ships. The expedition was joined by fifty ships from Chios and Lesbos and a multitude of allied troops.

No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been sent out by any single Hellenic power. The expedition dispatched by the Athenians to Syracuse fifteen years later was not superior. The year before, Pericles, at the head of an army of 13,000 hoplites devastated the Megarid. Now, as admiral, with a formidable fleet, he was about to descend upon the Peloponnesus. Just as soon as the forces of Archidamus reached their own country, Pericles set sail, directing his course southwest, across the Saronic Gulf. He sailed about forty miles and made a descent on Epidaurus, on the eastern coast of Argolis. He devastated the adjacent country and attacked the city, but did not succeed in taking it. From thence he proceeded south and attacked the cities Trœzen, Haliëis and Hermione, all in the State of Argolis. He sailed thence and attacked Prasîæ, in the State of Laconia. The season being now far advanced he returned to Attica. During his absence his enemies tried to discredit him, by sending envoys to Sparta to sue for peace, but owing to the vigorous and destructive campaign then being prosecuted by Pericles, the Lacedæmonians dismissed these envoys, as Pericles had formerly dismissed Melanippus, the envoy sent to Athens by Archidamus, at the beginning of the war.

On his return from this campaign, the last he was destined to conduct, he found that public feeling had been wrought to the highest pitch of excitement against

He convened the Public Assembly and made a vigorous defense of his conduct and policy and mercilessly attacked his rivals.¹ His superior intellectual gifts easily gave him the victory. The Assembly were carried away by the eloquence and remarkable courage displayed by Pericles. He was restored to favor, and was again elected strategus and regained his old time influence and popularity.

These matters occupied Pericles during the winter months. He was vexed by a suit for an accounting instigated by his enemies. This litigation took place that winter or in the following spring, B. C. 429. The season advanced, summer came, but Pericles, owing to the charges and accusations he was called upon to meet, was unable to take up the sword in defense of his country.

During this third summer of the struggle between Sparta and Athens, and their respective allies, the theatre of war shifted. Military operations were extended over a vast expanse of territory in localities extremely remote. Archidamus, doubtless fearing that his troops might become infected by the pestilence raging in Athens, refrained from invading Attica. He led his army into Bœotia at the behest of his allies in Thebes, and began the siege of Platæa, in territory which since the defeat of Mardonius, half a century earlier, was consecrated by Hellas as hallowed ground, in memory of that event. Phormio, whose services were no longer required in the Chalcidice, after the surrender of Potidea, was stationed at Naupactus with an Athenian fleet, to guard the entrance to the gulf of Corinth. Here he performed services and won victories as a naval commander, which made for him a reputation, whereby his name was thought worthy to be associated with Themistocles and Cimon. He de-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 60,

feated the Ambraciots, assisted by the barbarous tribes from Epirus, and their Peloponnesian allies, led by Brasidas, in their campaign to reduce Acarnania, in the hope to secure control also of the important islands of Zacynthus and Cephallenia, which commanded the entrance to the Corinthian gulf.

In the north Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues, was in command of the Athenian forces conducting operation against Spartolus, in Bottice in the Chalcidian peninsula. He was subsequently assigned to conduct a campaign in Macedonia, in conjunction with the Thracian prince Sitalces, to humiliate and defeat Perdiccas, who, in consequence of the aid he had given the Potideans incurred the displeasure of the Athenians.

Pericles, for the reasons stated above, was unable to take any active part in these campaigns. After his successful expedition the previous autumn in Argolis, in which he made a descent upon Epidaurus and towns in the Peloponnesus, his enemies, jealous of his achievements, as has been observed, sued him for an accounting as to the moneys expended by him in these military operations, and he was forced to pay a fine of some fifty talents (\$50,000) in consequence of the unjust and malicious accusations of his enemies led by the notorious Cleon.

But the people led away by the false clamor of demagogues soon repented of their rash conduct and unjust treatment of Pericles. Before the end of the summer they realized their mistake and hastened to make amends by again electing him to the office of strategus, and conferred upon him even greater authority than had formerly been accorded him. Pericles responded to this tardy act of justice on the part of his countrymen, and again entered upon the duties of his office.

The summer was now spent, and the glorious Sep-

tember days had come. The pestilence had almost run its course. Many were recovering from its effects. It was no longer epidemic. Pericles had now reached the age of three score and ten; had made his last campaign, and fought his last battle. He had recently suffered bereavement in the loss of his sister and his two sons, Paralus, who loved him, and Xanthippus, who loved him not. Many close friends, who had aided him politically and upon whose friendship and loyalty he could rely, had passed from the scenes of earth. Many friends and admirers, it is true, still remained, but, save for his wife, and little Pericles, the son Aspasia bore him, his home was indeed desolate. The nervous strain, occasioned by the exciting scenes through which he passed and the trials brought on by the ingratitude and scandalous behavior of the idle and vicious, led by schemers and demagogues, undermined his strength. He became ill. The distemper from which he suffered was not accompanied by violent symptoms and raging fever, which were characteristic of the plague. The disease from which he suffered slowly consumed his strength and energy, and in the autumn, B. C. 429, he passed away surrounded by friends and admirers. Aspasia was with him, nursed him through his illness, and proved her constancy and devotion by the tender and loving care she bestowed upon the sufferer. He lived long enough to learn of the great success achieved by Phormio at Naupactus. Doubtless the war news, brought to his sick chamber from time to time, conveyed tidings of his victories over Brasidas, and the defeat of the expedition to reduce Acarnania. These glorious messages gladdened the last days of the great statesman and patriot under whose wise administration Athens became the most renowned city in the world. When Pericles passed from the stage of action, the glory of Athens began to decline, and it was destined never to regain

the proud eminence which it attained through the genius of this remarkable man.

We get a closer view of the personality and kindly disposition of the illustrious statesman from an incident Plutarch relates of him, during his last illness. We give it as Landor interprets it. One day a friend who visited him noticed, as he raised his head from the pillow, that he wore a charm suspended from a cord about his neck. Seeing the interest manifested by his companion, Pericles smiled faintly, and said, "I need not warn you against superstition; it was never among my weaknesses. Do not wonder at these amulets; above all do not order them to be removed. The kind old nurses, who have been carefully watching over me day and night, are persuaded that these will save my life. After the good patient creatures have found, as they must soon, all their traditional charms unavailing, they will surely grieve enough and perhaps find some other motive than their fallibility in science. Inflict not a fresh wound upon their grief by throwing aside the tokens of their affection."

Landor, in a supposed letter of Pericles, written to his wife when he was about to die, gives a brief survey of his career, naming the eminent men with whom he came in contact, whose attainments contributed to the illustrious age, which bore his name. In this letter he observes what might be taken as his belief in immortality, that the happy never say, and never hear said, farewell. He refers to the fact that Damon, who was his preceptor in music, called him to the window to look at Aristides on his way to exile. He remembered how his father Xanthippus, as he was walking along one day, pressed the lad's wrist, and whispered in his ear, "Walk quickly by; gaze cautiously; it is there Miltiades is in prison." When he was a child Pindar took him in his arms when he brought to the house the dirge he had composed for the funeral of his

grandfather. He embraced the neck of Æschylus, when the latter was about to depart for Sicily. He had argued on eloquence with Sophocles, and with Euripides on poetry and ethics. He was an inquirer and sought to be instructed by Protagoras and Democritus, with Anaxagoras and Meton. He had listened to Herodotus, read his history, and heard Thucydides discuss the merits of the works of that eminent historian. He enjoyed the esteem also of the great sculptor, Phidias, who built the Parthenon and placed within it in ivory and gold the tutelary deity of Hellas. Under the portico of Death he formed the acquaintance of Acron and Hippocrates, the most skilful physicians of his age, who warred to overcome Pestilence and Death. Lander thus concludes this interesting letter:

“And now, at the close of my day, when every light is dim, and every guest departed, let me own that these wane before me, remembering as I do, in the pride and fullness of my heart, that Athens confided her glory, and Aspasia her happiness, to me.

“Have I been a faithful guardian? Do I resign them to the custody of the gods undiminished and unimpaired? Welcome, then, welcome my last hour. After enjoying for so great a number of years, in my public and my private life, what I believe has never been the lot of any other, I now extend my hand to the urn, and take without reluctance or hesitation what is the lot of all.”

The death of Pericles marked an epoch in the history of Greece. Since the Persian Wars, when Darius and Xerxes attempted to conquer Hellas, nearly two generations has passed. Prior to these invasions, which exhibited the might of Persia, the Hellenese had enjoyed a community of language, customs and traditions, which constituted a sort of national unity based on sentiment alone; but the hostile pressure of foreign fleets and armies, sent out to enslave them, created a

necessity and generated a spirit of patriotism which produced a power of cohesion among the Greeks, who became united for the purpose of self-preservation. The result was an anti-Persian alliance, and Athens and Sparta fought together side by side, at Platæa and Mycale. During this period of Hellenic unity were produced the distinguished men prominent in public affairs whose fame will live forever, Miltiades and Themistocles, Æschylus and Xanthippus, Aristides and Cimon, Ephialtes and Pericles. The flower of that great age perished, when Pericles, the sole survivor of those named, closed his eyes on the scenes of earth and the last in the line of these illustrious men was borne to the tomb.

CHARACTER OF PERICLES

In order to form a just estimate of the character of this eminent man, it will be necessary not only to examine his political acts in the light of his public conduct, but to discern, as far as possible, the motives by which he was actuated in conducting the affairs of state, especially during the closing years of his administration. A wide diversity of opinion exists among the able men who have contributed to the subject. On the one hand he is blamed and severely criticized by those who have reached the conclusion that he plunged his country into a needless and destructive war, for which they seek to throw upon him alone all the responsibility. These critics view the facts from the standpoint of the oligarchical party. They display considerable hostility toward the son of Xanthippus for the part he took with Ephialtes in establishing a pure democracy in Athens, and in compassing the humiliation and defeat of the great authority of Cimon.

On the other hand eminent authors, and among them

Grote and Curtius, assert that Pericles was not responsible for the Peloponnesian war, and was not able to avert it without acceding to the most humiliating and disgraceful terms. They contend also that the course he took in the matter was wholly justified. That he did right in applying the revenues of the Delian Confederacy, after the wars of Persian Expulsion had ceased, to adorn and beautify Athens.

The solution of the interesting questions presented by this discussion requires knowledge of the causes which influenced the conduct of Pericles. Were his actions prompted by personal ambition and selfish aims? Was he actuated by a desire to secure for himself political advancement, and finally supreme control in the state? Did he, solely for his own glory, open the way for himself to secure power and influence to the exclusion of his political rivals, that he might be enabled to do as his fancy dictated, within well defined limitations? Did he advocate a policy which was apparently in harmony with an ideal republic or popular democracy, for selfish ends, as Plutarch seems to intimate, or did he labor, like Aristides, with an eye single to the welfare of the people, to secure for their benefit, "a government of the people, by the people and for the people," best suited to advance their welfare and happiness? Was Pericles a benevolent despot? Was his boasted patriotism prompted by selfishness, or was he in fact, as well as in name, an altruistic philosopher, a statesman, devoted solely to the interests of the masses, a friend of liberty, and a foe of privilege? Was he a political demagogue seeking power by supporting a cause because it was popular without regard to whether it was right, or was he a sincere patriot like Ephialtes, supporting a cause because he believed it was right?

The answer to these inquiries, at least as to his advocacy of democracy, must depend upon what Per-

icles sincerely believed to be the best form of government to secure the integrity of a free state. If he did not believe in a democracy, but considered that form of government best, in which the few were permitted to govern the many, then his leadership of the people, whereby he weakened and destroyed the rule of the aristocracy, threw open the archonship and the ancient tribunal of the Areopagus, so as to make any citizen eligible to membership therein; whereby he founded in Attica an absolute democracy and gave the masses "such a copious and potent draft of liberty" that they became almost unmanageable, was absolutely inconsistent with his convictions.

From the limited knowledge we possess concerning the details of political conditions in the age of Pericles, it is impossible to give a satisfactory answer to these inquiries. On the one hand there are circumstances which give color to the theory that Pericles was at heart an imperialist. That he took the popular side in politics, and fought the battles of the people against privilege, and to secure their liberties, not because he was a democrat, not because he believed in popular government, but solely because Cimon, the great apostle of privilege and the leader of the aristocracy, at the time Pericles sought public honors, was the most powerful and influential man in Greece. Cimon stood in his path, as an obstacle to his political advancement. Pericles believed, therefore, that it was good politics to oppose whatever Cimon advocated, and for that reason he became the great advocate of democracy. Cimon won distinction with the sword. His unparalleled success in war, his achievement in driving the Persians from Europe, from the islands of the *Ægean* sea, and from the coasts of Asia Minor, made him a popular idol.

The notion that Pericles was not a democrat was supported also by the love he displayed to secure im-

perial power and dominion, and his work in rearing a maritime empire, a system obviously repugnant to the idea of a democracy, and which was consummated at the expense of the liberties of the constituent allies within the jurisdiction of imperial Athens.

On the other hand it is clear that Pericles guaranteed to every state and municipality within the jurisdiction of the Athenian empire a republican form of government. This course we have reason to believe was prompted by a sincere conviction on the part of Pericles that a democracy was more conducive to the public welfare than an oligarchy. It might be argued that when Athens built up her land empire after the battle of Œenophyta, she might have retained it by permitting oligarchies to continue, as they had previously existed in Bœotia, Phocis, Locris and other states. In answer to this theory it might be urged that if Tolmides had been successful at Coronea, the power of Athens in Central and Northern Greece would not have been broken. The retort could be urged, that had oligarchies been permitted instead of democracies, the battle of Coronea would never have been fought. This phase of the subject, therefore, must continue a matter of conjecture. But the fact remains that Pericles established democracies everywhere. He made war on the island of Samos, it is said, by some authorities, to secure a democratic form of government to the city of Priene, on the mainland, after Miletus had attempted to overthrow the oligarchy which the Samians had established there. These facts would seem to indicate that Pericles at heart was a democrat, and not an imperialist.

The death of Aristides and the absence of Themistocles who had been driven into exile, left the field open to Cimon with no political party sufficiently powerful to successfully dispute his authority. His portion of the spoils of war made him the wealthiest man in

Athens. To gain the esteem of the masses he did not advocate popular government, but was beloved by reason of his generosity and prodigality, whereby he made the poor the objects of his bounty and frequently invited the plain people to sit at his table and partake of his hospitality. But Cimon was an imperialist. He was the head of the party of privilege; the advocate of oligarchy, rather than democracy. He held the Lacedæmonians, the jealous rivals of the Athenians, in such high esteem that the partiality he showed for them was used by the political enemies of Cimon as a basis for the charge of disloyalty, a charge which was later skilfully used by Pericles to bring about his banishment under a decree of ostracism.

If these facts are correct, then the conclusion is justified that Pericles merely took advantage of circumstances and seized the opportunity which presented itself to enable him to reach the goal of his political ambition. He did not sail under false colors when he espoused the cause of the democracy and opposed Cimon, because he was the leader of the opposition. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was necessary to defeat the great admiral, the champion of privilege and head of the conservative party in order not only to win the applause of the people, and to secure for himself the supreme power in the state, but to establish free government for the Athenians.

In this connection it may be observed that the popular notion with respect to organized society implies that the first duty of the state is to advance the moral and material interests of every member of the commonwealth. That government was designed primarily for man in the concrete, not in the abstract, and that the power of the state should not be exploited for the benefit of the few. In that regard the idea of a democracy was distinguished from the idea of an oligarchy. In other words, the popular notion as to what consti-

tuted civil liberty, as embodied in a democracy, was altogether repugnant to the idea which prevailed in an oligarchy, that in order to secure privileges for the few, government must be privately owned. But Pericles seemed to regard the power of the state as of more importance than the prosperity of the individual. He believed that the material advancement and dignity of the commonwealth was the first object of government, upon the theory that the individual citizen was benefited most as a constituent member of a strong government. But he also believed that every citizen should have a voice as to the conduct of public affairs. To that extent he was a democrat.

In this connection we may note that the economic conditions which existed in his day were different in many respects from those which exist with us in the twentieth century of the Christian era. Since Jefferson acquired the western confines of the North American continent, and since Secretary Seward was instrumental in acquiring Alaska, we are not so much concerned in questions involving territorial expansion, in questions of empire and of imperialism. The problems which confront us relate to the development of our material resources and manufactures in such a way as to create wealth, enlarge the field of employment so as to stimulate the growth of our commercial industries, and multiply opportunities to accumulate wealth. We are called upon to solve problems with respect to the control and growth of great combinations of capital which threaten to destroy equality of opportunity; with questions relating to a protective tariff, whereby excessive duties might be imposed on articles of commerce with the design to keep foreign commodities out of the country and thus by preventing imports from abroad to create monopolies at home.

It may be observed, however, so far as foreign commerce was concerned, that while the Athenians did not

resort to a protective tariff in order to increase their commercial advantage, Pericles, as an act of retaliation for the conduct of Corinth, in assisting the revolt at Potidea, secured a decree from the Public Assembly putting an embargo upon certain foreign vessels and excluding the ships of Megara, an ally of Corinth, from Athenian ports.

In considering the character of Pericles, we may regard as altogether trustworthy what was said of him by his great contemporary, the eminent historian Thucydides. His observations are exceedingly brief, but in that regard they constitute the only contemporaneous account of any writer, whose works have reached posterity. In this connection we must remember also that five centuries intervened from the time Thucydides wrote his history and the period when Plutarch wrote the "lives." "During the peace, while Pericles was at the head of affairs," says Thucydides, "he ruled with prudence. Under his guidance Athens was safe, and reached the height of her greatness in his time. When the Peloponnesian war began, he showed that here too he had formed a true estimate of the Athenian power. He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months; and, after his death, his foresight was even better appreciated than during his life. For he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would be victorious; but they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters which seemingly had nothing to do with the war, from motives of private ambition and private interest, they adopted a policy which had disastrous effects in respect both of themselves and of their allies. Their measures, had they been successful, would only have brought honor and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccessful, crippled

the city in the conduct of the war. The reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a free spirit. He led them rather than was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen. But his successors were more on an equality with one another and each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people."

From this estimate of his character it would seem that Pericles was in truth a benevolent despot, a counterpart in many respects of his ancestor, Pisistratus, whom he so much resembled. The latter ruled Athens when it was a sort of semi-aristocratic republic under the constitution and laws established by Solon. The former was in control of public affairs when Athens was a pure democracy, under the constitution of Cleisthenes, amplified by the reforms introduced by Themistocles, Ephialtes and by Pericles himself. Pisistratus professed the highest reverence for the laws and constitution of Solon, but his sway was absolute, and his will was the supreme law. His mild reign was tempered to suit the whims and fancy of the masses. He managed by the art of diplomacy to please the people and although he usurped much of the power he exercised, yet his tact and shrewdness made him popular as long as he lived. Indeed the memory of the Pisistratidæ was execrated by posterity, not so much for what Pisis-

tratus, the ancestor had done, but by reason of the tyranny exercised by his son Hippias, after the death of his brother Hipparchus by the hand of an assassin.

Pericles, also, not only professed the greatest reverence for popular government, but bent all his energies to destroy the party of privilege, and carried out many reforms, which theoretically enabled the masses to control the state. In theory Athens enjoyed a government of the people, but in fact public opinion was largely moulded by Pericles, whose influence was potent in the state. His superior gifts and unusual abilities enabled him personally to govern the people. While at the head of affairs, owing to his great influence, "he ruled with prudence," and under his leadership Athens reached the height of her greatness. His remarkable talents were universally acknowledged, and not until the last year of his life, was his integrity ever questioned. By reason of these qualities he was able, as long as he was in power, to control the multitude in a free spirit. He was trusted and admired because of the strength of his character.

"Thus," Thucydides observes, "Athens although still a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen." Pisistratus was a patron of art and letters, and to him posterity is indebted for the preservation in their present form of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which were edited by men of letters who came to Athens to grace the court established by Pisistratus. He erected public buildings also, and began the work of embellishing the Attic capital. Pericles also was a patron of art and letters. He invited the great poets, philosophers, men of letters, artists, sculptors and architects to Athens. He managed the public moneys in such a way as to use what was necessary to rebuild the temples which the Persians had destroyed; to erect on the Acropolis the Parthenon, and re-erect the temple of Erechtheus, and the temple of Victory, and to con-

struct on its northern slope the marble portals known as the Propylea, adorned by the wonderful paintings of Polygnotus, and to build at its base the music hall, known as the Odeon, and the theatre of Dionysus, although the Propylea and the Theatre were not completed until after his death.

Plutarch corroborates, in some respects, the estimate placed by Thucydides upon the character of Pericles. He says that after the death of Aristides, after Themistocles had been driven out and Cimon, for the most part, was kept abroad by his expeditions out of Greece, Pericles took advantage of conditions existing in Athens, and came forward and allied himself "not with the rich and few, but with the many and poor *contrary to his natural bent* which was far from democratical." Plutarch assumes that the motives of Pericles in making this choice was a fear that he might be accused "of aiming at arbitrary power, and seeing Cimon on the side of the aristocracy, and much beloved by the better and more distinguished people, he joined the party of the people with a view at once both to secure himself and procure means against Cimon."

But his great rival at this time was very wealthy, and while Pericles was also a rich man, his fortune did not compare with that of Cimon, who used his money lavishly among the people, and by his invitation many guests from the poorer classes sat daily at his table. Plutarch observes further that at first Pericles did caress the people, but finding himself come short of his competitor in wealth and money, he resorted to a device whereby he used the public moneys by securing legislation, authorizing sums to be used for shows and exhibitions whereby such entertainments were made free to the public. He also secured the passage of a law, authorizing the dikasts, that is the five or six thousand citizens who were empaneled to serve on juries from time to time, to be paid a fixed sum *per diem* for

their services. A panel of dikasts consisted of five hundred jurymen. In some very important cases three panels or fifteen hundred dikasts were summoned to sit, hear the evidence and the addresses of the respective advocates, and render their decision by ballot, a majority vote being sufficient to constitute a verdict.

"Thus the common citizens," Plutarch says, "were changed from a sober thrifty people that maintained themselves by their own labors, to lovers of expense, intemperance and license. Pericles made his policy subservient to their pleasure, contriving continually to have some great public show or solemnity, some banquet, or some procession or other in the town to please them, coaxing his countrymen like children with such delights and pleasures, as were not however unedifying." Besides, he sent out every year sixty galleys for an eight months' cruise, manned by a number of citizens under pay, who were thereby drilled and practised the art of seamanship.

Plutarch says also that after Pericles secured the power of the state absolutely in his own hands, he did not so readily yield to the whims of the public, nor comply with the desires of the multitude, but turned his mild and indulgent authority "to the austerity of aristocratical and regal rule."

There is one phase of the character of Pericles concerning which Thucydides and Plutarch are absolutely in accord. Both commend highly his personal honesty. Thucydides, in this connection, speaks of Pericles as "a man of transparent integrity." Plutarch quotes from the historian on this point and observes that the strength of his character lay in his reputation for honesty and the confidence felt in his character and his manifest freedom from every kind of corruption, and his superiority to all considerations of money. Notwithstanding the tremendous sums paid out during his administration to adorn and beautify Athens "he

did not make the patrimony his father left him greater than it was by one drachma." Through all his public career he preserved his integrity unspotted. He further observes, in comparing his life with the Roman Fabius, that no man had ever greater opportunities to enrich himself having had presents offered him from so many kings and princes and allies, "yet no man was ever more free from corruption."

The conclusion, therefore, is justified that Pericles, although a benevolent despot, was endowed with lofty patriotism and unimpeachable integrity. He loved Athens, and devoted all his energies to make it the most renowned city of antiquity. He loved power, and built up an empire to add to the fame and importance of Athens, and while he established an imperial state, he was careful to guarantee to every city within its confines a republican form of government. His love of power, however, led him to disregard the rights of the tribute allies of Athens, in the Confederacy of Delos, when they became, against their will, constituent members of the Athenian empire, and he did not scruple to tax them without their consent, solely to enhance the dignity and glory of Athens.

The situation presents a paradox, for we observe how the great democrat, who imbibed the political teachings of Themistocles and Ephialtes, established a tyranny, "which," he himself said, "in the opinion of mankind might have been unjustly gained, but which could not be safely surrendered."¹

The ability of Pericles as a statesman is shown by the results of his administration, as evidenced by the condition of Athens, when he came into power about the time of the battle of Tanagra (B. C. 457), and its extent and influence at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 431). In this connection we must

¹ Thucyd. ii, 63.

remember that the foundation for the greatness of Athens was laid by Cimon, and resulted from his victories in the waters of the *Ægean* and in Asia Minor, whereby he swept the power of Persia from the seas, and defeated her armies at the *Eurymedon* and in Cyprus. Cimon made Athens a maritime power, opened up the remote shores of the ancient world for her colonies, and with the aid of Aristides established the *Delian Confederacy*, thus securing political unity with which to prevent the aggressions of Persian power.

But it was Pericles who converted the Confederacy of Delos into the Athenian empire. Prior to the removal of the treasury of the League from the sacred island of Delos to the city of Athens, the latter was merely the President of the Confederacy. Under the guiding hand of Pericles it became the head of a maritime empire, and the members of the League, instead of remaining independent constituents of a confederacy, taxed with their consent to contribute a war fund to police the *Ægean*, became tribute allies and subsequently subject allies within the jurisdiction of the most powerful state in the western world.

Pericles used the money of the Confederacy to embellish and adorn Athens until it became the most beautiful city in the world. Its ruins, after more than twenty-three centuries, still attract the interest and admiration of mankind. He planted colonies everywhere on the frontiers of civilization, on the shores of the *Euxine*, in Thrace, in Macedonia, in Italy and Sicily, and in Asia Minor. Thus he extended the commercial interests of Athens until the commerce of her rivals in Megara, in Corinth and elsewhere, in the *Peloponnesus* became insignificant in comparison. When the Dorian War began Athens was the richest city in Europe, and numbered among its subject and tributary allies more than a thousand cities and states from each of which it derived an annual income. This extensive

empire expanded and grew under the leadership of Pericles. In his last speech, replying to the final attack of his enemies, in the third year of the Peloponnesian War, he magnifies the glory of this vast empire, and while he admits it may have been unjustly acquired, told his countrymen that it was indeed worth fighting for. He reminded them that they were absolute masters of the sea, and had the power to extend their dominion wherever they pleased. "Neither the Great King, nor any nation on earth," he said, "can hinder a navy like yours from penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail. . . . You are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of your city, in which you all take pride; for you should not covet the glory unless you will endure the toil. . . . For by this time your empire has become a tyranny, which, in the opinion of mankind, you may have unjustly gained, but which cannot safely be surrendered."¹

Opinions differ as to the responsibility of Pericles for the Peloponnesian War. We must not lose sight of the fact that that disastrous conflict was waged to uphold Corinth, and avenge her wrongs. The Lacedæmonians had no special grievance. Indeed, during the fourteen years of peace under the treaty, the Lacedæmonians seem to have grown weary of war. Pericles became the warm personal friend of Archidamus, the Spartan King, who was not particularly eager for the conflict. But Corinth was in a bad way. Her commercial importance was gradually diminishing. Megara had been forbidden to enter Athenian ports. Corcyra had defeated her in her efforts to secure control of Epidamnus, and Potidea, her daughter city, had become a tribute ally of Athens. The Lacedæmonians must protect her against the power of the Athenians, or she would lose her importance as a commercial city,

¹ Thucyd. ii, 62, 63.

and her supremacy in the Corinthian gulf. The war, therefore, was fought mainly to preserve the commercial interests of Corinth.

If, therefore, we credit the facts as presented by Pericles in his War Speech, the Athenians were not to blame for bringing on the war. His argument as to the rectitude of the intention of the Athenians in the stand they took is unanswerable. He argued:

1. That the treaty provided that when differences arose between the contracting parties, they should be referred to arbitration.

2. That the Lacedæmonians never once asked to arbitrate any of the questions at issue.

3. That when the Athenians offered to submit the alleged grievances to arbitration, the Lacedæmonians refused to arbitrate.

4. That there should be a legal settlement of the questions at issue. That any claim imposed "on a neighbor and an equal, when there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery."

Then Pericles proposes to settle the differences between the contracting parties by yielding to the demands of the Spartans, if the latter would do likewise as follows:

1. That Athens will not exclude the Megarians from their markets, if the Lacedæmonians will not exclude foreigners, i. e., Athens or her allies, from Sparta, "for the treaty no more forbids one than the other."

2. That independence would be conceded to the cities that were independent when the treaty was made, just as soon as the Lacedæmonians would permit their subject states to be governed as they chose, and in their own interest.

3. That Athens would arbitrate all questions at issue.

4. That Athens would not begin war, but if attacked, will defend herself.

Upon what theory, then, can it be said that Pericles plunged his country into war? If the Peloponnesians had desired peace, and had offered to submit their differences to arbitration, it is fair to assume that an amicable settlement might have been reached and that the war might possibly have been averted. Although the Lacedæmonians made certain arbitrary demands upon the Athenians, we find no warrant in history for the assumption that the offer of the Athenians to arbitrate was even considered by the Lacedæmonians. Such offer certainly was never accepted. It would be unjust, therefore, in view of all the facts, to charge that Pericles made no effort to conciliate the Lacedæmonians. He offered to submit all questions in dispute to arbitration. What more could he do under the circumstances, and retain his dignity and self-respect?

Nor can it be successfully argued that Pericles was responsible for the war, because he sent back the herald sent at the last moment by Archidamus, without even hearing what the envoy had to say. The herald was sent by the Spartan King, when he was at the head of an invading army of 60,000 men, marching northward, having reached the borders of Attica. The herald sought Pericles when the enemy was at his door with arms in their hands. The war was actually begun. Pericles, therefore, was justified in believing that the motives of the enemy in sending the messenger were insincere, and that further parley would be fruitless.

Indeed, it is an open question whether the war would have begun at all, at that time, had not the selfish unpatriotic city of Thebes, the city that stood by the Persians when Hellas fought for independence, the city that furnished a friendly shelter for Mardonius, just before his overwhelming defeat at Platæa; had not Thebes planned a treacherous attack in the dead of night on that devoted city, solely because it was an ally of Athens.

PERICLES AS AN ORATOR

From the history of Thucydides, the only contemporary authority we have respecting the life and character of Pericles, the conclusion is justified that this gifted man, in addition to his many accomplishments, was also one of the great orators of antiquity. Thucydides has reported three speeches of Pericles. Doubtless, he heard all of them delivered, namely, the War Speech, made in the Public Assembly shortly before the commencement of the Peloponnesian War; the Funeral Oration, in memory of the dead, who had fallen during the first year of that memorable conflict, and his defense, in answer to the vicious and unfounded charges and accusations, which he deemed it prudent to answer, on his return from an expedition to the Peloponnesus and his attack on Epidaurus, in the second year of the war. Reference has already been made to the War Speech, and the argument presented on that occasion has been analyzed in discussing the question as to his responsibility for the Dorian War. That address, therefore, needs no further elaboration. His defense of his own conduct which resulted in his reinstatement to office, and his reelection as strategus has also been fully discussed. The Funeral Oration, his crowning effort, deserves more than a passing notice.

In point of excellence as an address suited to the dignity and solemnity of the occasion, it has never been surpassed, except by the immortal words of the great American, Abraham Lincoln, who spoke for five minutes at the memorial and dedicatory services on the historic field of Gettysburg.

An account of the heroism of the Greeks on the plains of Troy, and their adventures in distant lands, after the destruction of Priam's kingdom, as reflected in the fancy of Homer, and embalmed in the *Iliad* and

Odyssey, never failed to kindle the military ardor of Hellas, and for centuries furnished the canon of distinction among the descendants of those early heroes. The memory of their deeds inspired the courage of the men, who destroyed the might of Persia at Marathon and Thermopylæ, at Salamis and Platæa. The emulation of the example of Achilles inspired Alexander to conquer the world.

Pericles spoke nearly half a century after the Persian Wars of liberation. A fitting reference to the deeds of valor displayed by their ancestors, in those memorable contests was effective to stir the blood and arouse the patriotic ardor of his countrymen, awaken their interest and fix their attention.

In discharging the public duty conferred upon him in recognition of his great ability and intellectual attainments, Pericles, after referring to the law establishing the custom which required an oration at a public funeral, paid a graceful tribute to the achievements of his ancestors, without burdening his discourse with specific details. He then pronounced a eulogy on the laws and customs established under the Athenian constitution, and spoke of the glory of the Athenian Empire. He next referred to the virtues of the men who had given their lives for their country whose remains were being consigned to the tomb. Pericles then spoke comforting words to the parents of the dead who, he said, were to be comforted rather than pitied, and in praise of the sons and brothers of the departed. Referring to those in the assembly past middle life, the speaker expressed this graceful sentiment:

“To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honor alone is ever young, and not riches,

as some say, but honor is the delight of men when they are old and useless.”¹

It will be profitable to quote from the address of Pericles, in order to form a just estimate of his ability as an orator. The extracts given are from Jowett’s admirable translation:²

“I will speak first of our ancestors,” said Pericles, “for it is right and becoming that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valor they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigor of life, have chiefly done the work of improvement, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them.”

After referring to the laws and constitution of his country and the greatness of Athens, which he said was the school of Hellas, he observed: “We have com-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 44.

² Thucyd. ii, 36.

pelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valor and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for which these men nobly fought and died. They could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive would gladly toil on her behalf."

It was fitting to pay this tribute to Athens, and the men who fell in her defense. "For," said he, "in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them, whose virtues made her glorious." He then continued:

"I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonor always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present to her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres — I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone, but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not slight too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no

hope of a change for the better, has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far more bitter than death, striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope."

After the lapse of twenty-three centuries posterity will be able to judge somewhat of the character and attainments of this eminent man by the lofty thoughts and sentiments expressed in this address, spoken at the sepulchre of his countrymen who fell in battle. In the same way we may judge of the intense patriotism of Lincoln, who spoke to his countrymen when he took the oath at his first inauguration as President of the United States. He sought to arouse the patriotism of his countrymen and to persuade them not to make war. Like Pericles, he referred feelingly to the achievements of our ancestors:

"In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, are the momentous issues of civil war. . . . We are not enemies but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break the bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriotic grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely as they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

Lincoln's Gettysburg address it is not necessary to quote. The nation knows it by heart. It will be sufficient to refer to the two closing sentences, containing the highest expression of patriotism to be found in literature, that they may be read in connection with the lofty thoughts of the Athenian statesman.

"It is rather for us, the living to be dedicated here,

to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that the Government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

The eminent American statesman and distinguished orator, Daniel Webster, says, that eloquence in the true sense of the word is born of circumstances. "It must exist, in the man, in the subject, and in the occasion. . . . It comes, if it comes at all, like the outbursting of a fountain from the earth, or the bursting forth of volcanic fires, with spontaneous original native force." In this connection we note that the circumstances under which Pericles and Lincoln spoke on the occasions referred to were in one respect wholly dissimilar. Lincoln could appeal to that patriotic sentiment, which had its genesis in the great struggle for independence, in which the names of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill, of Bennington and Saratoga and Yorktown, suggested hallowed memories, which resulted in the birth of a great nation. He could appeal to "the mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land."

Pericles could not conjure with the mystic memories of united Hellas. It is true he sought to attain that lofty ideal when commissioners at his instigation were sent to every city and state in the Greek world to bring about political unity and cultivate Hellenic patriotism. But his efforts in that regard were defeated by the very men who disregarding the sacred ties of consanguinity, had taken up arms to destroy Athens. The

only concerted action among those of his race was born of necessity. It was brought about by Themistocles, who persuaded some of his countrymen to assemble in the temple of Poseidon, at Corinth, to devise ways and means to present a united front to repel the hosts of Xerxes which threatened the destruction of Greece. In this Themistocles was only partially successful. After the tide of Persian invasion was turned back at Salamis and Plataea, the various Greek states instead of forming a political union retained their autonomy and individuality with even greater tenacity, and refused to yield cohesion to a form of government which might have preserved their liberties in spite of Philip and Alexander.

There was no time during the administration of Pericles when he could appeal to a united country. When finally Sparta and her allies made war against Athens and her allies, Pericles was powerless to avert the disaster, and at the same time maintain the dignity and self-respect of the Athenians. When selfish interest threatened to disrupt and disintegrate the American union, it was still possible for Lincoln, the chosen head of the nation, to appeal to a common patriotism, and hallowed traditions. When people were excited and disturbed by visible preparation for the approaching conflict, it was yet possible for him to say when he took his oath as president of the United States, "in your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine are the momentous issues of civil war. . . . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies." He could still appeal to the chords of memory, and the bonds of affection, and the better angels of our nature for three generations had not passed since the war for American independence was won.

When Pericles was called upon to address the survivors of those who had fallen in battle, in the great civil war in which his people were then engaged, there

were no facts or traditions, which a great patriotic orator could use to appeal to the warring factions, that could touch the tender chords of memory so as to cause a patriotic response, strong enough to heal the wounds opened by the sword. The selfish commercial interests of the cities and states of Hellas created jealousy and rivalry among them, which extinguished patriotism and made the political unity of Greece impossible.

CHAPTER XLII

ADVANCE IN LEARNING SINCE THE AGE OF PERICLES, A RETROSPECT—THEORY OF THE CREATION—DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY AMONG THE ANCIENTS—CONTINUITY AS VIEWED BY MODERN SCIENCE

THE ideas of the Greek poets and philosophers, in the age of Pericles, as to the creation, and the beginning of things, were exceedingly vague. The mysteries as to how man came upon this planet, as to his destiny, and as to how the earth itself came into existence, were taught to the initiated by the seers of Egypt in dreamy legends.

It is interesting to note the similarity in the story of the creation as narrated in the Hebrew Scriptures and the account given by Ovid, the Latin poet who flourished in the last century B. C., and early in the first century of our era. The account in Genesis declares: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. . . . And God said let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters. . . . And God said, let the waters under the heaven be gathered unto one place, and let the dry land appear."

Referring to the advent of man, that is, intellectual man, Moses, assuming he wrote the book of Genesis, says: "And God said let us make man in our image

after our likeness. . . . And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." This is equivalent to saying that the man thus created was an intellectual being, as distinguished from prehistoric man, who used fire, and made pictures on the rocks.

There is no evidence that Ovid ever read Genesis, yet the similarity in the description of the creation by Moses, and that written by Ovid in the *Metamorphoses* is, in some respects, marked. Thus Ovid writes:

"In the beginning, the sea, the earth, and the heaven which covers all was but one face of nature through the whole universe; which they called chaos; a rude and indigested mass; nor anything but a lifeless lump, and the disagreeing seeds of jarring elements confusedly jumbled together in the same heap. . . . The light fiery element of vaulted ethereal heaven shone out and mounted to the highest region. To this the air succeeds in lightness and place. The earth, still heavier, drew along with it the more ponderous elements, and was pressed together by its own weight. The circling waters sunk to the lowest place *and begirt the solid orb*.

"When thus he, whoever he was of the gods, had divided the mass, and by that division formed it into distinct members; first of all, that no inequality might be found in either side, he rolled up the earth into the figure of a *spacious globe*. He then commanded the seas to flow round and swell with raging winds; and to mark out shores upon the encompassed earth. He added also springs and immense standing pools and lakes, and bounded the running rivers by winding banks. These different in different places, are swallowed up by the earth itself; others carrying their waters to the sea, are there received into the plains of

the ample ocean, and beat the shores in place of banks."¹

Ovid proceeds with a further description of the creation and then refers to the creation of man. "A more noble animal and capable of still higher faculties, formed for empire, and fit to rule over the rest, was yet wanting. . . . Man is born, fashioned after the image of the gods, who rule over all."²

We now approach a topic of absorbing interest. What knowledge had the ancients as to the foremost question discussed among men, since the morning of time — if a man die shall he live again? Where are the dead? Is the soul immortal? Phases of this sublime theme were discussed by Anaxagoras, who was honored by the friendship of Pericles, and who exercised great influence over the life and conduct of the Athenian statesmen.

Socrates, in his dialogue with Phædrus, refers directly to Pericles. "All the higher arts," says Socrates, "require much discussion and lofty contemplation of nature. This is the source of sublimity and perfect comprehensive power. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from his happening to know Anaxagoras. He was imbued with the higher philosophy, and

¹ Ante mare et tellus, et quod tegit omnia, coelum,
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
Quem dixere chaos; rudis indigestaque moles;
Nec quicquam, nisi pondus iners; congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.

Circumfluis humor,

Ultima possedit, solidumque coercuit orbem.
Sic ubi disposidam, quisquis fuit ille Deorum,
Congeriem secuit, sectamque in membra redegit;
Principio terram, ne non æqualis ab omni
Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis.

² Natus homo est,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

attained to the knowledge of mind and matter, which was the favorite theme of Anaxagoras, and hence he drew what was applicable to his art."

Pericles was familiar with the doctrine of immortality taught by Pythagoras, the Samian. The Egyptians believed themselves to be the most ancient of mankind, and Herodotus (ii, 123) declares that they were the first to advance the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. They believed "that when the body perishes, the soul enters into some other animal, constantly springing into existence, and when it has passed through the different kinds of terrestrial, marine and aerial beings, it again enters into the body of man," and that this transmigration from man to man again, is made in three thousand years. This belief is known as the doctrine of metempsychosis.

Diodorus, in his introduction to the Eighteenth Book of his history, declares that Pythagoras, and some others of the ancient philosophers, taught this doctrine, and held that men were able to foretell future events when the soul was parting from the body. On this point he cites Homer who declares that Hector when he was dying foretold the death of Achilles. Diodorus says also that Pythagoras learned his mysterious and sacred expressions, the art of geometry, arithmetic, and the "Transmigration of Souls" in Egypt.

Socrates was forty years old when Pericles passed from scenes of earth, but as he did not discourse upon the subject of immortality until late in life, it may be regarded as certain, that Pericles never heard the views expressed by Socrates on this important subject. The dialogue with Meno is said to contain the first expression of Socrates on this absorbing topic. He discusses it also with Phædrus. Both of these discussions took place before he was tried and condemned for heresy. His most impressive discourses, however, were after

that event, and his talk with Phædo was on the last day of his life, B. C. 399, immediately before his demise. In view of the fact that Socrates refers to the expressions of poets and philosophers, Pindar among others, whose teachings and writings were known to Pericles, it may be profitable to refer briefly to some of his teachings, which have been preserved to posterity in the works of Plato, his most distinguished pupil, who listened to his discourses under the palm trees on the banks of the Ilissus, and also in the prison, where Socrates awaited his execution. Among his disciples, also, was Xenophon, the distinguished soldier, who led the Greeks out of Asia, after the death of the younger Cyrus at Cunaxa, and who wrote the memoirs of his illustrious preceptor.

In his talk with Meno, Socrates observed that there have been poets, such as Pindar, and other inspired men, who spoke of things divine, and who say that the soul of man is immortal. "The soul, then, being immortal," he said, "and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that there are, whether in this world, or in the world below, has knowledge of them all. It is, therefore, no wonder that the soul should be able to call to remembrance all that it ever knew about virtues and about everything. For as all nature is akin, and as the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in the soul eliciting, or as men say, learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous and does not faint. For all inquiry and learning is but memory or recollection."

In his dialogue with Phædrus, Socrates states in somewhat modified form, the doctrine of metempsychosis: "Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can return to the place from whence it came. For it cannot grow its wings in less. Only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true; or the soul of a lover, who is not without philosophy, may acquire wings in

the third recurring period of a thousand years. And if they choose this life three times in succession, then they have their wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished. Others to some place in heaven, whither they are lightly borne by justice. There they live in a manner worthy of the life they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years, the good souls, and also the evil souls both come and cast lots, and choose their second life, and they may take any that they like. And then the soul of the man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast again into the man. But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For man ought to have intelligence, as they say, according to the species, proceeding from many particulars of sense, to one conception of reason. And this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw when in company with God — when looking down from above on that which we now call being, and upwards towards the true being. And, therefore, the mind of the philosopher alone has wings. And this is just. For according to the measure of his abilities, he always clings in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what he is. He who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries, and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests, and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; for they do not see that he is inspired."

In the dialogue with Phædo on the last day of his life, he thus discourses on death and immortality. "All experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul

in herself must behold all things in themselves. Then, I suppose, that we shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom; not while we live, but after death as the argument shows. For if while in company with the body the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of the two things seems to follow, either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. In this present life I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge, when we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure, and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure."

In his Apology, delivered after his conviction, shortly before he drank the fatal hemlock, he says: "Either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. . . . Now if death is like this, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. . . .

"But if death is the journey to another place, as there as men say all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If, indeed, when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Ehadamanthus and Æacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous

in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Museaus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment. And there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in that; I shall find out who is wise and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O Judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women, too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true."

The teachings which were instilled into the mind of Xenophon by his illustrious preceptor are set forth in the words which Xenophon puts in the mouth of Cyrus the Great when he is about to die. "I can never be persuaded," said the Persian monarch, "that the soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal body, and that it dies on its separation, for I see that the soul communicates vigor and motion to mortal bodies during its continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded that the soul is divested of intelligence on its separation from this gross senseless body. But it is possible that when the soul is separated, it becomes pure and entire, and then is more intelligent. It is evident that, on man's dissolution, every part of him returns to what is of the same nature with itself, except the soul. That

alone is invisible, both during its presence here, and at its departure."

Whoever would believe, in the resurrection of the dead, must walk by faith and not by sight. The solution of this riddle has baffled and continues to baffle scientific investigation. The latest utterance on the subject from a purely scientific standpoint is set forth in an address delivered by Sir Oliver Lodge, at Birmingham, England, before the most distinguished body of scientists in the world.¹

In the language of science the doctrine of immortality is embraced in the idea of continuity. "Occurrences now regarded as occult," said Sir Oliver, "can be examined and reduced to order by the methods of science, carefully and persistently applied. . . . Already the facts so examined have convinced me that memory and affection are not limited to that association with matter, by which alone they can manifest themselves here and now, and that personality persists beyond bodily death.

"The evidence, to my mind," he declared, "goes to prove that discarnate intelligence under certain conditions may interact with us on the material side . . . and we may hope to attain some understanding of the nature of a larger, perhaps ethereal existence, and of the conditions regulating intercourse across the chasm. . . . I cannot imagine the exertion of mechanical force across empty space, no matter how minute; a continuous medium seems to me essential. I cannot admit discontinuity in either space or time, nor can I imagine any sort of experiment which would justify such a hypothesis. For surely we must realize that we know nothing experimental of either space or time, we cannot modify them in any way."

¹ This most interesting contribution as to scientific research, was delivered September 10, 1913. The above extracts are from the report in the *New York Herald* of September 11, 1913.

He declares that it is impossible to account for all things by rules of applied science. Science cannot account for many things in the realm of metaphysics — in the dominion of the supernatural. "They account for things up to a point," he observed. "They account in part for the color of a sunset, for the majesty of a mountain peak, for the glory of animate existence. But do they account for everything completely? Do they account for our own feeling of joy and exaltation, for our sense of beauty, for the manifest beauty existing throughout nature? Do not these things suggest something higher and nobler and more joyous, something for the sake of which all the struggle for existence goes on?"

"Surely there must be a deeper meaning involved in natural objects. Orthodox explanations are only partial, though true as far as they go. When we examine each parti-colored pinnule in a peacock's tail, or hair in a zebra's hide, and realize that the varying shades on each are so placed as to contribute to the general design and pattern, it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain how this organized coöperation of parts, this harmonious distribution of pigment cells, has come about on merely mechanical principles.

"The mechanism whereby existence entrenches itself is manifest, or at least has been to a large extent discovered. Natural selection is a *vera causa*, so far as it goes; but if so much beauty is necessary for insects, what about the beauty of a landscape or of clouds? What utilitarian object do those observe? Beauty in general is not taken into account by science. Very well, that may be all right but it exists nevertheless. It is not my function to discuss it.

"No; but it is my function to remind you and myself that our studies do not exhaust the universe, and that if we dogmatize in a negative direction, and say that we can reduce everything to physics and chemis-

try, we gibbet ourselves as ludicrously narrow pedants, and are falling far short of the richness and fulness of our human birthright.

“But if we have learned from science that evolution is real, we have learned a great deal. I must not venture to philosophize, but certainly from the point of view of science evolution is a great reality. Surely evolution is not an illusion; surely the universe progresses in time. Time and space and matter are abstractions, but are none the less real; they are data given by experience, and time is the keystone of evolution. ‘Thy centuries follow each other, perfecting a small wildflower.’ . . .

“Either we are immortal beings or we are not. We may not know our destiny, but we must have a destiny of some sort. Those who make denials are just as likely to be wrong as those who make assertions; in fact, denials are assertions thrown into negative form. Scientific men are looked up to as authorities and should be careful not to mislead. Science may not be able to reveal human destiny, but it certainly should not obscure it. . . .

“We cannot really and seriously suppose that truth began to arrive on this planet a few centuries ago. The prescientific insight of genius — of poets and prophets and saints — was of supreme value, and the access of those inspired seers to the heart of the universe was profound. But the camp followers, the Scribes and Pharisees, by whatever name they may be called, had no such insight, only a vicious or foolish obstinacy; and the prophets of a new era were stoned.

“Now at last we of the new era have been victorious, we inherit the fruits of the age-long conflict and the stones are in our hands. Let us not fall into the old mistake of thinking that ours is the only way of exploring the multifarious depths of the universe and that all others are worthless and mistaken. The uni-

verse is a larger thing than we have any conception of, and no one method of search will exhaust its treasures.

"Men and brethren, we are trustees of the truth of the physical universe as scientifically explored. Let us be faithful to our trust.

"Genuine religion has its roots deep down in the heart of humanity and in the reality of things. It is not surprising that by our methods we fail to grasp it; the actions of the Deity make no appeal to any special sense, only a universal appeal, and our methods are, as we know, incompetent to detect complete uniformity. There is a principle of relativity here, and unless we encounter flaw or jar or change, nothing in us responds. We are deaf and blind therefore to the imminent grandeur around us unless we have insight enough to appreciate the whole, and to recognize in the woven fabric of existence flowing steadily from the loom in an infinite progress toward perfection, the ever-growing garment of a transcendent God."

But the continual advance in the domain of physical science is daily opening new vistas over new fields of discovery. Nature from time to time yields her secrets. But nature has no secrets with respect to the destiny of the human soul. Nothing has thus far been revealed by scientific research, which justifies the assumption, that an answer will be found to the inquiry, where are the dead. From remote antiquity we hear the positive declaration, there are no dead. The postulate of survival after death was taught for centuries in Egypt, in what is known as the doctrine of metempsychosis, which was introduced in Greece by Pythagoras, who declared that his soul inhabited the body of Euphorbus during the Trojan War, whose actions he claimed to have remembered. This belief assumes that the soul, at death, passes into other beings, not necessarily human, until after the lapse of centuries it is again re-incarnated in the body of man. Modern philosophy,

which is not satisfied to walk by faith, but seeks tangible evidence, has rejected the doctrine of the soul's migration through the bodies of animals.

The search for evidence has yielded to the scientist no tangible results, but speculative philosophy, while assuming that the soul is immortal, continues to press the inquiry, shall we carry with us into some other state of existence our conscious identity? In our day the speculative philosopher, Maurice Maeterlinck, while fascinated with the grand idea of immortality, loves to indulge in speculation as to our destiny in its new environment in another world. He assumes that there is no good reason to justify the belief, that in the other life, we should not advance, rather than retain the emotions and desires which we indulge in here during our mundane existence. In his recent book, "Our Eternity," he rejects the theory of annihilation. In this connection he observes: "If death carries us to nothingness, did birth then, draw us out of that same nothingness? Why should the second be more impossible than the first?" He assumes, therefore, that there are two eternities, that before birth, as well as that after death. There are three mysteries which the mind of man, unaided by divine revelation has never been able to solve. We know not whence we came, nor for what reason we are here, nor whither we go. If the soul of the individual has existed from all eternity, it is, in this life, unconscious of any prior existence, through which it may have passed, notwithstanding the testimony of Pythagoras who claimed that he remembered his conduct on the plains of Troy where his soul inhabited the body of Euphorbus, who fought with the hosts of Agamemnon.

New wonders also are being constantly revealed in the physical world. The philosophers and sages of antiquity never dreamed that scientific investigation would result in discoveries which when atmospheric con-

ditions are favorable, would enable one to practically listen to the ticking of a clock across the ocean 3,850 miles away. Wireless telegraphy was the latest wonder of the twentieth century. On the 21st day of November, 1913, for the first time in scientific annals by means of radio telegraphy, an expert operator in the naval observatory at the Arlington radio station at Washington, D. C., was able to compare the ticking of a clock with the ticking of another clock, in the national observatory at the Eiffel Tower station in Paris, France. The radio signals or aerograms were dispatched from America to Europe in the fraction of a second.

The object of this latest scientific achievement was to determine the difference in longitude on the earth's surface between the two places, and measure the velocity of projection of radio signals through space. The telegram and the cablegram made possible only by the intervention of wires and cables, have been superseded by the aerogram which darts through space with the velocity of light, surpassing the velocity of sound, and has rendered wires and cables no longer necessary.

Hertzian waves have been discovered. "With them," says Camille Flammarion, the distinguished French scientist, "disappears the complicated apparatus of wires, poles and cables. It was soon perceived that these marvelous waves, which are propagated in every direction, which traverse the thickest walls and surround us invisibly with a subtle reservoir of untranslated thoughts, can be easily held captive. The receiving apparatus is simplified to such an extent that to-day ingenious young fellows construct at very small expense delightful detectors, with which they receive surreptitiously the radio-telegraphic messages of the Eiffel Tower.

"This has even become an amusement in which many Parisians take part. One hears with curiosity the tick-

tacs, short or long, which are sounded in the little receiving apparatus and feels a strange emotion in thinking that at the same moment — or almost within a few hundredths of a second — this same ticking is heard in Washington, 62,000 kilometres (3,850 miles) from Paris; in the solitude of the seas by ships which voyage between the Old and the New Continent; and at immense distances in Europe and Africa. It is like a mysterious voice which whispers the same word across space and establishes a tacit accord between all those who hear it, unknown to each other."

In this connection it will be interesting to note the advance which has been made in the science of anatomy and physiology since the age of Pericles. Prior to the time of Aristotle, who was born nearly a century after Pericles, the human body was a locked body. With regard to the functions of the vital organs little was known. Scholars and philosophers knew nothing of the functions of the heart, with respect to its action in pumping the blood. It was obvious that the blood did not remain stagnant in the body, but the learned knew comparatively nothing more about it. Aristotle believed that the blood was generated by the food in the liver, and was thence carried to the heart, and from that organ was sent through the veins. As to the arteries, he supposed they only carried air. Galen, in the second century of our era, discovered that the arteries carried the blood, as well as vital air or spirit. But it was not till nearly the middle of the seventeenth century that William Harvey (1578-1657) discovered the manner in which the blood circulated in the body.

These observations are interesting, in view of the wonderful discoveries of the present century. Human ingenuity has invented an instrument whereby it is possible to look through opaque substances, and through the human body as if it were glass, and observe its internal mechanism in perfect harmonious action. X-ray

photography was the first means discovered to enable the scientist to look through living flesh. Radiography enabled the surgeon to photograph the vital organs; but to do this subjected the patient to exposure for such a length of time as to operate disastrously on the living tissues. An apparatus was discovered called a reinforcing screen, which greatly reduced the time required. Finally M. Dessauer invented a method, securing the desired results, without the reinforcing screen, by means of a Ruhmkorff coil, which enables the operator to photograph the internal organs of the body in a fraction of a second. "These photographs can be thrown upon a screen," says one of our distinguished scientists,¹ "and the time is at hand when we shall see upon a screen the entire internal mechanism of a human body in full action. Then physiology will be taught by sight, and not by books, and physicians themselves will learn things about these bodies of ours, of which, perhaps, they have never learned."

¹ Mr. Garrett P. Serviss, in the *New York American*, February, 1914.

THE END

INDEX

- Abraham, language of, 59;
driven from Ur of Chaldees,
66
- Achæan, line of heroes, 72
- Achilles, of Phthiotis, 79
- Achilles, shield of, 34, 37
- Acte, canal across, 312
- Actium, Battle of, 561, 616
- Adam, distinguished from pre-
historic man, 26
- Adimantus, insults Themisto-
cles, 353
- Æschylus, author of "The
Persians," 284; account of
Battle of Salamis, 366; con-
temporary of Herodotus, 275
- Agamemnon, reigned in My-
cenæ, 68
- Ahasuerus, referred to in Book
of Esther, 438
- Alcibiades advises Pericles,
618
- Alcmæonidæ, influence of, 143
- Alexander of Macedon, ap-
pears in disguise at Platæa,
406
- Alliances negotiated by Peri-
cles, 603
- Amestris, the wife of Xerxes,
439; cruelty of, 439
- Amompharetus at Platæa, con-
duct of, 411
- Amphictyonic Council, account
of, 104, *et seq.*; decree of,
against the Dolopians, 106
- Anatomy, Science of, 682
- Anaxagoras, teachings of, 592
- Antigone, tragedy of, by
Sophocles, 633
- Appella, assembly of, 94
- Archidamus invades Attica,
621
- Areopagus, Council of, 123;
jurisdiction of, 134
- Argos, remains of, 8
- Arguments as to credibility of
Herodotus, 275
- Aristides chosen commander at
Byzantium, 451; confers with
Themistocles at Salamis,
336; reply of, to Mardonius,
395; sketch of life, 464
- Aristodemus at Thermopylæ,
321
- Aristogoras of Miletus, 182
- Aristotle, theory as to circula-
tion of the blood, 682
- Army of Leonidas at Ther-
mopylæ, 316; of Xerxes, 263;
estimate of, 289; numerical
strength of, 274; review at
Doricus, 270
- Artabanus advises Xerxes,
249; points out danger of
his expedition, 259
- Artayctes in command of Per-
sians at Sestus, 441; cruci-
fixion of, 443
- Artemisia, advice of, to Xer-
xes, 351; at Battle of Sala-
mis, 366
- Aspasia courted by Pericles,
631; indicted for heresy,
625; correspondence with
Cleone, 636
- Astronomy in the time of
Abraham, 66
- Athenians aid Ionians, 196;
defeated at Coronea, 516;
defeat the Chalcidæans, 148;

- prepare to lead army of Xerxes, 301
- Athenian Empire, how acquired, 490; jurisprudence, 192
- Athens acquires a land empire, 501; becomes a great city, 548; burned by the Persians, 342; concludes an alliance with Corcyra, 569; oppresses her allies, 494; under Cimon becomes a maritime power, 476
- Atlantis, lost continent of, 20
- Attic tribes, names of, 152; tribes under Solon, 135
- Babylon, Euphrates deflected from its course, 312
- Bee Hive Tombs, 9
- Biblical and Homeric Literature, 45
- Boeotians defeat the Chalcidians, 148
- Byzantium taken by Pausanias, 445
- Callimachus at Marathon, 221
- Cavalry, absence of, at Marathon, 223
- Chalcideans defeated by Athenians, 148
- Chaldeans, knowledge of the constellations, 33; language of, 59
- Chronology, table of, 27, 29
- Cimmerians, destruction of, 168
- Cimon, achievements of, 476; at Cyprus, 533; chosen commander at Byzantium, 451; at the Eurymedon, 485; liable for debts of his father, 134; ostracism rescinded, 511; reduces Naxos, 483; reduces Thasos, 487; sketch of life of, 518; takes island of Scyros, 479; recovers remains of Theseus, 480; tried for his life, 527; reconciled to Pericles, 532; imprisoned for debt, 520; appointed admiral, 523
- Circulation of the blood discovered by Harvey, 682
- Cleomenes conspires with Isagoras, 147; declares he is not Dorian but Achæan, 82
- Cleon assails Pericles, 622
- Cleruchs, status of, 599
- Clisthenes, the elder, changes name of Dorian tribes, 81; hostility of, toward Argives, 81
- Clisthenes, constitution of, 140
- Constellations, known before time of Homer, 33
- Confederacy of Delos, 452; and *see* Delos, confederacy of
- Congress to provide means to oppose Xerxes, 302, 303
- Commanders of army of Xerxes, names of, 269
- Corcyra, appealed to for aid against Xerxes, 305; at war with Corinth, 556; seeks alliance with Athens, 563
- Corcyrain and Corinthian Wars, 615
- Correspondence of Aspasia with Cleone, 636
- Corinth, oldest sea power in Hellas, 557; opposes alliance of Corcyra with Athens, 566
- Constitution of Clisthenes, 140; of Solon, 122
- Corinthians defeated by Myronides, 505
- Coronea, Athenians defeated at, 516
- Creation, accounts of, 668
- Cretans, appealed to for aid against Xerxes, 305
- Ctesius, Persian historian, 275
- Cylon, affair of, 623
- Cyprus reduced by Pausanias, 445
- Cyrus the Great takes Baby-

- lon, 312; conquests in the East, 208; dominions of, 165; views on doctrine of immortality, 675
Cyrus the younger, 166
- Danaans of Heracleid line, 79
Danube, delta of, 176
Darius, annual income of, 167; first expedition off Mount Athos, 211; Scythian expedition, 172; threatens the Athenians, 187
Datis, forces of, at Marathon, 213
David, relations of, with Hiram, 47
Delos, Confederacy of, 452; an Athenian enterprise, 453; established B. C. 478; constituent members, 457; amount of annual assessments of members, 458; forms nucleus of Athenian Empire, 461; how regarded by Athens, 483; revenues of, 548
Delphi attacked by Persians, 339; miracle at, terrifies Persians, 341
Demaratus, colloquy of, with Xerxes, 271; consulted by Xerxes, 319
Descent, law of, at Athens, 132
Deucalion, story of, 12
Diarchy in Sparta, 71
Dikasts, jurisdiction of, 156
Diodorus assigns cause of Peloponnesian War, 618; praises Gelon, 380
Dionysius of Phocæa, 201, 203
Dolopians, decree of Amphictyonic Council as to, 106
Dorian Dialect, not confined to the Dorians, 80; tribes, 74; Dorian and Achæan in Peloponnesus, 77
Doricus, review of army of Xerxes at, 270
Draco, laws of, 125
Dress and costumes of army of Xerxes, 265
- Earth, knowledge of ancients concerning, 34
Earthquake destroys City of Sparta, 489
Eclipse of the sun alarms Xerxes, 256
Egyptians, learning of, 67
Elpinice, daughter of Miltiades, 241; influence of, with Pericles, 605; sister of Cimon, 134, 521
Ephialtes, statesman, assassination of, 600; traitor, aids Persians at Thermopylæ, 319
Ephors, Court of, 94
Eretria, destruction of, 215
Esther, reference to Ahasuerus in book of, 438
Eubœa, principal cities of, 2; revolts from Athens, 535
Eupatridæ, The, 127
Euripides born at Salamis, 369
Eurybiades bribed by Themistocles, 332; resolves to abandon the Athenians, 349; in command at Artemisium, 327
Eurymedon, battle of, 485
Evidence to sustain Herodotus, 278
Ezekiel pronounces doom of Tyre, 22
- Fauna in southern Europe, fifth century B. C., 310, 311
Flammarion, Camille, utility of Hertizian waves, 681
Funeral oration of Pericles, 661
- Gelon, at Himera, 377; strategy of, 379
Generals of army of Xerxes, 269

- Geography of Ancient Hellas, 1 *et seq.*
 Greece, early colonies of, 17
 Greek Myths, Symonds' views as to, 32; Greeks and Phœnicians, 49; commercial relations of, 60; strength of army at Doriscus, 270; at Plataea, 402
 Grote, criticises account of Herodotus as to army of Xerxes, 277
 Hamilcar at Himera, 375; sends Selinius for aid, 378; death of, 380
 Hebrew language, 58
 Hegesistratus appeals to Leotychnides, 427
 Hellas, geography of, 1; primitive inhabitants of, 6
 Hellenes, account of, 11
 Hellespont, crossing of army of Xerxes at, 261
 Helots, condition of, in Sparta, 88
 Heraclidæ, in Peloponnesus, 71; return of the, 76
 Hercules, birth of, 73
 Herodotus, critics of, 275; his description of first Suez Canal, 54
 Himera, Battle of, 374
 Hippas, abduction of, 144
 Hiram, friend of David and Solomon, 47
 Hirschof of Berlin, concerning the spectrum analysis, 190
 Histieus, preserves bridge on the Danube, 180, 191; treachery of, 199; fate of, 205
 Holy War, waged by the Dorians, 507
 Homer, the Iliad and the Odyssey of, 30, *et seq.*; Symonds' views on, 31; Wolf's Prolegomena, 32, 39; describes shield of Achilles, 34, 37; conception of the earth, 35; unity of, 39; theory of Dr. Bently, 43
 Hydarnes, at Thermopylae, 318, 319
 Hyllus invades Peloponnesus, 74
 Hipparchus, assassination of, 139
 Iliad of Homer, 30 *et seq.*
 Immortality, doctrine of, among the ancients, 670; as viewed by modern science, 667; views of Cyrus the Great as to, 675
 Immortals in army of Xerxes, 255
 Institutions of Lycurgus, 85 *et seq.*
 Inscriptions posted by Themistocles, 337
 Ionian Wars, 185
 Ionians, descent of, 78; revolt of, 191; urge confederacy of, after battle of Mycale, 431, 433
 Isagoras conspires with Cleomenes, 147
 Isthmian games, 119
 Job, reference of, to constellations, 61; describes the power of Jehovah, 63
 Jury system, under Clisthenes, 154
 Lacedæmon, in the age of Lycurgus, 89; Lacedæmonians prepare to meet army of Xerxes, 301
 Lade, battle of, 201
 Land, equality of distribution among the Spartans, 100
 Laws and institutions of Sparta, 85 *et seq.*
 Legitimacy, law of, in Athens, 633
 Leleges, account of, 10
 Leonidas, number of his army, 316; sent to Thermopylae, 315; defeat of, at Ther-

- mopylæ, 320
 Leotychides, sails to Samos and Mycale, 428; consents to accompany Xantippus to the Hellespont, 435; visits Abydos with Xantippus, 435; declines to aid at Siege of Sestus, 435
 Lesbos, seeks aid from Sparta, 499
 Lincoln, address of, at Gettysburg, 664
 Lions in southern Europe, 311
 Literature of the Bible and Homer, 45; in the time of Homer, 56
 Lodge, Sir Oliver, on continuity, doctrine of immortality, 676
 Love, poem of Sophocles describing power of, 631
 Lycurgus, age of, 69; ancestry of, 71; and Homer, 46, 47, 56; travels of, 92; form of government prior to, 93
 Macedonians send challenge to Pausanias, 409
 Man, antiquity of, 6
 Marathon, date of Battle of, 217; Battle of, 206
 Mardonius advises Xerxes at Salamis, 368; appeals to the Athenians, 393; retires to Bœotia, 397; speech of, to his allies, 412; death of, at Platæa, 417
 Marriage laws among Lacedæmonians, 98; and domestic relations, regulations of, 99
 Massisistius killed at Platæa, 400, 401
 Metempsychosis, doctrine of, 671
 Miletus, colonies of, 188
 Miltiades at the bridge on the Danube, 180; at Marathon, 220; expedition to Paros, 238; sketch of, 229; death of, 241
 Mnessiphilus confers with Themistocles at Salamis, 349
 Mount Athos, destruction of Persian Fleet at, 211
 Moabite Stone, 56, 57
 Money, use of, among the Spartans, 100
 Mortgages, how recorded in Athens, 128
 Moses, language of, 58
 Mount Ida, army of Xerxes at, 257
 Muster Roll of army of Xerxes, 278
 Mycale, Battle of, 425; fought on same day as Battle of Platæa, 429; results of the battle, 430
 Mycene, remains of, 8
 Myronides defeats Corinthians, 505
 Naval engagement at Artemisium, 334; naval forces of Xerxes, 267
 Navy composing army of Xerxes, 264
 Naxos taken by Cimon, 483
 Nemean Games, 117
 Odyssey of Homer, 30 *et seq.*
 Œnophyta, Battle of, 511
 Olympian Games, 118
 Ophir, gold from, 50; locality of, 51
 Ostracism under laws of Clisthenes, 157
 Ovid describes the creation, 670
 Pan-Hellenic Congress, proposal to establish, 614
 Panormus, troops of Hamilcar at, 376
 Patnos, member of Delian Confederacy, 457; book of revelations written at, 457
 Pausanias, at Platæa, 396; in command at Cyprus and

- Byzantium, 447; recalled at Byzantium, 451; treachery of, 451; number of army of, at Plataea, 402; sends message to Aristides at Plataea, 413; sought daughter of the Persian monarch in marriage, 456; vanity of, 422
- Pelasgi, account of, 7
- Peloponnesian War, causes of, 573, 608; responsibility of Pericles for, 617
- Peloponnesus, cities of, 31
- Pericles advocates war with Sparta, 581; bribes Pleistoanax, 540; conducts defense of Aspasia, 627; domestic troubles of, 632; commands in Samian War, 553; expedition in the Gulf of Corinth, 605; injustice of, 611; military exploits of, 513; peace of, 535; power and influence of, 503; quells revolts of Euboea, 539; reconciled to Cimon, 532; seeks to justify use of revenue of Delian Confederacy, 460; speech of, in his own defense, 622; survey of his career, 643; sued for an accounting, 639; death of, 641; sketch of life of, 588
- Periæci, condition of the, 88
- Persian fleet wrecked off Artemisium, 329; wrecked off "the Hollows," 335
- Pheidias accused of embezzlement, 619
- Phœnician alphabet, 56
- Phœnicians, retreat of, 319
- Phormo, victories of, 639
- Piracy regarded as honorable occupation, 106
- Pisistratidæ, administration of, 139
- Pisistratus, character of, 141
- Pithagoras, teachings of, 592
- Plague at Athens, 621, 622
- Plataea, battle of, 393; Persian spoils at, 421
- Plato states belief of Socrates as to immortality, 672
- Pleistoanax bribed by Pericles, 540, 608
- Plitdown skull, account of, 25
- Plutarch, views of, as to Pericles, 653
- Political parties in Athens, 127
- Polydectus, King of Sparta, 91
- Prehistoric Hellas, 6
- Priesthood, establishment of, 110
- Prophecies delivered at Delphi to Themistocles, 345
- Pyttalea, slaughter of Persians at, 467; account of by Æschylus, 468
- Pythian Games, 115
- Pythoress at Delphi, how consults the gods, 344
- Rawlinson, criticisms of Herodotus by, 277
- Reforms of Clisthenes, 151
- Religion amongst primitive peoples, 108; of Greeks, 104 *et seq.*
- Rhetra of Lycurgus, account of, 85 *et seq.*; not reduced to writing, 95
- Ruhmkorff Coil, used to photograph organs of the body, 683
- Salamis, battle of, 347; Straits of, blockaded by Xerxes, 359
- Samian War, 550; causes of, 628; expenses of, 555
- Sardis, burning of, 185, 197
- Scyllas, the diver, 333
- Scyros, decree against, 107; reduction of, 479
- Scythia and the Scyths, 161; expeditions against, account of, 172; preparations for, 166; habits of Scythians, 167
- Serpent of Delphi, account of, 422; in the hippodrome in Constantinople, 422

- Sestus, siege of, 431**
Shield of Achilles, 34
Sicilia, Gelon appeals to, for aid against Xerxes, 305
Sicinnus, sent to Persian fleet by Themistocles at Salamis, 357
Socrates' views as to immortality, 672
Solomon, treaty of, with Hiram, 47; marriage of, to daughter of Hiram, 60; writings of, 65
Solon, Laws and constitution of, 122
Soothsayer advises movements of troops at Plataea, 415
Sophocles elected Strategus by Pericles, 629; poem as to divine power of love, 631
Sparta destroyed by earthquake, 489; at enmity with Athens, 491; in the age of Lycurgus, 68, 87; declines to co-operate with Athenians, 451; suggests that Asiatic Greeks quit Ionia, 433; wars for possession of, 84; laws and institutions of, 84
Spies sent to ascertain movements of Xerxes, 304
States of Central Greece, 2
Struggle for body of Leonidas, 321
Suez Canal constructed by early kings of Egypt, 52; account of, by Herodotus, 55
Sybota, battle of, 570
Symonds, John A., views of, on Homer, 31; concerning Greek myths, 32
Tanagra, battle of, 509
Tarshish, locality of, 47, 50
Tearus, Springs of, 174
Tempe, Vale of, 4; abandoned by the Greeks, 307
Thales of Miletus, 189
Thasos, taken by Cimon, 487
Themistocles abandons Vale of Tempe, 317; active in opposing Xerxes, 302; bribes Adimantus, 332; entreats Eurybiades at Salamis, 353; in command at Artemisium, 327; interprets meaning of "Wooden Wall," 341; rebukes Adimantus, 355; sends Sicinnus to Xerxes, 357; sketch of life of, 382; outwits Lacedæmonians, 389; accorded honors at Sparta, 391
Theseus, inspiration of, at Marathon, 224; remains of, brought from Scyros, 481
Thermopylæ, battle of, 314
Thessalians unable to oppose army of Xerxes, 306
Thirty years' truce, 535, 609
Tiryns, remains of, 8
Tolmides, plunders coast of Peloponnesus, 512; killed at Coronea, 516, 607
Trachis, camp of Xerxes at, 313
Transmigration of souls, doctrine of, 671; described by Socrates, 672
Tribes of Attica, names of, 152
Twelve Tables, law of, 128
Tyre, doom of, pronounced by Ezekiel, 22
Ur, of the Chaldees, birthplace of Abraham, 59
Usher, Archbishop, table of chronology of, 27
War speech of Pericles, 617
Wolf, Prolegomena in Homerum by, 32, 39
Wooden Wall, prophecy as to, 431
Writing in the Homeric age, 40
Xantippus, besieges Sestus, 431; urges Spartans to go

- to Sestus, 434; and Leoty-
chides return to Samos, after
victory at Mycale, 431;
takes city of Sestus, 444
- Xenophon defends views of
Cyrus the Great on Immor-
tality, 675
- Xerxes prepares to invade
Greece, 223; speech of, at
Susa, 247; orders sham bat-
tle, 256; crosses the Helles-
pont, 261; estimate as to
strength of army, 289; forces
of, 263; at Mount Ida, 257;
leads his army in person,
310; review of army at Do-
riscus, 269; advances through
Thrace, Macedonia and Vale
of Tempe, 309; encamped
at Trachis, 313; blockades
the Straits of Salamis, 359;
intrigues of, 436
- Zeno, philosophy of, 590
- Zeus, power of, described, 62

